USA v. Arnold

THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff
V.
CaseNo. 3:25-cr-7(1)
Judge Walter H. Rice
OLLIEJ. ARNOLD, III,
Defendant.
DECISION AND ENTRY OVERRULING MOTION TO SUPPRESS OF DEFENDANT
OLLIE J. ARNOLD, III (DOC. #16)
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Suppress of Defendant
OllieJ. Arnold, III. (Doc. #16). Judge Christopher Roberts of the Dayton, Ohio,
Municipal Court issued a search warrant for 827 Brooklyn Avenue in Dayton, Ohio
("Brooklyn Residence"), on January 22, 2025. (Aug. 18, 2025, Hrg. Tr., Doc . #18,
PAGEID 56-57; Memo. in Opp., Doc. #22, PAGEID 86). The warrant was issued
upon the information contained in the Search Warrant Affidavit of Dayton, Ohio,
Police Department ("DPD") Detective Vincent Carter. {Id. ). In the Affidavit, Carter
stated that he had executed a search warrant at the Brooklyn Residence in August
2022 and, at that time, arrested Defendant. (Id. at PAGEID 60-61; Aff., p. 2, fl 4).
Defendant was in federal custody from September 6, 2022, through October 17,
2024. (Doc. #16, PAGEID 38). Carter further averred that in November 2024, after
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Defendant was released, he received information "from other law enforcement
agencies" that Defendant was selling drugs out of the Brooklyn Residence. (Doc.
#22, PAGEID 86, citing Aff., p. 2, II 4). However, Defendant's federal supervised
release records show him living at a different residence, with a different address.
(Doc. #16, PAGEID38).
On December 3, 2024, the DPD removed and opened two trash bags from a
garbage can in the alley behind the Brooklyn Residence, both of which contained
evidence of drugs and drug trafficking activity. (Doc. #22, PAGEID 86-87, citing
Aff., p. 2, 11115-6). However, Carter's Affidavit did not reflect that DPD knew who
lived at the Brooklyn Residence on that date. (Doc. #16, PAGEID 38). Carter
averred that, two days later, DPD performed surveillance and observed activity
consistent with selling of drugs. That same day, a DPD officer then proceeded to
stop and arrest a Troy White leaving the Brooklyn Residence. White informed
DPD that he had bought crack cocaine at the Brooklyn Residence from a dealer
using an alias, OJ, that Defendant had been known by DPD to use. (Doc. #18,
PAGEID 69-70; Doc. #22, PAGEID 87-88, citing Aff., p. 2, ^ 9-11). However, "[a]t
no point did Troy White give law enforcement a physical description of the
person, identify the person from a photograph, or provide a full name of anyone.
(Doc. #16, PAGEID 38-39). Finally, on January 16, 2025, DPD performed another
trash pull at the Brooklyn Residence, again finding evidence of drug activity.
Additionally, one trash "bag contained mail addressed to Mr. Arnold at the
Brooklyn Residence as well as two pill bottles in his name. " (Doc. #22, PAGEID
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88; see also Doc. #18, PAGEID 67). However, the pill bottles had Defendant's new
address, the different address, listed on them; Carter did not include the different
address in the Affidavit. (Doc. #16, PAGEID 39; Aff., pp. 2-3, 1112).
Based on the information contained in Carter's affidavit. Judge Roberts
issued the search warrant for the Brooklyn Residence on January 22, 2025. The
next day, DPD officers served the warrant and found Defendant sleeping inside.
They also found narcotics and paraphernalia associated with drug selling, along
with a Glock weapon lying next to Defendant. (Doc. #18, PAGEID 59-60).
Based on that evidence. Defendant was indicted for possessing with intent
to distribute methamphetamine out of the Brooklyn Residence, and for unlawfully
possessing a firearm. (Indictment, Doc. #2, PAGEID 4-6). Defendant moved to
suppress the evidence, arguing that there was not sufficient evidence in Carter's
affidavit for Judge Roberts to make a probable cause finding to issue the warrant.
(Doc. #16, PAGEID 41 ). Specifically, Defendant asserts that: (1) the Affidavit was
based on hearsay from an unreliable informant. White; (2) DPD made no efforts to
verify White's information; and (3) the Affidavit failed to establish a nexus
between the Brooklyn Residence and Defendant's alleged criminal activity. [Id. ).
Accordingly, Defendant claims that the search violated the Fourth Amendment,
and all evidence from the search itself and evidence deriving from the search
must be suppressed. (Id., citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 (1963)).
Plaintiff United States of America ("Government") responds that the Motion
is unavailing for three reasons:
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(1) As a transient visitor who was primarily at the Brooklyn Residence to
engage in dealing drugs. Defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy inside the Brooklyn Residence (Doc. #22, PAGEID 89-90, citing United
States v. Berryhill, 352 F. 3d 315, 317 (6th Cir. 2003); United States v. Harris, 255
F. 3d 288, 295 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Pollard, 215 F. 3d 643 (6th Cir. 2000));
(2) Judge Roberts had a substantial basis for his probable cause
determination, which is to be afforded wide deference, because: (a) numerous
facts within the four corners of the Affidavit corroborated White's statements, and
permitted the inference that White's statements were credible; and (b) those facts
provided a substantial, independent basis for Judge Roberts concluding that
Defendant was engaged in drug trafficking activity at the Brooklyn Residence (Id.
at PAGEID 91-92, 93-96, citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U. S. 213, 238-39 (1983); United
States v. Sanders, 106 F. 455, 463 (6th Cir. 2024) {en bane}; United States v. Perry,
864 F. 3d 412, 415 (6th Cir. 2017); United States v. May, 399 F. 3d 817, 824 (6th Cir.
2005); United States v. Johnson, 351 F. 3d 254, 258 (6th Cir. 2003)); and
(3) Even if the warrant lacked probable cause, that there existed some link
between known drug activity and the Brooklyn Residence means that DPD officers
would not have reasonably known that the warrant and consequent search were
illegal. Thus, DPD's reliance on the warrant was objectively reasonable, and the
good-faith exception precludes suppression. [Id. at PAGEID 96-98, citing United
States v. Leon, 468 U. S. 897, 909 (1984); United States v. Carpenter. 360 F. 3d 591,
595-96 (6th Cir. 2004) [en bane}).
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In Reply, Defendant argues that he still had a reasonable expectation of
privacy in the Brooklyn Residence as an overnight guest. (Doc. #25, PAGEID 112,
citing Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U. S. 91, 96-99 (1990)). Specifically, Defendant
notes that it is undisputed that: he had lived previously at the Brooklyn Residence;
in December 2024, Carter had seen Defendant exiting the Brooklyn Residence; in
the January 2025 trash pull, DPD officers found Defendants' personal effects; and
Defendant was found asleep at the Brooklyn Residence when the warrant was
executed. (Id. at PAGEID 112-13, citing Aff., pp. 2, 3, ^ 4, 7-8, 12). Defendant
asserts that the warrant lacked probable cause because it relied heavily on the
statements of a previously-unknown informant, White, and DPD did not provide
corroboration of White's statements. Moreover, unlike in Sanders, there were no
controlled buys at the Brooklyn Residence; nor did Carter ever specifically observe
drug dealing there. (Id. at PAGEID 113-14, citing Sanders. 106 F. 4th at 464 (6th Cir.
2024); Aff., p. 2, ^ 4-6, 9). Finally, Defendant claims that the good faith exception
does not apply. Rather, he argues that Carter both relied upon White's
uncorroborated statements and withheld information unhelpful to the
Government in his affidavit {e. g., not disclosing Defendant's new, different
address) so that Judge Roberts would make a probable cause determination
based on an incomplete and misleading set offsets. Consequently, Defendant
concludes. Carter could not have reasonably believed that Judge Roberts properly
issued the warrant. {Id. at PAGEID 114-15, citing Lean, 468 U. S. at 923; United
States v. Wilhelm, 80 F. 3d 116, 120 (4th Cir. 1996)).
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The matter is now ripe for decision
I. Legal Standard
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that:
"The right of the people . .. against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized. " U. S. CONST. AM. IV. "When evidence is obtained
in violation of the Fourth Amendment, the judicially developed exclusionary rule
usually precludes its use in a criminal proceeding against the victim of the illegal
search and seizure. " Illinois v. Krull, 480 U. S. 340, 347 (1987).
A defendant whose person or property was seized in the execution of a
search warrant may have the seized evidence suppressed upon demonstrating
that: (1) he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location where the
warrant was executed and, thus, has standing; (2) the issuing judge erred in
concluding that probable cause existed when he issued the warrant; and (3) the
executing officer should have reasonably known that probable cause did not
exist-and, thus, the Leon good-faith exception does not apply. To meet the first
element, "the defendant must show (1) that he had a subjective expectation of
privacy, and (2) his expectation was objectively reasonable .. . one that society is
prepared to recognize as legitimate. " United States v. Washington, 573 F. 3d 279,
282-83 (6th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). As to the
second element, "[t]he standard of review for the sufficiency of an affidavit 'is
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whether'" under the totality of the circumstances, "'the [judge] had a substantial
basis for finding that the affidavit established probable cause to believe that the
evidence would be found at the place cited. '" United States v. Greene, 250 F. 3d
471, 478 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Davidson, 936 F. 2d 856, 859 (6th
Cir. 1991)). Finally, to avoid application of the good-faith exception, the defendant
must show that the officer had "no reasonable grounds for believing that the
warrant was properly issued. " Leon, 468 U. S. at 923. "Thus, an officer would not
'manifest objective good faith in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
entirely unreasonable. '" Carpenter, 360 F. 3d at 596, quoting Lean, 468 U. S. at 923.
II. Analysis
A. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The Government relies heavily on Defendant's statements at the evidentiary
hearing that he was primarily connected to a residence at 4110 Midway Street,
and that pill bottles were found listing his address as 4110 Midway were found in
the Brooklyn Residence trash, for its position that Defendant has failed to
demonstrate his subjective expectation of privacy in the Brooklyn Residence.
(Doc. #22, PAGEID 90-91, citing Doc. #18, PAGEID 67). This evidence, however, is
outweighed by the facts that Defendant still received mail at the Brooklyn
Residence, had been observed talking on the phone at the Brooklyn Residence in
December 2024, and was sleeping there overnight when the warrant was
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executed. (Doc. #25, PAGEID 112-13, citing Doc. #18, PAGEID 60; Aff., p. 2, fl 7).
Thus, Defendant has met the subjective belief prong.
As to the objective reasonableness prong:
The Sixth Circuit has generously construed the Fourth Amendment
as protecting nearly all overnight guests, even when the guest
occupies a common area in the apartment that is not private from
other residents. In certain cases, this circuit has even extended
standing to challenge a search to non-overnight guests who are
permitted to keep items in the residence.
Washington, 573 F. 3d at 283, citing United States v. Waller, 5426 F. 3d 838, 844 (6th
Cir. 2005); United States v. Pollard, 215 F. 3d 643, 647-48 (6th Cir. 2000). Defendant
sleeping in the Brooklyn Residence, and Carter having previously observed him
on the premises, demonstrate that he was a guest at the Brooklyn Residence with
an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.
B. Probable Cause
Defendant argues that Carter's Affidavit was an insufficient basis upon
which Judge Roberts could reasonably rely to "determine that probable cause
existed to search the residence. " (Post-Hrg. Memo., Doc. #27, PAGEID 120).
Defendant raises several arguments; the Court considers them in turn.
1. Carter's ast knowled e about Defendant at Brookl n Residence:
While Carter averred in the affidavit that he had prior knowledge of Defendant
living at the Brooklyn Residence, he admitted at the hearing he knew this from
arresting Defendsnt at the Brooklyn Residence in August 2022, and had no
knowledge that Defendant had been incarcerated for most of the time in the
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interim. (Doc. #18, PAGEID 60-61; Doc. #27, PAGEID 120-21; Aff., p. 2, IT 4).
Notably, the Government does not rely on this information in its argument that
probable cause existed (Doc. #22, PAGEID 91-96), and, as discussed below. Judge
Roberts did not examine that statement in a vacuum.
2. Knowled eofdru traffickin at Brookl n Residence: Carter testified
that DPD relayed to him "information of ongoing drug trafficking coming from
that" Brooklyn Residence that DPD had received in November 2024 "from a
different law enforcement agency[. ]" (Doc. #18, PAGEID 55; Aff., p. 2, fl 4). From
that information, DPD surveilled the Brooklyn Residence, and Carter observed
both Defendant exiting the Residence and what Carter reasonably surmised, from
his experience as a narcotics officer, was drug-dealing activity. (Doc. #18, PAGEID
54-55; Aff., p. 2, 1111 6-7).
3. Statements of White: DPD officers observed the Brooklyn Residence
and saw numerous individuals entering and leaving after only a short time,
behavior consistent with drug trafficking activity. Perry, 864 F. 3d at 415. After
being detained and arrested just outside the Brooklyn Residence for possession of
crack cocaine. White informed the arresting DPD officer that he had purchased the
drugs from the Brooklyn Residence from a man named "OJ. " (Doc. #18, PAGEID
70). Defendant correctly notes that White had no history as an informant to the
DPD and that "[n]o 'controlled buys' had occurred at that residence!. ]" (Doc. #25,
PAGEID 114). However, Carter's search of DPD records revealed that Defendant
had a history of using OJ as an alias. (Doc. #22, PAGEID 88, citing Aff., p. 2, IT 11).
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Carter's cross-referencing White's statement against the DPD database gave him a
reasonable basis to rely upon White's statement. Both White's identification of OJ
and Carter's confirmation were included in the affidavit, meaning that Carter
provided corroboration of White's statement. Moreover, Judge Roberts could rely
upon that corroboration in finding White credible and using White's statement
that he bought drugs from OJ to support his conclusion that probable cause
existed.
4. Trash Pulls: DPD's December 3, 2024, trash pull at the Brooklyn
Residence yielded a significant amount of drug paraphernalia (Aff., p. 2, fl 5),
which "establishes probable cause to search a home when combined with other
evidence of the resident's involvement in drug crimes. " United States v.
Abernathy, 843 F. 3d 243, 251-52 (6th Cir. 2016)). Such involvement was further
established by White's statement identifying Defendant (by his alias) as the seller,
DPD's observation of likely drug activity, and the January 16, 2025, trash pull,
which revealed a piece of mail addressed to the Defendant at the Brooklyn
Residence and a bottle of pills bearing Defendant's name. (Doc. #22, PAGEID 95;
Aff., p. 2, 1111).
Because all of this information was contained in the four corners of Carter's
affidavit. Judge Roberts had more than enough valid evidence of a nexus between
the Brooklyn Residence and Defendant participating in drug trafficking.
Accordingly, probable cause existed for Judge Roberts's issuance of the warrant,
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Defendant has not demonstrated a Fourth Amendment violation, and the Motion
must be overruled.
C. Good-Faith Exception
Leon and its progeny establish the good-faith exception as a failsafe if it
were determined later that the search warrant that law enforcement officers
executed lacked probable cause. See, e. g., Carpenter, 360 F. 3d at 595 (internal
quotation marks omitted), quoting United States v. Bynum, 293 F. 3d 192, 195 (4th
Cir. 2002) (Good-faith exception requires "a less demanding showing than the
'substantial basis' threshold required to prove the existence of probable cause. ").
Accordingly, because probable cause existed for the issuance of the warrant, the
Court need not determine whether the good-faith exception would have applied.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons. Defendant's Motion to Suppress (Doc. #16) is
OVERRULED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
December 15, 2025
<^<^-V « 1 -^iA»
WALTER H. RICE, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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