Cook v. Whack et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
NATHAN COOK,
Plaintiff, 	Case No. 2:25-cv-1117
v. 	District Judge Michael H. Watson
Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson
GROVEPORT MADISON
LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al.,
Defendants.
REPORT & RECOMMENDATION
This matter before the Court is Plaintiff’s failure to respond to a show cause order. For the
following reasons, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s Complaint asserted against the
District, the Board, and the unidentified Defendants (Doc. 11) be DISMISSED for failure to
prosecute.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, who proceeds without the assistance of counsel, first filed this case in September
2025. (Doc. 1). He brings this action “individually and as parent and next friend of N.C., a minor.”
(Doc. 11 at 1). N.C. is Plaintiff’s tracheostomy-dependent child. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that over
the span of three years, Defendants Groveport Madison Local School District (“the District”),
Groveport Madison Board of Education (“The Board”), Franklin County Children Services
(“FCCS”), and unspecified “individual employees of the District and FCCS” denied N.C.
educational services on the basis of his disability and deprived Plaintiff of rights under federal law.
(Id. at ¶ 4).
Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and N.C., asserts a variety of discrimination claims against
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Defendants. (Id. at ¶ 4). Plaintiff sues the District, the Board, and their individual employees for
alleged violations of the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (“IDEA”), Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act (“Section 504”), and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act
(“ADA”). 	(Id. at ¶¶ 12–14). 	He sues all Defendants for violations of Procedural Due Process,
Substantive Due Process, and Equal Protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United
States Constitution. (Id. at ¶ 11). Against all Defendants, Plaintiff asserts civil conspiracy claims
under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 for Defendants’ “coordinated CPS referrals, false allegations,
and use of administrative processes” to deprive Plaintiff’s rights. (Id. at ¶ 15).
On a screen, the Court previously dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against FCCS because it
cannot be sued in its own right. 	(Doc. 13 at 4; Doc. 15). 	As for the other Defendants, the
Undersigned thrice ordered Plaintiff to refile his service forms for the District and to file service
forms for the Board. 	(Docs. 13, 14, 16). 	To date, Plaintiff has not filed proper service forms.
Concerning the claims Plaintiff asserted on his son’s behalf, the Undersigned ordered Plaintiff to
file a status report updating the Undersigned on his efforts to find counsel. (Doc. 16). Plaintiff
failed to file a status report as well. This case cannot languish any longer.
II. 	DISCUSSION
The Court’s inherent authority to dismiss an action because of a party’s failure to prosecute
is expressly recognized in Rule 41(b), which authorizes involuntary dismissal for failure to
prosecute or to comply with rules of procedure or court orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see also
Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 49 (1991) (noting that “a federal district court has the
inherent power to dismiss a case sua sponte for failure to prosecute” as recognized in Link v.
Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629–32 (1962)). “This measure is available to the district court
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as a tool to effect management of its docket and avoidance of unnecessary burdens on the tax-
supported courts and opposing parties.” Knoll v. AT & T, 176 F.3d 359, 63 (6th Cir. 1999).
The Sixth Circuit directs the district courts to consider the following four factors in
deciding whether to dismiss an action for failure to prosecute under Rule 41(b):
(1) whether the party’s failure is due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault; (2)
whether the adversary was prejudiced by the dismissed party’s conduct; (3)
whether the dismissed party was warned that failure to cooperate could lead to
dismissal; and (4) whether less drastic sanctions were imposed or considered
before dismissal was ordered.
Schafer v. City of Defiance Police Dep’t., 529 F.3d 731, 737 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Knoll, 176
F.3d at 363). “‘Although typically none of the factors is outcome dispositive, . . . a case is properly
dismissed by the district court where there is a clear record of delay or contumacious conduct.’”
Schafer, 529 F.3d at 737 (quoting Knoll, 176 F.3d at 363).
On balance, the factors set forth in Schafer support dismissal. First, despite being afforded
30 days to do so, Plaintiff failed to provide proper service forms. And then, he failed to respond
to the Court’s two Show Cause Orders by the imposed deadlines. What’s more, because the Show
Cause Orders center on Plaintiff’s service forms, Plaintiff has brought this case to a halt. Because
of Plaintiff’s actions (or lack thereof), the Court cannot order service upon Defendants. 	This
demonstrates, to some extent, Plaintiff has “a reckless disregard for the effect of [her] conduct on
[the Court’s] proceedings[,]” and thus acted with willfulness, bad faith, or fault. Schafer, 529 F.3d
at 737 (quoting Wu v. T.W. Wang, Inc., 420 F.3d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 2005)).
Moreover, as this Court has said, “[f]ailure to comply with this Court’s orders in several
instances indicates willfulness.” Manning v. Diversified Collection Servs., Inc., No. 3:09-CV-153,
2010 WL 1438735 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 9, 2010). 	As detailed above, Plaintiff has, on several
occasions, refused to comply with this Court’s clear instructions for months. This clear record of
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delay and noncompliance demonstrates Plaintiff has “a reckless disregard for the effect of his
conduct on [the Court’s] proceedings[,]” and thus acted with willfulness, bad faith, or fault.
Schafer, 529 F.3d at 737 (quoting Wu v. T.W. Wang, Inc., 420 F.3d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 2005)). The
Undersigned cannot help but infer that Plaintiff’s behavior will continue if the Court were to ask
him to file the proper service forms for a fourth time. There is no reason to believe that such an
exercise would be more than a drain on judicial resources.
Considering the second factor, because Defendants have not been served, there is little risk
of prejudice. 	Cf. Wilson v. T.D.O.C., No. 1:17-CV-348, 2018 WL 4006781, at *2 (E.D. Tenn.
Aug. 22, 2018) (dismissing a case for failure to prosecute even though the second factor weighed
against dismissal). But the remaining considerations nonetheless weigh in favor of dismissal. The
Court has twice warned Plaintiff to show cause, or else the action could result in dismissal. (Docs.
14, 16). And the Undersigned considered less drastic sanctions than dismissal but concludes that
any such effort would be futile given Plaintiff’s failure to participate in these proceedings. Grange
Mut. Cas. Co. v. Mack, 270 F. App’x 372, 377 (noting that a court must simply “consider” lesser
sanctions but is not required to actually issue such sanctions before granting a dismissal for failure
to prosecute).
In view of the foregoing, the Undersigned concludes Plaintiff has abandoned this action.
Although this Court has a “favored practice of reaching a disposition on the merits,” the Court’s
“need to manage its docket [and] the interest in expeditious resolution of litigation” outweigh
allowing this case to linger. Little v. Yeutter, 984 F.2d 160, 162 (6th Cir. 1993).
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned RECOMMENDS Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc.
11) be DISMISSED for failure to prosecute.
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Procedure on Objections
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen
(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific
proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting
authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination
of those portions of the Report or specific proposed findings or recommendations to which
objection is made. 	Upon proper objection, a District Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further
evidence, or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 	28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1).
The 	parties 	are 	specifically 	advised 	that 	failure 	to 	object 	to 	the 	Report 	and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the district judge review the Report
and Recommendation de novo and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of
the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
Date: February 18, 2026 	/s/ Kimberly A. Jolson
KIMBERLY A. JOLSON
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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