Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
ABDUL WALI
Petitioner,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT, in his official
capacity as Acting Field Office Director
of Enforcement and Removal Operations,
Detroit Field Office, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No. 1:26-CV-145
Judge Michael R. Barrett
OPINION & ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Abdul Wali’s petition for a writ
of habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). Respondents have filed a
return and response in opposition, (Doc. 4), and Wali has filed a reply in support of
his petition, (Doc. 5). The petition is now ripe for review.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner, a citizen of Afghanistan, arrived in the United States on February
1, 2023, (Doc. 1, PageID 17), after having served as an interpreter for U.S. military
forces in Afghanistan, (Doc. 5, PageID 88). He was issued a notice to appear for
removal proceedings by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”), (id.), and
subsequently released on his own recognizance, (Doc. 5, PageID 93). Petitioner
applied for asylum and withholding of removal, and was scheduled for an individual
hearing on that application on March 25, 2026. (Doc. 1, PageID 1).
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On December 2, 2025, despite having lived in San Antonio, Texas, for more
than two years, Petitioner received a letter instructing him to report to the
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) office in Westerville, Ohio. (Doc. 5,
PageID 97). Petitioner arrived for the appointment on December 17 and was
apprehended by ICE; he has remained in custody on behalf of ICE at the Butler
County Jail since that time.
Although Petitioner asserted that he “is neither a flight risk nor a danger to
the community because he has no criminal record and carries deep community ties,”
he was denied bond by an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) on January 28. (Doc. 4, PageID
82). The IJ rested the decision on jurisdictional grounds. See Matter of Yajure
Hurtado, 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025). The instant petition followed.
Petitioner contends that he is entitled to a constitutionally adequate custody
redetermination hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which allows for release on
parole or bond. He argues that he is a member of the “Bond Eligible Class” established
in Maldonado Bautista v. Santacruz, ___ F.Supp.3d ___, No. 5:25-CV-1873, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 269220 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025). Respondents counter that the
declaratory judgment issued in Maldonado Bautista “is void with respect to
petitioners and custodians outside the Central District of California because it was
issued despite a palpable lack of jurisdiction,” and urge that “the Court should not
give preclusive effect to the declaratory judgment because it is on appeal.” (Doc. 4,
PageID 64).
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II. CONTROLLING LAW & ANALYSIS
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, district courts possess the authority to grant a writ of
habeas corpus to any petitioner “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or
treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Relevant here, “[a]lthough the
court may not review discretionary decisions made by immigration authorities, it may
review immigration-related detentions to determine if they comport with the
demands of the Constitution.” Deng Chol A. v. Barr, 455 F.Supp.3d 896, 901 (D. Minn.
2020) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)); see Diaz-Calderon v. Barr, 535
F.Supp.3d 669, 675 (E.D. Mich. 2020) (“It has been well-established for over 100 years
that habeas corpus is the vehicle through which noncitizens may challenge the fact
of their detention.”).
A. Statutory Application
Petitioner and Respondents largely focus their arguments on whether
Petitioner is a member of the bond eligible class established in Maldonado Bautista,
and, as a result, whether that decision entitles Petitioner to a custody
redetermination hearing. But the Court need not address Maldonado Bautista or its
possible preclusive effects when the Court itself has already independently analyzed
and applied the controlling statutory authority. Thus, there is no danger of doing
what Respondents characterize as relying on a “void” judgment and giving “preclusive
effect to a declaratory judgment that is on appeal.”
The undersigned acknowledges the split of authority on this issue in the
Southern District of Ohio. Compare, e.g., Coronado v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec.,
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No. 1:25-CV-831, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 258690 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2025), and
Sanogh v. Raycraft, No. 1:25-CV-787, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23233 (S.D. Ohio Feb.
4, 2026), with Azalyar v. Raycraft, ___ F.Supp.3d ___, No. 1:25-CV-916, 2026 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3705 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 2, 2026), and Ortiz Gutierrez v. Raycraft, ___
F.Supp.3d ___, No. 1:26-CV-69, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32801 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 18,
2026). To that end, Respondents’ invocation of “controlling case precedent” is
unavailing, particularly when the undersigned has joined “the overwhelming
majority of fellow jurists from well over half of the federal judicial districts in the
country” in concluding that “detention under § 1226(a) attaches where DHS
encounters a noncitizen within the interior after admission or after a substantial
period of continuous presence, whereas § 1225(b) applies only where the individual
encountered is ‘seeking admission’ at the border or its functional equivalents.” Ortiz
Gutierrez, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32801, at *7.
For the reasons elucidated by the Court in Ortiz Gutierrez, Petitioner’s
detention is governed by § 1226(a), and not § 1225(b). Id., at *5-10. Neither the
relevant caselaw, nor the applicable statutory framework, nor the accompanying
regulations “give the government the authority and mandate to detain all noncitizens
unlawfully present in the United States without bond.” Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi,
___ F.4th ___, No. 25-20496, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 3899, at *40 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026)
(Douglas, J. dissenting).
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B. Due Process
Respondents argue that “to the extent that Petitioner raises due process
concerns, these are without merit and should be dismissed,” and claim further that
“[a]s Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention, the proper test for whether his due
process [rights] have been violated is pursuant to Zadvydas . . . and not Mathews v.
Eldridge [424 U.S. 319 (1976)].” (Doc. 4, PageID 77). The Court disagrees, and as it
has under substantially similar circumstances, reiterates that “non-punitive
detention in the immigration context violates the Due Process Clause absent
adequate procedural protections or a special justification outweighing a petitioner’s
liberty interest.” Azalyar, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3705, at *5 (cleaned up).
“The Due Process Clause extends to all persons regardless of status,” including
noncitizens, Ariza v. Noem, No. 4:25-CV-165, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 265012, at *28
(W.D. Ky. Dec. 23, 2025), and “[f]reedom from imprisonment—from government
custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty
that Clause protects,” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. at 690. The balance of factors
weighs in Petitioner’s favor; consequently, Petitioner’s detention without a custody
redetermination hearing is violative of his due process rights under the Fifth
Amendment. See Azalyar, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3705, at *4-12 (expanding upon and
applying the Mathews factors); see also Ortiz Gutierrez, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32801,
at *9-11.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Petitioner’s continued detention
is unlawful in the absence of an individualized, constitutionally adequate custody
redetermination hearing. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus, (Doc. 1), is
therefore GRANTED.
IT IS ORDERED that, on or before March 2, 2026, at 5:00 p.m. EST,
Respondents shall either (1) provide Petitioner with a bond hearing before an IJ, at
which the government shall bear the burden of persuasion of justifying his continued
detention1; or (2) immediately release Petitioner from custody.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondents shall file a status report
within five (5) business days of this order to certify compliance with the Court’s
ruling. The status report shall note whether and when a bond hearing was held,
whether bond was granted or denied, and the reasons therefore.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Michael R. Barrett
United States District Judge
1 Moreover, the IJ should be empowered to consider both “alternatives to detention” and Petitioner’s
“ability to pay when setting any bond amount.” M.P.L. v. Arteta, No. 25-CV-5307, 2025 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 204541, at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 16, 2025).
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