Hill v. Pell et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
MARK A. HILL, 	:
:
Petitioner, 	: 	Case No. 2:21-cv-4142
:
v. 	: 	Judge Algenon L. Marbley
: 	Magistrate Judge Caroline H. Gentry
JENNIFER PELL, et al., 	:
:
:
Defendant. 	:
OPINION & ORDER
This matter comes before this Court on Plaintiff Mark A. Hill’s Motion for Relief from
Judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (ECF No. 61). For the reasons
explained below, the motion is DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, an Ohio inmate proceeding pro se, initiated this action against Defendants
Jennifer Pell, Scott Crawford, Brittany Hamm,1 Rita Hamm, Anita Hamm, and Eric Kovachs. Mr.
Hill asserts various grounds for relief stemming from the Defendants’ alleged involvement in Mr.
Hill’s felonious assault conviction. The facts of this case are set forth at length in the Court’s March
11, 2024, Opinion & Order (ECF No. 51) adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) (ECF No. 45), recommending that this Court grant Defendant Pell’s
Motion to Dismiss without prejudice (ECF No. 33), deny Plaintiff’s remaining motions (ECF Nos.
26, 27, 43, 41), and dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against all Defendants without prejudice.
1 Because Defendants Brittany Hamm, Anita Hamm, and Rita Hamm share a last name, this Court refers to these
individuals by their first names.
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A. Factual Background
On August 25, 2018, Defendant Brittany Hamm requested that Mr. Hill, her then-
boyfriend, pick her up from her grandmother’s, Defendant Rita Hamm’s, house. (Compl., ECF
No. 1 at ¶ 5). Brittany informed Mr. Hill that Martie Jacobs propositioned her sexually and then
physically assaulted her. (Id. at ¶ 12). After seeing Brittany’s black eye, Mr. Hill entered Rita’s
house to confront Mr. Jacobs. (Id.). Mr. Hill and Mr. Jacobs then indisputably got into a physical
altercation. (Id. at ¶ 13). In Mr. Hill’s view, Mr. Jacobs struck him in the face, to which Mr. Hill
“responded with four (4) quick punches to Mr. Jacobs’ face in self-defense.” (Id. at ¶ 20). But in
Mr. Jacobs’ view, as relayed to the Columbus Police, Mr. Hill “hit [Mr. Jacobs] twice in the face
with a sledgehammer.” (Id. at ¶ 15). Rita provided that she saw Mr. Hill inside Mr. Jacobs’ room
for “a while,” after which she saw Mr. Jacobs laying on the bathroom floor covered in blood, but
that she did not see anything between those events. (Id., Ex. C). She reiterated Brittany’s account
of Mr. Jacobs’ sexual propositioning. (Id.). A neighbor, Defendant Scott Crawford, contradicted
this account, stating that Mr. Jacobs would not have propositioned Brittany, and that Brittany was
lying. (Id., Ex. D).
At trial, Mr. Hill was found guilty of felonious assault against Mr. Jacobs and was
sentenced to twelve (12) years in prison. (Id. at ¶ 30). Following trial, Mr. Hill learned of a potential
undisclosed eyewitness to the August 25 incident between Brittany and Mr. Jacobs: a neighbor,
Defendant Jennifer Pell. (Id. at ¶¶ 33, 35, 40-47; id., Ex. I). But Ms. Pell informed investigators
that she did not want to be involved in the case. (Id. at ¶ 40).
In this present Complaint, Mr. Hill, who is Black, alleges that Defendants, who are White,
conspired to deprive him of his civil rights. Mr. Hill takes issue with: (1) Mr. Jacobs’ allegedly
false testimony about the actions leading to Mr. Hill’s arrest; (2) Brittany’s failure to appear on
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time to testify in his defense; and (3) Defendant Pell and Crawford’s eyewitness accounts of Mr.
Jacobs’ attack(s) on Brittany and lack of reporting of such. (See generally ECF No. 1).
B. Procedural History
On August 11, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Complaint with this Court. (ECF No. 1). Defendant,
Jennifer Pell, subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint. (ECF No. 33). Plaintiff filed
a response in opposition. (ECF No. 37). On December 28, 2023, the Magistrate Judge issued a
Report and Recommendation (“R&R”), recommending that Defendant Pell’s Motion to Dismiss
be granted and that Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims against all Defendants be dismissed without
prejudice. (ECF No. 45).
On March 11, 2024, this Court entered an Order overruling Plaintiff’s objections (ECF No.
47) 	and 	adopting 	the 	Magistrate 	Judge’s 	Report 	and 	Recommendation. 	(ECF 	No. 	51).
Subsequently, Plaintiff appealed this Court’s Order to the Sixth Circuit arguing that this Court
erred by rejecting his §§ 1985 and 1986 conspiracy claims for failure to state a claim, however,
the Sixth Circuit affirmed this Court’s decision. (ECF No. 59).
Plaintiff now seeks relief from judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b)(2), (3), and (6). (ECF No. 61).
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), a party may move for, and the Court may
grant, relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for any of the following six reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud;
(4) the judgment is void;
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(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment
upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
In determining whether relief under Rule 60(b)(2) is warranted, the Sixth Circuit has noted
that “a movant must demonstrate: (1) that it exercised due diligence in obtaining the information[;]
and (2) [that] the evidence is material and controlling and clearly would have produced a different
result if presented before the original judgment.” Good v. Edison Co., 149 F.3d 413, 423 (6th Cir.
1998) (quoting New Hampshire Ins. Co. v. Martech U.S.A., Inc., 993 F.2d 1195, 1200–01 (5th
Cir.1993)) (quotation marks omitted). Further, such newly discovered evidence must have been in
existence at the time or pertain to facts in existence at the time of the relevant legal proceeding.
Davis v. Jellico Community Hosp., Inc., 912 F.2d 129, 135 (6th Cir.1990).
Alternatively, Rule 60(b)(3) allows for relief in situations of fraud where an “adverse party
committed a deliberate act that adversely impacted the fairness of the relevant legal proceeding
[in] question.” Info-Hold, Inc. v. Sound Merch., Inc., 538 F.3d 455, 455 (6th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Jordan v. Paccar, Inc., WL 528950, at *6 (6th Cir. 1996)). The Sixth Circuit has defined
fraud as “the knowing misrepresentation of a material fact, or concealment of the same when there
is a duty to disclose, done to induce another to act to his or her detriment.” Info-Hold, Inc., 538
F.3d at 456.
Lastly, Rule 60(b)(6) serves as a catchall provision that “vests courts with a deep reservoir
of equitable power to vacate judgments ‘to achieve substantial justice’ in the most ‘unusual and
extreme situations.’” Zagorski v. Mays, 907 F.3d 901, 904 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Stokes v.
Williams, 475 F.3d 732, 735 (6th Cir. 2007)). This provision “applies only in exceptional or
extraordinary circumstances where principles of equity mandate relief.” West v. Carpenter, 790
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F.3d 693, 696-97 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing McGuire v. Warden, Chillicothe Corr. Inst., 738 F.3d
741,750 (6th Cir. 2013)).
Although courts have discretion in ruling on Rule 60(b) motions, that discretion “is
circumscribed by public policy favoring finality of judgments and termination of litigation.” Jones
v. Bradshaw, 46 F.4th 459, 482 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Ford Motor Co. v. Mustangs Unlimited,
Inc., 487 F.3d 465, 468 (6th Cir. 2007)). This principle is especially applicable to Rule 60(b)(6),
“which applies only in exceptional or extraordinary circumstances which are not addressed by the
first five numbered clauses of the Rule.” Coleman-Bey v. Bouchard, 287 F. App'x 420, 421 (6th
Cir. 2008) (quoting Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Trs. of the UMWA Combined Benefit Fund, 249
F.3d 519, 524 (6th Cir.2001)).
III. 	ANALYSIS
A. Rule 60(b)(2)
To support his Rule 60(b)(2) claim, Plaintiff asserts that on October 21, 2024, via Plaintiff’s
fiancée’s public records requests, Plaintiff obtained audio recordings of interviews, conducted by
the Columbus Police Department, of Martie Jacobs, Rita Hamm, and Brittany Hamm following
the August 25, 2018, incident. (ECF No. 61 at 5). Plaintiff specifically points to the fact that during
the newly acquired recordings, both Rita and Brittany Hamm told investigators that neighbors
across the street witnessed Martie Jacobs sexually proposition and assault Brittany. (Id.)
Accordingly, Plaintiff contends that the recordings support the “plausible inference[]” that
Columbus Police also interviewed both neighbors across the street about the incident, Defendants
Jennifer Pell and Scott Crawford. (Id. at 6). Further, Plaintiff asserts that these audio recordings
were not previously provided to his defense counsel and therefore were undiscoverable at the time
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of trial. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff argues that had the audio recordings been available at the time of this
trial, the outcome would have been different. (See id. at 6-7).
This Court previously upheld the Magistrate Judge’s Order finding that Plaintiff failed to
state a claim for which relief could be granted because Plaintiff failed to allege a conspiratorial
objective between the Defendants. (ECF No. 51 at 7). This Court additionally expanded upon the
R&R and opined that Plaintiff’s conspiracy claims fail as a matter of law because no Defendant is
a state actor who could be held liable for constitutional violations under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. (Id.). Lastly, this Court highlighted that the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee
the appearance of witnesses at a trial, and thus Plaintiff failed to allege a constitutional violation
related to Defendant Brittany Hamm failing to testify on his behalf at trial. (Id.). Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s newly discovered evidence does nothing to uproot this Court’s prior judgment in
Plaintiff’s conspiracy case.
Although Plaintiff provides audio evidence that calls into question the veracity of the
Defendants’ various statements to investigators, such revelations do not cure Plaintiff’s failure to
state a claim in this case. The new audio recordings only provide further support for the allegations
that: (1) Defendants Rita and Brittany Hamm informed investigators of the witnesses across the
street; and (2) Defendant Pell may have been interviewed by the Columbus Police. In the
Complaint, however, Plaintiff already alleged that Jennifer Pell had talked to investigators and did
not wish to be involved. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 33, 40). Therefore, this Court already considered
allegations that Columbus Police likely interviewed Defendant Pell and was required to accept
them as true when considering the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s claims.
More importantly, the audio recordings do not provide further support as to the existence
of a conspiracy between the Defendants which is a primary reason that Plaintiff’s Complaint was
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deemed insufficient by this Court. Specifically, Plaintiff still fails to offer more than speculation
that the Defendants engaged in a conspiracy about him based on his race or some other protected
class membership. Thus, such evidence is neither “material” nor “controlling” and it would not
have “produced a different result” had he presented it prior to the motion to dismiss. Good, 149
F.3d at 423. Further, even if this Court were to accept Plaintiff’s speculation that the Columbus
Police failed to disclose potentially exculpatory witnesses to Plaintiff or his defense counsel, such
evidence does not defeat the fact that none of the Defendants named in this case is a State actor
who can be held liable for a constitutional violation.
Lastly, to the extent that Plaintiff argues that the audio recordings would have undermined the
prosecution’s theory at his trial, this Court need not entertain such arguments because “Rule
60(b) cannot be used to circumvent the stringent requirements for post-conviction relief.” In re
West, 103 F.4th 417, 420 (6th Cir. 2024). As such, Plaintiff’s newly discovered evidence does
nothing to alter this Court’s judgment that Plaintiff failed to plead his §§1985 and 1986 claims.
For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(2) argument fails.
B. Rule 60(b)(3)
Turning next to Rule 60(b)(3), Plaintiff asserts that Defendants committed fraud by making
various material misrepresentations to investigators and in responsive pleadings to the Complaint
warranting relief from judgment. (See generally ECF No. 61 at 6-8). As mentioned above, this
Court dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to allege a conspiratorial objective and for
failure to allege involvement of State actors. Thus, the alleged fraud Plaintiff points to is not
relevant to the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims in this conspiracy case. Even in accepting that
Plaintiff has identified various inconsistencies that cast doubt on the veracity of the Defendants’
recounting of events on August 25, 2018, such alleged fraudulent statements did not “adversely
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impact[] the fairness of the relevant legal proceeding” in which this Court assessed Plaintiff’s
conspiracy claims. Info-Hold, Inc., 538 F.3d at 456. For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(3)
argument fails.
C. Rule 60(b)(6)
Lastly, Plaintiff requests relief from judgment under Rule 60(b)(6) because Plaintiff believes
this Court failed to apply the proper legal standard and held him to a heightened pleading
standard. (ECF No. 61 at 9). Specifically, Plaintiff contends that under §1985, a plaintiff is not
required to allege racial animus but must allege discrimination based on membership in any
protected class. (Id. at 10). Accordingly, Plaintiff argues that this Court failed to acknowledge
that he is a member of a protected class because he is a person accused of a crime. (Id.).
Plaintiff’s argument fails because in his Complaint he alleged that the Defendants discriminated
against him on the basis of his race, not that he was discriminated against because he is a
criminal defendant. (ECF No. 1 at ¶¶ 54, 55); (Kline v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 704
Fed. Appx 451, 466 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Rule 60(b) is not a vehicle to give the losing litigant a
second bite at the apple.”); see also Bryant v. Allied Universal Security Services, 2019 WL
6317319 at * 2 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 26, 2019) (“Rule 60(b) does not permit parties to relitigate the
merits of a claim or to raise new arguments that could have been raised in the initial
complaint.”). Even in accepting Plaintiff’s argument that he is the member of a protected class,
the Complaint makes no allegations that Defendants have discriminated against him because of
his status as a criminal defendant. Finally, Plaintiff merely reframing his initial arguments does
not meet the “exceptional or extraordinary circumstances” requirement under Rule 60(b)(3).
Coleman-Bey, 287 F. App'x at 421. As such, Plaintiff’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion is also denied.
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IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court DENIES Petitioner’s Motion for Relief from
Judgment (ECF No. 61).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ALGENON L. MARBLEY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
DATED: November 25, 2025
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