USA v. Anderson

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 	: 	Case No. 2:25-cr-135
:
Plaintiff, 	: 	Judge Algenon L. Marbley
:
v. 	:
:
DENICO ANDERSON, 	:
:
Defendant. 	:
OPINION & ORDER
This matter is before this Court on Defendant Denico Anderson’s pro se Motion for Early
Termination of Supervised Release. (ECF No. 2). The Government does not oppose his request.
(ECF No. 4). The motion is GRANTED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On August 17, 2021, Defendant Denico Anderson pleaded guilty to distribution of
methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C).1 	Specifically, he
distributed methamphetamine in exchange for $100.2 	District Judge John Preston Bailey
sentenced Anderson to 30 months of imprisonment, followed by 3 years of supervised release. He
was ordered to participate in substance abuse treatment, submit to substance abuse testing, and
comply with the offender employment program. 3 Anderson’s supervised release was transferred
from the Northern District of West Virginia to the Northern District of Illinois on December 21,
1 See Sentencing Hr’g, No. 20-cr-16(6), ECF No. 809 (N.D. W. Va. Aug. 17, 2021).
2 Indictment, No. 20-cr-16(6), ECF No. 4 at 12 (N.D. W. Va. Aug. 5, 2020).
3 Executed Judgment in a Criminal Case, No. 20-cr-16(6), ECF No. 860 at 1–3, 5 (N.D. W. Va.
Sept. 21, 2021).
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2023.4 He secured employment and moved to the Southern District of Ohio in early 2025. (ECF
No. 1).
On March 30, 2025, Anderson was charged in the Franklin County Municipal Court for
Operating a Vehicle While Intoxicated and speeding at a rate of 61 miles per hour in a 35-mile-
per-hour zone; on April 4, he pleaded guilty to operating a vehicle while intoxicated and was
sentenced to three days in jail and a one-year license suspension. 	State v. Anderson, Case No.
2025-TRC-112177 (Franklin Cnty. Mun. Ct. April 4, 2025). 	He completed a substance abuse
assessment on March 31, and no further treatment was recommended. (ECF No. 4).
Anderson’s supervision was formally transferred to this Court on August 25. (ECF No. 1).
In that transfer Order, District Judge John F. Kness observed that Defendant “has made significant
strides.” (Id.). On September 5, Anderson petitioned for early termination of supervised release
via letter. (ECF No. 2). He points out that he has worked hard to reintegrate into society, has been
evaluated for drug and alcohol treatment with the conclusion that such treatment is unnecessary,
has been employed as a car lot attendant since March 17, and has recently obtained employment
as a home health care aid. 	(Id.). 	In response, neither the Government nor the United States
Probation Officer opposed Anderson’s request. (See ECF No. 4 at 1–2). Probation noted that, with
regard to the traffic offense, Anderson does not have an ordered alcohol condition5 and observed
that Anderson had been making a positive adjustment to supervision in Ohio. (Id. 4 at 1).
4 Transfer of Jurisdiction, No. 20-cr-527, ECF No. 13 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 21, 2023).
5 Though Anderson’s conditions of supervision prohibit possession or consumption of “organic or
synthetic intoxicants” which might appear to prohibit alcohol, see Intoxicant, Black’s Law
Dictionary (11th ed. 2019), these conditions list examples of intoxicants as being “bath salts,
synthetic cannabinoids or other designer stimulants.” Executed Judgment in a Criminal Case, No.
20-cr-16(6), ECF No. 860 at 4 (N.D. W. Va. Sept. 21, 2021). 	A review of supervised release
conditions in the Northern and Southern Districts of West Virginia suggest that alcohol provisions
are enumerated separately. E.g., United States v. Nieto-Garcia, 2017 WL 4125268, at *3 (N.D. W.
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II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
A court may order early termination of the period of supervised release when the defendant
has served one full year of supervised release. United States v. Emmert, 2025 WL 3165226, at *2
(S.D. Ohio Nov. 13, 2025) (Marbley, J.). 	Courts enjoy discretion in considering whether early
termination is warranted by the defendant’s conduct and is in the interest of justice. United States
v. Hale, 127 F.4th 638, 640 (6th Cir. 2025). Courts must consider the factors set forth in sections
3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), (a)(2)(D), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), and (a)(7). 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e).
These factors are: 	(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to afford adequate deterrence in criminal conduct; (3)
the need to protect the public from the defendant; (4) the need to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training, medical care, or other corrective treatment; (5) the sentencing
range provided for by the guidelines; (6) any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing
Commission; (7) the need to avoid sentence disparities; and (8) the need to provide restitution to
any victim. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); (a)(2)(B)–(D); (a)(4)–(7).
III. 	LAW & ANALYSIS
After carefully considering the statutory requirements, this Court determines that the first,
second, and third factors are most relevant to its determination.6 	First, the nature and
Va. Sept. 18, 2017) (separately prohibiting “organic or synthetic intoxicants” and “alcohol”);
accord United States v. Rhodes, 2024 WL 3345487, at *3, *5 (S.D. W. Va. July 17, 2024) (similar).
6 Anderson has not identified any needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or
corrective treatment. No argument is made about the term of Anderson’s sentence, which was at
the bottom of the guidelines range. See Statement of Reasons, No. 20-cr-16(6), ECF No. 811 at 1
(N.D. W. Va. Aug. 18, 2021). There is no victim needing restitution. Presentence Investigation
Report, No. 20-cr-16(6), ECF No. 814 at 8–9 (N.D. W. Va. Aug. 17, 2021) (“There are no
identifiable victims in this offense.”). Thus, the Court considers these factors to be inapplicable.
Cf. United States v. Tavarez, 141 F.4th 750, 757 (6th Cir. 2025) (“[T]he district court need not
‘articulate its analysis of each sentencing factor as long as the record demonstrates that the court
considered the relevant factors.’”) (citation omitted); United States v. Suber, 75 F. App’x 442, 444
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circumstances of Anderson’s offense, combined with Anderson’s characteristics, weigh in favor of
early termination. Although Anderson was convicted of a drug offense for distributing $100 worth
of methamphetamine, since his incarceration, he has secured employment, maintained contact with
his Probation Officers, and continued to test negative for drugs. 	(ECF No. 4 at 1). 	Second,
Anderson’s sentence has provided adequate deterrence. Indeed, he has served the majority of his
term of supervised release and has less than a year left. (Id.). Third, Anderson appears to be a low
risk to the public. Although his crime was serious, since the beginning of his term of supervised
release, the only issue has been his conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. 	(Id.).
These factors suggest early termination would be appropriate in this case.
In sum, three factors weigh in favor of early termination and the remainder do not apply.
Next, in considering Anderson’s conduct and the interest of justice, the Court concludes that both
favor an early termination. First, an early termination would not be incongruent with how district
courts treat similar (or worse) offenders. See United States v. Ponce, 2022 WL 1202781, at *1, *4
(D. Idaho Apr. 22, 2022) (finding defendant’s “perfect record on supervision” was sufficient for
early termination of 4 years’ supervised release, following 60-month term for one count of
distributing methamphetamine); see also United States v. Garcia-Rivas, 711 F. Supp. 3d 1246,
1249 (D. Ore. 2024) (grating early termination of 3 years’ supervised release following 121-month
term for operating two methamphetamine laboratories).
Second, Anderson is gainfully employed, has remained drug-free, and has left favorable
impressions with his probation officers. 	(ECF No. 4 at 1). 	This Court does take his traffic
conviction seriously and admonishes Anderson to refrain from drinking and driving. Yet the Court
(6th Cir. 2003) (affirming district court’s denial of early termination motion based on consideration
of only two factors).
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is also encouraged by the fact that Anderson immediately “participated in a substance abuse
assessment and no further treatment was recommended.” (Id.). Thus, this Court concludes that
Anderson “will be successful without supervision.” United States v. Baskette, 2022 WL 1698927,
at *2 (W.D. Ky. May 26, 2022); accord United States v. Holmes, 2025 WL 2589569, at *2 (E.D.
Mich. Aug. 14, 2025) (granting early termination where defendant “exhibited commendable
compliance with his supervision terms,” was employed, and remained crime-free).
This Court concludes that Anderson has made a sufficient showing to permit early
termination. 	Based on his conduct, the Government’s position, an evaluation of the relevant
section 3553(a) factors, and the interests of justice, early termination of Anderson’s three-year
sentence of supervised release is warranted.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
This Court commends Mr. Anderson for the progress he has made but reminds him to act
carefully and not jeopardize this progress. For these reasons and for good cause shown, his motion
for early termination of supervised release is GRANTED. The United States Probation Office for
the Southern District of Ohio is ORDERED to TERMINATE the supervised release of Denico
Anderson.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ALGENON L. MARBLEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: November 18, 2025
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