Young v. City of Logan et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
HAROLD D. YOUNG,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF LOGAN, et al.,
Defendants.
Case No. 2:25-cv-698
JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE
Magistrate Judge Deavers
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Harold Young, acting pro se, alleges that Defendants (a police officer
and the officer’s municipal employer) unlawfully took checks that belonged to Young
and gave them to Mr. Jeramy Huckleberry (who is not party to this suit). (Compl.,
Doc. 18). Separately, Young also requests a temporary restraining order (TRO) and
preliminary injunction (PI), claiming he needs to prevent retaliation against him for
filing 	this 	lawsuit. 	(Doc. 	4). 	Because 	Young 	is 	proceeding 	in 	forma 	pauperis,
Magistrate Judge Deavers screened his Complaint and request for a TRO and PI
under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and issued a Report and Recommendation. (R&R, Doc.
19). There, she recommends that the Court permit Young’s individual-capacity
Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim against Defendant Officer Kyle
Arnett to proceed, but dismiss all other claims. (Id. at #122). She further recommends
the Court deny Young’s request for a TRO and PI. (Id.). Young objected, three times.
(Docs. 20, 22, 24). He also moved to amend his Complaint, two times. (Docs. 21, 23).
And finally, Young requested the Court set a status conference and issue prompt
rulings on various pending motions. (Doc. 26). So, the Court ADOPTS the R&R (Doc.
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19), OVERRULES Young’s Objections (Docs. 20, 22, 24), and thus as recommended,
DISMISSES without prejudice all claims except Young’s unreasonable seizure claim
against Officer Kyle Arnett in his individual capacity and DENIES Young’s request
for a TRO and PI, (Doc. 4).
BACKGROUND
With Young’s filings now in the double digits, this suit has become a bit of a
mess. But his original Complaint is short and relatively straightforward. There, he
details an interaction that began when Logan police officers responded to a trespass
complaint (presumably from Young) involving a “Mr. Huckleberry” being unlawfully
present on Young’s property. (Doc. 18, #99). During that incident, Young alleges that
Huckleberry 	falsely 	accused 	Young 	of 	possessing 	checks 	that 	belonged 	to
Huckleberry. (Id.). Young informed the responding officers that “the checks in
question were his own and offered to retrieve them from inside the home.” (Id. at
#100). But Young claims that when he returned with the checks—which he alleges
“contained 	his 	full 	name, 	banking 	information, 	account 	number, 	and 	routing
number”—an officer took them and placed them in his pocket without explanation.
(Id.). The next day, Young encountered Huckleberry again and “discovered that he
was in possession of the very checks” that the officer had taken. (Id.). So presumably,
the officer had given the checks to Huckleberry. That is the extent of the facts alleged
in the Complaint. Based on these events, Young brings claims for (1) a violation of
his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, (2) negligent infliction of emotional distress, and
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(3) violation of Ohio privacy and identity protection laws (citing Ohio Revised Code
§ 1349.19 et seq. and “relevant tort law”). (Id. at #100–01).
Just over a month after he filed suit, and before the Magistrate Judge approved
his request to proceed in forma pauperis, Young filed an Emergency Motion for a
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction to Prevent Anticipated
Retaliation (Doc. 4). There, Young states that he “has observed early indicators of
retaliatory intent,” such as sudden involvement by “Code Enforcement,” “warnings
and scrutiny” directed at his residence, and an “uptick in passive monitoring” near
Young’s home—i.e., “marked police vehicles lingering in the vicinity.” (Id. at #17).
Based on this, Young claims that he “has a credible fear that the situation will
escalate into harassment, surveillance, or even physical intimidation.” (Id. at #18).
And Young claims the following foreseeable harms: (1) the chilling of his First
Amendment right to access the courts, (2) irreparable psychological and emotional
harm stemming from fear of retaliation, (3) disruption of the judicial process through
witness tampering, and (4) spoliation of evidence, “as City agents may act to conceal
or destroy materials relevant to this case.” (Id.). So, Young requests the Court issue
a TRO and PI restraining Defendants from any non-emergency contact with him,
entering within five hundred feet of his residence or known locations, pursuing code
enforcement actions against him, and deleting or concealing evidence related to
Young or this litigation. (Id. at #19). He also requests an emergency hearing. (Id.).
Because Young sought to proceed in forma pauperis, the matter was referred
under this Court’s Amended Columbus General Order 22-01 to a Magistrate Judge
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for initial handling. The Magistrate Judge granted Young’s second request to proceed
in forma pauperis and stated that she would conduct an initial screening of the
Complaint as soon as practicable. (Doc. 8). In the meantime, Young filed an
Emergency Motion to Preserve Body-Worn Camera Footage (Doc. 13), a Motion to
Obtain Electronic Case Filing Rights (Doc. 14), a Reply in support of his request for
a TRO, (Doc. 15), and the Declaration of Witness Jeramy Huckleberry (Doc. 16).
All of this occurred in less than a month, as the Magistrate Judge issued an
Order and Report and Recommendation only twenty-seven days after granting Young
leave to proceed in forma pauperis. (Doc. 19). There, invoking the Court’s screening
authority under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Magistrate Judge issued an R&R
recommending that the Court allow Young’s Fourth Amendment unreasonable
seizure claim against Defendant Officer Arnett in his individual capacity to proceed,
but dismiss all other claims. (Doc. 19, #122). She further recommends denying
Young’s request for a TRO and PI. (Id.). Finally, her Order denied Young’s Emergency
Motion to Preserve Body-Worn Camera Footage (Doc. 13) and his Motion by Pro Se
Litigant to Obtain Electronic Case Filing Rights (Doc. 14).
In the R&R portion of her Order, the Magistrate Judge begins by discussing
Young’s § 1983 claims against each Defendant. (Doc. 19, #108). As for the claims
against the City of Logan, she notes that any such claims “would be governed by
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).” (Id. at
#109). And under Monell, Young would need to assert some City policy or custom that
caused 	the 	alleged 	constitutional 	violation. 	(Id.). 	But 	while 	Young 	requests
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“injunctive relief requiring the Logan Police Department to implement and enforce
proper training, procedures, and oversight,” (Doc. 18, #102–03), he “makes no detailed
allegations of any official policy, failure to train, a custom of tolerance or acquiescence
to federal rights violations, or decision by a final policymaker that might give rise to
a claim under Monell,” (Doc. 19, #109). And even after liberally construing his request
for relief as a possible failure to train claim, the Magistrate Judge recommends
dismissing the § 1983 claims against the city because the Complaint lacks any
“specific facts related to the City of Logan’s actual training.” (Id. at #110).
Turning to Officer Arnett, the Magistrate Judge first notes that he is not
actually mentioned in the Complaint. (Id. at #111). But because of Young’s pro se
status, she infers that when Young discusses an officer who took his checks, Young
means Officer Arnett (and she points out that Young later confirms this in his motion
to preserve the body-cam footage). (Id.). The Magistrate Judge first recommends
dismissal of any claim against Arnett in his official capacity as both (1) duplicative of
claims against the city, and (2) failing for the same reason. (Id. at #112). Then, she
recommends that, based on the allegation that the officer took Young’s checks, the
Court should allow Young’s Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim against
Arnett in his individual capacity to proceed. (Id.). Finally, the Magistrate Judge finds
that Young fails to state any other § 1983 claims and recommends dismissing the
rest. (Id. at #112–14). Specifically, the Magistrate Judge finds that Young does not
have a Fourth Amendment fundamental right to privacy in his financial affairs as he
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claims, 	nor 	has 	Young 	asserted 	a 	Fourteenth 	Amendment 	due 	process 	claim
(whatever that claim might be). (Id.).
The R&R next addresses Young’s remaining state-law claims. First, the
Magistrate Judge finds that Young’s claim under Ohio Revised Code § 1349.19 (a
provision about disclosing breaches of computerized data) and unidentified “relevant
tort law” “has no applicability to Plaintiff’s allegations here.” (Id. at #115–16). Next,
the 	Magistrate 	Judge 	recommends 	dismissing 	Young’s 	negligent 	infliction 	of
emotional distress claim because under Ohio law he “must allege that he was aware
of real physical danger to himself or another” and he does not do so. (Id. at #116
(quoting Baker v. Lind, No. 1:23-CV-321, 2023 WL 3791646, at *4 (S.D. Ohio June 2,
2023), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:23-cv-321, 2023 WL 6161550 (S.D.
Ohio Sep. 21, 2023))).
The Magistrate Judge then recommends the Court deny Young’s motion
seeking a TRO and PI. (Id. at #117–20 (discussing Doc. 4)). That is so for several
reasons. First, “any claimed injury in [Young’s] TRO motion is not sufficiently related
to the conduct complained of in the Complaint,” as Young is instead alleging
retaliation after the filing of this action. (Id. at #117). And a plaintiff cannot “seek an
injunction pertaining to allegedly impermissible conduct not mentioned in his
original complaint.” (Id. at #117–18 (quoting Hairston v. Sparks, No. 1:22-cv-104,
2022 WL 22854896, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 22, 2022))). The Magistrate Judge also
found that the request for relief failed to meet the mark on the traditional preliminary
injunction factors (which also apply to a TRO): (1) likelihood of success on the merits,
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(2) risk of irreparable harm without the preliminary injunction, (3) risk of the
preliminary injunction harming others, and (4) whether the public interest would be
served by issuance of the preliminary injunction. (Id. at #118 (citing McNeilly v.
Land, 684 F.3d 611, 615 (6th Cir. 2012))). To start, the Magistrate Judge found that
Young “has made no showing of the required strong or substantial likelihood of
success on the merits of his action.” (Id. at #119). And any claims of irreparable harm
are “primarily pure speculation” because Young offers no evidentiary support for the
potential harms he lists. (Id.). Then, because these issues are dispositive, the
Magistrate Judge declined to even consider the final two factors. (Id. at #119–20
(citing Jones v. City of Monroe, 341 F.3d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 2003), abrogated on other
grounds by Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., 681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012) (en
banc))).
Along with offering recommendations on dispositive matters, the Order also
rules on two non-dispositive motions: Young’s Emergency Motion to Preserve Body-
Worn Camera Footage (Doc. 13) and Young’s Motion by Pro Se Litigant to Obtain
Electronic Case Filing Rights (Doc. 14)—denying both. (Id. at #120–22). She also
ordered him to refile the motion to preserve body-camera footage as well as his reply
in support of the motion for a TRO and PI, (Docs. 13, 15), because those filings did
not contain his original signature as a pro se litigant. (Id. at #121).
Finally, the R&R advised Young that he had fourteen days to serve and file
specific written objections. Young responded in force—he objected three times, (Docs.
20, 22, 24), and attempted to amend his Complaint twice, (Doc. 21, 23). Young’s first
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objection, the only one he filed within fourteen days, objects to the Magistrate Judge’s
recommended dismissals of his claims and her recommendation to deny the TRO and
PI. (Doc. 20). As to the former, he purports to object to the recommended dismissals
of a First Amendment retaliation claim and Fourteenth Amendment claims (due
process and equal protection). (Id. at #125–26). But these objections are a bit odd, as
his Complaint did not discuss a First Amendment retaliation or a Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection claim. As for the non-dispositive motions, Young also
objects to the Magistrate Judge’s denial of his motion to preserve evidence, (Doc. 13),
and the denial of his motion for pro se electronic filing rights, (Doc. 14). (Id. at #127).
Over two weeks later, Young sought leave to amend his Complaint to address
the deficiencies identified by the Magistrate Judge in her R&R. (Doc. 21). There, he
briefly states that he has met the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) standard
to amend his Complaint and asks to file his Amended Complaint in the form attached
as Exhibit A; but he fails to attach the asserted Exhibit A. (Id. at #130). On that same
day, the Court received more objections from Young. (Doc. 22). There, he objects to
the recommended dismissal of his claims against the City of Logan, his Fourteenth
Amendment due process claims (again), his state-law claims, and his motion for a
TRO and PI (also again). (Id. at #134–36).
Fast forward another month and a half. Young once again asks the Court to
grant him leave to file an amended complaint. (Doc. 23). This time he clarifies (and
successfully attaches an amended complaint) that he seeks leave to amend to “adjust
the amount of damages sought and to further clarify the relief requested.” (Id. at
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#138). Specifically, he clarifies that he is seeking $50,000 in punitive damages (his
original Complaint did not list an amount). (Id.).
Three days later, the Court received its third set of objections. (Doc. 24). In
content, though, they are identical to the first set, (see Doc. 20), so the Court
disregards them.
On that same day, the Court also received what Young labeled as his Reply in
Support of Emergency Motion to Preserve Body-Worn Camera Footage (Doc. 25). This
poses a problem, as the Magistrate Judge had denied that motion on August 28, 2025.
(Doc. 19). Compounding the confusion, while he filed the Reply on November 11, 2025,
he dated the document as being signed on August 26, 2025, (see Doc. 25, #147)—one
day after Defendants’ Response to the original motion and two days before the
Magistrate Judge ruled on it. Presumably, Young intended the Magistrate Judge to
have the benefit of his Reply when she ruled on his original motion to preserve body-
camera footage, but for some reason, it arrived at the Court three months later. In
any event, Young’s reply did not fix the fundamental problem with his motion, that
his “assertion of imminent destruction [of the footage] is mere conjecture.” (Doc. 19,
#121). While Young is welcome to file another motion seeking his injunction, the
Court warns him that he must provide actual, concrete evidence of a real danger of
evidence destruction.
That brings us to Young’s final filing in this Court: his request for a status
conference and “prompt ruling” on his pending motions. (Doc. 26, #154). As to the
latter request, the Court will oblige, making the former request moot.
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LEGAL STANDARD
When addressing dispositive motions, including requests for preliminary
injunctions, Magistrate Judges issue a Report and Recommendation. See Fed. R. Civ.
P. 72(b). And, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3), “district courts review
a[] [report and recommendation] de novo after a party files a timely objection.” Bates
v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., No. 1:22-cv-337, 2023 WL 4348835, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
July 5, 2023). But that de novo review requirement extends only to “any portion to
which a proper objection was made.” Id. (quotation omitted). A litigant must identify
each issue in the report and recommendation to which he objects with sufficient
clarity for the Court to identify it, or else the litigant forfeits the Court’s de novo
review of the issue. Miller v. Currie, 50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995) (“The objections
must be clear enough to enable the district court to discern those issues that are
dispositive and contentious.”). In response to such an objection, “the district court
may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence;
or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Bates, 2023 WL
4348835, at *1 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3)) (cleaned up).
When it comes to non-dispositive matters, a different approach applies. As to
those, the Court “must consider timely objections and modify or set aside any part of
the order that is clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a); see also
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) (permitting judges to designate to magistrate judges any
pretrial matter not excepted by the statute and to reconsider any decision on these
pretrial matters under a “clearly erroneous or contrary to law” standard). “The
‘clearly erroneous’ standard applies to factual findings and the ‘contrary to law’
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standard applies to legal conclusions.” Simms v. Warden, No. 2:22-cv-474, 2024 WL
4783911, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 14, 2024). As to the former, factual findings are clearly
erroneous if the Court has a “definite and firm conviction” that a magistrate judge
has erred. Id. As to the latter, legal conclusions are “‘contrary to law’ when the
magistrate judge has ‘misinterpreted or misapplied applicable law.’” Id. (citations
omitted). Either approach affords the magistrate judge wide discretion and the Court
will reverse a magistrate judge’s order only if that discretion is abused. Bonasera v.
Pa. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., No. 2:19-cv-3817, 2021 WL 1785618, *1 (S.D. Ohio May
5, 2021).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Young 	has 	objected 	to 	both 	(1) the 	Magistrate 	Judge’s 	report 	and
recommendations on dispositive matters, and (2) the Magistrate Judge’s rulings on
non-dispositive motions. The Court reviews each but ultimately concludes that
Young’s objections are not well taken on either front.
A. 	The Court Adopts the R&R.
The Court finds that Young cleared the first hurdle to obtain district court
review—he offers sufficiently specific objections to the R&R. So the Court reviews the
objected-to portions de novo. True, Young’s first set of objections was somewhat
lacking on this front, (see Doc. 20), but his second set directly objects to most of the
Magistrate Judge’s dismissal recommendations: (1) the dismissal of Young’s claims
against the City of Logan, (2) the dismissal of Young’s Fourteenth Amendment
claims, (3) the dismissal of Young’s state-law claims, and (4) the denial of his request
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for a TRO. (Doc. 22, #133–36). So the Court disregards Young’s first objections, at
least as to the R&R, 1 (Doc. 20), but treats his second objections, (Doc. 22), as proper.
One could perhaps quibble that the Court received these second objections eighteen
days after the deadline for objecting. But given Young’s pro se status, and more
importantly, that he received the R&R by regular mail and objected by the same, the
Court considers them timely. Sims v. Moss, No. 3:24-cv-1052, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
220803, *1 (M.D. Tenn. June 18, 2025). But while the Court considers the objections,
the Court’s de novo review of the objected-to portions does not change the outcome.
As discussed below, the Court agrees with the R&R and adopts it in its entirety.
To start, the Court agrees that Young fails to state a § 1983 claim against the
City of Logan. (Doc. 19, #108). As Young acknowledges, any such claim against the
city is governed by Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, and its requirement that Young’s injury
arise from some city custom or policy. (Doc. 22, #134). And while Young’s objections
clarify 	his 	Complaint’s 	vague 	reference 	to 	“proper 	training, 	procedures, 	and
oversight,” (Doc. 18, #103), as the city’s “failure to establish adequate safeguards for
private property entrusted during police investigations,” Young still fails to point to
any facts (other than what allegedly happened to him) in support of, or further
explaining, the alleged failure, (Doc. 22, #134). So, the Court agrees with the
Magistrate Judge that Young has failed to plausibly allege a custom or policy, and
therefore the Court dismisses any § 1983 claims against the City of Logan. And for
1 Young’s objections to the Magistrate Judge’s rulings on his non-dispositive motions are
discussed below. See infra Law & Analysis, Part B.
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that same reason, the Court also dismisses any official capacity § 1983 claims against
Officer Arnett.
Turn now to the Fourteenth Amendment claims. While his Complaint did not
make it clear, Young’s objections now clarify that he is pressing both procedural and
substantive due process Fourteenth Amendment claims regarding the deprivation of
his property (the checks). (Doc. 22, #135). The Magistrate Judge recommends
dismissing any procedural due process claim because Young provided no facts
showing that the state lacks adequate post-deprivation remedies. (Doc. 19, #113–14
(citing Jenkins v. Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 2:24-cv-4244, 2024 WL 5120020, at *2 (S.D.
Ohio Dec. 16, 2024))). On this front, his objections argue that Ohio remedies are
inadequate because they “cannot cure the exposure of sensitive financial data once it
has been disseminated.” (Doc. 22, #135). But the case that he cites, Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U.S. 527 (1981), did not recognize that the exposure of sensitive financial data
gives rise to an incurable harm. Rather, it states that when “[t]he remedies provided
could have fully compensated the respondent for the property loss he suffered, … they
are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process.” Id. at 544. Nor in any event
does the Court see how any remedy it could offer under § 1983 would do anything
more than state remedies could to cure any harm that arose from Huckleberry or the
officer seeing what was on the checks. So the Court dismisses that claim.
Turning to the substantive due process claim, the Magistrate Judge found that
Young’s factual allegations do not suggest circumstances that would “shock the
conscience” and more fundamentally, “[p]rivacy in financial records is not a right that
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is either fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” (Doc. 19, #114
(quoting Moore v. Wesbanco Bank, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-514, 2013 WL 11821469, at *8
(S.D. Ohio Nov. 12, 2013), aff’d, 612 F. App’x 816 (6th Cir. 2015). The Court agrees
that “[n]either the Supreme Court nor the Sixth Circuit has recognized a fundamental
right to privacy in financial records” and accordingly dismisses Young’s substantive
due process claim. Moore, 2013 WL 11821469, at *8.
As to the remaining § 1983 claim: the Fourth Amendment unreasonable
seizure claim against Officer Arnett, Young of course does not object to the Magistrate
Judge’s finding that it should proceed. (Doc. 19, #112). The Court, finding no clear
error, agrees that this one claim—based on Officer Arnett allegedly taking Young’s
checks—should proceed.
Turn now to the state-law claims. The Magistrate Judge recommends that
Young’s claim under Ohio Revised Code § 1349.19 and “relevant tort law” be
dismissed because that statute deals with computerized data breaches and only
authorizes actions by the Ohio Attorney General. (Id. at #115–16). Young objects that
this analysis neglects “to consider the statute’s purpose” of protecting personal
identifying information, and argues that regardless, he has sufficiently alleged
negligence, conversion, and invasion of privacy claims. (Doc. 22, #135). Unfortunately
for Young, this Court cannot entertain a claim under an Ohio statute that does not
create a cause of action. And even if the Court squints and generously interprets
Young’s reference to “relevant tort law” as advancing a negligence claim based on an
alleged breach of some duty that § 1349.19 creates, that claim still fails because
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Young 	failed 	to 	plausibly 	allege 	any 	violation 	of 	that 	provision. 	And 	Young’s
references to other tort claims fail because he has not alleged any facts about
negligence, conversion, or invasion of privacy. (Id.). So the Court dismisses those
state-law claims, too. Separately, Young did not object to the Magistrate Judge’s
recommended dismissal of his negligent infliction of emotional distress claim. (Doc
19, #116–17; Doc. 22, #135). The Court finds no clear error there and dismisses that
claim, as well.
That brings us to the recommended dismissal of Young’s request for a TRO and
PI. (Doc. 4). That request is largely based on Young’s allegations of retaliation since
the filing of this Complaint. (See generally id.). The Magistrate Judge found that
Young has no grounds to seek emergency relief based on unlawful conduct not found
in his original Complaint, and that Young’s allegations of retaliatory conduct by the
Defendants are of course, not in his Complaint. (Doc. 19, #117–18). Moreover, she
found that the “motion could not succeed on its merits” under the preliminary
injunction factors because Young has not shown a likelihood of success nor a risk of
irreparable harm beyond “pure speculation.” (Id. at #118–19). Young’s objections, for
his part, claim that the R&R fails to consider the “irreparable harm posed by the
unauthorized circulation of [his] financial instruments.” (Doc. 22, #136).
This Court agrees with the R&R and denies the motion. For one, the Court
fails 	to 	see 	how 	Young’s 	requested 	injunctive 	relief 	concerns 	his 	“financial
instruments,” as he is requesting the Court restrain Defendants from contacting him,
pursuing 	code 	enforcement 	against 	him, 	and deleting 	evidence. 	(Doc. 	4, 	#19).
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Separately, the Court agrees that the motion fails under the preliminary injunction
factors. For example, as to success on the merits, Young fails to plead facts that allow
the Court to reasonably infer that Defendants are acting unlawfully. The “early
indicators 	of 	retaliatory 	intent” 	he 	pleads, 	such 	as 	“involvement 	by 	Code
Enforcement,” “warnings and scrutiny directed at [Young’s] residence,” and “marked
police vehicles” near his home are vague and inconclusive; Young also fails to explain
how they are unlawful. (Id. at #17). Nor do those allegations suggest that Young is
actually facing irreparable harm. And as the Magistrate Judge notes, a Court need
not consider all the factors if those it has considered are dispositive. (Doc. 19, #119–
20 (citing Jones, 341 F.3d at 476, abrogated in part on other grounds by Lewis, 681
F.3d 312). So the Court denies Young’s motion for a TRO and PI. (Doc. 4).
Accordingly, the Court adopts the R&R (Doc. 19) in its entirety, dismissing all
claims without prejudice—except Young’s Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure
claim against Officer Arnett in his individual capacity, which may proceed—and
denying his request for a TRO and PI, (Doc. 4).
B. 	The Court Overrules the Objections on the Rulings on the Non-
Dispositive Motions.
Young also objects to the Magistrate Judge’s ruling on two of his non-
dispositive motions. (Doc. 20, #127). The Court’s review on those rulings, however, is
more circumspect: findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, and legal conclusions
are set aside if they are contrary to the law. Finding no such error, the Court overrules
Young’s objections.
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As to the first motion, the Magistrate Judge denied Young’s Emergency Motion
to Preserve Body-Worn Camera Footage (Doc. 13) both because it was “premature as
discovery ha[d] not begun” and because Young’s “assertion of imminent destruction
[was] mere conjecture … not ‘premised on a demonstration that a real danger of
evidence destruction exist[ed].’” (Doc. 19, #120–21 (quoting John B. v. Goetz, 531 F.3d
448, 459 (6th Cir. 2008))). Young objected, claiming that he had “provided factual
support showing Defendants’ intent to conceal or destroy key evidence.” (Doc. 20,
#127).
The Court disagrees with Young. The only factual support he initially provided
is his assertion that body-worn camera footage “is subject to automatic deletion under
Ohio law and internal police policies,” (Doc. 13, #50 (citing Ohio Revised Code
§ 2933.82)); nor does he provide any additional facts in his objection, (Doc. 20, #127).
And as the Magistrate Judge pointed out, that provision “relates only to securing
biological 	evidence” 	(and the 	Court 	notes 	that 	it 	does 	not discuss 	“automatic
deletion”). (Doc. 19, #121). So the Court overrules the objection.
Second, the Magistrate Judge denied Young’s Motion by Pro Se Litigant to
Obtain Electronic Case Filing Rights (Doc. 14) because “the grant of electronic filing
privileges is a privilege granted to pro se litigants in the discretion of [the] [c]ourt,”
(Doc. 19, #21 (emphasis in original) (quoting Needham v. Butler Cnty. Jail, No. 1:19-
cv-294, 2019 WL 5883643, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 12, 2019))), and Young “has not
demonstrated any need for such privileges or given any reason why they should be
granted,” (id.). Young objects but does not offer any specific facts about why he needs
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ECF access. (Doc. 20, #127). Accordingly, the Court overrules the objection as the
Magistrate Judge did not act contrary to law. Separately, the Court advises Young
(as did the Magistrate Judge) that he may renew this motion at a later time if he can
demonstrate individual circumstances that warrant granting him the access he
seeks.
C. 	Young’s Other Motions.
That leaves Young’s other outstanding motions on which the Magistrate Judge
has not ruled. Specifically, Young appears to have a desire to amend his Complaint
to pursue those now-dismissed claims against Defendants. (See Docs. 21, 23). In the
interest of efficiency, the Court will rule on them now, rather than waiting for the
Magistrate Judge to address them first. The Court denies his two outstanding
motions to amend his Complaint, (Docs. 21, 23), but grants Young thirty days in
which to seek leave to file a new amended complaint to address the issues raised in
this Order. And because the Court has now ruled on all outstanding motions, it denies
Young’s Motion to set a status conference, (Doc. 26), as moot, but without prejudice
to his ability to re-raise the need for a status conference if one exists.
CONCLUSION
The Court OVERRULES Young’s Objections (Docs. 20, 22, 24) and ADOPTS
the R&R’s (Doc. 19) recommendations. The Court therefore DISMISSES all claims
except Young’s Fourth Amendment unreasonable seizure claim against Defendant
Officer Kyle Arnett in his individual capacity WITHOUT PREJUDICE. The Court
DENIES 	Young’s 	Motion 	for 	Temporary 	Restraining 	Order 	and 	Preliminary
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Injunction to Prevent Anticipated Retaliation (Doc. 4). The Court also DENIES
Young’s two motions to amend the Complaint, (Docs. 21, 23), but GRANTS Young
thirty-one days (on or before March 9, 2026) in which to seek leave to file an amended
complaint, attaching the proposed amended complaint. Finally, the Court DENIES
as moot Young’s Motion to Set Status and for Prompt Ruling on Pending Objections
and Motions (Doc. 26).
SO ORDERED.
February 6, 2026
DATE 	DOUGLAS R. COLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
OUGLAS R. COLE
NITED STATES DISTRICT	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C	C
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