Clark et al v. Village of South Solon City Counsel et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
KURTIS CLARK, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
VILLAGE OF SOUTH SOLON
CITY COUNSEL, et al.,
Defendants.
:
:
Case No. 2:25-cv-0462
Judge Sarah D. Morrison
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P.
Deavers
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiffs Kurtis Clark and Julie Scott, proceeding without assistance of
counsel, assert thirteen claims against the Village of South Solon City Counsel,
Village councilmember James Doughty, Village Mayor Damian Grube, and their
neighbor, Timothy Warnock. Between April 29 and August 5, 2025, Plaintiffs
engaged in extensive and unnecessary motions practice and the Court ordered
Plaintiffs to stop filing documents in this case until further order. (ECF No. 71.)
Undeterred, Plaintiffs continued to file. Now before the Court are Plaintiffs’ eight
pending motions.
For ease of analysis, the Court will address Plaintiffs’ eight motions in four
buckets. First, Plaintiffs’ motions for injunctive relief filed before August 5, 2025.
(ECF Nos. 2, 3, and 20.) Second, Plaintiffs’ Motion to Preclude Defendants from
Utilizing Village-Funded Counsel. (ECF No. 4.) Third, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial
Case: 2:25-cv-00462-SDM-SCS Doc #: 88 Filed: 11/24/25 Page: 1 of 4 PAGEID #: <pageID>

2
Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 69.) And fourth, Plaintiffs’ motions filed after
August 5, 2025. (ECF Nos. 79, 81, and 85.)
I. ANALYSIS
A. Plaintiffs fail to establish entitlement to injunctive relief.
At the time the case was filed, Plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction
(ECF No. 2) and an ex parte temporary restraining order (ECF No. 3). Before the
Court resolved either motion, Plaintiffs filed a “renewed” motion intended to
supplement the earlier-filed motions. (ECF No. 20.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
65 governs both temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions. “The
standard for addressing a motion for a temporary restraining order is the same as
the standard applied to a motion for a preliminary injunction.” Ferron v. Search
Cactus, L.L.C., No. 2:06-cv-327, 2007 WL 2110497, *1 (S.D. Ohio July 13, 2007)
(Frost, J.). That standard requires courts to consider:
1) whether the movant has shown a strong or substantial likelihood of
success on the merits; 2) whether irreparable harm will result without
an injunction; 3) whether issuance of a preliminary injunction will
result in substantial harm to others; and 4) whether the public interest
is advanced by the injunction.
Id. While courts “balance” these four factors, “the existence of an irreparable injury
is mandatory.” EOG Res., Inc. v. Lucky Land Mgmt., LLC, 134 F.4th 868, 883 (6th
Cir. 2025) (quotation and citation omitted). Injunctive relief “is an extraordinary
remedy which should be granted only if the movant carries his or her burden of
proving that the circumstances clearly demand it.” Overstreet v. Lexington Fayette
Urb. Co. Govt., 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002).
Case: 2:25-cv-00462-SDM-SCS Doc #: 88 Filed: 11/24/25 Page: 2 of 4 PAGEID #: <pageID>

3
Plaintiffs state in conclusory fashion that they have shown a strong
likelihood of success on the merits. (ECF No. 2, PAGEID # 34.) They provide no
analysis or explanation supporting their conclusion. (Id.) There is a similar dearth
of support for Plaintiffs’ proposition that they stand to suffer irreparable harm
without an injunction. In particular, Plaintiffs provide no explanation as to why
their alleged harm is irreparable. (Id., PAGEID # 35.) Plaintiffs thus fail to
establish that they are entitled to temporary or preliminary injunctive relief. The
Motions (ECF Nos. 2, 3, 20) are DENIED.
B. Plaintiffs cannot choose Defendants’ counsel.
In their Motion to Preclude Defendants from Utilizing Village-Funded
Counsel, Plaintiffs ask the Court “for an order prohibiting Defendants” from using
“taxpayer-funded representation.” (ECF No. 4.) There is no legal basis for such an
order. The Motion (ECF No. 4) is DENIED.
C. Plaintiffs’ partial motion for summary judgment is improper.
Next, Plaintiffs move the Court for partial summary judgment based on
“Defendants’ express and deemed admissions to Requests for Admission[.]” (ECF
No. 69, PAGEID # 634.) But the Magistrate Judge struck those so-called admissions
as premature. (See ECF Nos. 44, 70.) The Partial Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 69) is thus DENIED.
D. Plaintiffs post-August 5 motions were filed out of Order.
On August 5, 2025, the Court ordered Plaintiffs “to stop filing documents in
this case until further Order of the Court.” (ECF No. 71.) Despite the Court’s clear
Case: 2:25-cv-00462-SDM-SCS Doc #: 88 Filed: 11/24/25 Page: 3 of 4 PAGEID #: <pageID>

4
directive, Plaintiffs filed motions on October 17 (ECF No. 79), October 22 (ECF No.
81), and November 14, 2025 (ECF No. 85). Those motions are hereby STRICKEN.
II. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Plaintiffs’ motions filed before August 5, 2025 (ECF
Nos. 2, 3, 4, 20, and 69) are DENIED and Plaintiffs’ motions filed after August 5,
2025 (ECF Nos. 79, 81, 85) are STRICKEN.
The parties are ORDERED to file a joint proposed amended case schedule
within twenty-one days. The Court’s August 5, 2025 Order (ECF No. 71) remains
in effect and the parties shall not file any motions until after an amended case
schedule is established for this case. After that time, Plaintiffs are CAUTIONED
that any future filings must comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio,
and this Court’s Standing Orders.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Sarah D. Morrison
SARAH D. MORRISON, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
Case: 2:25-cv-00462-SDM-SCS Doc #: 88 Filed: 11/24/25 Page: 4 of 4 PAGEID #: <pageID>