Holmes v. Ally Financial Inc.

U NITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
ROSALIND HOLMES, 	Case No. 1:26-cv-88
Plaintiff, 	Cole, J.
Litkovitz, M.J.
vs.
ALLY FINANCIAL, INC., 	REPORT AND
Defendants. 	RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff, a resident of Ohio, brings this pro se action against Ally Financial, Inc. (“Ally
Financial”) alleging violations of her rights. By separate Order, plaintiff has been granted leave
to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This matter is before the Court for a
sua sponte review of plaintiff’s complaint to determine whether the complaint, or any portion of
it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). This matter is also before the Court on plaintiff’s motion for temporary
restraining order. (Doc. 1-1).1
In enacting the original in forma pauperis statute, Congress recognized that a “litigant
whose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an
economic incentive to refrain from filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.” Denton
v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)).
To prevent such abusive litigation, Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an in
forma pauperis complaint if they are satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. Id.; see
also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint may be dismissed as frivolous when the
1 Plaintiff’s complaint is styled “Plaintiff’s Complaint and Motion for TRO/Preliminary Injunctive Relief.” (Doc. 1-
1).
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plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke v.
Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989); see also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th
Cir. 1990). An action has no arguable legal basis when the defendant is immune from suit or
when plaintiff claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490
U.S. at 327. An action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise
to the level of the irrational or “wholly incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d
at 1199. The Court need not accept as true factual allegations that are “fantastic or delusional”
in reviewing a complaint for frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 (6th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).
Congress also has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint filed
by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam)
(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same token, however, the
complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Hill, 630 F.3d at 470-71
(“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a
claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The Court must accept all well-
pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
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factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
(1986)). Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide
“more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.
at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual
enhancement.” Id. at 557. The complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . .
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted).
Plaintiff’s pro se complaint alleges that on November 4, 2024, defendant unlawfully
repossessed, converted, and sold plaintiff’s 2018 Toyota RAV4 LE, which was financed through
defendant Ally Financial, Inc. She brings claims of “wrongful repossession & conversion” and
“trespass & civil conspiracy.” (Doc. 1-1 at PAGEID 6). As relief, plaintiff seeks damages.
Plaintiff previously filed a complaint in the Butler County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas
against Ally Financial, Inc., the same defendant she sues in the instant federal court complaint.
In that case, she alleged that Ally Financial unlawfully repossessed her automobile on November
4, 2024. See Holmes v. Allied Financial, Inc., Case No. CV 2024-11-2332 (Butler Cty. Com.
Pleas) (complaint filed 11/19/2024).2 She brought claims of conspiracy, breach of contract,
tortious interference with a contractual relationship, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and corrupt activity under Ohio Rev. Code § 2923.32. On March 13, 2025, the common pleas
court granted summary judgment for Ally Financial and entered judgment on its behalf on
2 Viewed at
https://clerkservices.bcohio.gov/eservices/searchresults.page?x=q5jYUSvpJ4GpuiP56rHur5dLDbMrPQdR5DKbDc
3-RQUOUh*kd3-VASTv4cvp1z3FF7pR0Z56GoN4yXHBbe-NbA (last visited on Feb. 17, 2026) by searching
under plaintiff’s name. This Court may take judicial notice of court records that are available online to members of
the public. See Lynch v. Leis, 382 F.3d 642, 648 n.5 (6th Cir. 2004).
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plaintiff’s claims. See Holmes v. Ally Financial, Inc., Case No. CV 2024-11-2332 (Butler Ct.
Common Pls. March 13, 2025) (Doc. 1-1 at PAGEID 41). The docket in that case does not
reflect that plaintiff filed an appeal in the Ohio Court of Appeals.
Plaintiff’s pro se complaint is barred by res judicata and subject to dismissal. Res
judicata, or claim preclusion, bars a later lawsuit that “advances the same claim as an earlier suit
between the same parties.” Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc. v. Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc., 590
U.S. 405, 412 (2020). In addition, “claim preclusion prevents parties from raising issues that
could have been raised and decided in a prior action—even if they were not actually litigated.”
Id. “Suits involve the same claim (or cause of action) when they aris[e] from the same
transaction or involve a common nucleus of operative facts.” Id. (cleaned up).
Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, a “federal court
must give to a state-court judgment the same preclusive effect as would be given that judgment
under the law of the State in which the judgment was rendered.” Migra v. Warren City School
Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81 (1984); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 96 (1980). See also
28 U.S.C. § 1738; Young v. Twp. of Green Oak, 471 F.3d 674, 680 (6th Cir. 2006). If a state
court would prohibit relitigation of claims that could have been but were not raised in the earlier
state court action, then such claims are precluded in a subsequent federal action. Migra, 465
U.S. at 83. The prior state court action will preclude litigation in federal court when the litigant
against whom the preclusive effect is sought had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claims
or issues decided by the state courts. Allen, 449 U.S. at 104. A federal court must resort to state
law to determine the preclusive effect of a state court ruling. Migra, 465 U.S. at 81, 84. See also
Darrah v. City of Oak Park, 255 F.3d 301, 311 (6th Cir. 2001).
The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “a final judgment or decree, rendered on the
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merits by a court of competent jurisdiction, is a complete bar to any subsequent action on the
same claim between the same parties or those in privity with them.” State ex rel. Kendrick v.
Parker, 158 N.E.3d 573, 574 (Ohio 2020) (per curiam) (citation omitted). This bar includes “all
claims which were or might have been litigated in the first lawsuit.” Nat’l Amusements, Inc. v.
City of Springdale, 558 N.E.2d 1178, 1180 (Ohio 1990) (citations and quotations omitted)
(emphasis in the original). See also Grava v. Parkman Twp., 653 N.E.2d 226, 229 (Ohio 1995)
(“[t]he doctrine of res judicata requires a plaintiff to present every ground for relief in the first
action, or be forever barred from asserting it.”); State v. Dick, 738 N.E.2d 456, 460 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2000) (“res judicata bars a subsequent action based upon any claim arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action, whether or not that
particular claim was litigated, so long as there has been a valid, final judgment rendered upon
the merits.”) (emphasis in the original) (citing Grava, 653 N.E.2d at syllabus). Under Ohio law,
res judicata bars a claim when: (1) there is a final, valid decision on the merits by a court of
competent jurisdiction; (2) the second action involves the same parties or their privies as the
first; (3) the second action raises claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action;
and (4) the second action arises out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter
of the previous action. Portage Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. City of Akron, 846 N.E.2d 478, 495
(Ohio 2006). A “transaction” is defined as a “common nucleus of operative facts.” Id. (citation
omitted).
A federal court may dismiss a complaint on initial screening for failure to state a claim
for relief where the elements of res judicata are met. See Smith v. Morgan, 75 F. App’x 505, 506
(6th Cir. 2003) (affirming dismissal “pursuant to § 1915(e) because the doctrine of res judicata
bars consideration of the instant complaint”); Leirer v. Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles
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Compliance Unit, 246 F. App’x 372, 374 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming dismissal based on res
judicata pursuant to § 1915(e) because the plaintiff “could have made all of the same allegations
and claims he makes in his current lawsuit in that earlier second lawsuit”)).
The undersigned finds that all four elements necessary for the application of res judicata
are present in this case. The first element of res judicata is satisfied because the Butler County
Court of Common Pleas issued a final decision on the merits granting judgment for Ally
Financial based on plaintiff’s failure to make payments on the Retail Installment Sale Contract
that was executed in connection with the purchase of the 2018 Toyota RAV4. See Holmes v.
Allied Financial, Inc., Case No. CV 2024-11-2332 (Butler Ct. Common Pls. March 13, 2025)
(Doc. 1-1 at PAGEID 46). The second element is satisfied because plaintiff filed the prior case
against the same defendant she sues in this federal action. See id. The third element is satisfied
because plaintiff could have raised and litigated her “wrongful repossession & conversion” and
“trespass & civil conspiracy” claims in the state court case. Finally, plaintiff claims and the
factual allegations in her federal complaint arise out of the same transactions that were the
subject of the litigation before the Butler County Court of Common Pleas. Therefore, res
judicata applies to bar the instant complaint.
IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED:
1. 	Plaintiff’s complaint should be DISMISSED with prejudice.
2. 	Because plaintiff’s complaint should be dismissed on the basis of res judicata,
she has not shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits. See Leary v.
Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Chabad of S. Ohio &
Congregation Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati, 363 F.3d 427, 432 (6th Cir.
2004) (same four-factor analysis applies to a motion for temporary restraining
order). Therefore, her motion for temporary restraining order (Doc. 1-1)
should be DENIED.
3. 	The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) that for the foregoing
reasons an appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation
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would not be taken in good faith and therefore deny plaintiff leave to appeal in
forma pauperis. Plaintiff remains free to apply to proceed in forma pauperis
in the Court of Appeals. See Callihan v. Schneider, 178 F.3d 800, 803 (6th
Cir. 1999), overruling in part Floyd v. United States Postal Serv., 105 F.3d
274, 277 (6th Cir. 1997).
Date: 	______________________________
Karen L. Litkovitz, Magistrate Judge
United States District Court
2/17/2026
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
ROSALIND HOLMES, 	Case No. 1:26-cv-88
Plaintiff, 	Cole, J.
Litkovitz, M.J.
vs.
ALLY FINANCIAL, INC.,
Defendants.
NOTICE
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy of
the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations. 	This period may be extended further by the Court on
timely motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected
to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report
and Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral
hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such
portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the
assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections
WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in
accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140
(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).
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