Scowden v. Fluor-B&W Portsmouth LLC

1
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Tammy Scowden,
Plaintiff, 	Case No. 2:24-cv-3759
v. 	District Judge James L. Graham
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers
Fluor-B&W Portsmouth, LLC,
Defendant.
Opinion and Order
This matter is before the Court on sua sponte consideration of its jurisdiction over the remaining
claims in this action. See Answers in Genesis of Kentucky, Inc. v. Creation Ministries Int’l, Ltd., 556 F.3d 459,
465 (6th Cir. 2009) (“[F]ederal courts have a duty to consider their subject matter jurisdiction in regard
to every case and may raise the issue sua sponte.”).
Plaintiff originally filed this case against her employer in the Pike County Court of Common
Pleas. Her complaint asserted claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation
Act for failure to accommodate her disability. 	Her complaint also asserted state law claims for
disability discrimination and retaliation under Ohio Revised Code § 4112. Defendant removed the
case to federal court on the basis of the claims arising under federal law. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441.
Defendant moved for summary judgment. In response, plaintiff acknowledged that an outside
development has rendered her claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act no longer viable. See
Doc. 24 at PAGEID 1791 (referring to a favorable determination of her application for Social Security
disability income). See also Cleveland v. Pol’y Mgmt. Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 806 (1999). Plaintiff states
that she is not pursuing her federal claims and does not oppose their dismissal. 	See Doc. 24 at
PAGEID 1791; see also Doc. 27 at PAGEID 1815 (defendant agreeing that the federal claims are
subject to dismissal). The Court thus dismisses the ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims.
Still remaining are the state law claims, over which the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction. See
28 U.S.C. § 1332. According to the pleadings, plaintiff is an Ohio resident and defendant is an Ohio
limited liability company with its principal place of business in Pike County, Ohio.
Having dismissed the federal claims, the Court turns to the question of supplemental
jurisdiction. 	A trial court has broad discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law
Case: 2:24-cv-03759-JLG-EPD Doc #: 28 Filed: 03/16/26 Page: 1 of 3 PAGEID #: <pageID>

2
claims that are “so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part
of the same case or controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
“Generally, once a federal court has dismissed a plaintiff’s federal law claim, it should not
reach state law claims.” 	Experimental Holdings, Inc. v. Farris, 503 F.3d 514, 521 (6th Cir. 2007). 	In
determining whether to retain jurisdiction, a court should “consider and weigh several factors,
including the ‘values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity.’” Gamel v. City of
Cincinnati, 625 F.3d 949, 951–52 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343,
350 (1988)).
“Comity to state courts is considered a substantial interest” and thus a federal court “applies
a strong presumption against the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction once federal claims have been
dismissed—retaining residual jurisdiction ‘only in cases where the interests of judicial economy and
the avoidance of multiplicity of litigation outweigh our concern over needlessly deciding state law
issues.’” Packard v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Columbus Inc., 423 Fed. App’x 580, 584 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting
Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir. 2006)).
This Court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. In addition
to comity, several other factors weight against retaining jurisdiction. One of them is that the Court
has given no consideration to the merits of any of plaintiff’s claims, as no motions to dismiss were
filed. See Packard, 423 Fed. App’x at 585 (noting that “no dispositive rulings had been issued”); Gamel,
625 F.3d at 952 (considering whether the federal court had already “invested significant time in the
litigation”); Talismanic Props., LLC v. Tipp City, Ohio, 309 F.Supp.3d 501, 510 (S.D. Ohio 2017)
(declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where “the federal claims have been resolved on
procedural grounds without consideration of the merits of any of Plaintiffs’ claims”). 	Further, the
Pike County Court of Common Pleas is the more convenient venue for the parties, who are both
located there. See Packard, 423 Fed. App’x at 585 (noting that “litigation costs are lower in state court
than in federal court” and that the litigants’ discovery would be available for use in the state court
proceedings).
Accordingly, the federal claims are dismissed and the Court REMANDS the remaining state
law claims to the Pike County Court of Common Pleas. See Thurman v. DaimlerChrysler, Inc., 397 F.3d
352, 359 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that in a case removed from state court to federal court, where “all
federal claims have been dismissed before trial, the best course is to remand the state law claims to
the state court from which the case was removed”).
Case: 2:24-cv-03759-JLG-EPD Doc #: 28 Filed: 03/16/26 Page: 2 of 3 PAGEID #: <pageID>

3
It is so ordered.
s/ James L. Graham
JAMES L. GRAHAM
United States District Judge
DATE: March 16, 2026
Case: 2:24-cv-03759-JLG-EPD Doc #: 28 Filed: 03/16/26 Page: 3 of 3 PAGEID #: <pageID>