Flagner v. Bravara et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
HBRANDON LEE FLAGNER
Plaintiff,
v.
ANNETTE CHAMBERS-SMITH, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action 2:25-cv-904
Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura
ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Hbrandon Lee Flagner, an Ohio inmate who is proceeding without the
assistance of counsel, brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in this suit against: 1) Annette
Chambers-Smith, Director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (“ODRC”)
(“Director Chambers-Smith”); 2) S. Evans, Office of the Chief Investigator, ODRC (“Chief
Investigator Evans”); 3) S. Clemmons, Institutional Investigator at Pickaway Correctional
Institute (“PCI”) (“Investigator Evans”); 4) Miss Bravara, Food Service Manager at PCI
(“Manager Bravara”); 5) Miss Hill, Acting Food Service Supervisor at PCI (“Supervisor Hill”);
and 6) Michelle Tatman, State Dietician, ODRC (“Dietary Operations Manager Tatman”).
Plaintiff has filed a Motion seeking leave to amend his Complaint. (ECF No. 3.) That Motion
(ECF No. 3) is GRANTED.
This matter is also before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint (ECF Nos. 1–1, 1–2, 3–1), under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A to identify
cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, or any portion
of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
Case: 2:25-cv-00904-EAS-CMV Doc #: 6 Filed: 10/28/25 Page: 1 of 13 PAGEID #: <pageID>

2
seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b)(1)–(2); see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 (6th Cir.
1997). Having performed the initial screen, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff be permitted
to proceed on his free-exercise claim against Manager Bravura and Supervisor Hill in their
official capacities for injunctive relief and against Dietary Operations Manager Tatman in her
official and individual capacities for injunctive relief and damages, respectively. It is further
RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s remaining claims against the other Defendants be
DISMISSED as barred or for failing to state a claim.
Finally, this matter is before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s motion for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2), which is GRANTED. (ECF
No. 1.) Plaintiff must pay the full amount of the Court’s $350 filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).
Plaintiff’s certified trust fund statement reveals that he has $5.67 in his prison account, which is
insufficient to pay the filing fee.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust accounts
(Inmate ID Number A188413) at PCI is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio as an initial partial payment, 20% of the greater
of either the average monthly deposits to the inmate trust account or the average monthly balance
in the inmate trust account, for the six months immediately preceding the filing of the Complaint.
After full payment of the initial, partial filing fee, the custodian shall submit 20% of the
inmate’s preceding monthly income credited to the account, but only when the amount in the
account exceeds $10.00, until the full fee of $350.00 has been paid to the Clerk of this Court. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).
Case: 2:25-cv-00904-EAS-CMV Doc #: 6 Filed: 10/28/25 Page: 2 of 13 PAGEID #: <pageID>

3
Checks should be made payable to: Clerk, United States District Court. The checks
should be sent to:
Prisoner Accounts Receivable
260 U.S. Courthouse
85 Marconi Boulevard
Columbus, Ohio 43215
The prisoner’s name and this case number must be included on each check.
It is ORDERED that Plaintiff be allowed to prosecute his action without prepayment of
fees or costs and that judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs
had been prepaid. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and
the prison cashier’s office.
I. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to
“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). In
doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are
assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from
filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490
U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e):
(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid,
the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—
* * *
(B) the action or appeal—
(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or]
(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte
dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or
Case: 2:25-cv-00904-EAS-CMV Doc #: 6 Filed: 10/28/25 Page: 3 of 13 PAGEID #: <pageID>

4
upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See
also 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (requiring a court to conduct a screening of “a complaint in a civil action
in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a
governmental entity . . . [to] identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion
of the complaint [that is] frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted”).
Further, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the
basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also
Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule
8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual
demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B.,
727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013).
Although this pleading standard does not require “detailed factual allegations, a pleading
that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action”
is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not
“suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factual enhancement.” Id. (cleaned up).
Instead, to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up). Facial
plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The
plausibility of an inference depends on a host of considerations, including common sense and the
Case: 2:25-cv-00904-EAS-CMV Doc #: 6 Filed: 10/28/25 Page: 4 of 13 PAGEID #: <pageID>

5
strength of competing explanations for the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504
(citations omitted). Further, the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. Belmont Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 374 F. App’x 612,
614 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient
treatment, however, has limits; “courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim
asserted.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v.
Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).
II. 	ANALYSIS
Plaintiff is a follower of Judaism. (ECF No. 1–1, PageID# 18.) On April 12, 2025, he
went to food services at PCI to pick up his Seder meal for Passover. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that
Manager Bravara did not give him certain items that he needed for his Seder meal because they
were not authorized by Dietary Operations Manager Tatman. (Id.) Although Plaintiff does
specify the items he was denied, his exhibit suggests that they included grape juice and four
matzah wafers. (ECF No. 1–2, PageID# 21.) Plaintiff was, however, offered three matzah wafers,
but they were single-bagged instead of double-bagged to prevent contamination from contact
with non-kosher items. (ECF No. 1–1, PageID# 18; ECF No. 1–2, PageID# 21.) Because of that
improper packaging, Plaintiff refused them. (ECF No. 1–1, PageID# 18.) The same thing
allegedly happened the following day, April 13, 2025, when Plaintiff went to pick up his Seder
meal. (Id.)
Supervisor Hill allegedly failed to correct issues related to the unauthorized items and the
mishandling of the matzah. (Id.) Plaintiff then lodged an informal complaint, but Supervisor Hill
maintained that she had followed all procedures. (ECF No. 1–1, PageID #18; ECF No. 1–2,
PageID# 22.) Plaintiff escalated his grievance to Investigator Clemmons. (ECF No. 1–1,
PageID# 18; ECF No. 1–2, PageID# 23.) Investigator Clemmons confirmed with Supervisor Hill
Case: 2:25-cv-00904-EAS-CMV Doc #: 6 Filed: 10/28/25 Page: 5 of 13 PAGEID #: <pageID>

6
that kosher meal procedures had been followed and that decisions about the contents of Seder
meals were determined by ODRC’s Operation Support Center. (ECF No. 1–2, PageID# 24.)
Therefore, Plaintiff’s complaints about the unauthorized items for Seder meals could not be
addressed through the grievance process. (Id.) Plaintiff appealed to Chief Investigator Evans,
who upheld Investigator Clemmons’ findings. (Id. at PageID# 23, 21.)
Plaintiff additionally alleges that the general population is provided a “special festive
meal” on select holidays. (ECF No. 3–1, PageID # 55.) On July 4, 2025, such a meal was served
to the general population, but Plaintiff was denied participation because of his religious beliefs
and kosher status. (Id.) In an informal compliant, Plaintiff noted that Jewish inmates are always
denied special holiday meals and suggested that kosher options—such as watermelon—could be
easily provided with kosher trays already used by food service providers. (Id. at PageID# 59.)
Supervisor Hill responded that the guidelines for kosher holiday meals were made by the state
and that the meal enhancement for kosher meals is an omelet breakfast. (Id. at PageID# 62.)
After escalating his grievance, Investigator Clemmons confirmed that Supervisor Hill had
followed directions from Dietary Operations Manager Tatman regarding kosher meals on
holidays. (Id. at PageID# 61.) Inspector Clemmons closed Plaintiff’s grievance, and Plaintiff
unsuccessfully appealed to Chief Investigator Evans. (Id. at PageID# 60.)
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated his First Amendment and Equal Protection
rights. He sues all Defendants in their official capacities and additionally sues Chief
Investigator Evans and Dietary Operations Manager Tatman in their individual capacities. (ECF
No. 1–1, PageID# 15; ECF No. 3–1, PageID# 54.) He seeks compensatory damages from all
Defendants and punitive damages from Dietary Operations Manager Tatman. (ECF No. 1–1,
PageID# 14.) He also seeks injunctive relief in the form of an order compelling Defendants to
Case: 2:25-cv-00904-EAS-CMV Doc #: 6 Filed: 10/28/25 Page: 6 of 13 PAGEID #: <pageID>

7
change its policy to provide: 1) Seder meals during the first two nights of Passover; 2) two
unopened boxes of matzah every three days during Passover; 3) cheese during Shavuot; and 4)
fried items during Chanukah. (Id.) He also seeks an order requiring Defendants to treat Judaism
equally with other religious groups. (ECF No. 3–1, PageID# 58.)
A. 	Plaintiff’s Official-Capacity Claims for Damages
Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims for damages must be dismissed under the doctrine of
sovereign immunity. The Eleventh Amendment operates as a bar to federal-court jurisdiction
when a private citizen sues a state or its instrumentalities unless the state has given express
consent. Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1983); Lawson v. Shelby
Cty., 211 F.3d 331, 334 (6th Cir. 2000). A suit against a state official in his or her official
capacity is “not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official’s office,” and is
therefore “no different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). “There are three exceptions to sovereign immunity: (1) when the state
has waived immunity by consenting to the suit, (2) when Congress has expressly abrogated the
states’ sovereign immunity, and (3) when the doctrine set forth in Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123,
28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908), applies.” Boler v. Earley, 865 F.3d 391, 410 (6th Cir. 2017)
(citation omitted).
Here, no exception applies. First, “Ohio has not waived sovereign immunity in federal
court.” Mixon v. State of Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 1999). Second, “Section 1983 does
not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity.” Boler, 865 F.3d at 410 (citing Will, 491 U.S. at
66). Third, the Ex Parte Young doctrine applies only when a plaintiff brings “claims for
prospective relief against state officials sued in their official capacity to prevent future federal
constitutional or statutory violations.” Boler, 865 F.3d at 412. Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims
Case: 2:25-cv-00904-EAS-CMV Doc #: 6 Filed: 10/28/25 Page: 7 of 13 PAGEID #: <pageID>

8
for compensatory damages against all Defendants fall outside the scope of Ex Parte Young.
Accordingly, they are barred by sovereign immunity.
B. 	Plaintiff’s Remaining Claims
Plaintiff’s official-capacity claims against all Defendants for injunctive relief and his
individual-capacity claims against Chief Investigator Evans and Dietary Operations Manager
Tatman for damages must be denied, in part. To prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must plead
two elements: “(1) deprivation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States
(2) caused by a person acting under color of state law.” Hunt v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ., 542 F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Sch., 433 F.3d 460,
463 (6th Cir. 2006)). Plaintiff’s First Amendment and Equal Protection claims fail, in part, on the
first element—failing to allege a violation of his constitutional rights.
1. 	Free Exercise Claim
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states that “Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S.
Const. amend. I. This free exercise protection extends to inmates. Hayes v. Tenn., 424 F. App’x
546, 549 (6th Cir. 2011).
To state a free-exercise claim under § 1983, an inmate must allege that a belief or
practice “‘is religious in [his] own scheme of things,’” is sincerely held, and that prison officials
have infringed that belief or practice. Pryor v. Chambers-Smith, No. 24-3301, 2025 WL
1090997, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 2, 2025) (quoting Kent v. Johnson, 821 F.2d 1220, 1224-25 (6th
Cir. 1987). An inmate must also allege that the prison officials’ infringement constitutes a
substantial burden on his sincerely held religious belief. Mustin v. Wainwright, No. 23-3671,
2024 WL 3950810, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 27, 2024) (citations omitted). Prison officials
Case: 2:25-cv-00904-EAS-CMV Doc #: 6 Filed: 10/28/25 Page: 8 of 13 PAGEID #: <pageID>

9
substantially burden a prisoner’s religious exercise if they place “substantial pressure on an
adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs” or “effectively bar” his sincere faith-
based conduct. Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554, 565 (6th Cir. 2014) (cleaned up). Minor or
isolated incidents do not, however, create a substantial burden. Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282,
293 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding that isolated incidents of serving nonkosher food to an inmate was
insufficient to sustain a free exercise claim).
To the extent Plaintiff’s claim rests on Defendants’ failure to provide him with two Seder
meals, he has not alleged that his sincere beliefs were substantially burdened. Courts regularly
find that short-termed or limited denials of religious meals are de minimis and do not constitute
substantial burdens. Greenberg v. Hill, No. 2:07-CV-1076, 2009 WL 890521, at *6 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 31, 2009) (Jewish inmate denied a full Seder meal on two occasions did not have a free
exercise claim; burden was de minimis); Resch v. Rink, No. 2:21-CV-227, 2022 WL 794849, at
*4 (W.D. Mich. Mar. 16, 2022) (three-day denial of Passover meals not actionable); Lewis v.
Greason, No. 2:21-CV-11939, 2023 WL 8896274, at *6 (E.D. Mich. July 20, 2023), (temporary
lack of kosher meals did not constitute a constitutional violation), adopted and aff’d, 2024 WL
245530 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2024). Such is the case here.
On the other hand, Plaintiff also apparently challenges an ongoing policy that governs the
items that Jewish inmates receive for Seder meals. Plaintiff alleges Seder meals are “an essential
element of a religious service.” (ECF No. 1–1, PageID# 19.) He additionally alleges that he was
not provided necessary items for a Seder meal such as grape juice and an adequate amount of
matzah. (ECF No. 1–1, PageID# 18; ECF No. 1–2, PageID# 21.) Manager Bravara and
Supervisor Hill allegedly informed him that those allegedly necessary items had not been
authorized by Dietary Operations Manager Tatman. (ECF No. 1–1, at PageID# 18.) Moreover,
Case: 2:25-cv-00904-EAS-CMV Doc #: 6 Filed: 10/28/25 Page: 9 of 13 PAGEID #: <pageID>

10
Investigator Clemmons confirmed that the policy governing the contents of Seder meals
originated with ODRC’s Operations Support Center. (ECF No. 1–2, at PageID# 24.) Chief
Investigator Evans upheld that finding. (Id. at PageID# 23, 21.) These allegations, taken as true,
go beyond isolated incidents and plausibly challenge a policy that recurringly impacts Jewish
inmates’ free exercise of religion every year at Passover, “an especially critical and very special
time in the Jewish religion.” Whitney v. Brown, 882 F.2d 1068, 1073 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding that
a policy precluding Jewish inmates from observing Sabbath or Passover was unconstitutional
given their religious significance). Plaintiff has therefore stated a free-exercise claim on this
theory.
Plaintiff’s free-exercise claim against Director Chambers-Smith nevertheless fails. As
explained previously, to state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that an alleged
constitutional violation was caused by a person acting under color of state law. Hunt, 542 F.3d at
534. To establish that element, a plaintiff must show “personal involvement” by the defendant.
Grinter v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 575 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). This is because Ҥ 1983
liability cannot be imposed under a theory of respondeat superior.” Id. (citation omitted). Thus,
to hold a supervisor liable under § 1983, a plaintiff “must show that the official at least implicitly
authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct.” Everson v. Leis,
556 F.3d 484, 495 (6th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up). Because Plaintiff’s allegations do not mention
Director Chambers-Smith, he has not plausibly alleged that she authorized or acquiesced in the
deprivation of his free exercise rights.
Likewise, Plaintiff’s free exercise claim against Chief Investigator Evans and Investigator
Clemmons fails. Plaintiff’s chief allegations against these Defendants are that they denied his
grievances. The Sixth Circuit has determined that “denial of [a plaintiff’s] grievance appeal, it is
Case: 2:25-cv-00904-EAS-CMV Doc #: 6 Filed: 10/28/25 Page: 10 of 13 PAGEID #: <pageID>

11
clear, fails to state a claim.” Skinner v. Govorchin, 463 F.3d 518, 525 (6th Cir. 2006); see also
Shehee v. Lutrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that prisoner’s claims against
defendants whose only involvement was the denial of administrative remedies failed as a matter
of law).
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff be permitted to proceed on his free-
exercise claim against Manager Bravura and Supervisor Hill in their official capacities for
injunctive relief and against Dietary Operations Manager Tatman in her official and individual
capacities for injunctive relief and damages, respectively. It is further RECOMMENDED that
Plaintiff’s free exercise claims against the other Defendants in their official capacities for
injunctive relief be DISMISSED for failing to state a claim.
2. 	Equal Protection Claim
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state shall “deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The Equal Protection
clause “embodies the principle that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.”
Scarbrough v. Morgan Cty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 260 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)). “[T]o establish an equal protection
violation, a plaintiff must establish more than differential treatment alone—a discriminatory
intent or purpose is required.” Maye v. Klee, 915 F.3d 1076, 1085, (6th Cir. 2019).
Plaintiff fails to allege, however, that he is treated differently than similarly situated
inmates. Plaintiff alleges that the general population receives “special festive meals” on select
holidays, such as July 4, 2025, while Jewish inmates do not. (ECF No. 3–1, PageID# 55, 59.)
Plaintiff attributes this difference in treatment to his Jewish faith and maintains that it violates
the Equal Protection Clause. (Id.) But Jewish inmates are not similarly situated to inmates in the
Case: 2:25-cv-00904-EAS-CMV Doc #: 6 Filed: 10/28/25 Page: 11 of 13 PAGEID #: <pageID>

12
general prison population for purposes of dietary policies because their meals must comply with
different requirements. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit has expressly held that inmates with religious
dietary requirements are not similarly situated to inmates in the general population for equal
protection claims related to diet. Pleasant-Bey v. Tenn. Dep’t of Corr., No. 18-5424, 2019 WL
11880267, at *4 (6th Cir. Apr. 4, 2019) (“The district court correctly concluded that Pleasant-
Bey could not maintain an equal protection claim comparing the treatment of Muslim inmates
and general population inmates because those groups were not similarly situated with respect to
religious diets and fasting.”)
As the Supreme Court has explained “[t]he Equal Protection Clause does not forbid
classifications. It simply keeps governmental decisionmakers from treating differently persons
who are in all relevant respects alike.” Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 10 (1992) (emphasis
added). Because Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendants intentionally treated him differently
from inmates who are in all relevant aspects alike, his Equal Protection claim fails as a matter of
law.
Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s equal protection claim against all
Defendants in their official capacities for injunctive relief and his equal protection claims
against Chief Investigator Evans and Dietary Operations Manager Tatman in their individual
capacities for damages be dismissed for failing to state a claim.
III. DISPOSITION
Plaintiff’s Motion seeking leave to amend his Complaint (ECF No. 3) is GRANTED.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to file ECF Nos. 1–1, 1–2, and 3–1 as one consolidated document.
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (ECF No. 1) is also
GRANTED. It is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff be permitted to proceed on his free-exercise
claim against Manager Bravura and Supervisor Hill in their official capacities for injunctive
relief and against Dietary Operations Manager Tatman in her official and individual capacities
Case: 2:25-cv-00904-EAS-CMV Doc #: 6 Filed: 10/28/25 Page: 12 of 13 PAGEID #: <pageID>

13
for injunctive relief and damages, respectively. It is further RECOMMENDED that the rest of
Plaintiff’s claims be DISMISSED.
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen
(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those
specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with
supporting authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo
determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations
to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judge of this Court may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive
further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report
and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of
the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura
CHELSEY M. VASCURA
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Case: 2:25-cv-00904-EAS-CMV Doc #: 6 Filed: 10/28/25 Page: 13 of 13 PAGEID #: <pageID>