Red Roof Inns, Inc. et al v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
RED ROOF INNS, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs,
v.
LIBERTY MUTUAL FIRE
INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant.
:
:
Case No. 2:25-cv-00352
Chief Judge Sarah D. Morrison
Magistrate Judge Chelsey M.
Vascura
OPINION AND ORDER
Red Roof Inns, Inc., Red Roof Franchising, LLC, RRI West Management,
LLC, and RRF Holding Company, LLC (collectively, “Red Roof”) filed this lawsuit
against Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Company in response to Liberty’s refusal to
defend Red Roof in cases filed against it under the Trafficking Victims Protection
Reauthorization Act, 18 U.S.C. 1591, et seq. (“TVPRA”). Liberty responded, in part,
with counterclaims for declaratory judgment against Red Roof.
Red Roof has now filed a Partial Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF
No. 34) and Liberty responded with a Cross-Motion for Partial Judgment on the
Pleadings. (ECF No. 36.) Both motions are ripe for decision. For the reasons below,
Red Roof’s Motion is GRANTED and Liberty’s Cross-Motion is DENIED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
There are eleven pending lawsuits against Red Roof that include a claim
under Section 1595(a) of the TVPRA. (See ECF No. 34, PAGEID# 2153–54.) The
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plaintiffs in those lawsuits allege that they were trafficked for sex at Red Roof
hotels and that Red Roof benefited from the crime.
Red Roof sought coverage under its general liability insurance. The
applicable commercial general liability policies were issued by Liberty between July
1, 2011, and July 1, 2017. (ECF No. 36, PAGEID# 2335.) Liberty denied coverage,
and Red Roof filed this suit.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion for judgment on the pleadings made under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(c) is analyzed in the same manner as a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6). Tucker v. Middleburg-Legacy Place, 539 F.3d 545, 549 (6th Cir. 2008). To
overcome such a motion,
A complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations and quotations
omitted). The complaint need not contain detailed factual allegations, but it must
include more than labels, conclusions, and formulaic recitations of the elements of a
cause of action. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.) “Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.” Id. A motion for judgment on the pleadings should be granted when there is
no material issue of fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Tucker, 539 F.3d at 549.
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III. ANALYSIS
The following claims are at issue in both motions for partial judgment on the
pleadings: (1) Red Roof’s Count I (breach of contract); (2) Red Roof’s Count II
(declaratory judgment); and (3) the portion of Liberty’s Counterclaims I–XII
addressing Liberty’s duty to defend (declaratory judgment). These claims turn on
whether Liberty has a duty to defend Red Roof in eleven underlying lawsuits.
A. Liberty has a duty to defend Red Roof under Coverage A of the
insurance policies.
Under Ohio law,1 insurance policies are construed like any other written
contract. Scott v. Allstate Indem. Co., 417 F. Supp. 2d 929, 932 (N.D. Ohio
2006). “An insurance contract will only require interpretation if the applicable
language is ambiguous—that is, open to more than one interpretation.” Id. When
there is ambiguous language in an insurance contract, such language must be
“construed strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of
the insured.” Id. However, “liberal construction cannot be used to create an
ambiguity where one does not exist.” Id. “If the terms of a policy are clear and
unambiguous, a court must enforce the contract as written, giving words used in the
contract their plain and ordinary meaning.” Id. at 933.
If an insurance contract provides that an insurer will defend the insured,
then the insurer is under a duty to provide a defense so long as the “allegations
1 “When an insurance contract predicated upon diversity jurisdiction is before
[the] Court, the substantive law of the forum state” applies. Kanter v. Travelers
Casualty and Surety Co. of Am., 477 F. Supp. 3d 637, n. 4 (S.D. Ohio 2020)
(Morrison, J.) (citation omitted).
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state a claim that potentially or arguably falls within the liability insurance
coverage.” Ohio Govt. Risk Mgt. Plan v. Harrison, 874 N.E.2d 1155, 1160 (Ohio
2007). “An insurer’s duty to defend is broader than and distinct from its duty to
indemnify.” Sharonville v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 846 N.E.2d 833, 837 (Ohio 2006).
“For purposes of determining an insurer’s duty to defend, the insured’s conduct is
evaluated on the basis of the allegations in the complaint against the insured.” Doe
v. Pentz, No. 2:07-cv-00319, 2010 WL 11636090, *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2010)
(Watson, J.) (collecting cases). “When an insurer has a duty to defend one claim
asserted against its insured in a lawsuit, it must defend the entire lawsuit, even
though other claims may not come within the coverage of the policy.” Holloway
Sportswear, Inc. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 177 F. Supp. 2d 764, 769 (S.D. Ohio 2001)
(Rice, J.). If an insurer owes a duty to defend but fails to honor that obligation, that
failure “constitutes a material breach of the contract.” Sanderson v. Ohio Edison
Co., 635 N.E.2d 19, 23 (Ohio 1994).
Turning to the insurance contract at hand, Red Roof seeks coverage under
both Coverage A and Coverage B. Because the Court finds that Red Roof is entitled
to coverage for the underlying lawsuits under Coverage A, it need not address
Coverage B.
Coverage A provides insurance for bodily injury and property damage
liability. The relevant portion of Coverage A provides:
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated to
pay as damages because of “bodily injury” or “property damage” to
which this insurance applies. We will have the right and duty to
defend the insured against any “suit” seeking those damages.
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However, we will have no duty to defend the insured against any
“suit” seeking damages for “bodily injury” or “property damage” to
which this insurance does not apply. . . .
b. This insurance applies to “bodily injury” and “property damage” only
if:
(1) The “bodily injury” or “property damage” is caused by an
“occurrence” that takes place in the “coverage territory”; [and]
(2) The “bodily injury” or “property damage” occurs during the policy
period[.]
(ECF No. 18-12, PAGEID# 2064.) “Occurrence” is defined as “an accident, including
continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful
conditions.” (Id.) An “accident” is not defined in the policies; the Ohio Supreme
Court has defined the term as “an unexpected happening without intention or
design.” Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. White, 913 N.E.2d 426, 431 (Ohio 2009) (citing
Rothman v. Metro. Cas. Ins. Co., 16 N.E.2d 417 (Ohio 1938)). Thus, “if the injury
was not intentionally caused, then it was accidentally suffered.” Id.
To determine whether Liberty owes a duty to defend, the Court must review
the operative complaints in the underlying lawsuits to determine whether those
actions fall within the policies’ coverage. Each underlying lawsuit includes a civil
claim against Red Roof brought under the TVPRA.
The TVPRA is a comprehensive federal law enacted to address human
trafficking by, among other things, providing resources and legal mechanisms to
support victims. The statutory scheme defines a set of certain crimes and provides a
civil remedy to victims of those crimes. Red Roof is not facing any criminal liability
in the underlying lawsuits.
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The provision of the TVPRA providing for civil remedy states in relevant
part:
An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a
civil action against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, or
attempts or conspires to benefit, financially or by receiving anything of
value from participation in a venture which that person knew or
should have known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter)
in an appropriate district court of the United States and may recover
damages and reasonable attorneys fees.
18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). Thus, under the TVPRA, a victim of sex trafficking may bring
(a) a direct civil claim against the perpetrator of her trafficking and (b) a
“beneficiary” civil claim against “whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by
receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew
or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of [the TVPRA].” 18 U.S.C.
§ 1595(a).
The plaintiffs in the underlying lawsuits seek to hold Red Roof liable as a
TVPRA beneficiary. Under this theory, the plaintiffs must allege and prove that
Red Roof “(1) ‘knowingly benefit[ted] financially or by receiving anything of value’
(2) from participation in a venture [and] (3) that [it] ‘knew or should have known
[the venture] has engaged in’ sex trafficking under [the TVPRA].” Ramsbottom,
2024 WL 4993391, at *16 (quoting A.B. v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 455 F. Supp. 3d 171,
188 (E.D. Pa. 2020)); see also Powell v. W. Express, Inc., No. 3:24-cv-1315, 2025 WL
2306949, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 11, 2025) (Crenshaw, J.) (stating that “venture
liability” requires a showing that “(1) [the defendant] was part of a ‘venture,’(2) [the
defendant] knowingly benefitted from participation in the venture; and (3) [the
defendant] knew or should have known that the venture would violate § 1591(a)(1)”
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(citing A.M. v. Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 728 F. Supp. 3d 787, 797 (S.D. Ohio
2024))).
Liberty argues that the second element of a TVPRA civil claim precludes
coverage for Red Roof because that element requires a level of intent that is at odds
with an “occurrence” under the policies. For its part, Red Roof argues that the
relevant inquiry is not whether “participation in a venture” requires an intent to
act, but whether it requires an intent to cause harm.
1. The TVPRA’s “participation in a venture” element does
not require an intent to cause harm.
The TVPRA does not define “participation in a venture,” so the Court will
walk the “well-trod path” of statutory interpretation to define the term. United
States v. Fitzgerald, 906 F.3d 437, 442 (6th Cir. 2018). Terms are given their
“ordinary and natural meaning.” Id. (quoting United States v. Miller, 734 F.3d 530,
540 (6th Cir. 2013)). But if “a word in isolation is susceptible of multiple meanings,”
the Court also considers the word’s “placement and purpose in the statutory
scheme.” Id. (quoting Miller at 540). Finally, “working only within the range of
‘textually permissible meanings,’ [the Court will] consider which of those
interpretations would serve, rather than frustrate, the statute’s manifest purpose.”
Id. at 442–43 (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law 57 (2012)).
Starting with the phrase’s ordinary and natural meaning, this Court recently
held that “participation,” as used in the TVPRA, “simply means ‘taking part.’” M.A.
v. Wyndham Hotels and Resorts, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-00849, 2025 WL 2696500, *18
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(S.D. Ohio Sept. 22, 2025) (Marbley, J.). Given the term’s breadth, it follows that
“participation in a venture” can take many forms:
One way to establish participation is through evidence of a direct
association between the trafficking venture and [Red Roof]. A plaintiff,
for example, can point to “acts or omissions” that “facilitated the sex
trafficking venture,” like a hotel renting rooms to people they knew or
should have known were engaged in sex trafficking. “In the absence of
a direct association,” a plaintiff can adduce evidence of “a continuous
business relationship” between the trafficking venture and the hotel
“such that it would appear that the trafficker and the hotels have
established a pattern of conduct or could be said to have a tacit
agreement.”
Id. at *14 (internal citations omitted). Because “participation in a venture” can be
proven through either a direct or indirect association, this Court rejected the
proposition that it requires an “‘overt act’ in furtherance of the sex trafficking.’” Id.
The “participation in a venture” element does not require an intent to cause harm.
Turning to the statute’s context and structure, both support the conclusion
that a defendant can be liable under the civil provisions of the TVPRA without
evidence of an intent to cause harm. For example, and by contrast, the TVPRA’s
criminal provisions define “participation in a venture” as “knowingly assisting,
supporting, or facilitating” a violation. 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(4) (emphasis added). If
Congress intended the civil remedy to also have a scienter requirement for
“participation,” it would have used the criminal provision’s definition. But Congress
did not, and courts have refused to apply a standard not required by Congress. See
Doe #1, 21 F.4th 714, 724 (11th Cir. 2021) (“Section 1591(a) includes a scienter
requirement that does not appear in Section 1595(a)[.]”); G.G., 76 F.4th 544, 558
(7th Cir. 2023) (“We agree with the Eleventh Circuit that we should not import [the
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definition in Section 1591] into Section 1595.”); Ricchio v. Bijal, Inc., 424 F. Supp.
3d 182, 194 (D. Mass. 2019) (“[I]t is possible for a defendant to be civilly liable
without having violated any of the criminal portions of the [TVPRA], because the
statute permits recovery under a civil standard even in the absence of proof of
intentional conduct.”).
Moreover, the third element of a TVPRA civil claim speaks to the requisite
state of mind, i.e., that a defendant “knew” or “should have known” the venture was
engaged in sex trafficking. See Ricchio, 424 F. Supp. 3d at 193 (“The phrase ‘knew
or should have known,’ echoes common language used in describing an objective
standard of negligence.”). If “participation in a venture” was interpreted to include a
scienter requirement, then the third element would be superfluous and there would
be no need to specify that the defendant must have known or should have known
about the sex trafficking (or other TVPRA violations). See M.A., 2025 WL 2696500,
at *18 (“To require the kind of blatant, proactive acts [to satisfy ‘participation in a
venture’] that Defendants propose … would be to discard the ‘should have known’
language [in the statute].”).
Tracking that third element, the plaintiffs in the underlying lawsuits allege
both that Red Roof had actual knowledge of sex trafficking and that Red Roof
“should have known” about the criminal activity at its hotels. (See, e.g., ECF Nos.
18-1–18-11); see also Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Red Roof Inns, Inc., No. 1:23-cv-
02047, 2025 WL 2685867, *5 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 15, 2025) (“In addition to the
allegations of intentional participation, [defendant] also alleged that [Red Roof] had
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constructive knowledge of the sex trafficking and that they ‘should have known’ of
other crimes and happenings on the premises.”).
The Court finds that a civil TVPRA claim does not require that the
underlying plaintiffs allege or prove that Red Roof intended to cause harm. The
underlying lawsuits allege injury caused by an “occurrence” and Red Roof is entitled
to a defense under the policies.
2. The doctrine of inferred intent does not apply.
Liberty next argues that, even if a civil claim under the TVPRA does not
require an intent to cause harm, this Court can nevertheless infer that Red Roof
had an intent to cause harm. Under Ohio law, “the doctrine of inferred intent
applies only in cases in which the insured’s intentional act and the harm caused are
intrinsically tied so that the act has necessarily resulted in the harm.” Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 942 N.E.2d 1090, 1099 (Ohio 2010). In Campbell, the Ohio
Supreme Court explained:
Gill and Gearing provide clear examples of cases in which the doctrine
applies. In Gill, harm was inherent in the defendant's act of murder.
Harm was similarly inherent in the acts of sexual molestation
in Gearing. In each of these cases, the insured could not claim that he
was unaware that harm would result from his actions. The doctrine of
inferred intent thus applied in those cases, and the insureds' actions
were excluded from coverage.
The same cannot be said about the actions in Swanson and Buckeye
Union. In Swanson, the act of firing a BB gun from a relatively long
distance would not necessarily result in harm. Likewise, an insurance
company's bad-faith refusal to settle a claim, as in Buckeye Union, does
not necessarily result in compensable damages. In both cases, a factual
inquiry was necessary to determine whether the insureds' actions were
excluded from coverage.
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Id. at 1098. The doctrine does not apply when “the insured’s intentional act will not
necessarily result in the harm caused by the act.” Id.
The underlying complaints allege that Red Roof is a beneficiary of sex
trafficking; its alleged “intentional act” is “participation in a venture,” not the crime
of sex trafficking. As discussed, supra, “participation in a venture” can take several
forms, including renting a room to a sex trafficker. If renting a room to a sex
trafficker is what constitutes Red Roof’s “participation in a venture” (and the
underlying plaintiffs have alleged at least that), then a sex trafficker must still
commit a criminal violation of the TVPRA before harm is substantially certain to
occur. Put another way, the renting of a room does not necessarily result in harm or
compensable damages. The doctrine of inferred intent does not apply.
3. Ohio public policy does not preclude coverage.
Finally, Liberty argues that it need not defend Red Roof in the underlying
lawsuits because Red Roof’s intentional participation in sex trafficking is
“inherently injurious” so that “insulating Red Roof against the result of [its] own
conduct is against public interest.” (ECF No. 36, PAGEID# 2351.)
“Ohio public policy generally prohibits obtaining insurance to cover damages
caused by intentional torts.” Gearing v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 665 N.E.2d 1115, 1118
(Ohio 1996). That prohibition extends to “criminal acts,” such as those “of sexual
misconduct.” Id. at 1120. But Ohio public policy does not extend so far as to
preclude Red Roof from using liability insurance for its alleged negligence related to
the act of sex trafficking where, as here, it did not commit the act itself. See Doe v.
Shaffer, 738 N.E.2d 1243, 1248–49 (Ohio 2000) (“Ohio public policy permits a party
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to obtain liability insurance coverage for negligence related to sexual molestation
when that party has not committed the act of sexual molestation.”) Accordingly,
Ohio’s public policy does not apply here.
4. Liberty is obligated to defend Red Roof in the underlying
lawsuits.
The allegations brought against Red Roof under the TVPRA in the
underlying lawsuits constitute an “occurrence” under Coverage A, and neither the
doctrine of inferred intent nor Ohio’s public policy preclude coverage. Liberty’s
refusal to provide a defense constitutes material breach of the insurance contract.
Accordingly, Red Roof is entitled to judgment on its Counts I and II and
Liberty’s Counterclaims I through XII to the extent those counterclaims relate to
Liberty’s duty to defend.
B. Liberty is not entitled to discovery.
Liberty argues that if its Cross-Motion is denied, Red Roof’s Motion must also
be denied so that Liberty can uncover the “true facts” necessary to support a denial
of coverage. Put another way, Liberty asks for more time to conduct discovery to
uncover an alternative exception that might bar coverage.
“Where a complaint states a claim which is partially or arguably within
policy coverage, the insurer has an absolute duty to assume the defense of the
action.” Panzica Const. Co. v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., No. CV-223397, 1996 WL 257470,
*7 (Ohio App. Ct. May 16, 1996). “An insurer must provide a defense to all claims
based upon the same occurrence if some of the claims are within the coverage of the
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insured’s policy.” Id. The underlying lawsuits contain a civil TVPRA claim, and
Liberty owes Red Roof a duty to defend those cases.
Implicit in its request for additional time to conduct discovery is that Liberty
cannot currently demonstrate that any other exception to coverage applies. Liberty
concedes as much, by, for example, arguing that the “expected or intended injury”
exception might apply. But to rely on that exception, Liberty bears the burden of
proving “that the injury itself was expected or intended.” Allstate Vehicle & Prop.
Ins. Co. v. Inabnitt, Nos. CA2021-10-094, CA2021-10-098, 2022 WL 2208799, *4
(Ohio App. Ct. June 21, 2022) (quoting Physicians Ins. Co. v. Swanson, 569 N.E.2d
906 (Ohio 1991)). And while perhaps the “true facts” will one day show that Red
Roof’s “conduct was outside the coverage of the policy,” Liberty is obligated to
defend Red Roof in the meantime. Preferred Risk Ins. Co. v. Gill, 507 N.E.2d 1118,
1124 (Ohio 1987); see also City of Willoughby Hills v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 459
N.E.2d 555, n. 1 (Ohio 1984) (“[A]n insurer may accept the defense and reserve its
right to assert ‘at a later time the policy defenses it believes it has.’ Nothing
prevents the insurer, once the defense is accepted, from utilizing discovery to
attempt to clarify the nature of the claim against the insured.”).
Liberty’s request for additional time to conduct discovery is DENIED.
C. Liberty’s duty to indemnify and single occurrence
counterclaims are not yet ripe.
Liberty’s counterclaims for declaratory judgment (Counterclaims I–XII) ask
for a declaration that it is not obligated to indemnify Red Roof under the policies.
And in its Counterclaim XIII, Liberty asks for a declaration that Red Roof’s alleged
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actions constitute a single occurrence under the policies. Red Roof asks the Court to
stay these counterclaims as not ripe because Red Roof’s liability in the underlying
lawsuits has not yet been determined.
Ripeness is a jurisdictional question, as this Court “lacks jurisdiction over the
subject matter if [a] claim is not yet ripe for judicial review.” Norton v. Ashcroft, 298
F.3d 547, 554 (6th Cir. 2002). This Court has “an independent obligation to assure
[itself] of [its] own jurisdiction.” Kerchen v. Univ. of Michigan, 100 F.4th 751, 759
(6th Cir. 2024). “[T]he ripeness doctrine traditionally incorporates both
constitutional and prudential elements.” Kiser v. Reitz, 765 F.3d 601, 606 (6th Cir.
2014). The constitutional elements of ripeness encompass traditional parts of the
standing inquiry: namely, whether a plaintiff “is threatened with ‘imminent’ injury
in fact.” MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128 n.8 (2007) (quoting
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)); accord Susan B. Anthony
List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158–59 (2014). If a case is “dependent on ‘contingent
future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all,’” it
is not constitutionally ripe. Trump v. New York, 592 U.S. 125, 131 (2020) (per
curiam) (quoting Texas v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998)). Ripeness is
determined “as of the time a party files its complaint.” State v. Yellen, 539 F. Supp.
3d 802, 812 (S.D. Ohio 2021) (Cole, J.). “If a claim is unripe, federal courts lack
subject matter jurisdiction and the claim must be dismissed.” Dealer Comput.
Servs., Inc. v. Sub Herring Ford, 547 F.3d 558, 560 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing River City
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Cap., L.P. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 491 F.3d 301, 309 (6th Cir. 2007)) (internal
citations omitted).
“In order to determine whether a claim is ripe, this court examines (1) the
likelihood that the harm alleged will ever come to pass; (2) whether the factual
record is sufficiently developed to allow for adjudication; and, (3) hardship to the
parties if judicial review is denied.” Norton, 298 F.3d at 554.
Applying the ripeness question to Liberty’s counterclaims regarding its duty
to indemnify Red Roof and whether Red Roof’s alleged actions constitute a single
occurrence, the Court concludes that these issues are not yet ripe. Here, the
underlying lawsuits are ongoing, and it is unknown whether Red Roof will be found
liable in any or all those lawsuits. Whether Red Roof will need to be indemnified is
contingent on future events that may not occur as anticipated or may not occur at
all. See Ricchio, 424 F. Supp. 3d at 188 (“As a general matter, the issue of
indemnification must await the completing of trial or settlement.” (citation
omitted)). Likewise, it is unclear whether Red Roof will be responsible for any
“bodily injury,” so the question of whether such responsibility constitutes a single
occurrence is not ripe. Such hypothetical harms are not yet developed for
adjudication.
Liberty does not respond to Red Roof’s arguments regarding ripeness.
Nevertheless, there is no suggestion that Liberty will be harmed if its
indemnification and single occurrence counterclaims are dismissed without
prejudice until such time that those claims are ripe for review.
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Accordingly, the indemnification portion of Liberty’s Counterclaims I–XII and
Liberty’s Counterclaim XIII are DISMISSED without prejudice.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Red Roof’s Partial Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (ECF No. 34) is GRANTED. Red Roof is entitled to judgment on its
Counts I and II and Liberty’s Counterclaims I through XII to the extent those
claims relate to Liberty’s duty to defend Red Roof in the underlying lawsuits.
Liberty’s Cross-Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (ECF No. 36) is
DENIED.
The indemnification portion of Liberty’s Counterclaims I–XII and Liberty’s
Counterclaim XIII are not ripe for judicial review and are DISMISSED without
prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Sarah D. Morrison
SARAH D. MORRISON, CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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