Case Name in Immigration Case - Unavailable

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
EDWIN AROLDO MASIS LUCERO,
Petitioner,
v.
FIELD OFFICE DIRECTOR OF
ENFORCEMENT AND REMOVAL
OPERATIONS, DETROIT FIELD
OFFICE, IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, et al.,
Respondents.
Case No. 1:25-cv-823
JUDGE DOUGLAS R. COLE
OPINION AND ORDER
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is currently detaining
Petitioner Edwin Aroldo Masis Lucero pending removal proceedings. Masis Lucero
filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (Doc. 1), requesting this Court to order his
release or, in the alternative, to order Respondents to provide him a bond hearing.
Masis Lucero asserts that ICE is wrongly purporting to detain him under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1225(b)(2), which mandates detention, when instead 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which
provides for discretionary detention, governs. (Doc. 1, #2–3). The Respondents filed a
Return of Writ (Doc. 18), which argues that this Court lacks jurisdiction and that
§ 1225(b)(2) indeed applies. This Court recently addressed this precise question of
statutory interpretation in Coronado v. Secretary, Department of Homeland Security,
No. 1:25-cv-831, 2025 WL 3628229 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 15, 2025). Like Coronado, Masis
Lucero acknowledges he is present in the country but was never admitted. (Doc. 1,
#9–10). Thus, for the reasons more fully explained in Coronado, the Court finds that
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Masis Lucero is an “applicant for admission” and falls under the purview of
§ 1225(b)(2). Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Masis
Lucero’s Petition (Doc. 1).
At the same time, although the Court largely relies on Coronado, a little
further explanation is warranted. That is because, while Coronado is squarely on
point, Masis Lucero’s reply brief in this case, (Doc. 19), comes on the heels of that
decision. As a result, that brief raises some issues that the Court did not fully discuss
in Coronado. Beyond that, in the few days since the Court issued its earlier decision,
even more district courts have considered the issue and come down on the question
differently from how this Court decided it. Accordingly, the Court proceeds as follows.
First, it provides a brief review of Coronado. Then it discusses (1) some additional
arguments that focus on the text of § 1225, (2) Masis Lucero’s contention that the
Court read Jennings incorrectly in Coronado, (3) additional arguments arising from
the various immigration regulations that Masis Lucero cites, and (4) Masis Lucero’s
due process argument. The Court takes the arguments in that order. Ultimately, none
change the Court’s mind.
Start with a quick recap of Coronado. Recall that the issue here (and there) is
whether a noncitizen like Masis Lucero falls within the scope of § 1225(b)(2)(A). (Doc.
1, #2–3); 2025 WL 3628229, at *1. That statutory section applies to an “applicant for
admission,” other than those who fall within § 1225(b)(1) (and subject to certain other
exceptions not relevant here, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(B)). Section 1225(b)(2)(A) then
goes on provide that, as to any such “applicant for admission,” “if the examining
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immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is not clearly and
beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained for a proceeding
under section 1229a of this title.” In Coronado, the Court concluded: (1) that
noncitizens, like Masis Lucero, who are present in the country without having been
“admitted” (which refers to lawful entry after inspection and authorization by an
immigration officer, see 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A)), are “deemed” to be “applicant[s]
for admission,” see id. § 1225(a)(1) (defining the term “applicant for admission”);
(2) the phrase “alien seeking admission” in § 1225(b)(2)(A) is merely another way to
refer to “applicant[s] for admission,” and thus the same “deeming” that makes
someone an applicant for admission also makes them an “alien seeking admission,”
whether that is so as a matter of fact or not; and (3) an examining officer had not
determined that Coronado was clearly entitled to be admitted. Coronado, 2025 WL
3628229, at *7–9. Thus, Coronado fell within § 1225(b)(2)(A) and “shall be detained
for a proceeding under section 1229a.” See id. at *12. The Court then found further
support 	for 	this 	interpretation 	in 	Jennings, 	which 	the 	Court 	understands 	as
distinguishing between those noncitizens who entered unlawfully (who are subject to
§ 1225) and those who entered lawfully (who are subject to § 1226). Id. at *9–10.
Beyond that, while not expressly raised in Coronado, an additional statutory
point bears mention at the outset. A noncitizen might be tempted to argue that
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates detention “for a proceeding” and that “for” might simply
mean “until the start of such proceedings,” such that discretionary detention under
§ 1226 would be available after that point. But the Supreme Court, while recognizing
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that “for” could be understood that way, rejected that very argument: “In sum,
§§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) mandate detention of aliens throughout the completion of
applicable proceedings and not just until the moment those proceedings began.”
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 302 (2018).
True, Jennings ultimately was directed at a different question, so its analysis
of the meaning of “for” was arguably dicta. But the Sixth Circuit has instructed that
lower courts are generally “obligated to follow Supreme Court dicta, particularly
when there is no substantial reason for disregarding it, such as age or subsequent
statements undermining its rationale.” United States v. Marlow, 278 F.3d 581, 588
n.7 (6th Cir. 2002). And as to the two considerations the Sixth Circuit identified,
Jennings was decided only seven years ago, and the Court is not aware of any
“subsequent statements” undermining it. So, dicta or not, the Court concludes that
detention “for a proceeding” under § 1225(b)(2)(A) refers to mandatory detention that
lasts through the completion of the removal proceedings.1
So, applying that same reasoning to the case at hand, Masis Lucero (who was
not lawfully admitted) is subject to § 1225(b)(2)(A), and no immigration officer has
determined that he is clearly entitled to be present in the country. As a result, he
must be detained through the end of his removal proceedings—the same result that
the Court reached in Coronado.
1 While the detention is mandatory, it is subject the possibility of parole. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(d)(5).
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Masis Lucero, though, says the Court erred in Coronado. And in fairness, many
other district courts across the country share that view. He starts by arguing that, as
a textual and contextual matter, § 1225 simply does not extend to folks like him (those
who were not admitted, but who have been in this country for more than two years)
at all. (Doc. 19, #171). Rather, pointing to the section’s title, he contends that § 1225
is limited solely to those aliens who are subject to expedited removal. (Id. (“The
inclusion of the phrases ‘expedited removal’ and ‘arriving aliens’ in the title of the
statute means that this statue is limited to ‘arriving aliens,’ who are in ‘expedited
removal’ proceedings, not those already present in this country who are in non-
expedited removal proceedings of 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.”)).
The Court agrees that a statute’s title can be relevant in determining the
statute’s meaning in some circumstances. See Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528,
552 (2015) (Alito, J., concurring in judgment); Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110,
120–21 (2023). In Dubin, for example, the Supreme Court stated that “the title of a
statute and the heading of a section are tools available for the resolution of a doubt
about the meaning of a statute.” 599 U.S. at 120–121 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998)). But,
in words directly applicable here, the very next sentence in Dubin goes on to say, “[a]
title will not, of course, override the plain words of a statute.” Id. at 121 (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Fulton v. Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522, 536–37
(2021)).
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That latter point dooms Masis Lucero’s argument. As noted, he claims that
§ 1225 extends only to aliens who are subject to expedited removal. Not so. To be sure,
§ 1225(b)(1) 	addresses 	expedited 	removal, 	but 	§ 1225(b)(2) 	expressly 	addresses
standard (i.e., non-expedited) removal proceedings—that is, it refers to aliens who
“shall be detained for a proceeding under section 1229a of this title [i.e., standard
removal proceedings].” So it is incorrect to contend that the statutory domain for
§ 1225 is somehow limited to those aliens subject to expedited removal.
Trying a slightly different tack, Masis Lucero contends that § 1225 is instead
“intended to apply to recent arrivals at or near the United States border.” (Doc. 19,
#172). This argument implicitly echoes the many courts that have arrived at a similar
conclusion by relying on § 1225(b)(2)(A)’s phrase “aliens seeking admission.” See, e.g.,
Bethancourt Soto v. Soto, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2025 WL 2976572, at *5–6 (D.N.J. Oct.
22, 2025). Noting that “seeking admission” is a present participle, these courts
usually contend that someone present in the country for more than two years cannot
be said to be “seeking admission” as § 1225(b)(2) uses that term. See, e.g., Chingo v.
Stamper, No. 2:25-cv-590, 2025 WL 3513833, *4 (D. Me. Dec. 8, 2025) (citation
omitted)(“At bottom, the district courts consistently hold that § 1225(b)(2) applies
only to those noncitizens who are actively ‘seeking admission,’ and a noncitizen
continuously residing in the United States for more than two years cannot be
considered actively seeking admission.”). In other words, under that reading, for the
first two years they are present in the country, an applicant is “seeking admission,”
but on the dawn of the first day of the third year, that is no longer true.
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Not only does that reading seem odd as a logical matter, but looking at an
earlier portion of that same statutory section (i.e., § 1225), it appears that Congress
knew how to provide differing rules for those noncitizens here less than two years
and 	those 	here 	more 	than 	two 	years 	when 	it 	wanted 	to 	do 	so. 	Specifically,
§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii)(I) states that the Attorney General may apply §§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)
and (ii) to “any or all aliens described in subclause (II),” which in turn states, as
relevant 	here: 	“An 	alien 	described 	in 	this 	clause 	is 	an 	alien … who 	has 	not
affirmatively shown, to the satisfaction of an immigration officer, that the alien has
been physically present in the United States continuously for the 2-year period
immediately prior to the date of the determination of inadmissibility.” In other words,
§ 1225(b)(1)’s expedited removal provisions only apply to aliens who arrived in the
immediately preceding two years (or who cannot prove otherwise). But Congress did
not elect to include the same or similar phrasing in § 1225(b)(2). That is, Congress
expressly included the limitation in one statutory subpart, but declined to do so in
the immediately following subpart. Against that backdrop, this Court is leery of
reading that limitation into “aliens seeking admission” by implication.
Shifting gears, Masis Lucero then argues that Jennings shows that § 1226
controls. (Doc. 1, #9; Doc. 19, #172). Specifically, he reads Jennings as drawing a
bright line “between foreign nationals seeking admission into the United States and
those already in the country.” (Doc. 19, #173). But that argument seems to implicitly
rely on his view, noted above, that the “alien seeking admission” does not refer to all
“applicants for admission,” but rather refers only to those applicants for admission
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who have been in the country unlawfully for less than two years. And the Court has
already explained above why it disagrees with that as a textual matter.
Indeed, a close parsing of Jennings not only highlights shortcomings in Masis
Lucero’s preferred view, but offers further support that § 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to all
applicants for admission not covered by (b)(1), independent of how long they have
been in this country. The Jennings Court described § 1225(b) as primarily applying
to “aliens seeking entry into the United States (‘applicants for admission’ in the
language of the statute).” 583 U.S. at 297. In other words, the Jennings Court
understood 	the 	phrase 	“aliens 	seeking 	entry” 	and 	the 	phrase 	“applicants 	for
admission” to refer to the same group. Id. But, as a matter of plain English, “aliens
seeking 	entry” 	is 	nearly 	synonymous 	with 	“aliens 	seeking 	admission.” 	So, 	if
“applicants for admission” and “aliens seeking entry” are one and the same (as
Jennings says), and “aliens seeking entry” and “aliens seeking admission” also refer
to the same group (as a plain-language reading of the two would suggest), then the
group “applicants for admission” and “aliens seeking admission” necessarily are just
different ways to refer to the same set of aliens. But that is what the Court held in
Coronado—the statutory phrase “aliens seeking admission” does not refer to a subset
of “applicants for admission,” but rather is just another way to refer to that same
group.
In sum, for all the reasons set forth in Coronado, as supplemented by the
above, the Court once again arrives at the conclusion that, by its plain language,
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§ 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to noncitizens like Masis Lucero, and that the statutory
provision requires detention through the end of removal proceedings.
But there is one more set of arguments—one that Coronado did not make and
that the Court thus did not consider in its recent decision there. Specifically, Masis
Lucero argues that the various regulations governing ICE’s procedures mandate a
finding that § 1226(a) governs his detention. (Doc. 19, #175–76). Understanding that
argument requires the Court to begin by exploring one further statutory provision.
While § 1225(b)(2)(A) mandates detention for those persons it covers, it does not
specifically address how they come into custody in the first instance. In those
instances (like Masis Lucero’s situation), when ICE has not obtained a warrant in
advance of an arrest, the authority for a warrantless arrest appears to arise from 8
U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2): “Any officer … shall have power without warrant … to arrest any
alien in the Unites States, if he has reason to believe that the alien so arrested is in
the United States in violation of [immigration laws] and is likely to escape before a
warrant can be obtained for his arrest.” Assuming that is that basis for the arrest, 8
C.F.R. § 287.3 then regulates how officers proceed after they effect that warrantless
arrest. Most relevant to the issue at hand, § 287.3(d) governs custody procedures and
states, “a determination will be made within 48 hours of the arrest [except in cases
not relevant here] whether a notice to appear and warrant of arrest as prescribed in
8 CFR parts 236 and 239 will be issued.” Turning to the referenced § 236, particularly
§ 236.1(c)(8), “[a]ny officer authorized to issue a warrant of arrest may, in the officer’s
discretion, release an alien not described in [8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)], under the
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conditions at [§§ 1226(a)(2) and (3)]; provided that the alien must demonstrate to the
satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a danger to property or
persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” That
regulation also dictates that ICE will utilize Forms I-200 and I-286 for the Warrant
of Arrest and Notice of Custody Determination respectively. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(b)(1),
(g)(1). Counsel for the Petitioner helpfully supplied examples of these forms (although
not the ones including the details for Masis Lucero’s case). (Docs. 19-1, 19-2). The
Court acknowledges that both forms purport to invoke authority vested under § 1226.
(See Docs. 19-1, 19-2).
But the question for present purposes is what to make of that. That is, even
assuming that the government incorrectly identified the basis for its exercise of
custodial authority (by citing § 1226 instead of § 1225(b)(2)(A)), there is still the
question of what, if anything, follows from that error. From what the Court can glean
from Masis Lucero’s sparse briefing on the topic, his argument seems to sound in
some notion of estoppel—i.e., because Respondents claimed they were acting under
§ 1226, they cannot change that claim now. But “[i]t is well established that estoppel
cannot be used against the government on the same terms as against private parties.”
Kerger v. United States, 609 F. Supp. 3d 562, 574–75 (N.D. Ohio 2022) (quoting United
States v. Guy, 978 F.2d 934, 937 (6th Cir. 1992)). Beyond the traditional estoppel
elements, a party must also “demonstrate some affirmative misconduct by the
government.” Id. at 575 (cleaned up) (quoting Fuller v. United States, 475 F. Supp.
3d 762, 767 (S.D. Ohio 2020)). The mere fact that ICE officers have continued to use
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the same forms as before their recent policy change does not necessarily mean they
have engaged in “affirmative misconduct.” Id. And absent some such showing, the
government is not estopped from detaining Petitioner on grounds other than those it
listed, including § 1225(b)(2). So, on the argument that the Court understands Masis
Lucero to be pressing, the regulations he cites do not change the Court’s outcome.
That said, a closer review of the CFRs does bring into focus two other concerns
that rest on general principles of administrative law. First, where an agency has
bound itself, through the adoption of rules, to provide certain substantive rights, the
Accardi doctrine sharply limits the agency’s ability to simply ignore their own
published rules. See U.S. ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 267 (1954).
So, if the CFRs mandate substantive rights—for example a detention hearing—that
mandate 	remains 	binding 	on 	Respondents 	unless 	and 	until 	they 	change 	the
governing regulations.
Second, and relatedly, it seems clear to the Court that Respondents’ practices
on detention have shifted markedly in recent months. As the Court understands it,
that is largely a result of new advice the agency received from the Executive Officer
of 	Immigration 	Review 	(EOIR) 	in 	the 	Department 	of 	Justice 	stating 	that
§ 1225(b)(2)(A) rather than § 1226(a) controls when it comes to persons who entered
the country without being admitted,2 a position that the BIA then also adopted
2 Petitioner only provides a link to a photo of ICE's interim guidance dictating detention
under § 1225(b)(2) instead of § 1226(a). (Doc. 1, #6 n.1); see https://perma.cc/X8ZY-G7RQ.
Other courts have noted the lack of official guidance or policy as well. See, e.g., Rojas v. Olson,
No. 25-cv-1437, 2025 WL 3033967, at *1 n.2 (E.D. Wis. Oct. 30, 2025).
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through adjudication, see Matter of Yajure Hurtado, 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 220 (B.I.A.
2025). As described above, the Court agrees with that position as a matter of statutory
interpretation. But the new position nonetheless marks a major shift, and it has
profound implications for many persons in this country, who are now subject to the
potential for mandatory detention if taken into custody.
In a perhaps analogous situation, the Supreme Court has explained that the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) limits how an agency goes about undertaking
and implementing such a major policy change. See generally Dep’t of Homeland Sec.
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 591 U.S. 1 (2020). In Regents, the DHS had abruptly
terminated its Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program. Id. at 9.
Much like here, the Secretary explained that DHS’s basis for making the change was
advice the agency had received from the then-new Attorney General—specifically, his
opinion that DACA was unlawful under the INA. Id. But the Regents Court insisted
that, even if DACA was unlawful, the means for terminating the program still were
subject to review under an arbitrary and capricious standard. Id. at 25–33. In other
words, where an agency has a long-standing practice of granting rights, it must go
about terminating those rights with care.
It is possible that one or both of these arguments may provide some basis for
relief here. Or they may not—the Court is not certain whether any promulgated
regulations expressly grant Masis Lucero a right to a hearing, so Accardi may be
irrelevant; and it is not entirely clear to the Court what Regents requires in terms of
implementing a policy change, nor how that stacks up to the procedures Respondents
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followed in adopting and implementing their change here. And that just leads to a
broader point—Masis Lucero has not invoked the Accardi doctrine, nor has he raised
an APA challenge. As a result, unlike in some other cases, where petitioners have
raised such challenges, see, e.g., K.E.O. v. Woosley, No. 4:25-cv-74, 2025 WL 2553394,
at *7 (W.D. Ky. Sep. 4, 2025) (granting relief based on the Accardi doctrine),
Respondents have not been called upon to respond to either argument in this case.
Accordingly, under the party-presentation principle, the Court declines to consider
either challenge in this Opinion and Order. See Clark v. Sweeney, No. 25–52, 2025
WL 3260170, at *2 (U.S. Nov. 24, 2025) (reversing grant of habeas relief where “[t]he
Fourth Circuit transgressed the party-presentation principle by granting relief on a
claim that Sweeney never asserted and that the State never had the chance to
address”). Suffice to say that the CFRs, as Masis Lucero has argued them, do not
change the Court’s outcome.
Finally, Masis Lucero raises a similarly bare-bones substantive due process
challenge. (Doc. 19, #176–177). As the Court understands that challenge, Masis
Lucero claims he has a liberty interest in bond, and that the government has failed
to articulate a sufficient basis for interfering with that liberty interest under “the
classic balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1976).” (Id. at
#176). Masis Lucero does not, however, walk through that balancing test to explain
how or why he believes the government falls short.
At least on the argument as presented, the Court concludes that Masis Lucero
has not made the necessary showing to prevail on a due process claim. The Court does
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not dispute that Masis Lucero has a liberty interest in being free from detention. But
Respondents made a probable cause determination that Masis Lucero entered the
country unlawfully. Indeed, he concedes he entered without being admitted. And the
Supreme Court has concluded that deportable aliens can be detained through the
pendency of removal proceedings with no suggestion that such detention runs afoul
of the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Jennings, 583 U.S. at 305–06. True, removal
proceedings can take an extended period of time. If the resulting detention were to
become unreasonably long, due process concerns may emerge. But as things stand,
Masis Lucero’s due process claim, at least as the Court understands that claim, fails.
For those reasons, the Court DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE Masis
Lucero’s Petition (Doc. 1).3 Respondent Warden of Butler County Jail also filed a
Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 13), arguing it is not a proper respondent for this habeas
petition. Because the Court dismisses the Petition, the Court DENIES AS MOOT
Respondent’s Motion (Doc. 13). The Court DIRECTS the Clerk to enter judgment
and to TERMINATE this case on its docket.
SO ORDERED.
December 23, 2025
DATE 	DOUGLAS R. COLE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
3 The Court dismisses without prejudice in the event that Petitioner wishes to pursue relief
as a potential class member in Bautista v. Santacruz, No. 5:25-cv-1873, 2025 WL 3288403
(C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025).
UGLAS R. COLE
TED STATES DISTRICT	C	CT	T	T	T	T	C	CT	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T	T
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