Case Name in Social Security Case - Unavailable

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
BROOKE J.1
Plaintiff,
Civil Action 2:25-cv-160
v. 	Chief Judge Sarah D. Morrison
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers
COMMISSIONER OF
SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Brooke J., brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for review of a final
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application for
supplemental security income (“SSI”). This matter is before the United States Magistrate Judge
for a Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (ECF No. 9), the
Commissioner’s Memorandum in Opposition (ECF No. 12), Plaintiff’s Reply (ECF No. 13), and
the administrative record (ECF No. 7). For the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that
the Court OVERRULE Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors and AFFIRM the Commissioner’s
decision.
1 Pursuant to General Order 22-01, due to significant privacy concerns in social security
cases, any opinion, order, judgment or other disposition in social security cases in the Southern
District of Ohio shall refer to plaintiffs only by their first names and last initials.
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I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed applications for Child Disability Benefits, Disability and Disability
Insurance Benefits, and SSI in May 2020, alleging that she has been disabled since June 1, 2007,
due to Bipolar I with psychotic features, most recent depressed; generalized anxiety disorder;
borderline intellectual functioning; mild alcohol use disorder; chronic asthma; and alpha-1
antitrypsin. (R. at 501-18, 532.) Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially in August 2020
and upon reconsideration in November 2020. (R. at 335-401, 426-40.) Plaintiff sought a de
novo hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). (R. at 441-58.) ALJ Noceeba
Southern held a telephone hearing on August 13, 2021, at which Plaintiff, who was represented
by counsel, appeared and testified. (R. at 288-315.) A vocational expert (“VE”) also appeared
and testified. (Id.) On September 14, 2021, ALJ Southern issued a decision finding that Plaintiff
was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (R. at 234-58.) After the
Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review and adopted the ALJ’s decision as the
Commissioner’s final decision, (R. at 13-22) she filed suit in this Court. See [Brooke J.] v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., S.D. Ohio Case No. 2:23-cv-205. Upon stipulation of the parties, the Court
remanded the matter for further proceedings. (R. at 1849-54.)
On remand, the claim was heard by ALJ Jason P. Tepley. At the hearing, Plaintiff moved
to amend her alleged onset date from June 1, 2007, to May 29, 2020. (R. at 1750 citing R. at
1783-1784.) That resulted in the effective withdrawal of all claims but her SSI claim. (R. at
1785.) After a hearing on September 25, 2024, ALJ Tepley found on October 24, 2024, that
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Plaintiff was not eligible for benefits because she was not under a “disability” as defined in the
Social Security Act. (R. at 1746-76.)
Plaintiff did not request review by the Appeals Council opting to directly file suit with
this Court. This matter is properly before this Court for review.
II. 	RELEVANT RECORD EVIDENCE
The Undersigned has thoroughly reviewed the transcript in this matter, including
Plaintiff’s medical records, function and disability reports and testimony as to her conditions and
resulting limitations. As relevant here, the ALJ summarized Plaintiff’s mental health treatment,
characterizing it as medication management and counseling, as follows:
In June 2020, [Plaintiff] endorsed some stress in the neighborhood due to the kids
fighting but that she was encouraging her children to not respond to peers, also
noting fairly stable moods with her monthly injectable mood stabilizer and was
having a good relationship with her children (Exhibit 1F, page 59). [Plaintiff] also
indicated that she was looking forward to her yearly family vacation to Myrtle
Beach, was hoping to be able to travel to see her youngest child’s father and had an
entirely unremarkable mental status examination (Exhibit 1F, pages 59-60).
Medication management notes in the same month reflected use of Invega Sustenna
by injection (Exhibit 10F, page 9). Mental health notes in August 2020, showed
[Plaintiff] reporting having attended her family vacation, was off diet pills
temporarily, and was happy with her medication and had not been irritable (Exhibit
10F, page 14). Psychiatric examination was wholly unremarkable (Exhibit 10F,
pages 18-19).
Notes in September 2020 showed financial stressors, food insecurities, and
continued mental health symptoms (Exhibit 7F, page 65). In October 2020,
[Plaintiff] reported frustration with COVID, family stressors including an overdose
attempt by her son, and her daughter’s depression (Exhibit 7F, page 67). Mental
status examination showed a depressed mood and circumstantial thought processes,
but normal speech and fair insight and judgment (Exhibit 7F, page 67). Follow up
in November showed [Plaintiff] was struggling to take her medications, was having
troubled sleep, and high anxiety due to COVID and family stressors (Exhibit 7F,
page 69). Counseling and supportive therapy was provided (Exhibit 7F, page 70).
Medication management notes in November 2020 showed [Plaintiff] continued on
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her injection Invega Sustenna and Fluoxetine, with [Plaintiff] counseled regarding
smoking cessation and lifestyle changes (Exhibit 10F, page 31).
Medication management notes in December 2020 showed reports of doing better
with Prozac, sleeping well, with improved energy and motivation, and improved
mood (Exhibit 13F, page 13). Continued medication management with monthly
Invega Sustenna ordered in addition to lifestyle changes recommended (Exhibit
13F, page 20). Counseling notes in January 2021 showed [Plaintiff] had a
wonderful Christmas and New Years with her family, was able to see her brother
and enjoyed time with him, and that she had positive interaction with her children
and family of origin (Exhibit 14F, page 9). [Plaintiff] also indicated she had
purchased a 12-pack of beer as a reward, with [Plaintiff] counseled regarding
healthier choices (Exhibit 14F, page 9). Case management notes in February 2021,
noted [Plaintiff] had not had a drink in a couple of weeks but was struggling with
alcohol cravings and was also struggling with making healthier meals (Exhibit 15F,
page 5).
Medication management notes in April 2021 were notable for reports that
[Plaintiff]’s energy was poor, that she was sedentary, and even when she wanted to
go outside and enjoy the weather, she gets nervous and her body does not want to
move (Exhibit 21F, page 2). Psychiatric exam was generally unremarkable with
[Plaintiff] noted as having clear and linear thought processes, intact judgment and
insight, no apparent impairment in recent or remote memory, appropriate mood,
with an anxious affect (Exhibit 21F, pages 6-7). [Plaintiff] was advised to continue
her medication regimen, stop smoking, improve her diet, and increase physical
exercise (Exhibit 21F, page 9). Case management notes on April 22, 2021, showed
[Plaintiff] requesting assistance with completing a “huge packet of a bunch of
forms” for her child’s SSI benefit review (Exhibit 21F, page 13). [Plaintiff]’s case
manager continued to provide assistance to [Plaintiff] in maintaining her child’s
disability benefits through May 2021 (Exhibit 21F, pages 15-23). Behavioral health
follow-up in June 2021, showed [Plaintiff] reporting poor hygiene, lack of
motivation, poor energy, not caring for her household, and drinking alcohol
(Exhibit 22F, page 4). Mental status exam noted [Plaintiff] was cooperative with
and anxious and depressed mood, goal directed thought processes, normal insight
and judgment, and orientation times four (Exhibit 22F, page 4). [Plaintiff] was
provided cognitive behavioral therapy and noted to appear resistant to change,
advised to attend AA, and keep her appointment and routine/structure daily (Exhibit
22F, page 4).
Case management notes on August 13, 2021, reflected that the case manager
“assisted” [Plaintiff] “with her Administrative Hearing to obtain her Social
Security,” providing “support as client participated in the hearing and monitored
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symptoms,” and reminding [Plaintiff] “to count to three before answering questions
to enable her to calm her mind and focus on how she would like to answer” (Exhibit
23F, page 2). Behavioral health treatment notes in the same month noted continued
stress in her neighborhood, staying in the house more, reported continued attempts
to hold her children more accountable to help, and discussed her daughter’s
boyfriend and the struggle she is having with getting him to contribute to the
household if he is living there (Exhibit 24F, page 7). She noted concerns regarding
her eldest son’s health as he was not taking medication or engaged in treatment,
that she was trying to be supportive and lead by example, was looking forward to
her children going back to school for the routine and time to herself to engage in
self-care, and noting getting exhausted doing housework (Exhibit 24F, page 7).
Mental status examination was notable for an anxious mood and mood-congruent
affect, normal speech, normal thought processes, fair insight, and judgement, and
was alert and oriented to person, place, time, and situation (Exhibit 24F, pages 7-
8). [Plaintiff] was noted has having stable symptoms and provided cognitive
behavioral therapy to develop coping skills (Exhibit 24F, page 8). Medication
management notes in December 2021, showed [Plaintiff] continued on Invega
Sustenna, although having received it later and was having increased anxiety and
irritability symptoms (Exhibit 29F, pages 1-11).
Behavioral health notes in February 2022 showed [Plaintiff] reporting being under
lots of stress, and that she had been drinking again and it was causing significant
issues for her health as well as for her interactions with her family (Exhibit 28F,
page 6). [Plaintiff] reported having little motivation or energy when she was
drinking, that it makes her feel sick the next day, but was planning to attend an “AA
meeting” (Exhibit 28F, page 6). [Plaintiff] was provided cognitive behavioral
therapy and a list of AA meetings near her home (Exhibit 28F, pages 7-11).
Counseling notes in May 2022, reflected complaints of shortness of breath and
noting it was a barrier to her self-care and hygiene (Exhibit 28F, page 12).
Medication management notes in the same month showed increased anxiety in the
context of having run out of Prozac a month ago, and was requesting Buspirone for
anxiety (Exhibit 29F, page 20). However, by July 2022, [Plaintiff] endorsed
showing more often, feeling like she is engaged in better self-care, and noted
improvement in energy and motivation with medication compliance (Exhibit 28F,
page 14).
Interestingly, medication management notes in the same month showed [Plaintiff]
reporting having not seen her counselor lately as well as not taking Buspirone even
though it had been helpful when she started it, and that she had not been using her
CPAP therapy machine (Exhibit 29F, page 24). Mental status examination however
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was unremarkable, with Prozac restarted, Buspirone compliance counseled, and
continued use of Invega Sustenna ordered (Exhibit 29F, pages 28-31).
Medication management notes in September 2022 showed [Plaintiff] reporting
feeling upset that her daughter was moving out and that she was having
interpersonal problems with her son, and improved energy with CPAP use (Exhibit
29F, 	page 	46). 	Psychiatric 	examination 	reflected 	impair 	attention
span/distractibility but was otherwise unremarkable, with [Plaintiff] continued on
chronic medications, and started on an increased dosage of D3 (Exhibit 29F, pages
51-54).
Follow up in October 2022, reflected reports that [Plaintiff] was doing remodeling
with her family and was getting ready to paint and put wood flooring down (Exhibit
35F, page 58). Psychiatric examination was completely unremarkable, with chronic
medications refilled and increased physical activity and smoking cessation advised
(Exhibit 35F, pages 63-65).
In December 2022, [Plaintiff] reported that her mother was living with her now,
noting working on improving their communication, and endorsed stressors like
limited transportation and different views on how things in the home should be
handled (Exhibit 30F, page 33). Mental status examination showed an anxious and
depressed mood, normal thought processes, alert and oriented x4, and normal
insight and judgement (Exhibit 30F, pages 33-34). Cognitive behavioral therapy
was provided, with instructions for [Plaintiff] to keep a routine/daily structure,
focus on the present, and engage in positive self-talk (Exhibit 30F, page 34). In
January 2023, [Plaintiff] reported writing in her journal, taking Prozac, and doing
well, but having been in a slump for a week and had not showered or left the house,
with counseling and therapy provided (Exhibit 30F, page 35).
In July 2023, [Plaintiff] noted struggling with depression, motivation, and energy,
as well as with breathing and mobility (Exhibit 30F, page 38). Behavioral health
notes in August 2023 showed [Plaintiff] reported an interaction with her son’s
girlfriend and her mother, where she was at their house and was intoxicated and
unruly (Exhibit 30F, page 67). Mental status reflected normal speech, mood, and
thought processes, cooperative behavior, and fair insight and judgment (Exhibit
30F, 	page 	68). 	[Plaintiff] 	was 	provided 	counseling 	for 	coping 	and 	stress
management skills (Exhibit 30F, page 68). Medication management notes in the
same month showed reports of increased mental health symptoms due to missing
her shot, with her Invega Sustenna restarted at her request (Exhibit 35F, page 69).
Follow up later that month reflected no mental health complaints and specifically
denying hallucinations, delusions, suicidal or homicidal ideation, and was able to
advocate for a “pet letter” which was provided to her (Exhibit 35F, page 88).
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Notes in November 2023 showed reports of conflict with her daughter, but spending
time with her children, improved hygiene, working on taking the garbage out once
per week, and plans to decrease smoking (Exhibit 30F, page 74). Mental status
exam was notable for an anxious and depressed mood, circumstantial thought
processes but appropriate speech, normal insight and judgment, and a cooperative
attitude (Exhibit 30F, page 75). In December 2023, [Plaintiff] was started on
Minipress for complaints of nightmares (Exhibit 35F, page 112). Counseling notes
in January 2024, showed [Plaintiff] planning on looking into groups with her
behavioral health provider and possibly going back to “AA,” as well as plans to go
over to her daughter’s home and spend time with her daughter and grandchild
(Exhibit 30F, page 78). Follow up counseling in February 2024, showed [Plaintiff]
reported that her daughter did not want her around the baby because [Plaintiff] was
still smoking, making [Plaintiff] upset and isolate more (Exhibit 30F, page 80).
[Plaintiff] planned to decrease smoking with plans to track the same (Exhibit 30F,
pages 80-81). Mental status continued to reflect an anxious and depressed mood
and circumstantial thought process, but was otherwise unremarkable (Exhibit 30F,
page 81).
Medication management notes in March 2024, showed [Plaintiff]’s frequency of
Invega injections increased to every 3 weeks due to [Plaintiff] reported increase of
symptoms on the third week (Exhibit 35F, pages 116-124). Later that month,
[Plaintiff] noted significantly improved mood and motivation and improvement in
her anxiety, with a completely unremarkable mental status examination (Exhibit
30F, page 83). Case management notes in April 2024, showed [Plaintiff] contacting
her case manager to report that her daughter is pregnant and wanting to locate
resources for her, as well as having missed her own injection and several
appointments (Exhibit 35F, page 256).
(R. at 1759-62.)
III. 	ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
On October 22, 2024, the ALJ issued his decision. (R. at 1746-76.) The ALJ granted
Plaintiff’s motion to amend her alleged onset date to May 29, 2020. (R. at 1753.) At step one of
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the sequential evaluation process,2 the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantially
gainful activity since May 29, 2020, the amended alleged onset date. (Id.) The ALJ found that
Plaintiff had the severe impairments of obesity; asthma; headaches; anxiety disorder; mood
disorder; obsessive compulsive disorder; bipolar disorder; schizoaffective disorder; borderline
intellectual functioning; and a history of alcohol dependence. (Id.) He further found that
Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically
equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1. (R. at 1753.)
At step four of the sequential process, the ALJ set forth Plaintiff’s residual functional
capacity (“RFC”) as follows:
After careful consideration of the entire record, [the ALJ] finds that [Plaintiff] has
the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR
416.967(a) except: can occasionally climb ramps/stairs; occasionally kneel, crouch,
stoop, and crawl; can never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can have occasional
exposure to extreme heat, extreme cold, and atmospheric conditions as defined in
the Selected Characteristics of Occupations (SCO); can have no exposure to
2 Social Security Regulations require ALJs to resolve a disability claim through a five-step
sequential evaluation of the evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). Although a dispositive finding at
any step terminates the ALJ’s review, see Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007), if fully
considered, the sequential review considers and answers five questions:
1. 	Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity?
2. 	Does the claimant suffer from one or more severe impairments?
3. 	Do the claimant’s severe impairments, alone or in combination, meet or
equal the criteria of an impairment set forth in the Commissioner’s Listing of
Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Subpart P, Appendix 1?
4. 	Considering the claimant 's residual functional capacity, can the claimant perform his or
her past relevant work?
5. 	Considering the claimant’s age, education, past work experience, and residual functional
capacity, can the claimant perform other work available in the national economy?
See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4); see also Henley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 264 (6th Cir. 2009);
Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2001).
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unprotected 	heights, 	moving 	mechanical 	parts; 	and 	is 	unable 	to 	perform
commercial driving. [Plaintiff] can carry out simple tasks, with no work that
requires satisfaction of production quotas or that involves assembly line pace; can
make simple work-related decision; can have occasional interaction with coworkers
and supervisors, with no interaction with the general public; and can deal with
occasional changes in a routine work setting which are explained in advance.
(R. at 1755-56.)
Plaintiff has no past relevant work. (R. at 1765.) Relying on the VE’s testimony, the
ALJ concluded that Plaintiff can perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy, such as an ink printer, final assembler, or stuffer. (R. at 1766-67.) He
therefore concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act at any time
since May 29, 2020. (R. at 1767.)
V. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a case under the Social Security Act, the Court “must affirm the
Commissioner’s decision if it ‘is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to
proper legal standards.’” Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009)
(quoting Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also 42 U.S.C. §
405(g) (“[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). Under this standard, “substantial evidence is
defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Rogers, 486
F.3d at 241 (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)).
Although the substantial evidence standard is deferential, it is not trivial. The Court must
“‘take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from [the] weight’” of the
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Commissioner’s decision. TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 395 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951)). Nevertheless, “if substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, this Court defers to that finding ‘even if there is
substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.’” Blakley
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir.
1997)). Finally, even if the ALJ’s decision meets the substantial evidence standard, “‘a decision
of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and
where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives [Plaintiff] of a substantial right.’”
Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 651 (quoting Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir.
2007)).
VI. 	ANALYSIS
Plaintiff raises two claimed errors, both limited to matters relating to her mental health
impairments. First, she asserts that the ALJ erred by failing to properly evaluate the opinions of
her treating counselor, Lindsey Cornett, LISW. (ECF No. 9 at PageID 2978-2982.) Further,
Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to properly account for the state agency psychologists’
opined restrictions. (Id. at PageID 2983-86.)
A. The ALJ Properly Considered the Supportability of Lindsey Cornett’s Opinion
Turning first to the issue of the ALJ’s evaluation of Ms. Cornett’s opinion, Ms. Cornett
completed a largely check-box form questionnaire on Plaintiff’s behalf of April 8, 2021. In that
questionnaire, she assessed Plaintiff as being “unable to meet competitive standards” and having
“no useful ability to function” in most mental ability areas. (R. at 1686-87.) Specifically, Ms.
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Cornett opined that Plaintiff was seriously limited in her ability to carry out, understand and
remember very short and simple instructions. (R. at 1686.) Plaintiff was also found to be
seriously limited in her ability to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from
supervisors. (Id.) By way of narrative explanation, Ms. Cornett stated that Plaintiff engaged in
unhealthy thinking/cognitive distortions “that impede her ability to follow directions, carry out
tasks, make informed decision and regulate mood when there is a lot of input from her
environment.” (Id.). She also noted that Plaintiff “becomes overwhelmed very easily and
requires high levels of instruction, modeling, and supervision to complete tasks.” (R. at 1687.)
She further opined that Plaintiff would be expected to be absent from work more than four days
per month. (Id.).
Ms. Cornett completed a second largely check-box questionnaire on September 16, 2024,
in which she identified a range of marked to extreme limitations in every functional area,
including social interaction, sustained concentration and persistence, and adaptation. (R. at
2925-27.) 	When responding to the question regarding whether her answers with respect to
social interaction would change if Plaintiff was limited to “only minimal contact or interaction
with others,” Ms. Cornett narratively opined that “most areas would be reduced to ‘moderate’
…” (Id. at 2925.) She indicated that Plaintiff has “high social anxiety when around others” and
that stress and overstimulation causes panic attacks often followed by severe depressive
episodes. (Id. at 2927.) Ms. Cornett further believed that Plaintiff would likely experience two
or more unscheduled absences per month due to her diagnoses and/or medication side effects,
and that her condition would likely deteriorate if placed under stress. (Id.)
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By way of additional background, the ALJ, having outlined Plaintiff’s mental health
treatment history as set forth above, summarized the record in this way:
Regarding the claimant’s alleged mental impairments, the record contains a limited
treatment history which was entirely conservative in nature. At no time did the
claimant require emergency or inpatient treatment for any alleged mental health
concern. Additionally, the claimant was generally managed by behavioral health
for medication management and therapy. Mental status examinations of record
were generally unremarkable with respect to any finding other than mood and
affect, which were only occasionally depressed or anxious, however additional
limitations were noted during instances of alcohol relapse, periods of medication
non-compliance, and increased personal and life stressors. It is notable that the
claimant recognized the complicating impact alcohol use had on her mental health,
and few if any instances of AA attendance despite recommendations for the same
during the period at issue (Exhibit 28F, pages 6-11). The claimant was able to
maintain general independence with her activities of daily living including personal
hygiene and dressing, was able to interact appropriately with family and treatment
providers, able to provide childcare to her three children including one child who
was disabled, engage in home improvement, was able to drive, able to attend family
vacation, able to interact with her grandchild, advocating for herself and her family,
and seeking out treatment as needed. …
(R. at 1763.)
The ALJ proceeded to find Ms. Cornett’s assessments “unpersuasive,” explaining as
follows:
Ms. Cornett does not specifically identify any support from objective treatment
evidence during the period at issue to bolster the finding made with respect to
functional limitations. [Plaintiff]’s ability to care for her three children, with at least
one on disability, her ability to seek out community resources and treatment as
needed, and her ability to live independently and maintain independence with
respect to her activities of daily living stand in stark contrast to Ms. Cornett’s
extreme restrictions. As noted above, the while the record does show instances of
depressed and anxious mood, circumstantial thought processes, and limited
insight/judgment, the bulk of [Plaintiff]’s mental health treatment record showed
limited if any mental status examination findings with treatment compliance. As
reflected 	above, 	there 	are 	numerous 	instances 	of 	issues 	with 	medication
compliance, 	at 	times 	due 	to 	running 	out, 	and 	other 	times 	due 	to 	missed
appointments, but no indications that even during these instances that [Plaintiff]
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experienced disabling symptomology. Further, numerous recent examinations
reflect significantly less symptomatology than Ms. Cornett opines (see, e.g., Ex.
29F/7, 18, 29; 34F/13, 15, 22).
(R. at 1765.)
Against this backdrop, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ did not adequately consider the
supportability factor when evaluating Ms. Cornett’s opinion. For claims for Supplemental
Security Income filed after March 27, 2017, such as this one, medical opinions are considered
per 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c. Under those regulations, an ALJ does “not defer or give any specific
evidentiary weight ... to any medical opinion(s).” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a). Rather, “[w]hen a
medical source provides one or more medical opinions ..., [the ALJ] will consider those medical
opinions ... from that medical source together using” factors outlined in the Code of Federal
Regulations. Id. The factors an ALJ must consider when evaluating the persuasiveness of a
medical opinion are: supportability, consistency, relationship with the claimant, specialization,
and any other factors that support or contradict the medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. §
416.920c(c)(1)–(5). The most important factors, however, are supportability and consistency. 20
C.F.R. § 416.920c(a), (b)(2).
An ALJ must articulate in their decision how persuasive they found the medical opinion.
20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(b). Moreover, because supportability and consistency are the most
important factors, an ALJ must “explain how [they] considered the supportability and
consistency factors for a medical source's medical opinion[ ].” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b)(2). The
ALJ may, but is not required to, explain how they considered the other factors. Id. With regard
to supportability, “[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting
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explanations presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion[ ] ..., the
more persuasive the medical opinions ... will be.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(c)(1).
In Plaintiff’s view, the ALJ’s cursory conclusion that Ms. Cornett “did not specifically
identify any support from objective treatment evidence” is not supported by substantial evidence.
Thus, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in his consideration of the supportability factor, not that
the ALJ improperly failed to consider that factor. This is so, according to Plaintiff, because Ms.
Cornett provided support for her opinions within the four corners of both medical source
statements and her notes. In support, Plaintiff cites both the narrative portions of Ms. Cornett’s
assessments and her treatment notes spanning several years. In response, the Commissioner
asserts that Plaintiff’s argument is an impermissible request to reweigh the evidence of record.
Plaintiff does not address the issue further in her reply.
Upon review of the record, the Undersigned concludes that the Commissioner has the
better argument here and that the ALJ’s conclusion on this issue is supported by substantial
evidence. To be sure, as Plaintiff notes and the ALJ recognized, Ms. Cornett’s findings reflect
that Plaintiff’s mood frequently was anxious and depressed. Plaintiff also points out that she met
regularly with Ms. Cornett over many years for individual therapy sessions. Beyond this,
however, Plaintiff’s argument relies on her self-reports to Ms. Cornett regarding her mental
health issues. Thus, even by Plaintiff’s own description of the record, the ALJ was correct in his
assessment that “the bulk of [Plaintiff’s] mental health treatment record showed limited if any
mental examination findings with treatment compliance.” 	(R. at 1765; see also R. at 2152-
2195; 2344-2457; 2639-2662.) 	Moreover, the ALJ fairly summarized Plaintiff’s treatment
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record as containing “a limited treatment history which was entirely conservative in nature.” (R.
at 1763.) The ALJ also correctly noted that “[a]t no time did the claimant require emergency or
inpatient treatment for any alleged mental health concern.” (Id.) 	Plaintiff does not seriously
dispute the ALJ’s characterizations of her treatment history. In short, consistent with the ALJ’s
finding, the record shows that Ms. Cornett’s documented findings undermine her conclusions
regarding the severity of the opined limitations.
Thus, the ALJ’s supportability analysis is supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff’s
limited argument to the contrary is merely “a veiled attempt to have [this Court] reweigh the
evidence.” Nasser v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 22-1293, 2022 WL 17348838, at *2 (6th Cir.
Dec. 1, 2022). It is not this Court's role, however, to reweigh the evidence presented to the ALJ
or second guess their decision. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 424 F. App'x 411, 414
(6th Cir. 2011) (noting that the court “reviews the entire administrative record, but does not
reconsider facts, re-weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in evidence, decide questions of
credibility, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s first issue
does not warrant remand.
B. The ALJ Properly Accounted for the State Agency Psychologists’ Opined Restrictions
Turning to the matter of the state agency psychologists’ opinions, Paul Tangeman, Ph.D.
evaluated Plaintiff’s mental impairments as part of the initial determination on the claim on
August 17, 2020. (R. at 338-48.) Dr. Tangeman based his review on following severe medically
determinable mental impairment: Depressive, Bipolar and Related Disorders; Anxiety and
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorders; Borderline Intellectual Functioning; and the non-severe
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impairment of Substance Addiction Disorders (Alcohol). (R. at 343.) Dr. Tangeman did not
find that these impairments meet or medically equal any Listed impairment, finding moderate
limitations [with when evaluating the “paragraph B” criteria of the mental Listings. (Id.) Dr.
Tangeman then provided an assessment of Plaintiff’s mental residual functional capacity
(MRFC). (R. at 346-47.) Dr. Tangeman found Plaintiff capable of performing simple work
tasks, retaining the ability to complete simple tasks in a routine environment without high
production or pace quotas, with superficial contact with others, and with changes explained in
advance. (Id.)
In arriving at his findings regarding the severity of Plaintiff’s mental impairments and
resulting MRFC, Dr. Tangeman’s assessment refers to Plaintiff’s psychological consultative
examination report. (R. at 340.) In arriving at the limitations in understanding and memory, Dr.
Tangeman stated that Plaintiff is moderately limited in the ability to understand and remember
detailed instructions. (R. at 346.) In arriving at the limitations in sustained concentration and
persistence, Dr. Tangeman stated that Plaintiff is moderately limited in the ability to carry out
detailed instructions, maintain attention and concentration for extended periods, and to complete
a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms
and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods.
(R. at 346-47.) In arriving at the limitations in social interactions, Dr. Tangeman stated that
Plaintiff is moderately limited in the ability to interact appropriately with the general public and
to accept instructions and respond appropriately to criticism from supervisors. (R. at 347.) In
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addition, he provided narrative explanations for each of his findings regarding the four functional
areas considered in arriving at Plaintiff’s MRFC. (R. at 346-47.)
On reconsideration, Plaintiff’s claim was evaluated by Bonnie Katz, Ph.D. who, like Dr.
Tangeman, assessed Plaintiff’s medically determinable mental impairments, considered any
applicable Listings, and made findings regarding Plaintiff’s MRFC. (R. at 374-82.) Dr. Katz
reached the same conclusions as Dr. Tangeman regarding the evaluation of the “paragraph B”
criteria of the Listings and Plaintiff’s MRFC. (R. at 377, 380-81.)
The ALJ had this to say about those opinions:
The undersigned has also considered the State agency psychological consultant’s
opinions which initially assessed the claimant capable of performing simple work
tasks, retains the ability to complete simple tasks in a routine environment without
high production or pace quotas, with superficial contact with others, and changes
should be explained in advance (Exhibits 4A; 5A; 6A). This assessment was
affirmed at reconsideration (Exhibits 10A; 11A; 12A). The undersigned notes that
terminology used is not vocationally defined – such as “superficial” – which
significantly limits the probative value of the finding. As such, the undersigned
finds it persuasive only persuasive to the extent it finds no more than moderate
psychological limitations. This is supported by the consultants’ citation to specific
evidence of record. Further, it is consistent with the overall record, which shows,
despite multiple diagnosed mental impairments, objective findings suggestive of no
more than moderate symptoms (see, e.g., Ex. 29F/7, 18, 29; 34F/13, 15, 22).
(R. at 1764.)
As noted above, consistent with these findings, the ALJ included a social interaction
limitation in the RFC restricting Plaintiff to “occasional interaction with coworkers and
supervisors” and “no interaction with the general public.” (R. at 1756.) Plaintiff argues that the
ALJ erred by failing to include a limitation to “superficial” interaction with others. To be clear,
because the RFC limited Plaintiff to “no interaction with the general public,” Plaintiff’s
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argument more precisely is directed to the limitation as to “occasional interaction with coworkers
and supervisors.” In Plaintiff’s view, the terms “occasional” and “superficial” are not
interchangeable and a limitation to occasional interaction did not account for a limitation to
superficial interaction. According to Plaintiff, this resulted in an inconsistency between the RFC
and the evidence which the ALJ was required to address under SSR 96-8p. To the extent the
ALJ stated that the term “superficial” is not vocationally defined, Plaintiff contends that the term
remains relevant and not subject to being ignored by the ALJ.
In response, the Commissioner asserts that the ALJ’s RFC formulation as it relates to
Plaintiff’s social interaction limitations is supported by substantial evidence. Thus, in the
Commissioner’s view, Plaintiff’s arguments are unavailing for several reasons. First, according
to the Commissioner, the ALJ specifically found that the assessments were persuasive only to the
extent that they support a finding of no more than moderate psychological limitations and,
thereby, rejected the specific functional limitations. Further, the Commissioner notes the ALJ’s
evaluation of Plaintiff’s social interactions, including her ability “to interact appropriately with
health care providers, interact with her family[,]” “interact with others at Alcoholics Anonymous
and make friends[,]” and “to take family and other vacations throughout the period at issue
suggest[ed] greater functional ability than alleged.” (ECF No. 12 at 11 citing R. at 1754.)
Finally, the Commissioner contends that the ALJ was within his authority to craft the RFC as he
chose because doing so is solely his responsibility.
In reply, Plaintiff contends that a limitation to superficial interaction is synonymous with
a moderate limitation in social interaction. Thus, according to Plaintiff, to the extent that the ALJ
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found that she was no more than moderately limited in her ability to interact with others, the ALJ
was required to explain the inconsistency created by his rejection of a limitation to superficial
interaction.
Initially, an ALJ is not required to adopt all of the limitations suggested in prior
administrative medical findings or medical opinions, even if the ALJ has found the prior
administrative medical findings or opinions to be persuasive. See generally, 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520c; 419.920c. The ALJ – while not a physician – is responsible for assessing a claimant's
RFC. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1546(c); Pitrman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:15-cv-1503, 2023 WL
3510752, *13 (N.D. Ohio April 10, 2023). When assessing a claimant's RFC, an ALJ “is not
required to recite the medical opinion of a physician verbatim in [her] residual functional capacity
finding…[and] and ALJ does not improperly assume the role of a medical expert by assessing the
medical and nonmedical evidence before rendering a residual functional capacity finding. Poe v.
Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 342 F.App'x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009).
“[E]ven where an ALJ provides ‘great weight’ to an opinion, there is no requirement that
an ALJ adopt a state agency psychologist's opinion verbatim; nor is the ALJ required to adopt the
state agency psychologist's limitations wholesale.” Reeves v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 618 F. App'x
267, 275 (6th Cir. 2015). Further, an ALJ is not obligated to explain each limitation or restriction
adopted or not adopted. Pitrman, 2023 WL 3510752, at *14. “The ALJ is not required to describe
the claimant's limitation using the exact language of those medical sources as long as substantial
evidence demonstrates that the ALJ adequately portrayed the claimant's limitations in the RFC.”
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Aerial T. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:23-cv-04188, 2025 WL 798367, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 13,
2025).
Contrary to Plaintiff’s position, the Undersigned finds that the ALJ met his burden of
articulation here. The ALJ correctly noted that the term superficial is not a vocationally defined
term. 	Dawn M. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:24-CV-02, 2024 WL 3568859, at *6 (S.D. Ohio
July 29, 2024), aff'd sub nom. Mabry-Schlicher v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 24-3811, 2025 WL
1604376 (6th Cir. June 6, 2025) (citing Stephen D. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:21-CV-00746,
2023 WL 4991918, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 4, 2023), report and recommendation adopted, 734 F.
Supp. 3d 729 (S.D. Ohio 2024)). The ALJ then found the use of the word “superficial”
persuasive only to the extent that it was suggestive of no more than moderate psychological
limitations. This allows a reasonable subsequent reviewer to conclude that the ALJ plainly was
rejecting the use of that term.
The ALJ then went on to account for the Plaintiff’s moderate social interaction
limitations by limiting Plaintiff to only occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors.
Such a limitation properly accounted for Plaintiff's moderate limitation in interacting with others.
See Reeves, 618 F. App'x 267, 275 (noting that the ALJ accounted for the plaintiff's moderate
limitation in his ability to interact with the public by limiting him to “occasional interaction with
the public”); Cummings v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:24-CV-1368, 2025 WL 1949499, at *13
(N.D. Ohio July 16, 2025) (affirming the ALJ's decision that “accounted for [the claimant's]
moderate limitations in interacting with others by limiting her to ‘occasional interaction with the
public, coworkers, and supervisors.’ ”); Bryan v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:18-cv-554, 2019
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WL 2912089, at *3-4 (S.D. Ohio July 8, 2019) (affirming the ALJ's decision where the plaintiff
had moderate limitations in interacting with others and the ALJ limited the RFC to occasional
interactions with others); Beemer v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:14-cv-678, 2015 WL 4546520, at
*6 (W.D. Mich. July 28, 2015) (“[T]he Court finds no inconsistency between the doctor's
opinion that plaintiff had ... moderate limitations related to interacting with others ... and the
ALJ's RFC, which limited plaintiff ‘to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks’ and ‘occasional
interaction with coworkers, supervisors, and the public[.]’ ”). And, importantly, Plaintiff fails to
show that she was more limited in interacting with coworkers or supervisors than the ALJ found.
Indeed, Plaintiff essentially concedes that her social interaction limitations were appropriately
characterized as moderate.
Finally, there is no merit to Plaintiff’s claim that the ALJ created a “glaring
inconsistency” which he was required to address. 	(ECF No. 9 at 14.) Fundamentally, an ALJ is
not required to explain every departure from a medical opinion to which he has given only
“partial weight.” SSR 96-8p requires only that an RFC assessment include an explanation of
“how any material inconsistencies or ambiguities in the evidence ... were considered and
resolved.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7 (1996) (emphasis added). SSR 96-8p also
requires ALJs to “explain why” a medical opinion was not adopted if the ALJ's RFC assessment
conflicts with an opinion from a medical source. Id. As this Court has recognized,
“’occasionally” does not create a sufficient conflict with “superficially” when applied to
“interactions,” such that the ALJ would be required to explain that change.’” Stephen D., 734
F.Supp.3d at 738. That is,
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when a person is limited to engaging in only short and infrequent interactions, that
strongly correlates, as a practical matter, with interactions that are superficial, as
well. Given the correlation between the two, the ALJ's decision to use “occasional”
instead 	of 	“superficial” 	as 	applied 	to 	“interactions” 	in 	calculating 	the
mental RFC suggests that no real conflict exists. And, in turn, that means there is
no “inconsistency” that the ALJ must explain.
Id. Thus, “[a]n ALJ need not explain his failure to use a specific adjective like ‘superficial’
contained in a consultant's report when: (1) the term is rejected on grounds that it is
vocationally undefined; (2) the term is not inconsistent with the RFC as determined; and
(3) the ALJ found the opinion to be persuasive only in part.” Dawn M., 2024 WL 3568859,
at *7 (citing Reeves, 618 Fed. Appx. at 275). 	That is the situation here. 	Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s second statement of error does not require remand.
VII. 	CONCLUSION
In sum, from a review of the record as a whole, the Undersigned concludes that
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision denying benefits. Based on the foregoing, it is
therefore, RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors be OVERRULED and that
the Commissioner’s decision be AFFIRMED.
VIII. 	PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that
party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report an\d
Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in
question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
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The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a forfeiture of the right to de novo review by the District Judge
and forfeiture of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. Even when timely
objections are filed, appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is forfeited. Robert
v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s
report, which fails to specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for
appeal . . . .”) (citation omitted)).
Date: December 19, 2025 	s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers
ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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