Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
DONNA H.,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
Civil Action 3:25-cv-77
Judge Michael J. Newman
Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Donna H. (“Plaintiff”), brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for review of
a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her
application for Supplemental Security Income benefits (“SSI”). This matter is before the
undersigned for a Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (ECF No. 12),
the Commissioner’s Memorandum in Opposition (ECF No. 15), and the administrative record
(ECF No. 7). For the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Statement of
Errors be OVERRULED and that the Commissioner’s decision be AFFIRMED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed her SSI application in July 2022, alleging that she became disabled
beginning August 15, 2020. (R. at 214–220.) After Plaintiff’s application was denied initially
and upon reconsideration, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a telephonic hearing on
October 25, 2023, at which Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, appeared and testified. A
vocational expert (“VE”) also appeared and testified. On March 13, 2024, the ALJ issued an
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unfavorable determination, which became final on February 18, 2025, when the Appeals Council
declined review. (R. at 10–23, 1–6.)
Plaintiff seeks judicial review of that unfavorable determination. She contends that the
ALJ reversibly erred by failing to adequately develop the record about her mental health limits
and when evaluating prior administrative findings about her mental and physical impairments.
(Pl.’s Statement of Errors 4–6, 6–8, ECF No. 12.)
II. 	THE ALJ’S DECISION
The ALJ issued the unfavorable determination on March 13, 2024. (R. at 10–23.) At step
one of the sequential evaluation process,1 the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since her July 11, 2022 application date. (Id. at 12.) At step two, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff had the following severe medically determinable impairments:
1 Social Security Regulations require ALJs to resolve a disability claim through a five-step
sequential evaluation of the evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4). Although a dispositive
finding at any step terminates the ALJ’s review, see Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th
Cir. 2007), if fully considered, the sequential review considers and answers five questions:
1. Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity?
2. Does the claimant suffer from one or more severe impairments?
3. Do the claimant’s severe impairments, alone or in combination, meet or equal the
criteria of an impairment set forth in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments, 20
C.F.R. Subpart P, Appendix 1?
4. Considering the claimant’s residual functional capacity, can the claimant perform his
or her past relevant work?
5. Considering the claimant’s age, education, past work experience, and residual
functional capacity, can the claimant perform other work available in the national
economy?
See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4); see also Henley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 264 (6th Cir.
2009); Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2001).
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arthropathies; degenerative joint disease; carpal tunnel syndrome; migraines; hypertension; and
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). (Id.) At step three, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not
have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the
listed impairments described in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id. at 13.)
The ALJ then set forth Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”)2 as follows:
After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that the claimant has the
residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(b)
with the following: I find that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to
lift and/or carry up to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently. She is able
to stand and/or walk for a total of about 6 out of 8 hours. She is able to sit for a total
of about 6 out of 8 hours. The claimant can occasionally climb ramps and stairs,
and she can occasionally stoop, balance and crouch, but she can never kneel, crawl,
or climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds. She can reach overhead or to the side no more
than occasionally. The claimant can perform fine and gross manipulation frequently
but not constantly. She is not capable of working where she would be exposed to
excessive noise or bright, flashing lights exceeding levels generally encountered in
office-type work environments. The claimant should avoid concentrated exposure
to pulmonary irritants such as fumes, odors, dusts, gases, and poor ventilation. The
claimant is limited to working in non-hazardous environments, i.e., no driving at
work, operating moving machinery, working at unprotected heights, and she should
avoid concentrated exposure to unguarded hazardous machinery. The claimant can
understand, remember and carry out simple instructions. The claimant can use
judgment to make simple work-related decisions. The claimant can tolerate
occasional interactions with supervisors and coworkers. The claimant can tolerate
no interactions with the general public. The claimant cannot perform work
requiring a specific production rate such as assembly line work, but can tolerate
end of day quotas. The claimant can deal with occasional changes in a routine work
setting.
(Id. at 16.)
At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. (Id. at 22.)
Relying on the VE’s testimony, at step five, the ALJ determined that considering her age,
education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the
2 A claimant’s RFC is an assessment of “the most [she] can still do despite [her] limitations” “on
a regular and continuing basis.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(1), (b)–(c).
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national economy that Plaintiff could perform including the representative jobs of office helper,
mail clerk, and router. (Id. at 23.) Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not
disabled as defined in the Social Security Act during the relevant time frame. (Id.)
III. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a case under the Social Security Act, the Court “must affirm a decision
by the Commissioner as long as it is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to
proper legal standards.” DeLong v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 748 F.3d 723, 726 (6th Cir. 2014)
(cleaned up); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security
as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). While this
standard “requires more than a mere scintilla of evidence, substantial evidence means only such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Moats
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 42 F.4th 558, 561 (6th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up) (quoting Biestek v.
Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019)).
Although the substantial evidence standard is deferential, it is not trivial. The Court must
“examine[ ] the record as a whole and take[ ] into account whatever in the record fairly detracts
from the weight” of the Commissioner’s decision. Golden Living Ctr.-Frankfort v. Sec’y Of
Health And Hum. Servs., 656 F.3d 421, 425 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Universal Camera Corp. v.
NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951)).
Nevertheless, where “substantial evidence supports the Secretary’s determination, it is
conclusive, even if substantial evidence also supports the opposite conclusion.” Emard v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 953 F.3d 844, 849 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Crum v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 642,
644 (6th Cir. 1990)). Finally, even if the ALJ’s decision meets the substantial evidence standard,
“a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own
regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a
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substantial right.” Rabbers v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007)).
IV. 	ANALYSIS
As explained above, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ committed reversible error by failing
to adequately develop the record about her mental health issues and when evaluating prior
administrative findings about her mental and physical impairments. (Pl.’s Statement of Errors 4–
6, 6–8, ECF No. 12.) The undersigned considers each contention in turn and concludes that they
both lack merit.
A. 	Failure to Develop the Record About Plaintiff’s Mental Health Impairments
Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ reversibly erred by failing to adequately develop the
record of her mental health impairments. (Pl.’s Statement of Errors 4–6, ECF No. 12.) This
contention lacks merit.
A plaintiff bears the burden of proving the existence and severity of limitations caused by
her impairments. Cruse v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 502 F.3d 532, 545 (6th Cir. 2007). But an ALJ
bears the burden of developing the administrative record upon which a disability determination
rests. Lashley v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 708 F.2d 1048, 1051–52 (6th Cir. 1983). An
ALJ has a duty to develop the record because “[s]ocial security proceedings—unlike judicial
ones—are inquisitorial, not adversarial.” Chester v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 11-1535, 2013 WL
1122571, at *8 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 25, 2013); see also, Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 110-11
(2000) (“Social Security proceedings are inquisitorial rather than adversarial. It is the ALJ’s duty
to investigate facts and develop the arguments both for and against granting benefits.”).
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An ALJ is not required to base his RFC determination on a medical opinion.3 Mokbel-
Aljani v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 732 F. App’x 395, 401 (6th Cir. 2018) (“We have previously
rejected the argument that a [RFC] determination cannot be supported by substantial evidence
unless a physician offers an opinion consistent with that of the ALJ.”). See also Rudd v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 531 F. App’x 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2013) (explaining that requiring an ALJ to base an
RFC determination on medical opinions would transfer the statutory responsibility to determine
if an individual is under a disability from an ALJ to a medical source). Nor does an ALJ err by
relying on medical opinions from physicians who have reviewed an incomplete record if the ALJ
considers later evidence and adequately accounts for changes in a claimant’s conditions.
McGrew v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 343 F. App’x 26, 32 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding no error where an
ALJ relied on opinions from state agency reviewers where the ALJ considered later evidence and
accounted for relevant changes in the plaintiff’s condition).
Even so, pursuant to the so-called Deskin rule, an ALJ must obtain opinion evidence to
satisfy the duty to develop the record in at least two circumstances. See Deskin v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 605 F. Supp. 2d 908 (N.D. Ohio 2008). One circumstance arises when an ALJ is required to
make medical judgments about a claimant’s functional abilities by interpreting raw medical data.
Gonzalez v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 3:21-cv-000093-CEH, 2022 WL 824145, at *8 (N.D. Ohio
Mar. 18, 2022) (citing Alexander v. Kijakazi, No. 1:20-cv-01549, 2021 WL 4459700, at *9 (N.D.
Ohio Sept. 29, 2021) (“Courts are generally unqualified to interpret raw medical data and make
medical judgments concerning limitations that may reasonably be expected to accompany such
3 State agency reviewers’ functional assessments are now referred to as “prior administrative
findings” rather than “medical opinions.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a)(1)–(5), 416.913(a)(1)–(5).
Given prior case law, developed when the term “medical opinion” included opinions from
medical sources and functional assessments from state agency reviewers, the undersigned
sometimes uses both terms interchangeably for ease of reference.
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data.”) and Mascaro v. Colvin, No. 1:16CV0436, 2016 WL 7383796, at *11 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 1,
2016) (noting neither the ALJ nor the court had the medical expertise to conclude whether the
results of a neurological exam necessarily ruled out the existence of a disabling condition)),
adopt and aff’d, 2016 WL 7368676 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 20, 2016). This circumstance can arise
when the record lacks any medical opinion evidence. See Gonzalez, 2022 WL 824145, at *7
(citing Kizys v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:10 CV 25, 2011 WL 5024866 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 21,
2011)).
Second, a medical opinion must also be obtained when “a ‘critical body’ of the ‘objective
medical evidence’ is not accounted for by a medical opinion and there is significant evidence of
potentially disabling conditions.” Gonzalez, 2022 WL 824145, at *8 (quoting McCauley v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:20-cv-13069, 2021 WL 5871527, at *14–15 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 17,
2021) (cleaned up)). In such circumstances, an ALJ should obtain opinion evidence that accounts
for the entirety of the relevant period. Id. That obligation exists unless the medical evidence
shows “relatively little physical impairment” and an ALJ “can render a commonsense judgment
about functional capacity.” Kizys, 2011 WL 5024866, at *2 (quoting Deskin, 605 F.Supp.2d at
912 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (cleaned up)).
Neither circumstance is present here. First, this is not a case where the record lacks
medical opinions or prior administrative findings from state agency reviewers. Although Plaintiff
never alleged disabling mental health impairments, when her file was reviewed for physical
impairments in November 2022, it was noted that the records suggested that she had a history of
anxiety and depression. (R. at 262, 82.) Plaintiff’s authorized representative was also noted to be
nonresponsive, and therefore, a medical determination could not be made at that time. (Id. at 82.)
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During the April 2023 reconsideration, however, Plaintiff’s representative made it known
that Plaintiff had not received any mental health treatment until she began treating with Omni
Wellness Group (“Omni”) in January 2023, and that she had been treating there twice a week
since. (Id. at 93, 92.) The state-agency reconsideration reviewer summarized Plaintiff’s January
and February 2023 treatment records from Omni before finding that Plaintiff had only mild
limits in the paragraph B criteria. (Id. at 93.) The reviewer also wrote as follows:
Conclusion: while [plaintiff] did not formally allege mental impairments in [her
disability benefit applications], she has intermittently reported mood/anxiety
[symptoms] to various non-psych providers but with no ongoing psych treatments
until recently when she sought outpatient psych [treatment] for ptsd, mood, anxiety
[symptoms]. Her [mental status examinations] have been benign as detailed above.
The [medical evidence of record] does not document any acute or gradual psych
decompensations despite lack of consistent treatment. Current [mental status
examination] was entirely benign. Her [activities of daily living] have a good range
and she cares for her children and grandchildren, cooks, does some [household]
chores, drives, shops, manages finances. It is expected that with [plaintiff] now
pursuing 	treatment, 	her 	psychiatric 	[symptoms] 	would 	become 	even 	better
attenuated with a stable course.
(Id. at 93–94.)
The ALJ considered those findings and determined that they were only partly persuasive.
(Id. at 20.) That does not, however, trigger first Deskin circumstance. “[A] case where an ALJ
finds a prior administrative finding to be only partially persuasive is distinct from one in which
no prior administrative finding exists in the record.” Chelsea R. M. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
2:24-CV-499, 2025 WL 758158, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 11, 2025) (citing Brewer v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., No. 2:24-cv-499, 2025 WL 758158, at *13 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 12, 2024) adopted and
aff’d, 2024 WL 1676856 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 18, 2024))). Moreover, and as explained below, the
ALJ’s determination was more favorable to Plaintiff. The reviewer found only mild impairments,
but the ALJ discounted that finding and determined that Plaintiff had moderate impairments that
resulted in limits that he included in her RFC.
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Second, the undersigned is not persuaded that the record contains a critical body of
evidence that was unaccounted for by a medical opinion, coupled with significant proof of
potentially disabling conditions. Plaintiff correctly notes that additional evidence was added to
the record after the state agency reviewer’s April 2023 findings. Specifically, at the October
2024, hearing, the ALJ held the record open for Plaintiff to submit additional evidence. (R. at
41–42.) But no new evidence from Omni, or any other mental health treatment provider was
submitted. Instead, additional documents from Plaintiff’s physical treatments at Miami Valley
Hospital were submitted. (Id. at 1978–2050.) Plaintiff does not, however, identify any crucial
information about her mental health conditions in these newer records or show that they contain
significant details demonstrating potentially disabling conditions. Nor has the undersigned
independently identified any such information in those documents.
In short, Deskin describes two narrow circumstances where the record may establish that
an ALJ has a duty to further develop the record. Neither are present here—the record contained
prior administrative findings, and Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that a critical body of
objective medical evidence was unaccounted for by them. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s first
contention of error is not well taken.
B. 	The ALJ’s Evaluation of Prior Administrative Findings
Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ reversibly erred when evaluating the state agency
reviewers’ prior administrative findings about her mental and physical impairment. This
contention also lacks merit.
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An ALJ’s RFC determination must be “based on all the relevant evidence” in a
claimant’s case record. §§ 404.1545(a)(1); 416.945(a)(1). The governing regulations4 describe
five categories of evidence: (1) objective medical evidence, (2) medical opinions, (3) other
medical evidence, (4) evidence from nonmedical sources, and (5) prior administrative medical
findings. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(a)(1)–(5); 416.913(a)(1)–(5). An ALJ need not “defer or give
any specific evidentiary weight, including controlling weight, to any medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative finding(s) including those from [the claimant’s] medical sources.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1520c(a); 416.920c(a). Instead, an ALJ must use the following factors when considering
those categories of evidence: (1) “[s]upportability”; (2) “[c]onsistency”; (3) “[r]elationship with
the claimant”; (4) “[s]pecialization”; and (5) other factors, such as “evidence showing a medical
source has familiarity with the other evidence in the claim or an understanding of [the SSA’s]
disability program s policies and evidentiary requirements.” §§ 404.1520c(c)(1)–(5);
416.920c(c)(1)–(5). Although there are five factors, supportability and consistency are the most
important, and the ALJ must explain how they were considered. Id. And even though an ALJ
may discuss how he or she evaluated the other factors, he or she is not generally required to do
so. Id.
1. 	Mental Health Impairments
As explained, even though Plaintiff did not allege disabling mental impairments in her
SSI application, state agency reviewing psychologists reviewed her file. (R. at 262.) The ALJ
summarized those findings and determined that they were not persuasive, writing as follows:
The opinion of the Disability Determination Service (DDS), at the initial level
(Exhibit 1A), found no mental limitations which was not persuasive. At the
reconsideration 	level 	(Exhibit 	4A), 	the 	DDS 	found 	a 	mild 	limitation 	in
4 Because Plaintiff’s application was filed in 2022, it is subject to regulations governing
applications filed after March 27, 2017.
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understanding, 	remembering, 	or 	applying 	information; 	a 	mild 	limitation 	in
interacting 	with 	others; 	a 	mild 	limitation 	in 	concentrating, 	persisting, 	or
maintaining pace; and a mild limitation in adapting or managing oneself. Such
opinion was not persuasive.
(Id. at 20.) The ALJ explained that these findings were not persuasive because “[a]dditional
evidence was submitted at the hearing level which was not available to the DDS which showed
ongoing treatment for mental health.” (Id.) The ALJ additionally wrote:
The claimant’s mental impairments were considered in the above residual
functional capacity (RFC) with the following: The claimant can understand,
remember and carry out simple instructions. The claimant can use judgment to
make 	simple 	work-related 	decisions. 	The 	claimant 	can 	tolerate 	occasional
interactions with 	supervisors 	and coworkers. The 	claimant 	can 	tolerate 	no
interactions with the general public. The claimant cannot perform work requiring a
specific production rate such as assembly line work, but can tolerate end of day
quotas. The claimant can deal with occasional changes in a routine work setting.
(Id.)
The ALJ’s discussion did not strictly comply with the regulations. First, the ALJ
discounted the reviewers’ findings because additional evidence about Plaintiff’s mental health
treatment was submitted after they were made. But that is only partially correct. To be sure, the
initial reviewer did not have access to January and February 2023 treatment records from Omni.
But that evidence was available to the reconsideration reviewer who reviewed and summarized
it. (Id. at 92, 93.) Additional medical evidence was also submitted after the reconsideration
review, but it consisted of Plaintiff’s hearing testimony and 73 pages of documents from Miami
Valley Hospital, neither of which included information about Plaintiff’s mental health conditions
or treatment. (Id. at 36–75, 1978–2050.) Therefore, the ALJ’s reasons for discounting the
reviewers’ findings only applied to the initial reviewer and not the reconsideration reviewer.
Nevertheless, reversal is not required. Federal courts generally review decisions of
administrative agencies for harmless error. Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 654–55. Accordingly, “an
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agency’s violation of its procedural rules will not result in reversible error absent a showing that
the claimant has been prejudiced on the merits or deprived of substantial rights because of the
agency’s procedural lapses.” Connor v. United States Civ. Serv. Comm’n, 721 F.2d 1054, 1056
(6th Cir. 1983). Here, Plaintiff cannot show any prejudice because the ALJ found that she was
more limited than either of the state agency reviewing psychologists did. See Kristen H. v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:23-CV-199, 2024 WL 3429896, at *4 (S.D. Ohio July 16, 2024)
(finding that a plaintiff could not credibly complain that an ALJ erred by discounting an opinion
because it was not restrictive enough), adopted and aff’d, 2024 WL 4266500 (S.D. Ohio Sept.
23, 2024); Putnum v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:20-CV-3895, 2021 WL 2700330, at *5 (S.D.
Ohio July 1, 2021) (explaining that “[a]n ALJ does not commit reversible error when discounting
a medical opinion or an administrative finding because the ALJ determines that a claimant is
more limited than opined”); Laney v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:21-CV-01290-CEH, 2022 WL
2176539, at *7 (N.D. Ohio June 16, 2022) (“The Court will not fault the ALJ for finding more
restrictions than the state agency reviewers opined.”) Therefore, even if the ALJ’s explanation
for discounting the reviewers’ findings only applied to the initial reviewer’s findings, it is only
harmless error.
In addition, the ALJ did not discuss the supportability and consistency factors. The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals has not addressed when an ALJ’s failure to articulate the supportability
and consistency factors is harmless. District Courts sitting in the Sixth Circuit have held,
however, that such an error can be excused as harmless where: (1) the medical opinion is
patently deficient, (2) the ALJ adopted the medical opinion or made findings consistent with it,
or (3) the goal of the regulation was otherwise met. See e.g., Wilson C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., No. 3:20-CV-00457, 2022 WL 4244215, at *6–7 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 15, 2022); Burba v.
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Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:19-CV-905, 2020 WL 5792621, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2020);
Oliver v. Kijakazi, No. 3:22-CV-28-DCP, 2023 WL 2587487, at *5 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 21, 2023);
Nicholas E. v. Bisignano, No. 4:25-CV-00002-HBB, 2025 WL 2054367, at *4 (W.D. Ky. July
22, 2025).
This case relates to the second scenario. As explained, the state agency reviewers found
that Plaintiff had no more than mild impairments in three areas. (R. at 82, 93.) In contrast, the
ALJ determined that Plaintiff had moderate impairments in four areas and that they caused
functional limits that were incorporated into Plaintiff’s RFC. (Id. at 20.) If an ALJ’s failure to
articulate the regulatory factors is harmless error when an ALJ adopts the same or similar limits
as reviewers, it is also harmless when an ALJ assesses greater limits than reviewers. See
Gwendolyn F.H. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 3:22-CV-214, 2023 WL 5772796, at *4
(S.D. Ohio Sept. 7, 2023) (finding ALJ’s lack of supportability discussion harmless; reviewers
found plaintiff capable of restricted range of light work, but ALJ determined she was limited to a
range of sedentary work). Accordingly, the ALJ’s articulation error is harmless.
2. 	Physical Impairments
Similar reasoning applies to the ALJ’s assessment of the findings from the state agency
reviewing physicians. The ALJ summarized those findings and determined that they were only
somewhat persuasive, writing as follows:
The opinion of the DDS (Exhibit 1A; 4A), regarding physical and exertional
limitations, found a light residual functional capacity (RFC) with lifting and
carrying 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; and stand or walk for 6
hours and sit for 6 hours in an 8 hour workday. She has limited bilateral reaching
in 	front 	and/or 	laterally 	and 	limited 	bilateral 	reaching 	overhead. 	She 	can
occasionally climb ramps or stairs but never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She
can frequently kneel and crouch, and she can occasionally crawl. She should avoid
concentrated 	exposure 	to 	noise 	and 	hazards. 	Such 	opinion 	was 	somewhat
persuasive.
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(R. at 21.) The ALJ explained that these findings were only somewhat persuasive because
“[a]dditional evidence was submitted at the hearing level which was not available to the DDS.”
(Id.) The ALJ additionally wrote:
I also found a light RFC with the residual functional capacity to lift and/or carry up
to 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently as greater amounts can
aggravate the pain and discomfort in the neck, back, shoulders, arms, elbows,
wrists, hands and fingers as well as chest pain and shortness of breath, especially
as she is obese which can place additional stress on the body. She is able to stand
and/or walk for a total of about 6 out of 8 hours, and she is able to sit for a total of
about 6 out of 8 hours. The claimant can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, and
she can occasionally stoop, balance and crouch, but she can never kneel, crawl, or
climb ladders, ropes or scaffolds as greater activity can aggravate the pain and
discomfort in the back, neck, hips, buttocks, lower extremities, knees, ankles, feet,
shoulders and, arms (when used to crawl and support arising from crouching or
kneeling positions), especially as the claimant is obese which can place additional
stress on the body. She can reach overhead or to the side no more than occasionally,
and the claimant can perform fine and gross manipulation frequently but not
constantly, and is incapable of forceful grasping or torqueing as greater activity can
aggravate the pain and discomfort in the neck, back, shoulders, arms, elbows,
wrists, hands and fingers as well as chest pain and shortness of breath, especially
as she is obese which can place additional stress on the body. Due to her headaches,
seizure like activity, and shortness of breath, she is not capable of working where
she would be exposed to excessive noise or bright, flashing lights exceeding levels
generally encountered in office-type work environments, and the claimant should
avoid concentrated exposure to pulmonary irritants such as fumes, odors, dusts,
gases, and poor ventilation. Due to her headaches, seizure like activity, chest pain,
shortness of breath, and chronic pain symptoms, the claimant is limited to working
in non-hazardous environments, i.e., no driving at work, operating moving
machinery, working at unprotected heights, and she should avoid concentrated
exposure to unguarded hazardous machinery.
(Id.)
The ALJ discounted these findings because additional evidence was submitted after they
were made. That explanation is supported by substantial evidence because after the initial and
reconsideration reviews, treatment records from Miami Valley Hospital were submitted. (Id. at
45–69, 41–42, 1978–2050.)
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On the other hand, the ALJ did not expressly discuss the supportability and consistency
factors. But once again, any articulation error here is harmless. The state agency reviewers found
that Plaintiff could perform a range of light work. In contrast, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff
was capable of an even more restricted range of light work. For example, the reviewers found
that Plaintiff could frequently kneel and crouch and occasionally crawl, whereas the ALJ
determined that she could never kneel, occasionally crouch, and never crawl. (R. at 84, 95, 21.)
Likewise, the reviewers found that Plaintiff had no limits in stooping or balancing, but the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff could do either only occasionally. (Id.) And while the reviewers found
Plaintiff had a general reaching limit and no limits for handling, fingering, and feeling, the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff could only occasionally reach and frequently perform fine and gross
manipulations. (Id.)
Because the ALJ found Plaintiff more limited than the reviewers did, any articulation
error is harmless. Gwendolyn F.H., 2023 WL 5772796, at *4. Therefore, the undersigned cannot
conclude that the ALJ committed reversible error when assessing any prior administrative
findings from state agency reviewers.
V. 	RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION
Accordingly, for all the reasons contained herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court
OVERRULE Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors and AFFIRM the Commissioner of Social
Security’s decision.
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen
(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those
specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with
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supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations
to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive
further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report
and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of
the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura
CHELSEY M. VASCURA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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