The Bass Tank LLC v. MET Inc

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
THE BASS TANK LLC, an Oklahoma
Limited Liability Company,
Plaintiff,
v.
MET INC. D/B/A BASS BOAT
ELECTRONICS, a Tennessee Corporation,
Defendant.
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Case No. CIV-22-1086-D
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
On October 15, 2025, the Court conducted a bench trial of the issues presented for
decision in the Final Pretrial Report [Doc. No. 58]. Plaintiff The Bass Tank LLC, appeared
through attorneys Phillip L. Free and L. Matthew Dobson, and corporate representative
Robert Scott Palmer. Defendant MET Inc. d/b/a Bass Boat Electronics, a Tennessee
Corporation appeared through attorneys Wade Orr and Colby D. Karcher, and corporate
representative Jason Casell. Upon consideration of the evidence, the case record, and the
parties’ arguments, the Court finds and rules as follows.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. 	This action, brought pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(a) and 1125(d)(1),
concerns Defendant’s use of Plaintiff’s trademark in an internet domain name.
2. 	The claims are within the Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
1338, & 1367. [Doc. No. 58, at p. 3, ¶ 2].
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3. 	Plaintiff and Defendant are retailers in the marine electronics business and
consider each other to be direct competitors. [Doc. No. 68, at p. 33:8-14, 67:3-5, 77:21-
23].
4. 	Plaintiff operates under the trade name The Bass Tank, and Defendant
operates under the trade name Bass Boat Electronics. Id. at p. 15:23-16:3, 65:5-6.
5. 	Since 2019, Plaintiff has operated an online store hosted at the domain
“thebasstank.com” Id. at p. 26:22-28:17.
6. 	At all relevant times, Defendant operated its main online store hosted at the
domain “bassboatelectronics.com.” Id. at p. 65:22-24, 92:17-21.
7. 	Defendant became aware of Plaintiff as a business competitor around 2020.
Id. at p. 67:17-21.
8. 	Registration No. 6,057,441 was issued on May 19, 2020, and identifies
Plaintiff as the owner of a federal service mark registration for THE BASS TANK mark in
connection with “Retail store services featuring marine and sports-related electronics” and
“[o]n-line retail store services featuring marine and sports related electronics.” [Doc. No.
58, at p. 3, ¶ 3(B)].
9. 	In January 2022, Defendant entered into an agreement to purchase the
domain “basstank.com” (“Domain”) from a third-party seller, which provided that
Defendant would take ownership of the domain after making twelve monthly payments.
Id. at p. 4, ¶ 3(C), [Doc. No. 68, at p. 100:10-14]. In or about February 2022, Defendant
also sought to purchase a domain similar to the name of a different direct business
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competitor, Russell Marine Products, but was unsuccessful. [Doc. No. 68, at p. 99:20-
100:9].
10. 	The website hosted at the Domain mirrored the homepage of the website
hosted at the domain bassboatelectronics.com. Id. at p. 37:16-38:21, 88:23-89:7, see also
Plf.’s Ex. 9. When a user clicked anywhere on the Domain’s homepage, the user was
redirected to Defendant’s website at bassboatelectronics.com. Id. at p. 87:14-88:15.
11. 	Other than the terms “bass” and “tank” being incorporated into the Domain
name “basstank.com,” Defendant never displayed or otherwise used the phrase “bass tank”
on the websites hosted at bassboatelectronics.com, basstank.com, or elsewhere. [Doc. No.
58, at p. 4, ¶ 3(I)].
12. 	On or about December 14, 2022, Plaintiff discovered the Domain and
Defendant’s use of it. [Doc. No. 68, at p. 36:1-3].
13. 	On December 22, 2022, Plaintiff, for the first time, provided Defendant with
statutory notice that Plaintiff’s trademark was registered in compliance with 15 U.S.C. §
1111, when its counsel sent Defendant a cease-and-desist letter regarding Defendant’s use
of the Domain and pending lawsuit. [Doc. No. 58 at p. 4-5, ¶ 3(J),(K)], see also Def.’s Ex.
5.
14. 	On January 6, 2023, Defendant stopped using the Domain, and “parked” it.
[Doc. No. 58 at p. 4, ¶ 3(E)]; [Doc. No. 68, at p. 104:13-18].
15. 	Plaintiff filed suit, seeking damages for Defendant’s alleged trademark
infringement pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1114 and common law, unfair competition pursuant
to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) and common law, cyberpiracy pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d), and
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violation of the Oklahoma Deceptive Trade Practices Act pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 78, §
53, and seeking its attorneys’ fees and costs. Additionally, it sought an injunction enjoining
Defendant from using Plaintiff’s trademark. [Doc. No. 1].
16. 	The Court narrowed the issues on summary judgment. [Doc. No. 45]. The
Court ruled that the only damages Plaintiff may potentially recover at trial under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1117(a) are those damages incurred from December 22, 2022 to January 6, 2023
(“relevant time period”), because Plaintiff failed to provide the requisite statutory notice of
its trademark to Defendant until December 22, 2022. Moreover, the Court ruled that
Plaintiff may not recover Defendant’s profits as a remedy under the Oklahoma Deceptive
Trade Practices Act. [Doc. No. 45].
17. 	The parties further narrowed the triable issues, as Defendant stipulated that
it is liable to Plaintiff for its claims of trademark infringement and/or unfair competition
such that it is entitled to Defendant’s “profits” pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) for sales for
the relevant time period, less deductions for costs. [Doc. No. 58, at p. 5, ¶ 3(M)].
18. 	Defendant also stipulated that it is liable to Plaintiff for violation of 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(d), but retained all arguments with respect to minimizing the amount of statutory
damages to be awarded by the Court pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d). Id. at p. 5, ¶ 3(L).
19. 	Despite Defendant’s stipulated admissions of liability, Defendant did not
stipulate to any admission or inference that its actions were willful. Moreover, it did not
stipulate to any admission or inference that this matter constituted an “exceptional case”
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). Id. at p. 5, ¶ 3(N).
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20. 	Plaintiff stipulated that it was not seeking recovery of actual damages. Id. at
p. 5, ¶ 3(O).
21. 	Additionally, Defendant does not dispute the applicability of injunctive relief
and agreed to forfeit and transfer the Domain to Plaintiff. Id. at p. 7, ¶ 5(B)(ii)-(iii).
22. 	The evidence at trial showed Defendant’s gross online sales for the relevant
time period, were $7,308.03. [Doc. No. 68, at 93:20-94:15], See also Def.’s Ex. 10.
23. 	Although Mr. Casell testified that he did not purchase the Domain for the
purpose of redirecting potential customers from Plaintiff’s website to Defendant’s website,
but rather to avoid continuously paying Google AdWords to prioritize Defendant’s website
when particular words were searched, other testimony conflicted. [Doc. No. 68, at p. 73:16-
75:3, 77:24-78:19, 102:10-103:1]. Rather, the evidence at trial showed that Defendant
purchased the Domain because it was nearly identical to Plaintiff’s name and was using it
with the hopes that it would redirect customers to its primary website. Id. at p. 75:24-76:8,
76:20-22. Defendant also attempted to acquire a domain mimicking the name of another
competitor, Russell Marine Products, but was unsuccessful. Id. at p. 86:2-17.
24. 	Although Plaintiff testified that Defendant attempted to hide the Domain by
including the robots.txt file set to “no index” in the Domain’s source code, which prevented
the Domain from appearing in search engine results, Defendant’s evidence is more credible
on this point. Id. at p. 39:24-43:1, 98:3-99:7, 122:2-24, See also Plf.’s Ex. 12. Indeed, the
evidence at trial showed that Defendant did not attempt to hide or conceal its use of the
Domain. [Doc. No. 68, at p. 82:21-24, 98:3-99:7].
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25. 	Defendant did not attempt to sell the Domain to Plaintiff or a third party, and
stipulated that it will transfer the Domian to Plaintiff. [Doc. No. 58, at p. 4, ¶ 3(G); p. 7, ¶
5(B)(iii)].
26. 	The evidence at trial showed that Plaintiff is not aware of any specific
instances where it lost business because of Defendant’s use of the Domain. [Doc. No. 68,
at p. 57:18-20].
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
I. 	The Monetary Remedy for Defendant’s Trademark Violation Pursuant to
15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
“The Lanham Act explicitly prescribes the range of monetary remedies available to
a plaintiff who has successfully proven a trademark violation.” W. Diversified Serv., Inc. v.
Hyundai Motor America, Inc., 427 F.3d 1269, 1272 (10th Cir. 2005). The governing
statutory provision, 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a), provides in relevant part that:
[w]hen a violation of any right of the registrant of a mark...shall
have been established in any civil action arising under this
chapter, 	the 	plaintiff 	shall 	be 	entitled, 	... 	subject 	to 	the
principles of equity, to recover (1) defendant's profits, (2) any
damages sustained by the plaintiff, and (3) the costs of the
action. The court shall assess such profits and damages or
cause the same to be assessed under its direction. In assessing
profits the plaintiff shall be required to prove defendant’s sales
only; defendant must prove all elements of cost or deduction
claimed. . . . If the court shall find that the amount of the
recovery based on profits is either inadequate or excessive the
court may in its discretion enter judgment for such sum as the
court shall find to be just, according to the circumstances of the
case. Such sum . . . shall constitute compensation and not a
penalty.
15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
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The parties stipulated that Plaintiff is entitled to the profits from Defendant’s online
sales for the relevant time period. The parties agree that Defendant’s online sales for the
relevant time period totaled $7,308.03. However, Defendant argues that Plaintiff is not
entitled to §7,308.03, because that is its gross online sales and does not include its costs or
deductions.
Defendant has the burden to prove “all elements of cost or deduction claimed.”
Klein-Becker USA, LLC v. Englert, 711 F.3d 1153, 1163 (10th Cir. 2013) (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 1117(a)). Defendant failed to carry its burden to prove any cost or deductions to its online
sales for the relevant time period. Although Mr. Casell testified that Defendant’s profit
margins are generally twenty percent for online sales, Defendant failed to provide any
records evidencing its cost or deductions for the sales at issue. Thus, Mr. Casell’s testimony
regarding Defendant’s general profit margin is “a mere estimate and therefore unreliable.”
Vitamins Online, Inc. v. Heartwise, Inc., No. 2:13-cv-982-DAK, 2020 WL 6581050, at *
22 (D. Utah Nov. 10, 2020); see also Klein-Becker USA, LLC, 711 F.3d at 1163.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to $7,308.03, which constitutes
the disgorgement of Defendant’s profits from its online sales for the relevant time period.
Plaintiff also asserts that enhanced damages pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) are
warranted. Section 1117(a) provides, in relevant part, that “[i]f the court shall find that the
amount of the recovery based on profits is either inadequate or excessive the court may in
its discretion enter judgment for such sum as the court shall find to be just, according to
the circumstances of the case. Such sum . . . shall constitute compensation and not a
penalty.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
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Plaintiff asserts that recovering $7,308.03 under § 1117(a) is inadequate to fully
compensate it and to deter Defendant’s willful conduct. Plaintiff argues that an increase is
warranted, because its harm could not be fully ascertained as Defendant failed to track the
sales that originated from its use of the Domain. Although the evidence showed that
Defendant cannot with certainty identify which of its online sales during the relevant time
period originated from the Domain, the Court finds it inconsequential for its determination
because Plaintiff is to receive all of Defendant’s gross online sales for the relevant time
period, i.e. $7,308.03. Thus, an award in an amount greater than $7,308.03 would constitute
a penalty, which is prohibited by 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). Moreover, Plaintiff admitted that it
is not aware of any specific instances where it lost sales because of Defendant’s use of the
Domain. Therefore, an award of $7,308.03 is appropriate. Accordingly, the Court finds that
enhanced damages under 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) is not warranted.
II. 	The Statutory Relief Awarded for Defendant’s Violation of 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d) Pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d).
Defendant stipulated that it was liable to Plaintiff for its violation of 15 U.S.C. §
1125(d), but contests the amount of damages to be awarded. Plaintiff has elected “to
recover, instead of actual damages and profits, an award of statutory damages in an amount
of not less than $1,000 and not more than $100,000 per domain name, as the court considers
just” as its remedy for Defendant’s violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d). 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d).
“When a plaintiff seeks statutory damages, the court has wide discretion in
determining the amount of statutory damages to be awarded, constrained only by the
specified maxima and minima.” CrossFit, Inc. v. Jenkins, 69 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1101 (D.
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Colo. 2014) (quotation and citation omitted). “To determine a reasonable amount of
statutory damages, ‘courts generally consider a number of factors . . ., including the
egregiousness or willfulness of the defendant’s cybersquatting, the defendant’s use of false
contact information to conceal its infringing activities, the defendant’s status as a serial
cybersquatter . . . and other behavior by the defendant evidencing an attitude of contempt
towards the court of the proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Wecosign, Inc. v. IFG Holdings, Inc.,
845 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1086 (C.D. Cal. 2012)). The purpose for the “statutory damages
provision is not merely to compensate a plaintiff for its injury, but also to discourage
wrongful conduct by the defendant.” Id. 	(citing St. Luke’s Cataract and Laser Institute,
P.A. v. Sanderson, 573 F.3d 1186, 1206 (11th Cir. 2009)).
Of 	the 	factors, 	“‘the 	defendant’s 	intent 	and 	behavior 	are 	the 	foremost
consideration’” in determining the statutory damages. Id. (quoting Original Appalachian
Artworks, Inc. v. J.F. Reichert, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 458, 465 (E.D. Pa. 1987)). A finding of
willfulness “typically requires an intent to appropriate the goodwill of another’s mark.” W.
Diversified Servs., Inc., 427 F.3d at 1270. “[I]ntent . . . requires something more than
‘indifference’ or a ‘mere connection.’” Id. at 1274. Rather, intent requires “a conscious
desire.” Id. “‘The quintessential example of bad faith intent to profit is when a defendant
purchases a domain name very similar to the trademark and then offers to sell the name to
the trademark owner at an extortionate price.’” CrossFit, Inc., 69 F. Supp. 3d at 1103
(quoting Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & Research, 527 F.3d
1045, 1058 (10th Cir. 2008)).
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Here, 	Plaintiff 	requests 	the 	Court 	award 	it 	$100,000.00 	for 	Defendant’s
cybersquatting, and Defendant argues that the Court should award an amount closer to
$1,000.00. In considering the nature and seriousness of Defendant’s cybersquatting the
evidence at trial showed that Defendant knew Plaintiff was its direct competitor prior to
obtaining the Domain, and also tried to purchase another domain similar to a different
competitor’s name. Additionally, the evidence showed that Defendant obtained the Domain
with the hopes that it would increase and redirect potential customers to its primary website
rather than Plaintiff’s website. Thus, Defendant’s cybersquatting was willful as it intended
to appropriate the goodwill of Plaintiff’s mark.
However, on the other hand, the evidence at trial showed that Plaintiff has no
evidence that it provided statutory notice that its mark was registered in compliance with
15 U.S.C. § 1111 prior to filing this lawsuit. Further, the homepage hosted at the Domain
was a replica of Defendant’s homepage and did not contain any trademark infringing
material, and Defendant stopped using the Domain within a relatively short period of time
upon receipt of Plaintiff’s cease and desist letter. Additionally, the evidence at trial showed
that Defendant did not attempt to sell the Domain to Plaintiff. Rather, Defendant has agreed
to transfer the Domain to Plaintiff. Finally, Defendant did not contest liability.
Accordingly, in fully weighing and considering the evidence and circumstances,
including the importance of not only compensating Plaintiff, but also discouraging
wrongful conduct, the Court finds that Plaintiff is entitled to an award of $40,000.00
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d).
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III. 	A Permanent Injunction and Defendant’s Transfer of the Domain to
Plaintiff.
Plaintiff requests the Court enter a permanent injunction pursuant to 15 U.S.C. §
1116(a), “enjoining Defendant, its officers, agents, servants, employees, successors and
assigns, and all persons acting in concert with [Defendant], from using Plaintiff’s THE
BASS TANK mark or any confusingly similar variations, including the domain name
basstank.com, and from engaging in any other conduct likely to cause confusion as to
affiliation, connection, or sponsorship between Defendant and Plaintiff.” [Doc. No. 72, at
p. 12, ¶ 24]. Defendant does not take issue with Plaintiff’s request for a permanent
injunction.
Accordingly, the Court will issue a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant, its
officers, agents, servants, employees, successors and assigns, and all persons acting in
concert with Defendant, from using Plaintiff’s THE BASS TANK mark or any confusingly
similar variations, including the Domain, and from engaging in any other conduct likely to
cause confusion as to affiliation, connection, or sponsorship between Defendant and
Plaintiff.
Moreover, Plaintiff requests the Court order Defendant to transfer the Domain to
Plaintiff pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(C). Defendant does not contest Plaintiff’s
request and agrees to transfer the Domain to Plaintiff. [Doc. No. 58, at p. 7, ¶ 5(B)(iii)].
Accordingly, within fourteen days after entry of judgment in this matter, Defendant shall
transfer the Domain to Plaintiff.
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IV. 	Plaintiff’s Attorneys’ Fees and Costs
Finally, Plaintiff requests attorneys’ fees and costs under 15 U.S.C § 1117(a).
Section 1117(a) establishes that, when Section 1125(d) has been violated, a plaintiff is
entitled to costs and, in exceptional cases, attorneys’ fees. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
“The 	prevailing 	party 	has 	the 	burden 	of 	demonstrating 	exceptionality 	by 	a
preponderance of the evidence.” Aftwear, Inc. v. Mast-Jaegermeister US, Inc., No. 22-
4020, 2023 WL 8232072, at *2 (10th Cir. Nov. 28, 2023) (citing Octane Fitness, LLC v.
ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 572 U.S. 545, 557 (2014)). “District courts have broad
discretion to decide whether a case is exceptional under the totality of the circumstances.”
Id. Indeed, “[e]ven when a court deems a case exceptional it has discretion to decide
whether the case is sufficiently exceptional to warrant a fee award.” Id. (citing Nat’l Ass’n
of Pro. Basketball Leagues, Inc. v. Very Minor Leagues, Inc., 223 F.3d 1143, 1146 (10th
Cir. 2000)).
“There is no ‘precise rule or formula for making’ exceptional-case determinations.”
Id. (quoting Octane Fitness, LLC, 572 U.S. at 554). “‘[A]n exceptional case is simply one
that stands out from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s litigating
position (considering both the governing law and facts of the case) or the unreasonable
manner in which the case was litigated.’” Derma Pen, LLC v. 4EverYoung Ltd., 999 F.3d
1240, 1245 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting Octane Fitness, LLC, 572 U.S. at 554). In determining
whether a case is exceptional courts consider the “totality of the circumstances.” Id. at 1246
(quoting Octane Fitness, LLC, 572 U.S. at 554). Relevant factors to consider “include
frivolousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the factual and legal
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components of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to advance considerations
of compensation and deterrence” and “lack of foundation, [a party’s] bad faith, and
unusually vexatious and oppressive litigation practices.” Id. (quotations and citations
omitted).
Here, considering the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that this is not
an exceptional case such that an award of attorneys’ fees is warranted. Although Defendant
willfully infringed on Plaintiff’s mark, the other factors weigh against a finding of
exceptionality. Indeed, Defendant stopped using the domain relatively soon after receiving
Plaintiff’s cease and desist letter. Moreover, Plaintiff is not aware of any specific instances
where it lost business because of Defendant’s use of the Domain. Further, there is no
evidence indicating Defendant engaged in vexatious or oppressive litigation practices,
rather, it admitted liability. And, Defendant’s defense of this matter was not meritless, as
the Court granted in part Defendant’s motion for partial summary judgment [Doc. No. 45],
and, as reflected in this Order, maximum statutory damages were not awarded to Plaintiff.
Accordingly, in fully weighing and considering the evidence and circumstances, the
Court finds Plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
As to costs, the Lanham Act provides that a successful plaintiff “shall be entitled”
to recover “the costs of the action.” 15 U.S.C § 1117(a). “The costs of the action” is not
defined, but “courts have generally interpreted recoverable costs to be limited to those costs
enumerated in 28 U.S.C. § 1920.” BEPS Servs., LLC v. Blue Escape Pools, LLC, 4:23-CV-
975-SDJ, 2025 WL 2713722, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2025) (citation omitted).
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Accordingly, Plaintiff may submit a bill of costs in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §
1920 within thirty days after entry of judgment in this matter.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes as follows1:
1. 	Plaintiff is entitled to an award of $7,308.03 for Defendant’s trademark
violation pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
2. 	Plaintiff is entitled to an award of $40,000.00 in statutory damages for
Defendant’s violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(d).
3. 	The Court will enter a permanent injunction enjoining Defendant, its officers,
agents, servants, employees, successors and assigns, and all persons acting in concert with
Defendant, from using Plaintiff’s THE BASS TANK mark or any confusingly similar
variations, including the Domain, and from engaging in any other conduct likely to cause
confusion as to affiliation, connection, or sponsorship between Defendant and Plaintiff.
4. 	The Court orders Defendant to transfer the Domain to Plaintiff within
fourteen days after entry of judgment.
5. 	Plaintiff is not entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a).
6. 	Plaintiff may submit a bill of costs no later than thirty days after entry of
judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1920.
1 Although Plaintiff included in the Final Pretrial Report that it was also seeking “monetary
damages 	under 	Oklahoma 	law 	for 	unfair 	competition, 	common 	law 	trademark
infringement, passing off and violation of the Oklahoma Deceptive Trade Practices Act,”
Plaintiff did not address these claims at trial or in any of its subsequent filings. Compare
[Doc. No. 58, at p. 6, ¶ 5(A)(iii)] with [Doc. Nos. 68, 70, 72]. Accordingly, the Court
construes that Plaintiff has abandoned these claims.
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IT IS SO ORDERED this 16 th day of January, 2026.
TIMOTHY D. DeGIUSTI
Chief United States District Judge
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