Joseph Lee Burton

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
In re:
Joseph Lee Burton,
Debtor.
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Case No. 25-31881
Chapter 7
Judge Crist
ORDER DENYING 937 REALTY, LLC’S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM
DISCHARGE INJUNCTION (OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, FOR CLARIFICATION
OF RIGHTS) WITHOUT PREJUDICE (DOC. 33)
I. 	Introduction
This matter is before the Court on a motion received by paper filing1 at the Clerk’s office
on March 17, 2026 and captioned by the signatory, Bonnie Cochran, Authorized Representative
of 937 Realty LLC (“937 Realty”), as a “Motion for Relief from Discharge Injunction (or in the
Alternative, for Clarification of Rights)” (Doc. 33) (the “Motion”). The Motion requests that the
Court “[g]rant relief from the discharge injunction to continue [the] civil action,” which was “filed
on March 9, 2026 in Montgomery County Common Pleas Court, Case No. 2026 CV 01468[,]” or
in the alternative, to “clarify creditor may determine liability and assert rights to proceeds.” Mot.
at 1, 2, ¶¶ 1-2. However, the Motion was not property served. Moreover, because the Motion was
1 Under Southern District of Ohio Administrative Procedure for Electronic Case Filing (“ECF Procedure”) 1(c), unless
specifically excepted by subpart (d), which includes “documents filed by pro se debtors,” and pursuant to ECF
Procedure 2(a), documents filed by attorneys must be filed electronically, not conventionally (in paper).
This document has been electronically entered in the records of the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Ohio.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 18, 2026
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submitted by a non-attorney on behalf of a limited liability company, and for other reasons
discussed below, it will be denied without prejudice.
II. 	Background
On September 17, 2025, Joseph Lee Burton (the “Debtor”) filed a Voluntary Petition
(Doc. 1) under chapter 7. On October 23, 2025, the Chapter 7 Trustee (the “Trustee”) filed his
Report of No Distribution. See Docket Entry dated Oct. 23, 2025.
Prior to the entry of the Debtor’s discharge, the Debtor moved to avoid two judicial liens
on his real property located at 5435 Sherfield Dr., Dayton, OH 45426 (Docs. 16 and 17), on
December 1, 2025, in which he valued said property at $296,720, pursuant to the Montgomery
County, Ohio Auditor’s 2024 appraised value, with a senior mortgage of $290,009. See Ex. C to
Mot. to Avoid Judicial Lien of RPV Mgmt., LLC (Doc. 16 at 9-12). Thus, after applying the
exemption of $182,625 available under R.C. § 2329.66(A)(1)(b), effective April 1, 2025, which
Debtor claimed on his Schedule C (Doc. 1 at 17), there was no remaining equity to which the
judicial liens could attach.2
On December 9, 2025, Creditor NewRez LLC d/b/a Shellpoint Mortgage, as servicer for
U.S. Bank National Association, not in its individual capacity, but solely as owner trustee of New
Residential Mortgage Loan Trust 2002-NQM2 (the “NewRez”), moved for relief from stay to
proceed with a foreclosure action against the Debtor (Doc. 19) (the “Motion for Relief from Stay”)
in which NewRez asserted the value of the real property was $296,720. The Debtor responded on
December 18, 2026 (Doc. 21) (the “Response”), indicating he had sufficient funds to bring the
mortgage payments current and that “there is adequate protection for the Movant.” Resp. at 1.
On December 30, 2025, the Court issued the Order of Discharge (Doc. 24). Thereafter, on
February 10, 2026, NewRez, withdrew its Motion for Relief from Stay (Doc. 27). And on March
2, 2026, the motions to avoid judicial liens (Docs. 16 and 17), to which no opposition had been
2 The Court notes that at the much higher ultimate sale price of $499,900 (Doc. 35 at 1) and using the other figures set
forth in the motions to avoid judicial liens (Docs. 16 and 17) there would have been equity (of approximately $27,266),
even after Debtor’s claimed homestead exemption of $182,625, to which the senior judgment lien could have attached.
Those figures, however, are contradicted by the figures in the Trustee’s Abandonment (Doc. 35). And to further
confuse matters, according to attachments to the United States Trustee’s Motion to Appear and Show Cause (Doc. 36)
filed on May 12, 2026, Debtor had a contract to sell his real property for $540,000 as of February 28, 2025 (Doc.
36-2), and the Debtor had an appraisal as of March 25, 2025 for $520,000. (Doc. 36-3.)
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filed, were granted such that both judicial liens were avoided under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f) (Docs. 28
and 29.).
On March 16, 2026, the Debtor filed Amended Schedule E/F (Doc. 32), adding 937 Realty
LLC as an unsecured prepetition creditor. That same day, 937 Realty, by and through Ms. Cochran,
Owner/Broker, filed a non-priority unsecured proof of claim in the amount of $13,166.55 (the
“Claim”) for an unpaid broker commission arising out of the sale of the Property, which failed to
close because of an unclear title. Cl. 1-1. The Complaint that Ms. Cochran filed “pro se” on behalf
of 937 Realty in the Montgomery County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2026 CV
01468, on March 9, 2026, is attached to the Claim, as is a Notice of Lis Pendens, also recorded on
March 9, 2026 with the Montgomery County, Ohio Recorder, which gives notice of the action
pending in the Common Pleas Court. It appears that 937 Realty was neither listed nor scheduled
as a creditor in this case until later when Debtor amended his Schedule F on March 16, 2026 (Doc.
32), such that prior to then 937 Realty had not received any notices in this bankruptcy case.
On the same day the Motion was filed, March 17, 2026, the Trustee withdrew his Report
of No Distribution “based upon credible information that the Debtor may have misrepresented the
value of his real estate and that real estate may, in fact have value for the benefit of creditors.”
(Doc. 34 at 1.) The Debtor’s residence at 5435 Sherfield Drive, Dayton, Ohio 45436 was scheduled
with a value of $296,720. Sch. A/B at 1, Part 1, item 1 (Doc. 1 at 10). And although the “value and
current sale price . . . is $499,000[,]” the Trustee ultimately abandoned any interest in the Property
consistent with 11 U.S.C. § 554, Bankruptcy Rule 6007, and LBR 6007-1 because “[a]fter payoff
of the mortgage, pro-rated taxes, real estate commission, HOA dues . . . , and closing costs[,]” “the
net proceeds of $146,277.98” would be fully exempt as claimed on Schedule C. (Doc. 35 at 1.)
Therefore, although the Trustee has not yet re-filed his Report of No Distribution, it appears this
chapter 7 estate will not distribute any funds to creditors and will therefore be what is typically
referred to as a no-asset case.
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III. 	Analysis
The Motion was signed by Ms. Cochran, who is not an attorney,3 on behalf of a limited
liability corporation. But Local Bankruptcy Rule (“LBR”) 9011-2(b), for long-established reasons
discussed below, specifically prohibits any entities “other than an individual[,]” such as
corporations, partnerships, as well as limited liability companies, from filing papers (appearing)
without an attorney (pro se), except as provided by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
(“Bankruptcy Rule”) 9010(a), which does not apply in this circumstance.4 This follows the
“two-century-old rule ‘that a corporation may appear in federal courts only through licensed
counsel[.]” Rowland v. Cal. Men’s Colony, 506 U.S. 194, 202 (1993) (quoted in 10A Collier on
Bankruptcy ¶ 9010.06, n.1 (16th ed. 2026)). As further explained:
The reason for this rule, which carries on a tradition that dates back to the
early days of the common law, is that “[since] a corporation can appear only
through its agents, they must be acceptable to the court; attorneys at law, who have
been admitted to practice, are officers of the court and subject to its control.”
Numerous other courts have followed this rule, which has also been applied to
limited liability companies and partnerships, as well as business entities generally.
10A Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 9010.06 (footnotes omitted); see also In re SFR ATL Owner 1, L.P.,
No. 26-30246, 2026 Bankr. LEXIS 543, at *13-16 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2026) (Gustafson,
J.) (noting that the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has also “held that: ‘A
corporate officer may not appear in federal court on behalf of the corporation; rather, the
corporation must be represented by counsel.” (quoting Taylor Steel, Inc. v. Keeton, 417 F.3d 598,
603 (6th Cir. 2005); Doherty v. Am. Motors Corp., 728 F.2d 334, 340 (6th Cir.1984); Ginger v.
Cohn, 426 F.2d 1385, 1386 (6th Cir.1970)) and that Bankruptcy Rule 9010(a) “does not change
this requirement that a licensed attorney must represent corporations, partnerships, LLCs, trusts,
and other similar entities or associations in federal court.”). The Sixth Circuit has also held “under
3 The Supreme Court of Ohio Attorney Directory, at https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/AttorneySearch/#/search,
did not reveal any attorney named Bonnie Cochran.
4 Bankruptcy Rule 9010(a)(1) states that a creditor or other party may “appear in a case and act either on the entity’s
own behalf or through an attorney authorized to practice in the court[,]” but subsection (a)(2) qualifies that a creditor
or other party may only “perform any act not constituting the practice of law, by an authorized agent . . . .” “As the
1983 Advisory Committee Note to Rule 9010 points out, corporations are not entitled to appear in bankruptcy court
pro se.” 10A Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 9010.06 (16th ed.)
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28 U.S.C. § 1654[5], that plaintiffs in federal court may not ‘appear pro se where interests other
than their own are at stake.’ ” Olagues v. Timken, 908 F.3d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting
Shepherd v. Wellman, 313 F.3d 963, 970 (6th Cir. 2002) (italicization omitted)). In essence, “while
a pro se plaintiff can ‘squander’ his own rights, he cannot waste the rights of other persons or
entities[,]” which “is why, ‘under longstanding tradition,’ a corporation can only appear by an
attorney.’ ” Id. (quoting Bass v. Leatherwood, 788 F.3d 228, 230 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Osborn
v. President, Directors & Co. of Bank, 22 U.S. 738, 829 (1824)); Ginger v. Cohn, 426 F.2d 1385,
1386 (6th Cir. 1970); see also Sanchez v. Walentin, 526 F. App’x 49, 51 (2d Cir. 2013)
(quoting Jones v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 722 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1983) (characterizing
this rule as “venerable and widespread”))).
Bankruptcy Rule 9010(a) only permits non-attorney individuals to perform acts on behalf
of corporate entities that do not constitute the practice of law, such as file proofs of claim (as Ms.
Cochran has done for 937 Realty), ask questions at a meeting of creditors held pursuant to § 3416,
“file certain administrative forms, and . . . fil[e] its own fee application.” 10A Collier on
Bankruptcy ¶ 9010.06 (footnotes omitted). This is the tradition that Local Bankruptcy Rule
(“LBR”) 9011-2 carries forward and implements in this District. And for this reason alone, the
Motion must be denied.7 That noted, the Court will briefly review the other substantive concerns
the Court has with the Motion.
To the extent that 937 Realty is seeking relief to continue its state court litigation against
the Debtor, notwithstanding the discharge injunction, Ms. Cochran has not shown (and she cannot
show as an “Authorized Representative”) that 937 Realty holds a valid in rem right that arose
prepetition, or that 937 Realty should otherwise be granted such relief. Although she did not attach
it to her Motion, the Court has seen the Notice of Lis Pendens attached to her pro se Complaint
that was recorded post-discharge. Within the Motion, Ms. Cochran only references “preservation
of rights tied to the transaction[,]” but does not further explain. Thus, 937 Realty has not yet set
5 This statute, enacted in 1948 (and previously in 1911 – Judicial code, 36 Stat. 1087), is titled “Appearance personally
or by counsel” and states that “[i]n all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases
personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct cases
therein.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654.
6 All sections referred to herein, unless otherwise specifically noted, are to sections of title 11 of the United States
Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”).
7 The Motion also fails to certify service on the Debtor, which is required by LBR 9013-3(b).
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forth any legally cognizable basis for why its state court action should be excepted from the
discharge injunction. And although Ms. Cochran has not given much in the way of details, the
online docket for the Montgomery County, Ohio Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2026 CV
01468, particularly the Exclusive Right to Sell Contract dated February 26, 2025, which pre-dated
this bankruptcy, attached to the “pro se” Compliant she filed therein (also on behalf of 937 Realty),
indicates that Ms. Cochran sued the Debtor postpetition on a prepetition obligation. Thus, while
she might not have violated the discharge injunction – to the extent she was unaware of the
bankruptcy case8 – she knows now. And any further effort to pursue the Debtor outside of this
Court without first obtaining any relief to which 937 Realty might ultimately be able to show it is
entitled would run afoul of the discharge injunction presently in place. See, e.g., Berry v. Fay
Servicing, LLC (In re Berry), No. 21-8005/8007, 2022 Bankr. LEXIS 2496, at *27-30 (B.A.P. 6th
Cir. Sept. 9, 2022) (discussing the discharge injunction, enforcement of discharge orders through
civil contempt powers, and extinguishment of in personam, but not in rem enforcement of a claim
(quoting Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S. 78, 84 (1991)). Whether Ms. Cochran has violated
the discharge injunction and needs to withdraw the Complaint or Notice of Lis Pendens is not
presently before the Court but is yet another reason why 937 Realty may wish to engage counsel.
Whether or not Debtor can realize equity from a sale of the real property, following
avoidance of judicial liens that impaired his claimed exemption of $182,625, has no bearing, by
itself, on whether 937 Realty could continue to pursue its state court litigation against the Debtor.
Notably, however, in the United States Trustee’s Motion to Appear and Show Cause (Doc. 36)
filed on May 12, 2026, the U.S. Trustee is seeking to revoke the Debtor’s discharge and to set
aside the orders avoiding the judicial liens (Docs. 28 and 29).
Finally, to the extent that 937 Realty is attempting to obtain a declaratory judgment as to
these issues, an adversary proceeding is required.9 See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7001(a) and (f).
8 The BNC Certificate of Mailing (Doc. 25) of the Order Discharging Debtor (Doc. 24) was not mailed to either 937
Realty LLC or Ms. Cochran.
9 Any debt not timely listed or scheduled under § 521(a)(1) could potentially be excepted from discharge pursuant to
§ 523(a)(3)(B), but there’s nothing pending before the Court on that issue, and the Court expresses no opinion on that
question; however, 937 Realty may do well to consult a bankruptcy attorney before attempting to take any further
action.
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IV. 	Conclusion
Accordingly, based upon the foregoing, the Motion for Relief from Discharge Injunction
(or in the Alternative, for Clarification of Rights) (Doc. 33), as filed by Ms. Cochran on behalf of
937 Realty, as an Authorized Representative but not an attorney, is hereby DENIED without
prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Copies to:
Default List, Plus
Bonnie Cochran, Broker, Authorized Representative, 937 Realty LLC, 208 Snider Rd., New
Carlisle, OH 45344
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