Johnson v. McDonald's Restaurants of Ohio, Inc.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION - CINCINNATI
SINDIE S. JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
V.
MCDONALD'S RESTAURANTS
OF OHIO, INC.,
Defendant.
Case No. 1:24-cv-34
Judge Matthew W. McFarland
ORDER AND OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
(Doc. 23). Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition (Doc. 36), to which Defendant filed a
Reply in Support (Doc. 37). Thus, this matter is fully briefed and ripe for the Court's
review. For the following reasons, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 23)
is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff 	Sindie 	Johnson 	held 	several 	roles 	with 	Defendant 	McDonald's
Restaurants of Ohio, Inc., over her four-decade career with the fast-food company.
(Plaintiff's Dep., Doc. 24, Pg. ID 155, 178.) Plaintiff first worked as a crew person. (Id. at
Pg. ID 155.) More recently, from June 2019 through around July 2022, Plaintiff worked as
the General Manager of McDonald's Liberty restaurant. (Id. at Pg. ID 225-29.) While
serving in this role at Liberty, Plaintiff was directly supervised by Joey Somera-an
Operations Consultant 	who 	collaborated with General 	Managers 	to 	help 	achieve
Case: 1:24-cv-00034-MWM Doc #: 38 Filed: 01/22/26 Page: 1 of 21 PAGEID #: <pageID>

performance targets. (Id. at Pg. ID 229; Somera Deel., Doc. 26-2, Pg. ID 615-16.) Somera,
in turn, 	reported 	to Crystal 	Haught-the 	Operations 	Manager who 	oversaw 	the
operations of more than twenty restaurants within the region. (Plaintiff's Dep., Doc. 24,
Pg. ID 229; Haught Deel., Doc. 26-1, Pg. ID 609-10.)
In July 2022, Plaintiff learned that she would need surgery. (Plaintiff's Dep., Doc.
24, Pg. ID 271-72.) She conveyed this update to Somera sometime between July 13 and
July 27 of 2022. (Id. at Pg. ID 280-81.) Plaintiff also applied for short-term disability on
July 28, 2022. (Id. at Pg. ID 282.) Sometime during this July timeframe, Plaintiff was told
that she would be working at the Breiel restaurant but was also informed that she would
help out with the Beckett and Batavia restaurants. (Id. at Pg. ID 232-33.)
A vacancy for the General Manager position at Defendant's Batavia restaurant
became available in June or July 2022. (Haught Deel., Doc. 26-1, Pg. ID 610.) According to
Haught, she decided to offer to transfer Plaintiff from Liberty to Batavia due to Plaintiff's
"significant experience, strong performance, employee training skills, and knowledge as
a General Manager." (Id. at Pg. ID 611.) In line with this decision, Haught instructed
Somera to discuss the transfer with Plaintiff. (Id.) At some point during the end of July or
early August, Somera and Haught informed Plaintiff that her profile would be moved to
Batavia as the General Manager. (Plaintiff's Dep., Doc. 24, Pg. ID 234-35.) Hearing this
news, Plaintiff mumbled under her breath: "so I'm working for a franchise when I
return." (Id. at Pg. ID 234.) Haught avers that she did not know that the Batavia restaurant
would be sold at the time she made the decision to transfer Plaintiff. (Haught Deel., Doc.
26-1, Pg. ID 611.) Similarly, Somera declares that he was unaware that Batavia would be
2
Case: 1:24-cv-00034-MWM Doc #: 38 Filed: 01/22/26 Page: 2 of 21 PAGEID #: <pageID>

sold at the time he received instructions from Haught. (Somera Deel., Doc. 26-2, Pg. ID
616.) From Defendant's perspective, Plaintiff's transfer to Batavia was effective on August
1, 2022. (Haught Deel., Doc. 26-1, Pg. ID 611; Transfer, Doc. 26-1, Pg. ID 613.) Ultimately,
Plaintiff worked "basically like a crew person" for two days- August 21 and August 23
of 2022-at the Batavia restaurant before taking leave to address her medical situation.
(Plaintiff's Dep., Doc. 24, Pg. ID 230-31.)
Then, on November 14, 2022, Haught and a Human Resources Manager notified
Plaintiff that the Batavia restaurant would be sold by the end of the month and that
Plaintiff's termination would be effective on November 30, 2022. (Molina Deel., Doc. 26-
3, Pg. ID 620.) Every employee of the Batavia restaurant was terminated on November
30, 2022, due to this sale. (Id.) While the other employees of the Batavia restaurant were
hired by the new owner, Plaintiff elected not to interview with the new owner. (Plaintiff's
Dep., Doc. 24, Pg. ID 319; Haught Deel., Doc. 26-1, Pg. ID 612.) There were no other
General Manager positions available at Defendant's restaurants within the region at the
time. (Molina Deel., Doc. 26-3, Pg. ID 620.)
On January 23, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant alleging
disability discrimination and age discrimination. (Compl., Doc. 1.) Plaintiff subsequently
filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. 16) in order to correct Defendant's name. (See
Stipulation, Doc. 15.) Defendant filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on April 1, 2025.
(Motion, Doc. 23.) This matter is now fully briefed and ripe for the Court's review. (See
Response, Doc. 36; Reply, Doc. 37.)
3
Case: 1:24-cv-00034-MWM Doc #: 38 Filed: 01/22/26 Page: 3 of 21 PAGEID #: <pageID>

LAW
A court must grant summary judgment if the record "reveals that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Laster v. CihJ of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714, 726 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c)). In making this determination, a court views the evidence in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144,157 (1970). The
moving party has the burden to conclusively show that no genuine issue of material fact
exists. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Espy, 39 F.3d
1339, 1347 (6th Cir.1994). This can be accomplished by pointing out the lack of admissible
evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(l)(B); Hayes v.
Equitable Energy Res. Co., 266 F.3d 560, 566 (6th Cir. 2001). If the moving party meets this
burden, it then becomes the nonmoving party's responsibility to put forth affirmative
evidence to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242,250,257 (1986).
Notably, a "mere scintilla" of evidence in support of the nonmoving party's
position is not enough to avoid summary judgment. Daniels v. Woodside, 396 F.3d 730, 734
(6th Cir. 2005). To preclude summary judgment, the nonmoving party must point to
probative evidence on which a jury could reasonably reach a verdict in that party's favor.
Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make the necessary showing for an element on which
it has the burden of proof, then the moving party is entitled to summary judgment.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
4
Case: 1:24-cv-00034-MWM Doc #: 38 Filed: 01/22/26 Page: 4 of 21 PAGEID #: <pageID>

As confirmed by the Sixth Circuit, a court is under no obligation to search the
record for genuine issues of material fact. Betkerur v. Aultman Hosp. Ass'n, 78 F.3d 1079,
1087 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3) (explaining that "the court need
consider only the cited materials"). "If a party fails to properly support an assertion of
fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact ... , the court may . ..
grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials-including the facts
considered undisputed-show that the movant is entitled to it." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). "The
court's duty to view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant does not
require or permit the court to accept mere allegations that are not supported by factual
evidence." Chappell v. City of Cleveland, 585 F.3d 901,906 (6th Cir. 2009).
The undersigned's Standing Orders also require that any response in opposition
to a motion for summary judgment include a response to the proposed undisputed facts
that (1) states whether each fact is admitted or denied; and (2) if denied, provides citation
to the supporting documentation in the record. (Standing Orders for Civil Cases, 111.B.2.)
Plaintiff failed to respond to Defendant's proposed undisputed facts. 	(See generally
Response, Doc. 36.) A nonmovant may not rely solely on the pleadings but must present
affirmative evidence supporting her claims. Banks v. Wolfe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 330 F.3d 888,
892 (6th Cir. 2003). Unsworn allegations in a complaint are not considered evidence. See
Mack v. Bessner, 512 F. Supp. 3d 784, 792 (E.D. Mich. 2021) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248; Sweeting v. Schweigtzer, No. 19-3930, 2020 WL 5822513, at *2 (6th Cir. July 31, 2020)).
Additionally, "[c]onclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are
not evidence, and are not enough to defeat a well-supported motion for summary
5
Case: 1:24-cv-00034-MWM Doc #: 38 Filed: 01/22/26 Page: 5 of 21 PAGEID #: <pageID>

judgment." Gooden v. City of Memphis Police Dep't, 67 F. App'x 893, 895 (6th Cir. 2003)
(citing Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871,888 (1990)).
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's noncompliance with the undersigned's Standing
Orders entitles Defendant to summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(e)(3). (Reply, Doc. 37, Pg . ID 1148-49.) The Court finds that Plaintiff has not complied
with the Standing Orders. In any event, the Court will walk through the following
analysis on the merits.
ANALYSIS
Where, 	like 	here, 	workplace-discrimination 	claims 	lack 	direct 	evidence 	of
discrimination, courts apply the three-part framework established in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). First, the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing a
prima fade case of discrimination. Thompson v. Fresh Prods., LLC, 985 F.3d 509, 522 (6th
Cir. 2021). Assuming the plaintiff accomplishes this, "the burden shifts to the employer
to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse action." Id. If so, "the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to establish that the proffered reason was merely
pretext for unlawful discrimination." Id.
The Court first turns to Plaintiff's 	disability discrimination claim and then
considers Plaintiff's age discrimination claim. Both are subject to the similar well-traveled
McDonnell Douglas framework. See Hedrick v. W Rsrv. Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444,459 (6th Cir.
2004). Finally, the Court addresses Plaintiff's recently developed claim for failure to
accommodate.
6
Case: 1:24-cv-00034-MWM Doc #: 38 Filed: 01/22/26 Page: 6 of 21 PAGEID #: <pageID>

I. 	Disability Discrimination Claim
Plaintiff's disability discrimination claim is grounded in the Americans with
Disabilities Act(" ADA"). (Am. Compl., Doc. 16, 1, 18-21.) The ADA provides that "[n]o
covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability
in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and
privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a).
i. 	Prima Fade Case
To begin, a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that "(l) she is disabled; (2)
otherwise qualified for the position, with or without reasonable accommodation; (3)
suffered an adverse employment decision; (4) the employer knew or had reason to know
of the plaintiff's disability; and (5) the position remained open while the employer sought
other applicants or the disabled individual was replaced." Whitfield v. Tennessee, 639 F.3d
253,259 (6th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). However, in cases involving a reduction-in-
force, the fifth prong is substituted with a heightened standard: "rather than showing
that she was replaced, the plaintiff must present direct, circumstantial, or statistical
evidence tending to indicate that the employer singled out the plaintiff for discharge for
impermissible reasons." Thompson, 985 F.3d at 522 (quotation omitted); see also Arthur v.
Am. Showa, Inc., 625 F. App'x 704, 707 (6th Cir. 2015) (applying modified fifth prong in
ADA context).
A reduction-in-force occurs "when an employer eliminates an employee's position
because of business considerations and does not replace that employee after her
7
Case: 1:24-cv-00034-MWM Doc #: 38 Filed: 01/22/26 Page: 7 of 21 PAGEID #: <pageID>

discharge." Thompson, 985 F.3d at 522 n.6. Defendant terminated each of its Batavia-based
employees-including Plaintiff- after it sold that particular restaurant. (Molina Deel.,
Doc. 26-3, Pg. ID 620.) Therefore, as recognized by both Plaintiff and Defendant, the
reduction-in-force standard applies here. (Motion Brief, Doc. 25, Pg. ID 591-92; Response,
Doc. 36, Pg. ID 1143).
The parties operate under the assumption that the first four McDonell Douglas
prongs are satisfied. (See Motion Brief, Doc. 25, Pg. ID 592.) Defendant does not dispute
that Plaintiff was (1) disabled, (2) qualified for her position, (3) suffered the adverse
employment action of termination, and (4) that Defendant was aware of Plaintiff's
disability. (Id.) Thus, the Court's prima fade inquiry turns on the fifth prong: whether
Plaintiff has provided "additional direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence tending to
indicate that the employer singled [her out] for discharge for impermissible reasons."
Barnes v. GenCorp. Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1465 (6th Cir. 1990). As the Sixth Circuit recognizes,
this modified framework does not create II
an undue hardship" because a plaintiff who
was truly singled out for discriminatory discharge II
should be able to develop enough
evidence through the discovery process or otherwise to establish a prima fade case." Id.
at 1465-66. For instance, demonstrating that the plaintiff "possessed qualifications
superior to those of a [non-protected employee] working in the same position" or that
"the employer made statements of a discriminatory motive" may suffice. Id. at 1466. "The
guiding principle," at the end of the day, "is that the evidence must be sufficiently
probative to allow a factfinder to believe that the employer intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff." Geiger v. Tower Auto., 579 F.3d 614,624 (6th Cir. 2009) (cleaned up).
8
Case: 1:24-cv-00034-MWM Doc #: 38 Filed: 01/22/26 Page: 8 of 21 PAGEID #: <pageID>

Plaintiff does not offer any statistical evidence to support a finding that this final
prong is met. 	Nor does Plaintiff submit evidence of similarly situated coworkers
receiving more favorable treatment. It could be said that Plaintiff attempts to rely upon
an allegedly discriminatory statement by a decisionmaker: Somera told her on more than
one occasion that Plaintiff was "a high paid [General Manager]." (Response, Doc. 36, Pg.
ID 1142; Plaintiff's Dep., Doc. 24, Pg. ID 362.) But, whether viewed alone or within the
context of the entire record, this statement lacks a sufficient nexus to disability or age
discrimination. And, as the Sixth Circuit highlights, "vague, ambiguous, or isolated
remarks" do not suffice in this setting. Hein v. All Am. Plywood Co., 232 F.3d 482,488 (6th
Cir. 2000).
The thrust of Plaintiff's argument, instead, appears to rely on a collection of
purported indirect evidence of discrimination to show that Defendant decided to
terminate Plaintiff due to her disability after learning that she would be on medical leave
and may also need surgery. (Response, Doc. 36, Pg. ID 1142.) Certain evidence of
temporal proximity can form a basis for indirect evidence in the reduction-in-force
context. See Asmo v. Keane, Inc., 471 F.3d 588, 593-94 (6th Cir. 2006). Though the Sixth
Circuit has "generally caution[ed] against the permissibility of drawing an inference of
causation from temporal proximity alone, ... '[w]here an adverse employment action
occurs very close in time after an employer learns of a protected activity, such temporal
proximity between the events is significant enough to constitute evidence of a causal
connection for the purposes of satisfying a prima facie case of retaliation."' Barrow v. City
9
Case: 1:24-cv-00034-MWM Doc #: 38 Filed: 01/22/26 Page: 9 of 21 PAGEID #: <pageID>

of Cleveland, 773 F. App'x 254,263 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co.,
516 F.3d 516,525 (6th Cir. 2008)).
Here, Plaintiff testified that, sometime between July 13 and July 27 of 2022, she
notified Somera of her upcoming surgery. (Plaintiff's Dep., Doc. 24, Pg. ID 280-81.)
Additionally, Plaintiff applied for short-term disability on July 28, 2022, with an expected
start date of August 24, 2022. (Id. at Pg. ID 282-88.) Shortly thereafter, sometime in the
end of July or early August of 2022, Somera and Haught notified Plaintiff that her profile
would be transferred to the Batavia restaurant. (Plaintiff's Dep., Doc. 24, Pg. ID 234-35.)
According to Defendant, Plaintiff was effectively transferred to Batavia on August 1,
2022. (Haught Deel., Doc. 26-1, Pg. ID 611; Transfer, Doc. 26-1, Pg. ID 613.) Then, Plaintiff
was notified on November 14, 2022, that she would be terminated as of November 30,
2022. (Molina Deel., Doc. 26-3, Pg. ID 620.)
This timeline shows that approximately four months elapsed between the time
Plaintiff notified Somera of her upcoming surgery and her ultimate termination. While
"no other evidence is needed" when "there is a very close temporal proximity," this four-
month period is too lengthy-in and of itself-to satisfy the final prima facie prong. Taylor
v. Geithner, 703 F.3d 328,339 (6th Cir. 2013); Cooper v. City of North Olmsted, 795 F.2d 1265,
1272 (6th Cir. 1986) (explaining that discharge "four months after filing a discrimination
claim is insufficient to support" an inference of retaliation); Kenney v. Aspen Techs., Inc.,
965 F.3d 443,449 (6th Cir. 2020) ("[A] roughly 75-day delay between [plaintiff's] protected
activity and an adverse employment action is not, standing alone, a convincing case for
proving causation."). Rather, for temporal proximity alone to satisfy a prima facie case,
10
Case: 1:24-cv-00034-MWM Doc #: 38 Filed: 01/22/26 Page: 10 of 21 PAGEID #: <pageID>

the Sixth Circuit has generally demarcated a cutoff "shy of the ten-week mark." Stein v.
Atlas Indus., Inc., 730 F. App'x 313,319 (6th Cir. 2018); see also Kirilenko-Ison v. Bd. of Educ.
of Danville Indep. Sch., 974 F.3d 652, 664-65 (6th Cir. 2020) (collecting cases).
Plaintiff, to be sure, was notified of her profile transfer to Batavia within days of
sharing that she would be having surgery and applying for short-term disability. But,
Plaintiff does not point to evidence that Haught or Somera knew that Batavia would be
sold before they notified Plaintiff of this profile transfer. To the contrary, Haught avers
that she was not aware of the sale until October 7, 2022-months after Plaintiff was
transferred. (Haught Deel., Doc. 26-1, Pg. ID 611.) Similarly, Somera declares that he was
unaware that Batavia would be sold at the time he received instructions from Haught
about the transfer. (Somera Deel., Doc. 26-2, Pg. ID 616.)
Plaintiff attempts to illustrate a genuine dispute of material fact by contesting that
Haught actually knew about the sale before Plaintiff was transferred. (Response, Doc. 36,
Pg. ID 1142-43.) In support of this claim, Plaintiff points to her conversation with Haught
and Somera sometime between late July and early August of 2022 in which they informed
her that her profile was being transferred to the Batavia restaurant. (Plaintiff's Dep., Doc.
24, Pg. ID 234.) Plaintiff testified that she responded with a "sarcastic remark" about
"working for a franchise when I return." (Id.) But, as Defendant convincingly points out,
even construing these facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, this remark by Plaintiff
could have only put Haught on notice of the potential sale after Haught had informed
Plaintiff of her transfer to Batavia. (Reply, Doc. 37, Pg. ID 1152.) Indeed, it was Haught's
act of notifying Plaintiff of the transfer decision that prompted Plaintiff's remark
11
Case: 1:24-cv-00034-MWM Doc #: 38 Filed: 01/22/26 Page: 11 of 21 PAGEID #: <pageID>

implying that the Batavia restaurant would soon be sold to a franchisor. Thus, Plaintiff
fails to identify any admissible evidence that Haught or Somera knew about the sale
before approaching Plaintiff about the transfer to Batavia. Mere speculation that Haught
or Somera may have previously known of the sale does not suffice. See Gooden v. City of
Memphis Police Dep't, 67 F. App'x 893,895 (6th Cir. 2003); Daniels v. Woodside, 396 F.3d 730,
734 (6th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff next contends that "Somera had made a promise of Plaintiff being
transferred to the Breiel store after her return to work." (Response, Doc. 36, Pg. ID 1142.)
However, no record citation is offered for this assertion of fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3),
(e). "The Court has no duty to 'conduct its own probing investigation of the record' on a
motion for summary judgment, and it expressly declines to undertake such an effort
beyond examining the record citations provided in briefing materials" on this point.
Meyrose v. Vitas Hospice Servs., LLC, No. 19-CV-91, 2021 WL 5139478, at *8 (E.D. Ky. Nov.
3, 2021) (quoting Guarino v. Brookfield Twp. Trs., 980 F.2d 399, 405 (6th Cir. 1992))1 affd1
No. 21-6124, 2022 WL 3046969 (6th Cir. Aug. 2, 2022).
To the extent Plaintiff intends to rely on her deposition testimony cited elsewhere
in her Response, 	this testimony relates to Plaintiff being told that she would be
transferred to Breiel at one point in time; no mention is made of a "promise" that she
would remain there for any specific amount of time. (Plaintiff's Dep., Doc. 24, Pg. ID 232.)
Defendant also objects that, even if the record did bear out Plaintiff recalling a "promise"
by Somera, it would amount to inadmissible hearsay. (Reply, Doc. 37, Pg. ID 1154-55.)
The Court finds that, even assuming this language falls beyond the definition of hearsay
12
Case: 1:24-cv-00034-MWM Doc #: 38 Filed: 01/22/26 Page: 12 of 21 PAGEID #: <pageID>

or under the opposing party statement exception, Plaintiff's line of reasoning fails to
convince. Plaintiff recalls being told that she would work between Breiel, Batavia, and
Beckett. (Plaintiff's Dep., Doc. 24, Pg. ID 233, 263.) Again, because Plaintiff does not point
to evidence that Haught knew the Batavia restaurant would be sold before she made the
decision to transfer Plaintiff, whether or not Plaintiff had previously been told about
working at Breiel does not sufficiently suggest that she was singled out for discharge due
to impermissible reasons.
Finally, Plaintiff asserts that her transfer to Batavia conflicts with Defendant's
policy of not transferring employees to a location more than one hour away from their
homes. Plaintiff, however, does not provide record evidence as to this being an official
policy instituted by Defendant. At best, Plaintiff testified that she had "always heard they
won't transfer you more than an hour away." (Plaintiff's Dep., Doc. 24, Pg. ID 319.) As
Plaintiff does not identify the individual who made these statements, the Court is
hindered in making a hearsay admissibility ruling. See Back v. Nestle USA, Inc., 694 F.3d
571, 578 (6th Cir. 2012). In any event, even if this proposition were fully credited, the
Court does not find this to be sufficient evidence that Plaintiff was singled out because of
her disability.
Viewing the arguments and evidence together, the Court finds that Plaintiff has
not shown a genuine dispute as to an issue of material fact concerning the final prima
facie prong. Defendant is therefore entitled to summary judgment on this basis alone.
Nevertheless, even if the Court were to continue its analysis, Plaintiff's ADA claim fails
for the following reasons.
13
Case: 1:24-cv-00034-MWM Doc #: 38 Filed: 01/22/26 Page: 13 of 21 PAGEID #: <pageID>

ii. 	Legitimate Non discriminatory Reason
Turning to the second step, even assuming Plaintiff had made a prima facie case,
Defendant articulates a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff:
every employee at the Batavia restaurant was terminated on November 30, 2022, upon
the sale of the restaurant. (Motion Brief, Doc. 25, Pg. ID 594.) See Clark v. Rest. Growth
Servs., LLC, No. 3:24-CV-825, 2025 WL 1463159, at *7 (M.D. Tenn. May 21, 2025) (noting
the closure of restaurants as a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for termination). In
fact, "when work force reductions by the employer are a factor in the decision, the most
common legitimate reasons for the discharge are the work force reductions." Barnes, 896
F.2d at 1465 (cleaned up); see also Sullivan v. Metro Knoxville HMA, LLC, No. 24-5531, 2025
WL 263456, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 22, 2025). Thus, Defendant meets its burden at this step.
iii. 	Pretext
The question now becomes whether Plaintiff "present[ed] evidence from which a
jury could 	reasonably find 	that 	the 	employer's 	proffered reason for 	the 	adverse
employment action was not the real reason that it discharged her and that unlawful .. .
discrimination was the true reason." Moffat v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 624 F. App'x 341,347
(6th Cir. 2015). In other words, "a plaintiff must show both that the employer's proffered
reason was not the real reason for its action, and that the employer's real reason was
unlawful." E.E.O.C. v. Ford Motor Co., 782 F.3d 753, 767 (6th Cir. 2015); see also Smith v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 195 F. App'x. 389,395 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 519 (1993)). Arguments contesting the proffered reason for termination
typically fall within one of three buckets: "(1) [the proffered reason] has no basis in fact,
14
Case: 1:24-cv-00034-MWM Doc #: 38 Filed: 01/22/26 Page: 14 of 21 PAGEID #: <pageID>

(2) did not actually motivate the adverse employment decision, or (3) was insufficient to
motivate discharge." Moffat, 624 F. App'x at 347. These categories are not meantto unduly
restrict a court's analysis of the ultimate inquiry: "did the employer fire the employee for
the stated reason or not?" Tingle v. Arbors at Hilliard, 692 F.3d 523, 530 (6th Cir. 2012)
(quotation omitted). At the summary-judgment stage, a plaintiff "need only rebut the
employer's proffered rationales," not disprove them. Moffat, 624 F. App'x at 348.
Though not mentioning pretext by name, Plaintiff posits that "Defendant's
proffered business justification for Plaintiff's assignment to Batavia is devoid of common
sense and is not otherwise factually supported." (Response, Doc. 36, Pg. ID 1143.)
However, Haught averred that she "offer[ed] to transfer [Plaintiff] from the Liberty
restaurant to the Batavia restaurant location to fill the vacancy, based on [Plaintiff's]
significant experience, strong performance, employee training skills, and knowledge as a
General Manager." (Haught Deel., Doc. 26-1, Pg. ID 611.) Plaintiff, for her part, also
testified that she understood Batavia to be a "priority store" that needed extra help.
(Plaintiff's Dep., Doc. 24, Pg. ID 262.)
Plaintiff insists that a factual issue remains "as to why Defendant elected to claim
that Plaintiff was actually a Batavia store employee at the time the store was sold."
(Response, Doc. 36, Pg. ID 1143.) Specifically, Plaintiff's briefing seems to appreciate that
she was transferred to Batavia by early August 2022 but dismisses this as merely a "paper
transfer [of] her [General Manager] profile to the store while she was out on medical
leave." (Id. at Pg. ID 1139, 1143.) To the extent Plaintiff argues that this "paper transfer"
was somehow lacking, she does not cite to sufficient record evidence to support such a
15
Case: 1:24-cv-00034-MWM Doc #: 38 Filed: 01/22/26 Page: 15 of 21 PAGEID #: <pageID>

finding. See Peters v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 285 F.3d 456,470 (6th Cir. 2002) ("Mere conjecture
that 	the 	employer's 	explanation 	is 	a 	pretext for 	intentional 	discrimination 	is 	an
insufficient basis for denial of summary judgment.") (cleaned up).
Plaintiff's own deposition testimony, in contrast, evinces that she grasped the
significance of the transfer. As Plaintiff testified, upon learning of her profile transfer to
Batavia, she was "afraid that meant that's where I was going to be working when I
returned." (Plaintiff's Dep., Doc. 24, Pg. ID 235.) This transfer also translated to a tangible
impact because Plaintiff worked two days at the Batavia restaurant-albeit "basically like
a crew person" -before beginning medical leave. (Id. at Pg. ID 230-31.) In light of her
transfer to the Batavia restaurant and her subsequent work at the location for multiple
days (Haught Deel., Doc. 26-1, Pg. ID 611; Transfer Sheet, Doc. 26-1, Pg. ID 613), Plaintiff
has not shown a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her termination after transfer
to the Batavia restaurant lacked a basis in fact or was otherwise pretextual.
Moreover, the Court pauses to reiterate that "the question [of pretext] is always
whether the employer made up its stated reason to conceal intentional discrimination."
Pelcha v. MW Bancorp, Inc., 988 F.3d 318, 326-27 (6th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). The
fact that Plaintiff has not pointed to record evidence showing that Haught or Somera
knew that Batavia would be sold at the time they approached Plaintiff about the transfer
cuts against a finding of pretext. See Liv. Univ. of Akron, No. 5:21-CV-2277, 2023 WL
4133647, at *6 (N.D. Ohio June 22, 2023) ("Discharge of a qualified employee within a
protected class is not inherently suspicious because it is the nature of a RIF that some
16
Case: 1:24-cv-00034-MWM Doc #: 38 Filed: 01/22/26 Page: 16 of 21 PAGEID #: <pageID>

'qualified employees are going to be discharged."') (quoting Brocklehurst v. PPG Indus.,
Inc., 123 F.3d 890,896 (6th Cir. 1997)).
Finally, a review of the arguments explored in the prima facie discussion above
further confirms that Plaintiff's prior arguments fail to persuade at the pretext stage.
Notably, even if the temporal proximity between Plaintiff notifying Defendant of her
upcoming surgery and her termination could hold water as adequate prima facie
evidence of discrimination, the Sixth Circuit has been crystal clear: "temporal proximity
cannot be the sole basis for finding pretext." Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757, 763 (6th
Cir. 2012) (citing Skrjanc v. Great Lakes Power Serv. Co., 272 F.3d 309, 317 (6th Cir. 2001)).
And, even assuming Plaintiff could point to evidence that Defendant had violated its own
policy by transferring Plaintiff more than one hour away from her home, precedent
instructs that "an employer's failure to follow self-imposed regulations or procedures is
generally insufficient to support a finding of pretext." Miles v. S. Cent. Hum. Res. Agency,
Inc., 946 F.3d 883,896 (6th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted); see also Kean v. Brinker Int'[, Inc.,
140 F.4th 759,776 (6th Cir. 2025) (acknowledging that failure to follow policy can still "be
considered as part of the constellation of evidence").
Viewing all of the evidence together in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the
Court finds that Plaintiff has not demonstrated pretext. Accordingly, Defendant is
entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff's disability discrimination claim.
II. 	Age Discrimination Claim
The Court now shifts to Plaintiff's age discrimination claim under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (" ADEA"). (Am. Compl., Doc. 16, ,r,r 22-25.) "The
17
Case: 1:24-cv-00034-MWM Doc #: 38 Filed: 01/22/26 Page: 17 of 21 PAGEID #: <pageID>

ADEA prohlbits an employer from discriminating against an employee 'because of such
individual's age."' Sullivan v. Metro Knoxville HMA, LLC, No. 24-5531, 2025 WL 263456, at
*2 (6th Cir. Jan. 22, 2025) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(l)).
"To establish a prima fade case of age discrimination, the ADEA plaintiff must
show that: (1) she was over 40 years old; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action;
(3) she was qualified for the position she held; and (4) she was either replaced by a person
outside the protected class or treated differently than similarly-situated individuals."
Smith v. Wrigley Mfg. Co., LLC, 749 F. App'x 446,448 (6th Cir. 2018) (quotation omitted).
As mentioned, because this case involves a reduction-in-force, the fourth prong is
modified into a required showing of "direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence
tending 	to 	indicate 	that the 	employer singled 	out the 	plaintiff for 	discharge for
impermissible reasons." Id. (quotation omitted).
Again, there is no dispute that Plaintiff satisfies the first three prima fade elements.
First, as Plaintiff was over the age of forty at the time of termination (Plaintiff's Dep., Doc.
24, Pg. ID 133), she falls within a protected group. See Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1465. Second,
Plaintiff was subjected to the adverse employment action of termination. (Molina Deel.,
Doc. 	26-3, 	Pg. 	ID 	620.) 	And, 	third, 	Defendant does not argue 	that Plaintiff was
unqualified. See Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1469 n.18.
However, Defendant contends that Plaintiff stumbles on the fourth prong, as well
as at the pretext stage. (Motion Brief, Doc. 25, Pg. ID 597-98.) Plaintiff admitted during
her deposition that she does not believe she was treated differently than younger
employees regarding her termination. (Plaintiff's Dep., Doc. 24, Pg. ID 403-04.) And, other
18
Case: 1:24-cv-00034-MWM Doc #: 38 Filed: 01/22/26 Page: 18 of 21 PAGEID #: <pageID>

than a few general references that she "believes that Defendant elected to terminate her
due to her age" and that the circumstances show evidence of "age discrimination,"
Plaintiff's Response does not otherwise supply argument as to her age discrimination
claim. (Response, Doc. 36, Pg. ID 1142-43.) To the extent Plaintiff fashions an argument
as to her age discrimination claim, it is therefore based upon the same reasoning put forth
to support her disability discrimination claim. Accordingly, for the reasons discussed
earlier, Plaintiff fails to make a prima facie showing as to the last element and to pretext.
And, unlike her disability discrimination claim, Plaintiff has not made any form of
temporal proximity argument concerning her age discrimination claim. Thus, Defendant
is entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff's age discrimination claim.
III. 	Failure to Accommodate
Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
also claims that Defendant refused to grant Plaintiff's reasonable accommodation request
for a transfer to a different location. (Response, Doc. 36, Pg. ID 1145.) But, Plaintiff never
brought a claim for failure to accommodate in her Amended Complaint. (Am. Compl.,
Doc. 16; see also Reply, Doc. 37, Pg. ID 1155-56 (additionally arguing that a failure to
accommodate was never mentioned in Plaintiff's EEOC charge)). Notably, Plaintiff's
Amended 	Complaint 	revolves 	around 	Defendant 	allegedly 	treating 	Plaintiff
"differently" than comparable non-disabled or younger employees- not the failure to
accommodate. (Am. Compl., Doc. 16, ,r,r 20, 24.) See Lemieux v. Louisville Metro Gov't, No.
3:22-CV-151, 2023 WL 8241569, at *6 (W.D. 	Ky. 	Nov. 	28, 2023) 	(emphasizing the
distinction between a failure-to-accommodate claim and a discrimination claim). Neither
19
Case: 1:24-cv-00034-MWM Doc #: 38 Filed: 01/22/26 Page: 19 of 21 PAGEID #: <pageID>

Plaintiff's Amended Complaint nor her deposition testimony provided Defendant with
"fair notice" that she would be advancing such a claim. See Russ v. Memphis Light Gas &
Water Div., 720 F. App'x 229,235 (6th Cir. 2017).
11
A non-moving party plaintiff may not raise a new legal claim for the first time in
response to the opposing party's summary judgment motion." 	Tucker v. 	Union of
Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Emps., 407 F.3d 784, 788 (6th Cir. 2005) (quotation omitted).
Rather, 11
[a]t the summary judgment stage, the proper procedure for plaintiffs to assert a
new claim is to amend the complaint in accordance with Rule 15(a)." Id. (quotation
omitted). By a similar token, 11
[a] plaintiff may not expand his claims to assert new
theories for the first time in response to a summary judgment motion." Nathan v. Ohio
State Univ., 984 F. Supp. 2d 789,810 (S.D. Ohio 2013), aff d, 577 F. App'x 544 (6th Cir. 2014);
see also Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. WM Music Corp., 508 F.3d 394, 400 (6th Cir. 2007)
(collecting cases). Thus, Plaintiff's novel claim for failure to accommodate is not properly
before the Court.
In any case, even construing Plaintiff's arguments as potential support for the
claims alleged in her Amended Complaint, the Court is not persuaded. Plaintiff does not
dispute that every Batavia employee was terminated, and she does not identify any
employee who received a transfer in lieu of termination. Moreover, the record shows that
there were no other General Manager positions available at Defendant's restaurants
within the region at the time. (Haught Deel., Doc. 26-1, Pg. ID 612.) Similarly, Plaintiff
does not point to record evidence that other types of positions were available. Thus, these
arguments do not support Plaintiff's claim that she was treated II
differently" than
20
Case: 1:24-cv-00034-MWM Doc #: 38 Filed: 01/22/26 Page: 20 of 21 PAGEID #: <pageID>

comparable non-disabled or younger employees. (Am. Compl., Doc. 16, ,r,r 20, 24.) See
Braithwaite v. Sec'y of Dep't of Homeland Sec., 699 F. Supp. 2d 949, 961-62 (N.D. Ohio 2010),
aff d sub nom. Braithwaite v. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 473 F. App'x 405 (6th Cir. 2012)
(emphasizing that the plaintiff failed to show any vacancies or that similarly situated
individuals were offered such transfers); Hedrick v. W. Reserve Care Sys., 355 F.3d 444,459
(6th Cir. 2004). Likewise, these arguments do not suggest that Plaintiff was singled out
within the reduction-in-force context. See Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154
F.3d 344, 351 (6th Cir. 1998). For all these reasons, Plaintiff's failure-to-accommodate
arguments-framed as either an indepeJdent theory for relief or as an effort to support
her discrimination claims discussed above - are not well taken.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment (Doc. 23). Accordingly, judgment is entered in favor of Defendant on all of
Plaintiff's claims. This matter is TERMINATED from the Court's docket.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUT1:~ Jr D,.ISTRICT OF OHIO
By: -::]~1v_-i,{~w
JUDGE MATTHEW W. McFARLAND
21
Case: 1:24-cv-00034-MWM Doc #: 38 Filed: 01/22/26 Page: 21 of 21 PAGEID #: <pageID>