White v. Chambers-Smith et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS
LARRY O. WHITE, JR.,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ANNETTE CHAMBERS-SMITH, et al.,
Defendants.
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Case No. 2:25-cv-1202
Judge Matthew W. McFarland
Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman
ORDER AND REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Larry O. White, Jr., a state prisoner currently incarcerated at Ross Correctional
Institution, and proceeding without the assistance of counsel, brings this civil rights action pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 	(Doc. 1-3, PageID 73 (Civil Cover Sheet); Doc. 6-1, PageID 100-05
(Amended Complaint)). The case has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate
Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and this Court’s Amended General Order 22-05.
Plaintiff filed an Original Complaint that was over 50 pages long (Doc. 1-1, PageID 6-63),
naming 25 individuals as defendants (Doc. 1-2, PageID 64-72). The Court ordered Plaintiff to file
an Amended Complaint that complies with Rule 8(a) and Rule 20(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and this District’s Local Rule 5.1. (Doc. 4).
On December 3, 2025, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint against Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) Director Annette Chambers-Smith, Lebanon Correctional
Institution 	(LeCI) 	Deputy 	Warden 	Hogan, 	LeCI 	Unit 	Manager 	Johnson, 	and 	LeCI
Lieutenant/Captain Edwards. (Doc. 6-1, PageID 100-05). The filing of an Amended Complaint
“supersedes an earlier complaint for all purposes.” In re Refrigerant Compressors Antitrust Litig.,
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731 F.3d 586, 589 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. LinkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S.
438, 456 n.4 (2009)). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 6-1) is now the operative
complaint. By separate Order, Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.
This matter is now before the Undersigned for an initial screening of the Amended
Complaint as required by law. 	28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 	For the reasons
that follow, the Undersigned concludes that Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claims and
access to the courts claims against Defendants Hogan, Johnson, and Edwards may PROCEED for
further development. 	The Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s remaining claims be
DISMISSED and that the remaining individuals, including Defendant Chambers-Smith, be
DISMISSED as defendants in this action.
I. 	INITIAL SCREENING STANDARD
Because Plaintiff is a prisoner who is seeking “redress from a governmental entity or
officer or employee of a governmental entity,” the Court is required to screen the Amended
Complaint to determine whether it, or any portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous,
malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2).
A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with
a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. 	Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989);
Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis
when the defendant is immune from suit or when a plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest
which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis
when the allegations are “delusional” or “rise to the level of the irrational or wholly incredible.”
Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992) (citations omitted); Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. The
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Court need not accept as true factual allegations that are “fantastic or delusional” in reviewing a
complaint for frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Neitzke,
490 U.S. at 327-28).
Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint filed by a
pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers.” 	Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). 	But the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). See also
Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71 (finding that the “dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly
governs dismissals for failure to state a claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept all well-pleaded
factual allegations as true but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation.” 	Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than
an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). 	A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citation
omitted). Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual
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enhancement.” 	Id. at 557. 	The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what
the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).
II. 	ALLEGATIONS IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff alleges that while he was incarcerated at LeCI, on April 1, 2024, Defendants
Hogan, Johnson, and Edwards forced Plaintiff out of the “relative safety” of Restrictive Housing
(RH) and placed him in Limited Privilege Housing (LPH) as retaliation after they learned about
Plaintiff’s other pending civil complaint. (Amended Complaint, Doc. 6-1, PageID 104). Plaintiff
alleges that Edwards threatened to use “OC/mace” spray on him if he did not follow orders. (Id.).
Plaintiff also alleges that Hogan and Johnson ordered and oversaw these actions. (Id.).
Plaintiff further alleges that while housed in LPH, where he should have received more
privileges, he instead received less privileges than in RH, including having his GTL tablet taken
away and having no access to the grievance and kite systems, nor to Lexis Nexis. (Id.). Plaintiff
alleges that during his first 30 days in LPH he was “denied access to the Shared Tablet System,
phones, Library and Law library, and also commissary.” (Id.). These restrictions, he alleges, took
away his means to file civil complaints. 	(Id. at PageID 102). 	Plaintiff alleges that Hogan and
Johnson told him that he would have a “rough time” as long as Plaintiff was housed at LeCI and
alleges that they told him to “stop pursuing a ‘no-win’/‘frivolous[]’ civil complaint.” 	(Id. at
PageID 104). Plaintiff alleges these actions were retaliation for filing a civil complaint. (Id.).
Plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive relief. (Id. at PageID 105).
III. 	DISCUSSION
The Undersigned understands Plaintiff to be raising the following claims:
1. 	First Amendment retaliation claims against Defendants Hogan, Johnson, and Edwards
for allegedly taking adverse action against Plaintiff after he filed a civil complaint; and
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2. 	First Amendment access to the courts claims against Defendants Hogan, Johnson, and
Edwards for allegedly prohibiting Plaintiff’s right to file civil complaints.
At this stage in the proceedings, and without the benefit of an answer or other briefing, the
Undersigned concludes that Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation and access to the courts claims
against Defendants Hogan, Johnson, and Edwards may PROCEED for further development. The
Court advises Plaintiff that this is only a preliminary determination. 	The Court has not made a
determination as to the merits of the claims being allowed to proceed at this juncture, nor has the
Court considered any potential defenses. 	Defendants are not precluded from filing a motion to
dismiss, a motion for a more definite statement, or other appropriate motions under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., Wiley v. Austin, No. 8:20-cv-220, 2020 WL 6204382, at *3
(D. Neb. Oct. 22, 2020).
Plaintiff’s remaining claims, however, should be DISMISSED for the failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, as explained in further detail below.
A. Official Capacity Claims for Monetary Damages
Any official capacity claims for monetary damages should be dismissed as barred by the
Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. Maben v. Thelen, 887 F.3d 252, 270 (6th
Cir. 2018). Absent an express waiver, a state is immune from damage suits under the Eleventh
Amendment. P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993) (citations
omitted). 	The State of Ohio has not constitutionally nor statutorily waived its Eleventh
Amendment immunity in the federal courts. See Smith v. DeWine, 476 F. Supp. 3d 635, 652 (S.D.
Ohio 2020) (citations omitted); Johns v. Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 753 F.2d 524, 526-27 (6th Cir. 1985).
The Eleventh Amendment bar extends to actions where the state is not a named party, but
where the action is essentially one for recovery of money from the state. Edelman v. Jordan, 415
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U.S. 651, 663 (1974) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)).
And a suit against defendants in their official capacities would be a way of pleading the action
against the entity of which defendants are agents. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
690 (1978); Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473
U.S. 159, 165 (1985)) (“While personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a
government official for actions he takes under color of state law, individuals sued in their official
capacities stand in the shoes of the entity they represent.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Thus, actions against state officials in their official capacities are included in this bar. Maben, 887
F.3d at 270; Smith, 476 F. Supp. 3d at 650-52; Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 289 (6th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Cady v. Arenac Cnty., 574 F.3d 334, 344 (6th Cir. 2009)) (“[A]n official-capacity suit
against a state official is deemed to be a suit against the state and is thus barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, absent a waiver.”).
Plaintiff indicates he is suing Defendants Hogan, Johnson, and Edwards in their individual
and official capacities; and Plaintiff seeks monetary and injunctive relief. (Doc. 6-1, PageID 100,
105). Plaintiff’s official capacity claims are therefore considered claims against the State of Ohio
and any claims for monetary damages against Hogan, Johnson, and Edwards in their official
capacities should be DISMISSED. Smith, 476 F. Supp. 3d at 650-51; Colvin, 605 F.3d at 289;
Maben, 887 F.3d at 270.
B. Claims Against Defendant Chambers-Smith
Plaintiff also fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted against Defendant
Chambers-Smith. As noted above, a plaintiff must allege a short and plain statement against each
defendant with sufficient factual details to state a plausible claim for relief. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8(a);
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
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570 (2007)). 	Plaintiff names Chambers-Smith as a Defendant but then fails to allege any facts
against her. 	(See generally Amended Complaint, Doc. 6-1). 	Because Plaintiff has not stated a
plausible claim for relief against her, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Chambers-Smith be
DISMISSED as a defendant in this action.
IV. 	SERVICE DOCUMENTS AND CONCLUSION
The Undersigned determines that Plaintiff, in an abundance of caution, may PROCEED
at this juncture on his First Amendment retaliation claims and access to the courts claims against
Defendants Hogan, Johnson, and Edwards for allegedly taking adverse action against Plaintiff for
filing a civil complaint and denying him access to file future complaints. But Plaintiff has not yet
provided the required service documents for these Defendants. Plaintiff is therefore ORDERED
to provide a completed summons form, a completed U.S. Marshal form, and a service copy of the
Amended Complaint (Doc. 6-1) for each of these three Defendants—Hogan, Johnson, and
Edwards. Plaintiff must submit these documents WITHIN 30 days of the date of this Order with
a motion to issue service. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to send Plaintiff three blank copies
of the summons form and the U.S. Marshal form for his use.
Plaintiff shall serve upon Defendants or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon
Defendants’ attorney, a copy of every further pleading or other document submitted for
consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall include with the original paper to be filed with the Clerk
of Court a certificate stating the date a true and correct copy of any document was mailed to
Defendants or Defendants’ counsel. Any paper received by a District Judge or Magistrate Judge
which has not been filed with the Clerk, or which fails to include a certificate of service, will be
disregarded by the Court.
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Plaintiff must also keep this Court informed of his current address and promptly file a
Notice of New Address if he is released or transferred.
Additionally, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff’s remaining claims be
DISMISSED, including the following:
1. 	Official capacity claims for monetary damages against Defendants Hogan, Johnson, and
Edwards; and
2. 	Any claims against Defendant Chambers-Smith for the failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.
Because Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible claim against Defendant Chambers-Smith,
the Undersigned RECOMMENDS that Chambers-Smith be DISMISSED as a defendant.
The Undersigned further RECOMMENDS that Defendants LeCI Warden (Unknown),
LeCI Deputy Warden Amber Stanley, LeCI Chaplain and Institutional Inspector Tad Palmer, LeCI
Warden Administrative Assistant (Unknown), LeCI Chaplain Robert Smith, LeCI Mailroom
Supervisor (Unknown), LeCI Sargeant Turner, LeCI Case Manager (Unknown), LeCI Sargeant
Gibson, LeCI Correctional Officer (CO) Koontz, LeCI Lieutenant S. Michael, LeCI CO Pittman,
LeCI CO Copley, LeCI 2nd Shift Rover B, LeCI CO Alexander, LeCI CO Hickman, LeCI
Investigator Tabor, LeCI CO Whiteside, Ohio State Trooper Investigator (Unknown), and
Attorney Mindy Worly (see Doc. 1-2, PageID 64), who are no longer named as defendants in
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Doc. 6-1), be DISMISSED from this case. See Intelli Shop Inc.
v. FedEx Corp., No. 4:24-cv-00074, 2024 WL 2331858, at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 3, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 4:24-cv-00074, 2024 WL 2332936 (S.D. Tex. May 20, 2024).
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PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served a copy of the
recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed
findings and recommendations. 	This period may be extended further by the Court on timely
motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and
shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report and
Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral
hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such
portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the
assigned District Judge otherwise directs. 	A party may respond to another party’s objections
WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. 	Failure to make objections in
accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. 	See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
IT IS SO ORDERED AND RECOMMENDED.
Date: 1/7/2026 	s/Stephanie K. Bowman
STEPHANIE K. BOWMAN
United States Chief Magistrate Judge
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