Loveless v. Grady County Sheriff's Department et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
CHRIS ELROY LOVELESS, 	)
)
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	Case No. CIV-24-00594-JD
)
GRADY COUNTY SHERIFF’S 	)
DEPARTMENT, et al., 	)
)
Defendants. 	)
ORDER
Before the Court is a Report and Recommendation (“R. & R.”) issued by United
States Magistrate Judge Amanda L. Maxfield. [Doc. No. 9]. Judge Maxfield recommends
that the Court dismiss Plaintiff Chris Elroy Loveless’s complaint [Doc. No. 1]. Mr.
Loveless filed a timely objection. [Doc. Nos. 10, 11]. Upon de novo review in accordance
with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3), the Court
accepts the Report and Recommendation as modified herein and dismisses the complaint.
I. 	BACKGROUND
At the time Mr. Loveless filed this pro se action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he was a
pretrial detainee at the Grady County Detention Center. Mr. Loveless has since pleaded
guilty to one count of trafficking in illegal drugs, two counts of possession of a controlled
dangerous substance with intent to distribute, and one count of intimidation of a witness.1
1 “[F]ederal courts, in appropriate circumstances, may take notice of proceedings
in other courts, both within and without the federal judicial system, if those proceedings
have a direct relation to matters at issue.” St. Louis Baptist Temple, Inc. v. Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp., 605 F.2d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 1979). Accordingly, the Court takes judicial
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Loveless’s complaint names the following defendants:
• 	The Grady County Sheriff’s Department (“Sheriff’s Department”);
• 	The Grady County District Attorney’s Office (“District Attorney’s Office”);
• 	The Grady County District Court Clerk (“Court Clerk”);
• 	Jeff Sifers,2 Grady County Assistant District Attorney, in his individual and
official capacities;
• 	Jim Peek, Grady County Sheriff’s Deputy, in his individual and official capacities;
and
• 	Jason M. Hicks, Grady County District Attorney, in his individual and official
capacities.
[Doc. No. 1 at 1, 3–4].3
notice of the dockets in Mr. Loveless’s state criminal proceedings in the District Court of
Grady County, Oklahoma. See State v. Loveless, Case No. CF-2022-00165, available at
https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=grady&number=CF-2022-
165 (last accessed Feb. 28, 2026); State v. Loveless, Case No. CF-2024-00089, available
at https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=grady&number=CF-2024-
89 (last accessed Feb. 28, 2026).
2 While it is spelled “Jeff Siefers” in some filings in this § 1983 action, see, e.g.,
[Doc. No. 1 at 3], the correct spelling is “Jeff Sifers” based on other § 1983 cases Mr.
Loveless has filed in this Court. See Loveless v. Sifers, et al., Case No. 24-cv-00696-JD
(dismissed on May 22, 2025, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Loveless v. Grady Cnty. Det.
Ctr., Case No. 24-cv-00879-JD (dismissed on May 30, 2025, under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A); Loveless v. Grady Cnty. Dist. Att’ys Off., Case No. 24-
cv-00992-JD (dismissed on May 22, 2025, under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and
1915A). Thus, the Court will use Sifers in this Order and directs the Clerk of Court to
correct the spelling of his name on the docket.
3 The Court uses CM/ECF page numbering from the top of docket filings in this
Order.
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Against the Sheriff’s Department and Defendant Peek, Loveless raises claims
under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, alleging that Defendant Peek
executed a “bogus” search warrant that resulted in an illegal search that deprived
Loveless of his due process rights. Id. at 6, 8, 10–11, 19, 24–25. Loveless also alleges
that Defendant Peek “feloniously created briefs incident reports fact reports after the
execution of the ‘forged bogus’ search warrant, suggesting and implying a person named
Morgan Lee Roberts contacted him,” even though Morgan Lee Roberts signed an
affidavit stating that she never spoke with Defendant Peek. Id. at 11. In addition,
Loveless raises a claim of false arrest against the Sheriff’s Department and Defendant
Peek, as well as an excessive force claim against the Sheriff’s Department. Id. at 12, 16.
Loveless brings claims against the District Attorney’s Office and “Attorney’s of
Record” under the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 8. Loveless alleges
that the District Attorney’s Office “intentionally, unlawfully, willingfully [sic],
wrongfully, and feloniously creat[ed] and design[ed] false and frivolous statements”
against him, which resulted in a malicious prosecution against him without probable
cause. Id. at 12, 18. Further, Loveless alleges, the District Attorney’s Office made
“extrajudicial comments that have substantial likelihood of heightening public
condemnation of the Plaintiff.” Id. at 13. Loveless also alleges that the District Attorney’s
Office violated the Eighth Amendment by revoking Loveless’s bail because he allegedly
violated a non-existent bail condition, and the District Attorney’s Office falsely arrested
Loveless when they charged him with intimidation of a witness. Id. at 14–15, 26.
Loveless claims that the District Attorney’s Office and Court Clerk violated the
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Eighth Amendment by “knowingly, willfully, and feloniously . . . using unreasonable
authority for false arrest, false imprisonment, intentional mental abuse, using and
threating [sic] with prison time, excessive bail, and stacking charges and bail revocation
condition violations that do not exist and can not be supported.” Id. at 26. Lastly,
Loveless brings against all defendants various state-law claims related to the same set of
facts giving rise to his federal claims. Id. at 18–23.
For relief, Loveless seeks $10 million in damages for his claims against Defendant
Peek and the Sheriff’s Department, and he requests either $28 or $18 million for his
claims against the District Attorney’s Office and Court Clerk. Id. at 8–9, 26, 29. The
complaint seeks only monetary damages; Loveless does not request any injunctive or
declaratory relief.
Judge Maxfield recommends dismissing Loveless’s complaint in its entirety.
R. & R. at 17. The R. & R. recommends dismissing the claim against the Sheriff’s Office
because it is not a suable “person” in a suit for damages under § 1983. Id. at 6–7. The
R. & R. recommends dismissing the claims against the Court Clerk because the
complaint fails to allege how she personally participated in any constitutional violation
and, alternatively, she is entitled to “derivative” judicial immunity for any judicial
functions. Id. at 8–9. The R. & R. recommends dismissing the claims against the District
Attorney’s Office because it enjoys the state’s sovereign immunity, and the R. & R.
recommends dismissing the claims against Defendants Sifers and Hicks in their
individual capacities because they have prosecutorial immunity and Loveless has failed
to state a claim against them. Id. at 9–11. As for Defendant Peek, Judge Maxfield
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recommends dismissing the claims against him in his individual and official capacities
because Loveless’s false arrest claim is barred by his guilty plea, his unreasonable search
claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), and the Court should decline
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims against him. Id.
at 12–16.
Loveless filed two timely objections. [Doc. Nos. 10, 11]. Loveless also filed
exhibits, see [Doc. No. 12], which are documents filed as part of the public record in his
two Grady County District Court criminal cases. Supra n.1. He also has recently updated
his address with the Court. [Doc. Nos. 13, 14, 15].
II. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
When a magistrate judge has entered a recommended disposition of a matter, the
Court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made,” and “may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the
magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). “[O]nly an objection that is sufficiently specific
to focus the district court’s attention on the factual and legal issues that are truly in
dispute will . . . . preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for
appellate review.” United States v. 2121 E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996).
“De novo review requires the district court to consider relevant evidence of record and
not merely review the magistrate judge’s recommendation.” In re Griego, 64 F.3d 580,
584 (10th Cir. 1995).
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Judge Maxfield recommends dismissal of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915A(a) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), which require dismissal of a civil action filed by a
prisoner who is proceeding in forma pauperis if the complaint fails to state a claim on
which relief may be granted. The same standard applies to dismissals under these
provisions as dismissals for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). Thus, the complaint “must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Under this standard, the Court
accepts the well-pleaded facts alleged as true and views them in the light most favorable
to the plaintiff. Peterson v. Grisham, 594 F.3d 723, 727 (10th Cir. 2010). “Threadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do
not suffice,” and the Court must “draw on its judicial experience and common sense” to
determine whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–
79.
Loveless is proceeding pro se, so his “pleadings are to be construed liberally and
held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hall v.
Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Nevertheless, “a pro se plaintiff requires
no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury, and he must
provide such facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out a claim on which
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relief can be granted.” Id. “[T]he court cannot take on the responsibility of serving as the
litigant’s attorney in constructing arguments and searching the record.” Garrett v. Selby
Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	The Sheriff’s Department and District Attorney’s Office are not
“persons” who can be sued for monetary damages under § 1983.
Mr. Loveless seeks monetary damages against the Sheriff’s Department, the
District Attorney’s Office, and Defendants Sifers and Hicks in their official capacities. In
his objection, Mr. Loveless argues that the Sheriff’s Department is a suable “person”
under § 1983 because it knew of previous misconduct by Defendant Peek and maintained
his employment anyway. [Doc. No. 10 at 8–12].
Section 1983 provides a federal cause of action against “every person who,” under
color of state law, “subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added).
Sheriff’s offices are governmental sub-units that are not suable “persons” under § 1983.
See Hinton v. Dennis, 362 F. App’x 904, 907 (10th Cir. 2010) (unpublished) (“Generally,
governmental sub-units are not separate suable entities that may be sued under § 1983.”);
Lindsey v. Thomson, 275 F. App’x 744, 747 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (“Plaintiff has
attempted to sue a number of entities . . . that are not legally suable entities, e.g., . . . the
Carter County Sheriff’s Department.”).
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Likewise, states and “entities that are considered ‘arms of the State’ for Eleventh
Amendment purposes” are not “persons” who are subject to suit under § 1983 for
monetary damages. Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70–71 (1989).
District attorney’s offices are considered arms of the state, so they are not “persons”
under § 1983. See Erikson v. Pawnee Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 263 F.3d 1151, 1153–
54 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[U]nder Oklahoma law, a district attorney is an arm of the
state . . . .”). Further, “a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a
suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” Will, 491 U.S. at
71. Accordingly, Loveless’s suit against Defendants Hicks and Sifers in their official
capacities operates as a suit against the District Attorney’s Office and, consequently, the
State of Oklahoma. The District Attorney’s Office and Defendants Hicks and Sifers in
their official capacities are not suable “persons” in § 1983 suits for monetary damages.
Therefore, Mr. Loveless’s claims against the Sheriff’s Office, the District
Attorney’s Office, and Defendants Sifers and Hicks in their official capacities are
dismissed with prejudice.4 See Tufaro v. Okla. ex rel. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla.,
4 The Court modifies the R. & R. to clarify that it is not dismissing the claim
against the District Attorney’s Office on grounds of immunity. The Supreme Court has
explained that “in deciphering congressional intent as to the scope of § 1983, the scope of
the Eleventh Amendment is a consideration,” but, ultimately, “the scope of the Eleventh
Amendment and the scope of § 1983 are . . . separate issues.” Will, 491 U.S. at 66–67.
The “statutory question [is] ‘logically antecedent to the existence of’ the Eleventh
Amendment question,” and “there is no realistic possibility that addressing the statutory
question will expand the Court’s power beyond the limits that the jurisdictional
restriction has imposed.” Vt. Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529
U.S. 765, 779 (2000). “This combination of logical priority and virtual coincidence of
scope makes it possible, and indeed appropriate, to decide the statutory issue first.” Id. at
779–80. With this guidance in mind, the Court dismisses the claim against the District
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107 F.4th 1121, 1135 (10th Cir. 2024) (affirming a district court’s dismissal with
prejudice on grounds that state defendants were not suable “persons” under § 1983);
Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1237, 1242 (10th Cir. 1999)
(same).5
B. 	Loveless has failed to state a claim against the Court Clerk.
Judge Maxfield recommends dismissing Mr. Loveless’s claims against the Court
Clerk because the complaint “fails to allege what specific actions taken by Defendant
Court Clerk violated his constitutional rights, instead broadly alleging that Defendant
Court Clerk has falsely imprisoned him, set excessive bail, threatened him with prison
time, and stacked charges against him.” R. & R. at 8. Mr. Loveless objects that the Court
Clerk personally participated in violating Loveless’s rights by following the instructions
of Defendant Sifers and “viewing private citizen information and then divulging
information to the District Attorney’s Office A.D.A.,” Jeff Sifers. [Doc. No. 10 at 14].
Attorney’s Office because it is not a suable “person” under § 1983; the Court need not
address the sovereign immunity issue. Accordingly, Loveless’s reliance on Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), which is an exception to states’ sovereign immunity, is
misplaced. See [Doc. No. 10 at 16–17].
5 See also Wolf v. N.M. Dep’t of Corr., No. 23-cv-1120-JCH-KBM, 2024 WL
2396852, at *2 (D.N.M. May 22, 2024) (dismissing the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against
New Mexico Department of Corrections “with prejudice” because the New Mexico
Department of Corrections was “not a person subject to suit under § 1983” (citation
modified)); Buchanan v. Oklahoma, No. CIV-09-744-D, 2010 WL 1448856, at *2 (W.D.
Okla. Apr. 8, 2010) (“Dismissal is with prejudice because a § 1983 claim applies only to
a person; the individuals sued in their official capacities and the State and its agencies are
not persons for purposes of § 1983 . . . .”), aff’d, 398 F. App’x 339, 341–42 (10th Cir.
2010) (unpublished) (affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims with
prejudice).
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When a plaintiff brings a § 1983 action against various government agencies and
state actors in their individual capacities, “it is particularly important . . . that the
complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each
individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her, as
distinguished from collective allegations against the state.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519
F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008). Thus, “it is incumbent upon a plaintiff to ‘identify
specific actions taken by particular defendants’ in order to make out a viable
§ 1983 . . . claim.” Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1226 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting
Tonkovich v. Kan. Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 532 (10th Cir. 1998)). The Court agrees
with the R. & R. that Loveless has failed to state a particularized claim for any
constitutional violation committed by the Court Clerk. Loveless’s objection does not
change this conclusion, as it is not clear how the Court Clerk violated Loveless’s rights
by reporting information to Defendant Sifers. Loveless alleges that the Court Clerk
violated Oklahoma’s “Court Clerk Act” [Doc. No. 10 at 15] (citing 21 Okla. Stat. § 345),
but a violation of state law does not give rise to a § 1983 action. Accordingly, the Court
dismisses Loveless’s claims against the Court Clerk without prejudice for failure to state
a claim. See Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1253–54 (reversing and remanding “with instructions
to DISMISS the complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim on which relief
can be granted”).
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C. 	Defendants Sifers and Hicks have prosecutorial immunity, and
Loveless has failed to state a claim based on functions for which
Defendants Sifers and Hicks are not immune.
Judge Maxfield recommends dismissing Loveless’s claims against Defendants
Sifers and Hicks in their individual capacities because they are immune from claims
arising from their functions that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the
criminal process,” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976), and Loveless has failed
to state a claim based on any other functions performed by Defendants Sifers and Hicks.
R. & R. at 10–12. Loveless objects that Defendants Sifers and Hicks are not entitled to
immunity because they “purposefully withheld exculpatory information willfully to get a
conviction and manipulate and provide emotional distress on Plaintiff.” [Doc. No. 10 at
18]. Loveless avers that “discovery will provide[] additional claims of false arrest,
malicious prosecution and conspiracy.” Id. at 22.
Prosecutors are entitled to absolute immunity from monetary damages for their
activities that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.”
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430. Such functions include prosecutors’ “decisions to prosecute,
their investigatory or evidence-gathering actions, their evaluation of evidence, their
determination of whether probable cause exists, and their determination of what
information to show the court.” Nielander v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 582 F.3d 1155, 1164
(10th Cir. 2009). Absolute prosecutorial immunity extends to a prosecutor’s “deliberate
withholding of exculpatory information.” Imbler, 424 U.S. at 431 n.34. But “the actions
of a prosecutor are not absolutely immune merely because they are performed by a
prosecutor.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993). When prosecutors make
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comments to the media, id. at 277, or act as a complaining witness, they are not entitled
to absolute immunity because they are not “performing the traditional functions of an
advocate,” Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 131 (1997).
Loveless alleges that Defendants Sifers and Hicks withheld exculpatory
information and decided to prosecute him without probable cause. These claims implicate
Defendants Sifers and Hicks’s traditional functions as advocates, so they are barred by
Defendants Sifers and Hicks’s absolute prosecutorial immunity. These claims—and any
others implicating Defendants Sifers and Hicks’s roles as advocates—are dismissed with
prejudice. See Glaser v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 557 F. App’x 689, 705–06 (10th Cir.
2014) (unpublished) (affirming dismissal with prejudice based on prosecutorial
immunity).
As for Loveless’s allegations that Defendants Sifers and Hicks made false
statements in furtherance of their malicious prosecution of Mr. Loveless and in support of
the motion to revoke Loveless’s bond, as well as Loveless’s allegations that they made
“extrajudicial comments that have substantial likelihood of heightening public
condemnation” of Mr. Loveless, the Court agrees with Judge Maxfield that absolute
prosecutorial immunity does not extend to such conduct. Nevertheless, the Court agrees
with the R. & R.’s conclusion that these allegations do not state a claim against
Defendants Hicks and Sifers. Loveless does not specify what statements Defendants
Sifers and Hicks allegedly made, nor does he allege how these specific statements
violated his constitutional rights. Without such allegations, it is not clear “who is alleged
to have done what to whom,” so Loveless has failed to state a claim on these grounds.
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Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1250. Although Loveless argues that discovery will uncover
additional factual allegations against these defendants, “a plaintiff armed with nothing
more than conclusions” may not “unlock the doors of discovery.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009); cf. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (“It is
no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible entitlement to relief can, if
groundless, be weeded out early in the discovery process . . . .”). Therefore, Loveless’s
claims arising from his allegations that Defendants Sifers and Hicks made false
statements and disparaging public comments are dismissed without prejudice for failure
to state a claim.
D. 	The Court dismisses all claims against Defendant Peek.
Regarding Loveless’s claims against Defendant Peek, Judge Maxfield
recommends dismissing the false arrest claim because it is barred by Loveless’s guilty
plea, dismissing the unreasonable search claim because it is Heck-barred, and declining to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.6 R. & R. at 12–
16. Loveless argues that he has withdrawn his guilty plea in all of the state proceedings
6 As Judge Maxfield notes, Loveless sues Defendant Peek in his individual and
official capacities, and the official capacity suit against him functions as a suit against
Grady County. See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55 (1978)
(“[O]fficial-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action
against an entity of which an officer is an agent . . . .”). “Proper analysis” of a § 1983
claim asserted against a county requires the Court to consider two separate issues: “(1)
whether plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation, and (2) if so, whether
the [local government entity] is responsible for that violation.” Collins v. City of Harker
Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). Because, for the reasons stated herein, Loveless fails
to state a claim for a constitutional violation, his suit fails against Defendant Peek in both
his individual and official capacities.
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against him and has filed an appeal challenging his guilty plea, so his false arrest claim is
not barred. [Doc. No. 10 at 2–4, 29]. As for the unlawful search claim, Loveless argues
that Defendant Peek violated the Fourth Amendment “when under color of state law [he]
illegally served search warrant at 0115 a.m., when he was aware search warrant would
not meet criteria of O.S. title 22 sections 1–4.” Id. at 9.
1. 	Loveless’s guilty plea bars his false arrest claim.
Loveless pleaded guilty in state court to charges of trafficking in illegal drugs,
possessing a controlled dangerous substance with intent to distribute, and intimidating a
witness. Supra n.1. Although Loveless filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea in both
of his cases, the state trial court overruled that motion, and his appeal has been rejected.
See Loveless v. State, Case No. C-2024-00827 (Okla. Crim. App.), available at
https://www.oscn.net/dockets/GetCaseInformation.aspx?db=appellate&number=C-2024-
827&cmid=138775 (last accessed Feb. 28, 2026) (summary opinion denying certiorari
and affirming district court’s ruling and judgment and sentence, along with issuance of
mandate on August 7, 2025). Applying Oklahoma law, the Tenth Circuit has held that a
guilty plea, which “‘admit[s] the validity of th[e] charges,’ . . . . and the consequent
adjudication of guilt thereon, estop the defendant from later disputing the validity of
those charges as a basis to deny the existence of probable cause for his arrest.” Jackson v.
Loftis, 189 F. App’x 775, 779 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (alterations in original)
(quoting Delong v. State ex rel. Okla. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 1998 OK CIV APP 32, ¶ 7,
956 P.2d 937, 939). Thus, a plaintiff cannot bring a § 1983 action alleging he was falsely
arrested on charges to which he pleaded guilty in state court. Id. at 779–80 (“Plaintiff
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cannot now challenge the existence of probable cause for, and hence the validity of, his
arrest on charges he conclusively admitted were valid.”). Because Loveless has pleaded
guilty to the charges against him, the Court agrees with the R. & R. that he cannot
challenge the validity of those charges, including the existence of probable cause to
support them, through a false arrest claim. Accordingly, Loveless’s false arrest claim
against Defendant Peek is dismissed without prejudice.
2. 	Loveless’s unreasonable search claim is Heck-barred.
“[W]hen a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit” and “a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence[,]”
then “the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the
conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.” Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,
487 (1994). Heck bars § 1983 claims for unlawful searches and seizures if the plaintiff
“could not have been convicted” without the evidence discovered during the allegedly
unlawful search. Garza v. Burnett, 672 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Without the
unlawfully seized evidence, it is abundantly clear that Garza could not have been
convicted, and thus a declaration that the search was unconstitutional would undermine
the convictions.”).
The Court agrees with Judge Maxfield’s conclusion that Loveless’s unlawful
search claim against Defendant Peek necessarily implies the invalidity of his conviction
for trafficking in illegal drugs and possessing a controlled dangerous substance with
intent to distribute. See R. & R. at 14–15. The evidence found during the allegedly
“bogus” search was integral to Loveless’s conviction, which prosecutors would not have
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obtained without the evidence discovered in the search Loveless now challenges.
Loveless’s convictions have not been invalidated. Therefore, Heck bars his Fourth
Amendment claim against Defendant Peek; the Court dismisses this claim without
prejudice. See Fottler v. United States, 73 F.3d 1064, 1065 (10th Cir. 1996) (“When a
§ 1983 claim is dismissed under Heck, the dismissal should be without prejudice.”).
3. 	The Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Loveless’s
state-law claims.
Loveless raises various claims under Oklahoma statutes and the Oklahoma
constitution. [Doc. No. 1 at 19–23]. The Court declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over these claims because the Court has dismissed all federal claims over
which it has original jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Smith v. City of Enid ex rel.
Enid City Comm’n, 149 F.3d 1151, 1156 (10th Cir. 1998) (“When all federal claims have
been dismissed, the court may, and usually should, decline to exercise jurisdiction over
any remaining state claims.”).
IV. 	CONCLUSION
The Court ACCEPTS the Report and Recommendation [Doc. No. 9] as modified
by this Order and DISMISSES Loveless’s complaint in its entirety. Loveless’s claims
against the Sheriff’s Office, the District Attorney’s Office, and Defendants Sifers and
Hicks in their official capacities are dismissed with prejudice, as are Loveless’s claims
against Defendants Sifers and Hicks in their individual capacities based on allegations
that they withheld exculpatory information and decided to prosecute Loveless without
probable cause. All other claims are dismissed without prejudice. A separate judgment
Case 5:24-cv-00594-JD Document 16 Filed 02/28/26 Page 16 of 17

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will follow.
IT IS SO ORDERED this 28th day of February 2026.
Case 5:24-cv-00594-JD Document 16 Filed 02/28/26 Page 17 of 17