Cook v. Trostel et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
JOSHUA COOK,
Plaintiff,
v.
KATIE TROSTEL, et al.,
Defendants.
Civil Action 2:23-cv-2314
Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, Joshua Cook, proceeding without counsel, filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983 while he was an Ohio inmate incarcerated at the Chillicothe Correctional Institution. 	(ECF
No. 3.) 	This matter is currently before the Court following Plaintiff’s failure to respond to the
Court’s most recent Order dated December 9, 2025. 	(ECF No. 108.) 	For the following reasons,
it is RECOMMENDED that this matter be DISMISSED without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure
to prosecute.
I.
Initially, the Court finds the following background necessary. 	Plaintiff moved for leave to
proceed in forma pauperis in this action on July 20, 2023. (ECF No. 1.) 	By Order dated August 4,
2023, the Court concluded, following its sua sponte review, that Plaintiff’s Complaint deserved
further development and permitted Plaintiff to proceed on her claims.1 (ECF No. 4.) 	At that time,
the Court ordered the United States Marshal to serve a copy of the Complaint, Summons and the
Screening Order on the named Defendants. (Id.) 	In the Screening Order, the Court summarized
1 Plaintiff, a transgendered inmate, previously moved the Court to use female pronouns when
referring to her. (ECF No. 24.) The Court granted Plaintiff’s request. (ECF No. 26.)
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Plaintiff’s claims as follows: …
plaintiff alleges that defendants violated plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment rights by
acting with deliberate indifference to plaintiff’s safety. Specifically, plaintiff claims
that defendants were aware of ongoing safety issues within the sex offender programs
at the Madison and Belmont Correctional Institutions, where plaintiff was previously
located, but have subjected plaintiff to continued physical and sexual victimization
through mandatory participation in sex offender programming. (See Doc. 1-1,
Complaint at PageID 15-17). Plaintiff further alleges that 67-MNH-12— the ODRC
policy governing sex offender services—violates the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment by mandating that male offenders participate in the program
while allowing female offenders to participate on a voluntary basis.
(Id.) The Complaint named as Defendants Katie Trostel, Joshua Neff, Corby Free, Edward Shutek,
and Annette Chambers-Smith in both their individual and official capacities. (ECF No. 3.) 	In the
Complaint, by way of relief, Plaintiff sought $750,000 in damages or punitive damages and asked the
Court to enjoin ODRC from enforcing Policy 67-MNH-12. 	(Id.)
By Order dated August 30, 2024, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim for monetary damages
against Defendants in their official capacities and Plaintiff’s claims for injunctive relief as to
Defendants Edward Shutek and Joshua Neff. (ECF No. 83.) 	Further, the Court adopted the
recommendation that Plaintiff waived her right to pursue a claim for damages under the Leaman
doctrine and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims for damages against Defendants in their individual
capacities. 	Following those rulings, the only remaining claim was Plaintiff’s claim for injunctive
relief against Defendants Katherine Trostel, Kelly Storm, Corby Free, and Annette Chambers-Smith
in their official capacities. 	(Id.)
On September 3, 2024, the Court issued a Scheduling Order. 	(ECF No. 84.) 	Pursuant to
that Scheduling Order, discovery was due on March 3, 2025, and dispositive motions were due on
June 3, 2025. (ECF No. 84.) 	Well prior to the close of discovery, Plaintiff filed a Motion for
Summary Judgment on January 27, 2025, prompting Defendants to seek an extension of time for
their response to coincide with the due date for dispositive motions. (ECF Nos. 93, 98.) 	By
notation order dated February 12, 2025, the Court granted Defendants until June 3, 2025, to respond
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to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment. 	(ECF No. 100.) 	In an Order dated March 18,
2025, addressed to various motions, the Court denied without prejudice Plaintiff’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, a ruling made not on the merits, but for purposes of judicial efficiency and
resource allocation, given the extension granted to Defendants. (ECF No. 101.) 	The Court
directed Plaintiff to re-file her Motion for Summary Judgment no earlier than ten days prior to June
3, 2025, and no later than the deadline itself. 	On April 29, 2025, Defendants filed a combined
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment.2
Plaintiff did not re-file her Motion for Summary Judgment nor otherwise express any intention
to renew that Motion, for example by filing a Reply in support of her Motion for Summary
Judgment following Defendants’ Response, ECF No. 102. 	Further, Plaintiff did not respond to
Defendants’ separately filed Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 103. 	Indeed,
Plaintiff, who had been a consistently active litigator throughout this action, did not file anything
for nearly six months, including any requests for extension of time relating to dispositive motions.
This caused the Court to issue a Show Cause Order on July 24, 2025, directing Plaintiff to show
cause as to why Defendants’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment should not be considered by the
Court as unopposed or why this action should not otherwise be dismissed for failure to prosecute.
(ECF No. 104.)
Plaintiff responded to the Show Cause Order on August 12, 2025, and, in part, requested a
stay of this case until December 8, 2025. 	(ECF No. 105.) 	The Court entered a temporary stay
by Order dated August 14, 2025. (ECF No. 106.) 	Although Plaintiff had requested a stay through
December 8, 2025, the Court granted the stay only through October 17, 2025, and directed Plaintiff
2 More accurately, Defendants filed two copies of the identical document, one appearing on the
Court’s docket as a Response in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion (ECF No. 102) and one appearing
on the Court’s docket as Defendants’ Cross Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 103.)
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to file a Status Report on that same date, updating the Court as to her circumstances and her
progress in moving forward with this action. (Id.)
That Order, mailed to Plaintiff at her Chillicothe Correctional Institution address, was not
returned to the Court as undeliverable.3 	Plaintiff did not file a Status Report on October 17, 2025,
as ordered. 	Following the Court’s further review, the Clerk’s office mailed the Order to Plaintiff
at her previously provided Southern Ohio Correctional Facility address. 	That mailing was
returned to the Court as undeliverable on November 24, 2025. 	(ECF No. 107.) 	The returned
envelope indicated that Plaintiff had been released. 	Out of an abundance of caution, the Court
opted to wait until Plaintiff’s previously requested date of December 8, 2025, the date by which she
had represented that she would be “able to properly defend/prosecute this matter.” 	(ECF No. 105
at 2.) 	That date passed, and Plaintiff failed to file anything substantive or update the Court as to
her post-release address.
By Order dated December 9, 2025, the Court directed Plaintiff to file a “Notice of New
Address” that advises the Court of her current address by December 23, 2025. 	(ECF No. 108.)
Further, the Court advised Plaintiff that if she intended to proceed with this case, she must re-file
her Motion for Summary Judgment and/or respond to Defendants’ separately filed Cross Motion for
Summary Judgment by that same date. 	(Id.) 	The Court cautioned Plaintiff that her failure to file
a Notice of New Address by December 23, 2025, would result in the recommendation that this case
be dismissed for failure to prosecute. (Id.) 	Additionally, the Court advised Plaintiff that if she did
not file a response to Defendants’ Motion by December 23, 2025, the Court may proceed to
consider the Motion without considering any arguments or evidence presented by Plaintiff.
On January 5, 2025, the Court’s most recent Order (ECF No. 108) was returned as
3 As the Order issued October 17, 2025, reflected, Plaintiff had provided her updated address as the
Southern Ohio Correctional Facility. (ECF No. 106.) Nevertheless, the docket was not updated at
that time.
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undeliverable. 	(ECF No. 109.) 	Consequently, to date, Plaintiff has not responded to the Court’s
Order dated December 9, 2025, in any way.
II.
A plaintiff has an affirmative duty to notify the court of any change in her address. 	Stephens
v. Page, No. 2:24-CV-35, 2024 WL 2701961, at *1–2 (S.D. Ohio May 24, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted sub nom. Stephens v. Paige, No. 2:24-CV-35, 2024 WL 2941841 (S.D.
Ohio June 11, 2024) (citing Barber v. Runyon, No. 93–6318, 1994 WL 163765, at *1 (6th Cir. May
2, 1994)). 	Indeed, a plaintiff's failure to supply the Court with an updated address may subject the
case to dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) for failure to prosecute. 	Id. (citing
White v. City of Grand Rapids, 34 F. App'x 210, 211 (6th Cir. 2002) (finding that a pro se prisoner's
complaint “was subject to dismissal for want of prosecution because he failed to keep the district
court apprised of his current address”).
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b), a federal court may dismiss a claim for failure
to prosecute or comply with an order on a motion by the defendant. Indeed, the “authority of a
federal trial court to dismiss a plaintiff's action with prejudice because of his failure to prosecute
cannot seriously be doubted.” 	Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629 (1962). 	“The power
to invoke this sanction is necessary in order to prevent undue delays in the disposition of pending
cases and to avoid congestion in the calendars of the [d]istrict [c]ourts.” 	Id. at 629-30.
“[D]istrict courts possess broad discretion to sanction parties for failure to comply with procedural
requirements.” 	Tetro v. Elliot Popham Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick, and GMC Trucks, Inc., 173
F.3d 988, 991 (6th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted).
When contemplating dismissal of a case under Rule 41(b), a court must consider four factors:
(1) whether the party's failure to cooperate is due to willfulness, bad faith, or fault;
(2) whether the adversary was prejudiced by the dilatory conduct of the party; (3)
whether the dismissed party was warned that failure to cooperate could lead to
dismissal; and (4) whether less drastic sanctions were imposed or considered before
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dismissal was ordered.
Stough v. Mayville Cmty. Schs., 138 F.3d 612, 615 (6th Cir. 1998).
Here, these factors weigh in favor of dismissal. 	First, Plaintiff's failure to update her address
constitutes willfulness, bad faith, or fault, because it demonstrates reckless disregard for how her
actions, or inactions, impact her case. 	Stephens, 2024 WL 2701961, at *2 (citing See Wu v. T.W.
Tang, Inc., 420 F. 3d 641, 643 (6th Cir. 2005) (“For a plaintiff's actions to be motivated by bad
faith, willfulness or fault, his conduct must display either an intent to thwart judicial proceedings or
a reckless disregard for the effect of his conduct on those proceedings”); see also Fountain v.
Warden, Franklin Med. Ctr., 2013 WL 2468361, at *2 (S.D. Ohio June 7, 2013), report and
recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 3467057 (S.D. Ohio July 9, 2013) (finding that a plaintiff's
failure to update his address exhibited reckless disregard for the effect of his conduct on the
proceedings); Keaton v. Bennett, 322 F.R.D. 303, 305 (N.D. Ohio 2017) (finding that pro se
plaintiff's failure to provide the court with updated contact information was “indicative of his
disregard for the court's ability to manage th[e] litigation in an orderly fashion” and amounted to
fault). 	In short, Plaintiff has deprived this Court of a means to contact her about her case.
Second, as described above, Plaintiff has caused lengthy delay here and has hampered the
Court’s ability to resolve this case in an orderly fashion. 	As a result, Defendants have been
deprived of a prompt resolution of this matter, resulting in prejudice.
Third, the Court’s most recent Order explicitly stated that Plaintiff's failure to update her
address would result in dismissal of this case. 	(ECF No. 108.) 	Although the Order (ECF No.
108) was returned as undeliverable, the Court nevertheless attempted to warn Plaintiff that her
conduct would result in a dismissal. 	See Sullivan v. Waffle House, No. 1:06-cv-63, 2006 WL
3007360, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 19, 2006) (dismissing action even though the Court's warnings did
not reach the plaintiff due to his failure to update his address); Bryant v. Warden, Franklin Cnty.
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Corr. Ctr., No. 2:17-CV-00335, 2017 WL 6520874, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 4, 2017), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 2:17-CV-00335, 2017 WL 6508595 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 20, 2017)
(same).
Finally, there is no sanction less drastic than dismissal that would be appropriate under the
circumstances. 	Any other sanction that the Court might impose would not reach Plaintiff because
she has left the Court with no means of contacting her. 	See Sullivan, 2006 WL 3007360, at * 2
(“[E]ven if the Court were to implement sanctions less drastic than dismissal, the case would
remain stalled due to the Court's inability to communicate with Plaintiff.”); Alger v. McDowell, No.
19-12889, 2022 WL 2349722, at *2 (E.D. Mich. May 12, 2022), report and recommendation
adopted, 2022 WL 2345737 (E.D. Mich. June 29, 2022) (“[G]iven Plaintiff's failure to respond to
the Court's Order to Show Cause, the undersigned sees no utility in considering or imposing lesser
sanctions.”).
Having considered the relevant factors, the Court finds that dismissal of this action is an
appropriate sanction for Plaintiff’s failure to update her address. 	Under the circumstances
described above it is RECOMMENDED that this dismissal be without prejudice.
III.
For the reasons stated above, it is RECOMMENDED that this case be DISMISSED
without prejudice pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(b) for failure to prosecute and that Defendants’
Cross Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 103) be DENIED as moot.
PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS
If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that party
may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and
Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in
question, as well as the basis for objection. 	28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
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Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72(b).
The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and
Recommendation will result in a forfeiture of the right to de novo review of by the District Judge
and forfeiture of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. 	Even when timely
objections are filed, appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is forfeited. 	Robert v.
Tesson, 507 F.3d 981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report,
which fails to specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .”
(citation omitted)).
DATE: 	February 3, 2026 	/s/ 	Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers
ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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