Alford v. Chambers-Smith et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
BRIAN KEITH ALFORD,
Plaintiff,
v.
ANNETTE CHAMBERS-SMITH et
al., 1
Defendants.
Case No. 2:24-cv-4184
JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE
Magistrate Judge Silvain
OPINION AND ORDER
In his October 14, 2025, Report and Recommendation, Magistrate Judge
Silvain recommends that the Court (1) deny Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma
pauperis (IFP) and order Plaintiff to pay the full $405 fee necessary to commence a
suit in federal court, (2) deny Plaintiff’s motion for issuance of an order to the Ross
Correctional Institution’s prison cashier as moot, and (3) certify that an appeal of any
Order adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation would not be
taken in good faith. (R&R, Doc. 15, #141). Plaintiff objected. (Doc. 17). For the reasons
stated below, the Court OVERRULES Plaintiff’s Objections (Doc. 17) and ADOPTS
the R&R (Doc. 15).
BACKGROUND
Pro se plaintiff Brian Keith Alford, a former federal prisoner currently in state
custody at the Ross Correctional Institution (RCI), filed this action on November 20,
1 Defendant Chambers-Smith appears on the docket as “DRC – Director Anette Chambers-
Smith.” The Court opts to omit Chambers-Smith’s title, and to correct the spelling of her first
name.
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2024. (Compl., Doc. 1). Alford has so far filed four separate versions of his complaint
in this matter. (See Doc. 1; Doc. 3; Doc. 13; Doc. 14). The most recent iteration—
Alford’s Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 14)—alleges claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983
and 1985 against eighteen Defendants. (Doc. 14, #108; Doc. 15, #130). The matter
came before Magistrate Judge Silvain on Alford’s Motions to Proceed in Forma
Pauperis 2 (Doc. 4; Doc. 12) and his Motion for Issuance of an Order to the Prison
Cashier (Doc. 10). (Doc. 15, #130).
The Magistrate Judge’s R&R explains that the Court had previously entered a
Deficiency Order (Doc. 7) under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) directing
Alford to provide a “Certificate” page (i.e., page 8 of the Application and Affidavit
form that this Court makes available to litigants), “completed and signed by the
institutional cashier, and a certified copy of his prison trust fund account statement
(or institutional equivalent) for the preceding six-month period.” (Id. at #131 (citing
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)). In response to that Order, Alford submitted a non-certified
account statement, 3 (see Doc. 12), and a motion to compel the RCI cashier to provide
the requested information, (Doc. 10). The Magistrate Judge then explains that
typically he would have pursued this “request for the required account information.”
(Doc. 15, #131). In this case, however, he concluded that the PLRA’s “three-strikes
rule” bars Alford from proceeding IFP, and that this independent bar obviates the
2 Alford filed another Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis (Doc. 18) as the Court was
finalizing this Opinion and Order.
3 Alford had already filed a non-certified account statement with his first motion to proceed
IFP. (See Doc. 4-1).
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need for any account information. (Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). Accordingly, the
Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court deny Alford’s motions to proceed IFP,
and deny as moot Alford’s motion to compel the cashier to provide the requested
information. (Id.).
The Magistrate Judge began his analysis by noting that Alford is a frequent
litigant in this Court who has filed nineteen civil rights actions since 1997. (Id.). In
connection with that litigation history, the Southern District of Ohio has found that
Alford has accumulated “three strikes” under the PLRA in several prior cases. (Id.
(citing Alford v. Mohr, No. 1:15-cv-645 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 22, 2016) (ordering Alford to
pay the full filing fee based on his previous dismissals); Alford v. Chambers-Smith,
No. 2:20-cv-3879 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 19, 2021) (same); Alford v. Schweitzer, No. 2:22-cv-
1652 (S.D. Ohio July 11, 2022) (same))). But since those earlier determinations, the
Sixth Circuit decided Crump v. Blue, 121 F.4th 1108 (6th Cir. 2024), which clarified
the requirements to accumulate a strike under the PLRA. (Id.). In light of that new
guidance, the Magistrate Judge reevaluated whether Alford has accumulated three
strikes. (Id. at #132–37).
The 	Magistrate 	Judge 	started 	that 	analysis 	by 	summarizing 	the 	law
surrounding prisoner IFP filings and Crump’s effect on that law. (Id. at #132–35).
Generally, a plaintiff is required to pay a filing fee to initiate a suit in federal court.
(Id. at #132 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a)). But a litigant who cannot afford to pay may
seek leave to procced IFP. (Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1)). If granted, the Court
may waive the fee entirely, require only partial payment, or order periodic payments
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over 	time. 	(Id. 	(first 	citing 	28 	U.S.C. 	§ 1915(a)(1); 	and then 	citing 	28 	U.S.C.
§ 1915(b)(1)–(4))). Prisoners, however, may lose this privilege if courts have dismissed
three or more of their prior actions or appeals on the grounds that they were frivolous,
malicious, or failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Id. (citations
omitted)).
Since the PLRA’s enactment, courts in the Sixth Circuit have assessed strikes
to prisoners who filed so-called “mixed-claim actions,” i.e., cases where some of the
claims were dismissed for reasons “covered by” the PLRA but others were not. (Id.
(citations omitted)). But that changed in 2024, when the Sixth Circuit handed down
Crump. (Id.). There, the court held that two of Horace Crump’s prior actions should
not be assessed as strikes under the PLRA because they were “mixed-claim” actions.
(Id. (citing Crump, 121 F.4th at 1110, 1112)). According to Crump, “all claims in a
complaint, not just some of them, must be dismissed on grounds listed in the [PLRA]
for the dismissal to count as a strike.” (Id. at #133 (quoting Crump, 121 F.4th at
1111)).
With Crump in mind, the Magistrate Judge turned to this case. But even
applying Crump’s smaller strike zone, he concluded that Alford still has accumulated
three strikes. (Id. at #135–37).
The 	first 	comes 	from 	Alford 	v. 	Wilkinson, 	No. 	2:97-cv-997 	(S.D. 	Ohio)
(dismissed October 29, 1997). (Id. at #135). There, the court dismissed Alford’s
complaint under § 1983 because it “failed to state a viable constitutional claim.” (Id.
(citation omitted)). So “[b]ecause the complaint was dismissed in its entirety for
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failure to state [a] claim, a ground expressly enumerated in the PLRA’s strike
provision, it continues to constitute a strike under Crump.” (Id. (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(g)).
Next, the Magistrate Judge considered Alford v. Wilkinson, No. 2:98-cv-226
(S.D. Ohio) (dismissed February 27, 1998). (Id. at #136). There, the court dismissed
Alford’s § 1983 complaint “because, among other things, it was barred by the statute
of limitations.” (Id.). So because the complaint was “dismissed for failure to state a
claim, a ground expressly enumerated in the PLRA’s strike provision, it also
continues to constitute a strike under Crump.” (Id. (citations omitted)).
Finally, the Magistrate Judge considered Alford v. Rice, No. 3:10-cv-424 (S.D.
Ohio) (dismissed January 28, 2011), in which the court dismissed Alford’s entire
complaint “because, among other things, the statute of limitations had long since run
on all the claims in the case.” (Id. (cleaned up)). In dismissing the case, the court
specifically found it to be “frivolous,” a ground “expressly enumerated in the PLRA’s
strike provision.” (Id. at #136–37 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). So the case “continues
to constitute a strike under Crump.” (Id. at #137 (citations omitted)).
Thus, even given Crump, the R&R concludes that Alford has accumulated
three strikes and therefore cannot proceed IFP. But the R&R further recognized there
is one exception to that rule—prisoners who are “under imminent danger of serious
physical injury” can proceed IFP notwithstanding three strikes. (Id.). To meet the
exception, though, “the threat or prison condition ‘must be real and proximate’ and
the danger of serious physical injury must exist at the time the [initial] complaint is
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filed.” (Id. (citations omitted)). Neither “an assertion of past danger, nor speculative
future harm” will do. (Id. (citations omitted)). Additionally, the type of injury alleged
“must ‘have potentially dangerous consequences such as death or severe bodily harm’
to qualify as ‘serious’ under § 1915(g).” (Id. (citation omitted)). The “only relevant
allegations” in applying these standards “are those in which [Plaintiff] describes
physical injury, threats of violence, and deprivation of medical treatment.” (Id. at
#137–38 (citation omitted)).
The Magistrate Judge divided the allegations in the various versions of the
complaints 4 Alford filed in this case into two categories: “(1) allegations regarding his
housing situation at the time he initiated the case; and (2) allegations regarding his
medical treatment for hepatitis-C at the time he initiated the case.” 5 (Id. at #138
(citations omitted)).
In the first set of allegations, Alford maintains that, at the time he filed this
case in November 2024, “he had recently been moved back to RCI housing unit 1A,
where he had previously lived in February 2024.” (Id.). He alleges that when he last
resided there, he was housed “with a known PREA and homosexual inmate who
smoked intoxicants.” (Id. (quoting Doc. 14, #114)). To make matters worse, on
February 15, 2024, this cellmate allegedly “caus[ed] multiple damages to himself,”
4 Although the Magistrate Judge said that Alford has filed three complaints on the docket,
he has, as noted, filed four. (See Doc. 1; Doc. 3; Doc. 13; Doc. 14).
5 The Magistrate Judge also noted a third class of allegations—such as “claims of wrongful
placement on academic probation” or “violation of the Public Records Act”—that cannot
possibly implicate the imminent-danger exception because they do not involve Alford’s
physical security at all. (Doc. 15, #138). The Court agrees with this assessment and therefore
sets these allegations aside for present purposes.
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“accused [Alford] of causing the damage,” and also accused Alford of “touching his
[i.e., the cellmate’s] buttocks.” (Id. at #138–39). Though prison officials investigated
the incident, neither Alford nor the cellmate were charged. (Id. at #139). Alford was
relocated to a different housing unit and “told not to say or do anything to” his former
cellmate. (Id.). All of this, Alford says, caused him to “lose property, the ability to
timely file documents with the Courts, [and be] subjected to ridicule and shame.” (Id.).
But despite all that, Alford says, prison officials are now moving him back to unit 1A.
The Magistrate Judge concluded that these allegations are “insufficient to
invoke the imminent danger exception.” (Id.). That’s because Alford’s return to
housing unit 1A—and the attendant prospect of Alford coming into contact with his
former cellmate—raises a mere “possibility” that the cellmate “might pose a risk of
injury.” (Id. (citation omitted)). And that possibility is “neither sufficiently real nor
sufficiently 	proximate 	to 	satisfy 	the 	requirements 	necessary 	to 	fit 	within 	the
imminent danger exception.” (Id. (citation omitted)).
As for the second set of allegations—those concerning Alford’s treatment for
hepatitis-C—the Magistrate Judge concluded that Alford’s “conclusory allegations”
are insufficient to allege “a danger of serious physical injury as a result of being
presently denied adequate medical treatment.” (Id. (citation omitted)). The thrust of
Alford’s allegations is that “Chief Medical Examiner Dr. Eddy has denied [Alford]
treatment for hepatitis C since 2011 and that he now has a vitamin B-12 deficiency.”
(Id.). But although Alford “may be dissatisfied with his hepatitis-C treatment,” he
does not “allege[] that he is being denied all medical treatment for this condition or
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for his vitamin B-12 deficiency.” (Id. at #140). And a mere “dispute over the adequacy
of medical treatment is also not enough to invoke the imminent danger exception to
the three-strikes rule.” (Id. (citations omitted)). So “[b]ecause [Alford’s] allegations
regarding his hepatitis[-]C treatment suggest merely a dispute over the adequacy of
his treatment, they are insufficient to invoke the imminent danger exception.” (Id.).
For these reasons, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court (1) deny
Alford’s motions to proceed IFP and order Alford to pay the full $405 filing fee within
30 days on pain of dismissal, (2) deny Alford’s motion for an issuance of an order to
the RCI prison cashier as moot, and (3) certify that an appeal of any Order adopting
the R&R would not be taken in good faith. (Id. at #141).
The R&R further explains that Alford had 14 days to object, (id. at #142), a
deadline that Alford met, (Doc. 17). In his Objections, Alford asks the Court to “take
Judicial notice” of various facts. (Id. at #146). Those facts include, among others, that
Alford “has been placed in imminent threat of danger or serious bodily harm when
RCI Hospital staff delayed providing treatment to plaintiff interrelated to his chronic
liver disease,” and that Alford “nearly died from the failure to treat from December
7th, 2024 to December 10th, 2024[,] where he was hospitalized at OSU with double
kidney infection, bladder infection, a blood clot on his left lung, and the loss of 36
pounds before he was transported to OSU medical center on December 23rd, 2024
where he remained until December 29th, 2024.” (Id. at #147). After that, Alford was
“housed in RCI Medical Hospital from December 29th, 2024 to January 2nd, 2025.”
(Id.). Alford’s medical allegations aside, he also asserts that the “remaining claims”
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in his complaint (e.g., those regarding the cellmate) describe facts that place him in
imminent danger. (Id.).
LEGAL STANDARD
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b)(3), “district courts review a[]
[report and recommendation] de novo after a party files a timely objection.” Bates v.
Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., No. 1:22-cv-337, 2023 WL 4348835, at *1 (S.D. Ohio
July 5, 2023). But that de novo review requirement extends only to “any portion to
which a proper objection was made.” Id. (citation omitted). In response to such an
objection, 	“the 	district 	court 	may 	accept, 	reject, 	or 	modify 	the 	recommended
disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge
with instructions.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3)) (cleaned up).
By contrast, if a party makes only a general objection, that “has the same
effect[] as would a failure to object.” Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 932
F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991). A litigant must identify each issue in the report and
recommendation to which he objects with sufficient clarity for the Court to identify
it, or else the litigant forfeits the Court’s de novo review of the issue. Miller v. Currie,
50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995) (“The objections must be clear enough to enable the
district court to discern those issues that are dispositive and contentious.”).
That said, Alford is proceeding pro se. A pro se litigant’s pleadings should be
construed liberally and are subject to less stringent standards than formal pleadings
filed by attorneys. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Franklin v. Rose,
765 F.2d 82, 84–85 (6th Cir. 1985). But pro se litigants still must comply with the
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procedural rules that govern civil cases. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113
(1993). And “[t]he liberal treatment of pro se pleadings does not require lenient
treatment of substantive law, and the liberal standards that apply at the pleading
stage do not apply after a case has progressed to the summary judgment stage.”
Johnson v. Stewart, No. 08-1521, 2010 WL 8738105, at *3 (6th Cir. May 5, 2010)
(citations omitted).
For any unobjected portions of an R&R, “the advisory committee notes to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b) suggest that the Court still must ‘satisfy itself
that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the
recommendation.’” Redmon v. Noel, No. 1:21-cv-445, 2021 WL 4771259, at *1 (S.D.
Ohio Oct. 13, 2021) (collecting cases).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
The Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court (1) deny Alford’s motion to
proceed IFP and order Alford to pay the full filing fee or else face dismissal, (2) deny
Alford’s motion for an order to the RCI prison cashier as moot, and (3) certify that
any appeal from this Opinion and Order would not be taken in good faith. (Doc. 15,
#141).
Alford’s Objections do not challenge the Magistrate Judge’s determination that
he has accumulated three strikes under the PLRA. But as best the Court can tell,
they do contend that Alford’s pleadings satisfy the imminent-danger exception. (Doc.
17, #146–48). Accordingly, the Court reviews the Magistrate Judge’s assessment of
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Alford’s PLRA strikes for clear error, and the Magistrate Judge’s evaluation of the
imminent-danger exception de novo.
Starting with the former, the Court concludes that the Magistrate Judge did
not commit clear error in his PLRA three-strikes analysis. As described above, the
Magistrate Judge rightly observed that each of these three cases counted as strikes:
(1) Alford v. Wilkinson, No. 2:97-cv-997 (S.D. Ohio), which the Sixth Circuit affirmed
in Alford v. Wilkinson, 173 F.3d 428, 1999 WL 96732, at *1 (6th Cir. 1999) (Table);
(2) Alford v. Wilkinson, No. 2:98-cv-226 (S.D. Ohio), which the Sixth Circuit affirmed
in Alford v. Wilkinson, 188 F.3d 506, 1999 WL 644375, at *1 (6th Cir. 1999) (Table);
and (3) Alford v. Rice, No. 3:10-cv-424 (S.D. Ohio), which the Sixth Circuit declined
to adjudicate because it denied Alford’s request to appeal IFP, (see Order of USCA,
Alford v. Rice, No. 3:10-cv-424 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 11, 2012), Doc. 27). In each of the three,
the district court dismissed the entirety of the action on PLRA-covered grounds, so
each counts under Crump.
That means that Alford must meet the imminent-danger exception to proceed
IFP. But he fails to do so. The exception applies when “the prisoner is under imminent
danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). The Sixth Circuit has held
that a plaintiff who endeavors to rely on the exception must plausibly allege that “the
threat or prison condition [is] real and proximate and the danger of serious physical
injury … exist[s] at the time the complaint is filed.” Rittner v. Kinder, 290 F. App’x
796, 797 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, an assertion that
the prisoner “faced danger in the past is insufficient to invoke the exception.” Id. at
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797–98; see also Percival v. Gerth, 443 F. App’x 944, 946 (6th Cir. 2011) (“Assertions
of past danger will not satisfy the ‘imminent danger’ exception.”). That said, in
applying these standards, the Court must also remain mindful that “[t]he imminent
danger exception is essentially a pleading requirement subject to the ordinary
principles of notice pleading,” and that Alford, a pro se litigant, is thus “entitled to
have his complaint liberally construed.” Vandiver v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 727
F.3d 580, 585 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Vandiver v. Vasbinder, 416 F. App’x 560, 562
(6th Cir. 2011)). But even then, the exception is not met “when the prisoner’s claims
of imminent danger are conclusory or ridiculous, or are clearly baseless.” Id. (quoting
Rittner, 290 F. App’x at 798). At bottom, then, Alford must “show that his complaint
alleged facts from which a court, informed by its judicial experience and common
sense, could draw the reasonable inference that he was under an existing danger at
the time he filed his complaint.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Taylor v. First Med. Mgmt., 508 F. App’x 488, 492 (6th Cir. 2012)).
As noted, the Magistrate Judge grouped Alford’s allegations into two classes
relevant here: (1) those regarding Alford’s housing situation, and (2) those regarding
Alford’s medical treatment for hepatitis-C. (Doc. 15, #138). Start with the former.
Alford’s Objections assert that his “placement with a PREA inmate using intoxicants”
places him in “imminent threat” of “death or serious bodily harm.” (Doc. 17, #147).
But even assuming that, at the time Alford filed this case, he was “moved back to the
same cell in housing unit 1A as before, he merely alleges the ‘possibility’ that his
cellmate ‘might pose a risk of injury.’” (Doc. 15, #139 (quoting White v. McKee, No.
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1:16-cv-601, 2016 WL 3226030, at *4 (W.D. Mich. June 13, 2016), aff’d, No. 16-2066,
2017 WL 3165081 (6th Cir. July 13, 2017))). And because “the only allegations of
physical harm … were to [Alford’s] cellmate, not to [Alford], that ‘possibility’ is
‘neither sufficiently real nor sufficiently proximate to satisfy the requirements
necessary to fit within the imminent danger exception.’” (Id.).
The second set of allegations—those involving Alford’s hepatitis-C treatment—
present 	a 	closer 	question. 	But 	ultimately, 	the 	Court 	concludes 	that 	they 	are
insufficient for purposes of the imminent-danger exception. The Sixth Circuit has
expressly held that “a plaintiff who alleges a danger of serious harm due to a failure
to treat a chronic illness or condition satisfies” the exception. Vandiver, 727 F.3d at
587. But they must plausibly allege facts supporting that assertion—the exception is
not met where a prisoner’s allegations are “conclusory.” Id. at 585. And here, none of
the four versions of the complaint that Alford has filed on the docket presents “facts
from which [the Court], informed by its judicial experience and common sense, c[an]
draw the reasonable inference that [Alford] was under an existing danger at the time
he filed his complaint.” Taylor, 508 F. App’x at 492.
The only allegation in Alford’s original Complaint on this front is his conclusory
assertion that “Dr. Andrew Eddy failed to treat Plaintiff for a life-threatening illness
(hep-C) in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” (Doc. 1, #5). Alford’s
Amended Complaint expands this allegation into a paragraph:
Since 2011 Defendant Dr. Andrew Eddy denied Plaintiff treatment for
a life-threatening illness ((Hep-c) (sic) which was the result of receiving
tainted 	blood 	transfusion 	while 	in 	the 	Armed 	Forces 	in 	Tacoma,
Washington, which has now been determined to have caused a B-12
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deficiency 	as 	a 	result 	of 	hepato-intestinal 	disease 	and 	now
neuropathy/nerve damages to Plaintiff’s feet and legs. Dr. Donato
Borrillo, MD, JD, MS determined these facts on October 18th, 2024.
(Doc. 3, #32). The Second and Third Amended Complaints repeat this paragraph
verbatim, and do not supplement it with any additional facts. (Doc. 13, #101; Doc. 14,
#118). Note that while these allegations set forth the conditions from which Alford
claims he suffers, they provide no facts regarding any treatment that he allegedly
was denied or any risks allegedly arising from that denial (other than the conclusory
reference to his condition being “life-threatening”).
Such allegations stand in stark contrast to the allegations at issue in Vandiver,
where the Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged an imminent
danger based on denial of medical treatment. There, the petitioner stated “in multiple
paragraphs of his complaint, and aver[ed] in his affidavit, that he [was] denied
medical treatment.” 727 F.3d at 587. More importantly, he identified the allegedly
lacking treatment. He claimed, for example, that he needed, but was denied,
“specialty care referral visits.” Id. Additionally, the Vandiver plaintiff specifically
pleaded risks he allegedly faced—“coma, death, physical loss of limbs and mental
pain, mental anguish and emotional distress”—and the specific alleged denials of
treatment giving rise to those risks—“defendants’ past and present failure to provide
him with physician prescribed special shoes, and transport vehicle, [and] a special
diet and medication.” Id. (cleaned up). Alford’s pleadings make no similarly “detailed
allegations showing a present danger of serious injury.” Id. at 588.
Alford tries to cure that defect by providing additional details in his Objections.
There, he explains that “RCI Hospital staff delayed providing treatment to plaintiff
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interrelated to his chronic liver disease … from December 7th, 2024, to December
10th, 2024.” (Doc. 17, #147). Alford says that the delay caused him to “nearly die[],”
which led to Alford being “hospitalized at OSU with double kidney infection, bladder
infection, a blood clot on his left lung, and the loss of 36 pounds.” (Id.). The OSU stay
lasted a little less than a week. (Id.). After that, Alford “was housed in RCI Medical
Hospital from December 29th, 2024[,] to January 2nd, 2025.” (Id.). This story is
generally consistent with a “Notice to the Court” (Doc. 6) that Alford filed in January
2025. There, Alford reports that “he [was] treated for a life-threatening illness from
December 7th, 2024 until present following admission to Ohio State University
Wexner Medical Center on December 23rd, 2024.” (Id. at #51).
A few problems, though. For one, none of these factual assertions appear in
any of the four versions of the complaint that Alford filed. And ultimately, the Court
must look to the pleadings to decide whether Alford has adequately alleged an
imminent danger. See Vandiver, 416 F. App’x at 562. Beyond that, though, the
additional facts set forth in the Objections also suggest that Alford was, in fact,
receiving medical treatment. As best the Court can tell, Alford’s Objections assert
that RCI hospital staff “delayed” Alford’s treatment, which led to a stay at an external
hospital before Alford was ultimately returned to the care of RCI medical staff. (Doc.
17, #147). And again, this is all consistent with Alford’s “Notice to the Court,” in which
he expressly states that he was “treated for a life-threatening illness.” (Doc. 6, #51).
Indeed, that very filing contains what appears to be a “Medical Services Treatment
Pass” from RCI. (Id. at #55). And, while Alford might object to the adequacy of the
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treatment he received, “disagreement with the healthcare provider’s plan of care does
not constitute a denial of treatment.” Tucker v. Kandulski, No. 15-cv-11117, 2015 WL
5692909, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Sep. 28, 2015). Thus, even considering the matter de novo,
the Court lands at the same spot—Alford has not alleged facts from which the Court
can plausibly infer that he was under an existing danger at the time he filed his
Complaint due to the care he was (or wasn’t) receiving. Taylor, 508 F. App’x at 492.
In sum, Alford has accumulated three strikes under the PLRA. And because
his pleadings do not satisfy the imminent-danger exception, he may not press his
claims IFP.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons above, the Court OVERRULES Alford’s Objections (Doc. 17)
and ADOPTS the R&R (Doc. 15). The Court therefore DENIES Alford’s Motions to
Proceed in Forma Pauperis. (Doc. 4; Doc. 12; Doc. 18). The Court further ORDERS
Alford to pay the full $405 fee (a $350 filing fee plus a $55 administrative fee) within
30 days if he wishes to proceed with this action. Failure to pay the requisite fee will
result in dismissal WITHOUT PREJUDICE. See, e.g., Dupree v. Palmer, 284 F.3d
1234, 1236 (11th Cir. 2002) (“[T]he proper procedure is for the district court to dismiss
the complaint without prejudice when it denies the prisoner leave to proceed in forma
pauperis pursuant to the three strikes provision of § 1915(g).”). The Court further
DENIES Alford’s motion for issuance of an order to the prison cashier (Doc. 10) as
MOOT. Finally, the Court CERTIFIES, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal
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of this Opinion and Order would not be made in good faith, and DENIES Alford leave
to appeal IFP.
SO ORDERED.
December 12, 2025
DATE 	DOUGLAS R. COLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
OUGLAS R. COLE
NITED STATES DISTRICT	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T J
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