Beatty v. Commissioner of Social Security

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
RUSSELL ALLEN BEATTY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
CASE NO. 5:25-cv-778
DISTRICT JUDGE
PATRICIA A GAUGHAN
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
JAMES E. GRIMES JR.
REPORT &
RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff 	Russell 	Allen 	Beatty 	filed 	a 	Complaint 	against 	the
Commissioner of Social Security seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s
decision denying disability insurance benefits and supplemental security
income. This Court has jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c). The
Court referred this matter to a Magistrate Judge under Local Rule 72.2(b)(1)
for the preparation of a Report and Recommendation. Following review, and
for the reasons stated below, I recommend that the District Court affirm the
Commissioner’s decision.
Procedural history
In August 2022, Beatty filed an application for disability insurance
benefits and supplemental security income, alleging a disability onset date of
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March 12, 2022.1 Tr. 14, 213, 220. In his application, Beatty claimed disability
due to diabetes, depression, heart failure, and asthma. Tr. 277. The Social
Security Administration denied Beatty’s applications and his motion for
reconsideration. Tr. 68–69, 86, 105. Beatty then requested a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Tr. 129.
In January 2024, an ALJ held a hearing, during which Beatty and a
vocational expert testified. Tr. 38–67. The next month, the ALJ issued a
written decision finding that Beatty was not disabled. Tr. 14–32. The ALJ’s
decision became final on March 5, 2025, when the Social Security Appeals
Council declined further review. Tr. 1–3; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.981.
Beatty filed this action on April 17, 2025. Doc. 1. He asserts the following
assignment of error:
The ALJ failed to account for the “total limiting
effects” of Plaintiff’s impairments pursuant to 20
C.F.R. 	§§ 	404.1520c, 	404.1529, 	and 	404.1545(e),
resulting in a decision that is not supported by
substantial evidence.
Doc. 9, at 1.
Evidence
Personal and vocational evidence
Beatty was 39 years old on his alleged disability onset date. Tr. 30. He
graduated from high school and earned about a year of college credits. Tr. 48.
1 	“Once a finding of disability is made, the [agency] must determine the
onset date of the disability.” McClanahan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 193 F. App’x
422, 425 (6th Cir. 2006).
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He last worked in 2022 as an order picker at an Amazon warehouse. Tr. 49.
Relevant medical evidence2
At cardiologist appointments in January, February, and March 2022,
the provider noted that Beatty was fully oriented with normal behavior,
thought content, and judgment. Tr. 422, 434, 577.
At an April 2022 pulmonology visit, Beatty denied psychiatric and
behavioral symptoms. Tr. 366. The same month, Beatty saw his primary care
provider, Paulo Borges, M.D. Tr. 464. Beatty reported symptoms consistent
with mild depression. Tr. 464. He indicated depression stressors as being the
caregiver for his ailing father and his mother’s recent stage 4 cancer diagnosis.
Tr. 464. Beatty reported normal concentration and denied sleep disturbance
and suicidal ideation. Tr. 464. He said that his mood was improving and that
Lexapro was helping, but not enough. Tr. 464. Dr. Borges described Beatty as
alert, 	oriented, 	and 	pleasant, 	with 	age-appropriate 	behavior, 	adequate
grooming, and normal eye contact. Tr. 467. Dr. Borges increased Beatty’s daily
Lexapro dosage from 10 mg to 20 mg. Tr. 467.
During a June 2022 telehealth visit with Dr. Borges, Beatty reported no
depression symptoms. Tr. 460. He said that his mood was improving and that
Lexapro was helping “significantly.” Tr. 460. Dr. Borges described Beatty as
2 	Beatty only challenges the ALJ’s evaluation of his mental impairments.
So in this report and recommendation I only recite evidence related to those
impairments.
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alert, 	oriented, 	and 	pleasant, 	with 	age-appropriate 	behavior, 	adequate
grooming, normal eye contact, and appropriate speech. Tr. 462. Dr. Borges
continued the Lexapro. Tr. 463.
In June 2022, Beatty saw a gastroenterologist. Tr. 408. At this visit,
Beatty reported depression and difficulty sleeping. Tr. 409. His medical history
included sleep apnea. Tr. 408. On exam, Beatty was fully oriented with normal
insight and judgment and no evidence of depression, anxiety, or agitation. Tr.
410.
In September 2022, Beatty had a cardiology appointment. Tr. 440. The
provider described Beatty as fully oriented with normal behavior, thought
content, and judgment. Tr. 444. About a week later, Beatty saw Dr. Borges for
a routine exam. Tr. 452, 454. Beatty denied depression, stressors, anxiety,
mood swings, sleep problems, or memory loss. Tr. 455. Dr. Borges described
Beatty as fully oriented, cooperative, pleasant, appropriate, and well-groomed
with good hygiene and normal speech. Tr. 453. He decreased the Lexapro
dosage to 10 mg daily. Tr. 454.
In January 2023, Beatty saw Taylor Groneck, Psy.D., for a virtual
consultative psychological exam. Tr. 621. Beatty’s chief complaint of mental
impairments was that he was his father’s caregiver, his mother had a recent
stage 4 cancer diagnosis, and his doctor had put him on an anti-depressant. Tr.
621. Beatty denied then-current involvement in mental health treatment,
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explaining that he had given up after three unsuccessful attempts to contact a
mental health provider that his primary care provider had referred. Tr. 623.
Beatty denied a history of mental health hospitalizations and said that
he was stressed due to his finances. Tr. 623. He reported that he was easily
irritated and overwhelmed. Tr. 623. Beatty cited depression, sleep difficulties,
no energy due to easily feeling winded, some problems with motivation, and
loss of interest in previously enjoyable activities. Tr. 623. He said that he had
never had any discipline problems at work, had never been fired from a job,
and usually had no problems getting along with people at work. Tr. 623. He
also said that he had “a short temper” and if people at work did “stupid stuff,”
Beatty would “snap pretty easy but other than that [he] g[o]t along with people
well.” Tr. 623. Beatty reported the following activities of daily living: watching
television, doing “stuff” around the house, grocery shopping, performing all
household chores, and occasionally visiting with family members. Tr. 623. He
said that he takes breaks performing chores because of breathing problems.
Tr. 623.
Dr. Groneck described Beatty as “a quietly cooperative man” who was
casually dressed and adequately groomed. Tr. 624. His thoughts were goal
oriented, organized, and relevant to the questions asked of him, and his
responses suggested that he was of average intelligence. Tr. 624. Beatty
appeared depressed and mildly irritable with a blunted affect. Tr. 624. He
maintained good eye contact, but had non-expressive facial expressions, low
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energy, and markedly slowed psychomotor speed. Tr. 623. Beatty was fully
oriented with adequate short-term, working, recent, and remote memory. Tr.
624. Dr. Groneck described Beatty’s mathematical abilities as “adequate as he
was able to complete basic addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division.”
Tr. 624. Beatty’s “concentration skills were poor” and he “appeared to be
distracted during the conversation,” asking for questions to be repeated. Tr.
624. Beatty had adequate general reasoning abilities, insight, and judgment
Tr. 624.
Dr. 	Groneck 	diagnosed 	Beatty 	with 	“major 	depressive 	disorder,
recurrent, severe.” Tr. 625. She concluded that “Beatty is not expected to show
problems 	remembering 	or 	carrying 	out 	simple 	one 	and 	two 	step 	job
instructions.” Tr. 626. He “may be easily distracted by depressive symptoms”
and “will likely appear withdrawn to others.” Tr. 626. Beatty “may display poor
frustration 	tolerance 	in 	response 	to 	novel 	and 	demanding 	tasks,” 	and
“exposure to workplace pressures may also exacerbate his experience of
fatigue.” Tr. 626.
In March 2023, Beatty transferred care to a new primary care provider,
Ahmad Ibrahim, M.D. Tr. 631. Beatty reported that for his anxiety he had been
on Lexapro for about a year “at 20 mg but he had side effects.” Tr. 631. Beatty
told Dr. Ibrahim that he felt overwhelmed, but that he wanted to address his
physical complaints before titrating his then-current, 10 mg Lexapro dosage.
Tr. 631–32. On exam, Beatty’s mood was normal. Tr. 633.
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During an April 2023 cardiology visit, Beatty was fully oriented with an
appropriate mood and affect. Tr. 875–76. At a May 2023 appointment with Dr.
Ibrahim, Beatty was alert with a normal mood. Tr. 864, 867.
In September 2023, Beatty visited the emergency room for physical
complaints. Tr. 833. He denied agitation and behavioral problems and had a
normal mood and behavior. Tr. 834–35. At a follow-up visit with Dr. Ibrahim,
Beatty denied agitation and behavioral problems. Tr. 815, 817. On exam, he
had a normal mood and normal behavior. Tr. 818.
At a pulmonology appointment in October 2023, Beatty denied sleep
disturbance, mood disorder, and recent psychosocial stressors. Tr. 806. In
November 2023, Beatty followed up with Dr. Ibrahim. Tr. 779. Beatty reported
numerous physical-related complaints and anxiety. Tr. 782–83. Dr. Ibrahim
described Beatty as alert with a normal mood. Tr. 784. He assessed Beatty
with anxiety and advised him to consider counseling or medication in the
future if no organic cause were found for his shortness of breath. Tr. 785.
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State agency opinions.3
In February 2023, Clare McGinness, Ph.D., reviewed Beatty’s record
and found that Beatty had no more than mild limitations in four areas of
mental functioning. Tr. 73–74.
In June 2023, Mary Hill, Ph.D., reviewed Beatty’s record and opined
that Beatty had mild and moderate limitations in four areas of functioning. Tr.
90, 93. Regarding Beatty’s mental residual functional capacity (RFC),4 Dr. Hill
found that Beatty could “complete a variety of tasks with no requirement for a
rapid pace” and “work in a setting with occasional changes.” Tr. 93.
Hearing testimony
Beatty, who was represented by counsel, testified at the telephonic
administrative hearing held in January 2024. Beatty testified that he easily
becomes irritable and is “always irritable.” Tr. 57. He lacks motivation to do
things on his own and does better when he does things with others. Tr. 57. He
3 	When a claimant applies for disability benefits, the State Agency creates
a record. The record includes the claimant’s medical evidence. A State Agency
disability examiner and a State Agency physician or psychologist review the
claimant’s record and determine whether and to what extent the claimant’s
condition affects his or her ability to work. If the State Agency denies the
claimant’s 	application, 	the 	claimant 	can 	ask 	for 	reconsideration. 	On
reconsideration, the State Agency updates the record and a second disability
examiner and doctor review the file and make a new determination. See, e.g.,
20 C.F.R. § 404.1615.
4 	An RFC is an “‘assessment of’” a claimant’s ability to work, taking his or
her “limitations … into account.” Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235,
239 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.945). Essentially, it’s the SSA’s
“description of what the claimant ‘can and cannot do.’” Webb v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 368 F.3d 629, 631 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Howard, 276 F.3d at 239).
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sleeps a lot and takes Lexapro for depression. Tr. 57. Beatty takes online
college courses but struggles to focus and remember the material. Tr. 58. For
example, he needs to revisit the material because he forgets things or hasn’t
comprehended what he read. Tr. 58.
The ALJ discussed with the vocational expert Beatty’s past work as a
stock clerk and order picker. Tr. 62–63. The ALJ asked the vocational expert
to determine whether a hypothetical individual with the same age, education,
and work experience as Beatty could perform Beatty’s past work or any other
work 	if 	the 	individual 	had 	the 	limitations 	assessed 	in 	the 	ALJ’s 	RFC
determination, described below. Tr. 63. The vocational expert answered that
such an individual could not perform Beatty’s past work, but could perform the
following jobs: office helper, collator operator, and order caller. Tr. 64. The ALJ
asked the vocational expert to describe the tolerable off-task time rate. Tr. 65.
The vocational expert answered that most employers will tolerate up to nine
percent of off-task time. Tr. 65. She confirmed that off-task time included
unscheduled breaks. Tr. 65.
The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
1. 	The 	claimant 	meets 	the 	insured 	status
requirements of the Social Security Act through
December 31, 2027. (4D).
2. The claimant has not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since March 12, 2022, the alleged
onset date (20 CFR 404.1571 et seq., and 416.971 et
seq.).
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3. 	The 	claimant 	has 	the 	following 	severe
impairments: 	Chronic 	Systolic 	Congestive 	Heart
Failure (“CHF”), Cardiomyopathy, Asthma, Chronic
Obstructive 	Pulmonary 	Disease 	(“COPD”),
Restrictive Airway Disease, Diabetes Mellitus Type
I with Hyperglycemia and Neuropathy, Varicose
Veins 	of 	the 	Bilateral 	Lower 	Extremities,
Depressive 	Disorder, 	and 	Anxiety. 	(20 	CFR
404.1520(c) and 416.920(c)).
4. The claimant does not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that meets or medically
equals the severity of one of the listed impairments
in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (20 CFR
404.1520(d), 	404.1525, 	404.1526, 	416.920(d),
416.925 and 416.926).
5. After careful consideration of the entire record,
the undersigned finds that the claimant has the
residual functional capacity to perform light work as
defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except
the claimant can never climb ladders, ropes, or
scaffolds, 	but 	can 	occasionally climb 	ramps 	and
stairs. The claimant can frequently balance, stoop,
kneel, crouch, and crawl. The claimant can tolerate
occasional exposure to extreme cold, extreme heat,
humidity, and pulmonary irritants such as fumes,
odors, 	dusts, 	gases, 	and 	poor 	ventilation. 	The
claimant must avoid all exposure to hazards such as
unprotected heights, dangerous moving mechanical
parts, and commercial driving. The claimant can
perform simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, but
cannot 	perform 	tasks 	which 	require 	a 	high
production rate pace (for example, such as assembly
line 	work), 	and 	can 	respond 	appropriately 	to
occasional change in a routine work setting.
6. 	The 	claimant 	is unable 	to 	perform 	any 	past
relevant work (20 CFR 404.1565 and 416.965).
7. The claimant was … 39 years old, which is defined
as a younger individual age 18–49, on the alleged
disability onset date (20 CFR 404.1563 and 416.963).
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8. The claimant has at least a high school education
(20 CFR 404.1564 and 416.964).
9. Transferability of job skills is not material to the
determination 	of 	disability 	because 	using 	the
Medical-Vocational Rules as a framework supports
a 	finding 	that 	the 	claimant 	is 	“not 	disabled,”
whether or not the claimant has transferable job
skills (See SSR 82-41 and 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart
P, Appendix 2).
10. Considering the claimant’s age, education, work
experience, and residual functional capacity, there
are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the
national economy that the claimant can perform (20
CFR 404.1569, 404.1569a, 416.969, and 416.969a).
11. The claimant has not been under a disability, as
defined in the Social Security Act, from March 12,
2022, through the date of this decision (20 CFR
404.1520(g) and 416.920(g)).
Tr. 16–32.
Standard for Disability
Eligibility for social security benefit payments depends on the existence
of a disability. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(a), 1382(a). “Disability” is defined as the
“inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(a)(3)(A).
An ALJ is required to follow a five-step sequential analysis to make a
disability determination:
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1. 	Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful
activity? If so, the claimant is not disabled.
2. 	Does 	the 	claimant 	have 	a 	medically
determinable impairment, or a combination of
impairments, 	that 	is 	“severe”? 	If 	not, 	the
claimant is not disabled.
3. 	Does the claimant’s impairment meet or equal
one of the listed impairments and meet the
duration requirement? If so, the claimant is
disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the next
step.
4. 	What is the claimant’s residual functional
capacity and can the claimant perform past
relevant 	work? 	If 	so, 	the 	claimant 	is 	not
disabled. If not, the ALJ proceeds to the next
step.
5. 	Can 	the 	claimant 	do 	any 	other 	work
considering the claimant’s residual functional
capacity, 	age, 	education, 	and 	work
experience? If so, the claimant is not disabled.
If not, the claimant is disabled.
20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. see Jordan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 548 F.3d
417, 422 (6th Cir. 2008). Under this sequential analysis, the claimant has the
burden of proof at steps one through four. Jordan, 548 F.3d at 423. The burden
shifts to the Commissioner at step five “to prove the availability of jobs in the
national economy that the claimant is capable of performing.” Id. “The
claimant, however, retains the burden of proving her lack of residual functional
capacity.” Id. If a claimant satisfies each element of the analysis and meets the
duration requirements, the claimant is determined to be disabled. Walters
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997).
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Standard of review
A reviewing court must affirm the Commissioner’s conclusions unless it
determines “that the ALJ has failed to apply the correct legal standards or has
made findings of fact unsupported by substantial evidence in the record.”
Jordan, 548 F.3d at 422. “‘[S]ubstantial evidence’ is a ‘term of art’” under which
“a court … asks whether” the “existing administrative record … contains
‘sufficien[t] evidence’ to support the agency’s factual determinations.” Biestek
v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102 (2019) (citations omitted). The substantial
evidence standard “is not high.” Id. at 103. Substantial evidence “is ‘more than
a mere scintilla’” but it “means only[] ‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might 	accept 	as 	adequate 	to 	support 	a 	conclusion.’” 	Id. 	(citations
omitted). The Commissioner’s “findings … as to any fact if supported by
substantial evidence [are] conclusive.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Biestek, 587 U.S. at
99.
A court may “not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence, or
decide questions of credibility.” Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir.
2007). Even if substantial evidence or a preponderance of the evidence
supports 	a 	claimant’s 	position, 	a 	reviewing 	court 	cannot 	overturn 	the
Commissioner’s decision “so long as substantial evidence also supports the
conclusion reached by the ALJ.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469,
477 (6th Cir. 2003). This is so because there is a “zone of choice within which”
the Commissioner can act, without fear of judicial “interference.” Lindsley v.
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Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 560 F.3d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Felisky v.
Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994)).
Discussion
Beatty argues that the ALJ “failed to account for the ‘total limiting
effects’ 	of 	[Beatty’s] 	impairments 	pursuant 	to 	20 	C.F.R. 	§§ 	404.1520c,
404.1529, and 404.1545(e), resulting in a decision that is not supported by
substantial evidence.” Doc. 9, at 1. Essentially, Beatty challenges the ALJ’s
evaluation of the opinion evidence, Beatty’s reports of symptoms, and whether
the ALJ’s RFC was supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 8–13.
1. The ALJ did not err when evaluating Dr. Hill’s opinion
Beatty challenges the ALJ’s evaluation of state agency reviewer Dr.
Hill’s opinion. Dr. Hill assessed Beatty’s RFC and opined that Beatty could
“complete a variety of tasks with no requirement for a rapid pace” and “work
in a setting with occasional changes.” Tr. 102–03. The ALJ discussed Dr. Hill’s
opinion as follows:
the State agency consultant opined that the claimant
could complete a variety of tasks with no requirement
for a rapid pace. The claimant could work in a setting
with occasional changes. (6A; 7A). I find this opinion
to be persuasive as it is consistent with the overall
record.
Tr. 28 (the ALJ’s fact-based explanation omitted). And the 	ALJ’s RFC
assessment limited Beatty to the following:
simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, but cannot
perform tasks which require a high production rate
pace (for example, such as assembly line work), and
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can respond appropriately to occasional change in a
routine work setting.
Tr. 22. In short, the ALJ evaluated Dr. Hill’s opinion; found it persuasive; and
adopted Dr. Hill’s limitations in the RFC assessment.
Beatty argues that Dr. Hill made other findings that the ALJ failed to
discuss. Doc. 9, at 8–9 (citing Tr. 102). Beatty highlights on the Agency’s form
the “moderate” limitations that Dr. Hill ascribed to Beatty’s abilities. Id. (citing
the ability to “maintain attention and concentration for extended periods,”
“perform activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be
punctual within customary tolerances,” and “complete a normal workday and
workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to
perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of
rest periods”), Tr. 102. Beatty claims that these all amount to an “off-task”
limitation that Dr. Hill assessed and which the ALJ erroneously failed to
include in the RFC assessment or explain why he omitted it. Doc. 9, at 9–10.
What Beatty is referring to is a list of questions that the Agency’s form
asks doctors to answer to aid the doctors in drafting the narrative portion of
the claimant’s RFC limitations. See, e.g., Tr. 102 (the Agency’s “MRFC1” form
asking the doctor to rate eight questions regarding “Sustained Concentration
and Persistence Limitation”). But this question-and-rating portion of the form
is not Dr. Hill’s RFC assessment. Dr. Hill’s RFC assessment is found later, in
the narrative portion of the form. Indeed, the form itself explains this:
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The questions below help determine the individual’s
ability 	to 	perform 	sustained 	work 	activities.
However, 	the 	actual 	mental 	residual 	functional
capacity assessment 	is recorded in the narrative
discussion(s), 	which 	describes 	how 	the 	evidence
supports 	each 	conclusion. 	This 	discussion(s) 	is
documented in the explanatory text boxes following
each category of limitation (i.e., understanding and
memory, sustained concentration and persistence,
social interaction and adaptation).
Tr. 102 (emphasis added). True to form, following the list of questions Beatty
cites, Dr. Hill is asked to “[e]xplain in narrative form” Beatty’s “sustained
concentration and persistence capacities and/or limitations.” Id. And Dr. Hill
wrote that Beatty is “[a]ble to complete a variety of tasks with no requirement
for a rapid pace.” Id. This is Dr. Hill’s opinion on Beatty’s concentration,
persistence, and pace abilities, and this is what the ALJ evaluated. Tr. 28, 102.
Beatty has not cited any legal authority to support his interpretation of
the Agency’s forms and what the ALJ must discuss. His argument that Dr.
Hill’s “moderately limited” ratings constitute an “opinion” subject to the
discussion requirement is not persuasive. Unlike the narrative portion of the
forms, 	the 	ratings 	don’t 	describe 	what 	Beatty 	can 	still 	do 	despite 	his
impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(a)(2) (defining a “medical opinion” as “a
statement from a medical source about what [claimants] can still do despite
[their] impairment(s)”); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1) (“Your residual functional
capacity is the most you can still do despite your limitations.”). Beatty argues
that the regulations require the ALJ to “consider ‘all relevant evidence’ under
the RFC analysis,” Doc. 9, at 10 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1)), but he has
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not shown that the ALJ failed to “consider” all of Dr. Hill’s notations. See
Kornecky v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 167 F. App’x 496, 508 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[a]n
ALJ can consider all the evidence without directly addressing in his written
decision every piece of evidence submitted by a party”) (quoting Loral Defense
Systems–Akron v. NLRB, 200 F.3d 436, 453 (6th Cir. 1999)).
In his reply brief, Beatty makes a new argument. He contends that Dr.
Hill erred because her “narrative RFC does not encapsulate” the moderately
limited ratings that she assessed in the rating portion of the form. Doc. 12, at
3. And the ALJ in turn erred, Beatty says, because he “provided no analysis
regarding 	whether 	Dr. 	Hill’s 	narrative 	RFC 	assessment 	‘adequately
encapsulate[d] 	and 	translate[d]’ 	the 	moderate 	limitations 	that 	would
inevitably result in Plaintiff being off task at least some portion of the
workday.” Id. (citing Pavlicek v. Saul, 994 F.3d 777, 783 (7th Cir. 2021)). This
is a different argument than the one that Beatty made in his opening brief. He
has therefore forfeited this argument. See Island Creek Coal Co. v. Wilkerson,
910 F.3d 254, 256 (6th Cir. 2018) (“Time, time, and time again, we have
reminded litigants that we will treat an ‘argument’ as ‘forfeited when it was
not raised in the opening brief.’”) (citation omitted)).
Even if the Court were to consider Beatty’s forfeited argument, it would
fail. First, Beatty argues that the ALJ had a duty to “provide … analysis”
regarding whether Dr. Hill’s ratings matched her narrative RFC limitations,
Doc. 12, at 3, but the Seventh Circuit case he cites in support, which is not
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binding on this Court, did not say that the ALJ must discuss this issue. See
Pavlicek, 994 F.3d at 783 (“The ALJ must consider whether the consultants’
narrative RFC assessments ‘adequately encapsulate[d] and translate[d]” the
checklist.”) (emphasis added). Again, Beatty has confused the ALJ’s duty to
consider evidence with the ALJ’s duty to discuss evidence. And he has not
shown that the ALJ failed to consider all of Dr. Hill’s notations.
Second, Beatty relies on Varga v. Colvin, 794 F.3d 809 (7th Cir. 2015),
which is also not binding on this Court. Doc. 9, at 3. In Varga, the Agency lost
the state agency reviewing doctor’s narrative portion of the form—it only had
the doctor’s indication of “moderate” limitations in the ratings portion of the
form. Id. at 812. The court held that “where, as here, no narrative translation
exists—because of error on the part of the doctor or the agency—an ALJ’s
hypothetical question to the [vocational expert] must take into account any
moderate difficulties in mental functioning found [in the ratings section of the
Agency’s form].” 794 F.3d at 816. Beatty quotes this passage, Doc. 12, at 3, but
ignores the fact that in this case Dr. Hill’s narrative portion of the form has
not been lost. It exists, Tr. 102, and the ALJ relied on it, Tr. 28. Varga is not
on point.
Finally, Beatty hasn’t shown that moderate limitations in the ability to
“maintain 	attention 	and 	concentration 	for 	extended 	periods”; 	“perform
activities within a schedule, maintain regular attendance, and be punctual
within customary tolerances”; and “complete a normal workday and workweek
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without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at
a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods,”
see Tr. 102, is not “adequately encapsulate[d] and translate[d]” by Dr. Hill’s
finding that Beatty can “complete a variety of tasks with no requirement for a
rapid pace.” See Weirauch v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-11511, 2021 WL
4497865, at *15 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 23, 2021) (“a limitation of non-production-
rate work is a common and adequate limitation for those persons who suffer
from moderate difficulties in concentration, persistence, or pace.”), report and
recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 4480473 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 30, 2021); see
also Pavlicek, 994 F.3d at 783 (finding that “the ALJ reasonably relied on the
narrative RFC because it was in fact consistent with the ‘moderate’ checklist
ratings” since “a ‘moderate’ limitation in performing at a consistent pace seems
consistent with the ability to perform simple, repetitive tasks at a consistent
pace.”).
For all of the reasons explained above, Beatty has not shown that the
ALJ erred when he evaluated Dr. Hill’s opinion.
2. The ALJ did not err when evaluating Dr. Groneck’s opinion
Beatty argues that the ALJ “did not address whether []he accepted or
rejected Dr. Groneck’s pacing limitation.” Doc. 9, at 10. He also alleges that the
ALJ failed to “explain why he explicitly adopted Dr. Groneck’s opinion, citing
evidence of social and stress tolerance problems, but failed to include social or
stress tolerance limitations in the RFC.” Id.
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The ALJ discussed and evaluated Dr. Groneck’s opinion as follows:
The psychological consultive examiner opined that
the claimant was not expected to show problems
remembering or carrying out simple one and two
step job instructions. The claimant might be easily
distracted 	by 	his 	mental 	health 	symptoms. 	The
claimant would likely appear withdrawn to others.
The 	claimant 	might 	display 	poor 	frustration
tolerance 	and 	exposure 	to 	workplace 	pressures
might exacerbate the claimant’s fatigue. (10F/7). I
find this opinion to be persuasive to the degree that
it suggests that the claimant has impairments to his
concentration and stress tolerance. It was supported
by the claimant’s need for redirection during the
examination 	and 	the 	claimant’s 	reports 	of 	poor
stress tolerance. It was also consistent with the
claimant’s statements in his function report that he
tolerated 	stress 	poorly 	and 	had 	limited
concentration 	unless 	he 	was 	interested 	in 	a
particular 	subject. 	However, 	the 	limitations
discussed are vague which limits their usefulness as
a 	tool 	to 	establish 	specific 	work 	limitations.
(Testimony; 2E; 10F).
Tr. 27.
Dr. Groneck did not assess a “pacing limitation”—all Dr. Groneck said
was that Beatty “may be easily distracted by depressive symptoms.” Tr. 626.
The ALJ considered this opinion and explained to what extent he found it to
be both persuasive and unpersuasive. Tr. 27. And the ALJ’s RFC included a
pace restriction. Tr. 22. So the ALJ “address[ed] whether [h]e accepted or
rejected Dr. Groneck’s pacing limitation,” Doc. 9, at 10, to the extent it could
be said that Dr. Groneck assessed one.
Beatty’s assertion that the ALJ “failed to include … stress tolerance
limitations in the RFC,” Doc. 9, at 10, fails because the ALJ included a stress-
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tolerance limitation in his RFC assessment, see Tr. 22 (the ALJ’s RFC
assessment limiting Beatty to occasional changes in a routine work setting).
Beatty argues that the ALJ “explicitly adopted Dr. Groneck’s opinion,
citing evidence of social … problems, but failed to include social … limitations
in the RFC.” Doc. 9, at 10. But the ALJ didn’t adopt Dr. Groneck’s social-
limitations comment; he only adopted Dr. Groneck’s opinion regarding pace
and stress tolerance. Tr. 22, 27. So the ALJ wasn’t required to include social
limitations in his RFC assessment. See Lester v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 596 F. App’x
387, 389 (6th Cir. 2015) (“The ALJ is required to incorporate [in the RFC] only
those limitations that he or she accepted as credible.”). Moreover, Dr. Groneck’s
opinion that Beatty “would likely appear withdrawn to others,” Tr. 626, is
vague, as the ALJ found, Tr. 27. Indeed, it “can be discounted as not describing
any functional limitations at all.” See Woodard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin.,
No. 	5:22-cv-1728, 	2023 	WL 	6005004, at *10 	(N.D. 	Ohio 	July 	27, 	2023)
(“Opinions 	that 	express 	functional 	limitations 	in 	vague 	terms 	can 	be
discounted 	as 	not 	describing 	any 	functional 	limitations 	at 	all.”) 	(citing
Quisenberry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 757 F. App’x 422, 431 (6th Cir. 2018)),
report and recommendation adopted, 2023 WL 5842016 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 11,
2023); Nolcox v. Berryhill, No. 1:17-cv-02655, 2019 WL 1331582, at *10 (N.D.
Ohio Mar. 25, 2019) (“To treat the possible limitations floated by [doctors] as
an affirmative finding … would improperly alter the contents of the medical
source’s opinion.”).
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Beatty has not shown that the ALJ erred when evaluating Dr. Groneck’s
opinion.
3. The ALJ did not err when evaluating Beatty’s reports of limitations
Beatty argues that the ALJ failed to properly evaluate Beatty’s “self-
described limitations.” Doc. 9, at 11. This is so, Beatty contends, because of the
errors that the ALJ made when evaluating the opinion evidence. Id.; Doc. 12,
at 5. But the ALJ did not err when evaluating the opinion evidence, so this
argument fails.
To 	evaluate 	the “intensity, 	persistence, 	and limiting 	effects 	of 	an
individual’s symptoms,” the ALJ considers medical evidence, the claimant’s
statements, other information provided by medical sources, and any other
relevant evidence in the record. See Soc. Sec. Ruling 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304,
at *4 (Oct. 25, 2017); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529. Other relevant evidence includes:
daily activities; the location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or
symptoms; 	precipitating 	and 	aggravating 	factors; 	the 	type, 	dosage,
effectiveness, 	and 	side 	effects 	of 	any 	medication; 	treatment, 	other 	than
medication, to relieve pain; any measures used to relieve pain; and “[o]ther
factors concerning … functional limitations and restrictions due to pain or
other symptoms.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c). “The ALJ need not analyze all seven
factors, but should show that he considered the relevant evidence.” Hatcher v.
Berryhill, No. 1:18-cv-1123, 2019 WL 1382288, at *15 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 27,
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2019) (citing Cross v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 373 F. Supp. 2d 724, 733 (N.D. Ohio
2005)).
Beatty objects to the ALJ’s finding that his mental health treatment was
“conservative, consisting of medication, and was provided by his primary care
provider, not a mental healthcare specialist.” Doc. 9, at 11 (citing Tr. 26).
Beatty complains that the ALJ “did not define nonconservative mental health
care” and that he “is unaware of any agency authority requiring a claimant to
demonstrate whatever that might mean (e.g., electroconvulsive therapy or
psychiatric institutionalization), to prevail in a Social Security disability
claim.” 	Id. 	at 	11–12. 	But 	the 	ALJ 	explained 	why 	Beatty’s 	care 	was
conservative—it consisted of medication provided by his primary-care doctor
rather than a specialist. Tr. 26. This was accurate and appropriate. See Napier
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.4th 1000, 1005 (6th Cir. 2025) (upholding the
ALJ’s non-severe finding at step two because, in part, the ALJ “emphasized
that Napier’s treatment history with respect to her anxiety and depression was
quite limited [since] … she had been prescribed antidepressants by a medical
(not mental) healthcare provider”); Monateri v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 436 F.
App’x 434, 445 (6th Cir. 2011) (affirming the ALJ’s adverse credibility finding,
noting that the claimant’s mental impairments did not require “acute inpatient
or outpatient emergency care and treatment”); Burley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 4:23-cv-218, 2023 WL 9604195, at *16 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 20, 2023) (the ALJ’s
characterization of the claimant’s treatment as conservative was accurate
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since it “required no associated emergent, inpatient, or day program treatment
related to her mental health”), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL
1297554 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2024). Indeed, even Beatty testified at the
administrative hearing that he’s “not being treated for depression or anxiety”
since he takes medication “that’s just prescribed by my primary care doctor.”
Tr. 56. The type of treatment is a proper basis for discounting Beatty’s reports
of 	limitations. 	See 	20 	C.F.R. 	§ 	404.1529(c)(3)(iv),(v) 	(the 	ALJ 	considers
treatment, including medication, that the claimant receives).
Beatty concedes that his treatment was conservative, because he then
contends that he “failed conservative treatment.” Doc. 9, at 12. In support of
this assertion, Beatty cites a treatment note from March 2023 in which he told
his new primary care doctor that he had “side effects” when taking 20 mg of
Lexapro. Id. (citing Tr. 631). This does not show that Beatty failed conservative
treatment. In fact, at this March 2023 visit, Beatty told Dr. Ibrahim that he
didn’t want to address his mental-health issues by trying a medication
adjustment. Tr. 631.
Beatty points out that he testified that he was “always irritable” and
that he reported to Dr. Groneck this and other complaints.5 Doc. 9, at 12. But
5 	Twice Beatty in his brief asserts that he testified that he “spends most
of his time alone,” Doc. 9, at 4, 12 (citing Tr. 58–59), and argues that the ALJ
“failed to reflect these [and other] findings,” id. at 13. Beatty testified at the
hearing that his lives with his spouse and father, Tr. 46, and the pages Beatty
cites show Beatty discussing at the hearing picking up his father from the
hospital, taking online college classes, checking Facebook, and getting lunch
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the ALJ considered Beatty’s reports of irritability and other complaints that
he made to Dr. Groneck. Tr. 21, 27. The ALJ explained:
As for the claimant’s mental health, the claimant
stated in his function report that his concentration
was limited, and he could become distracted while
engaging in activities that did not interest him. He
testified that he experienced limited motivation and
energy. 	The 	psychological 	consultative 	examiner
observed that the claimant’s concentration was poor,
and that he required instructions to be repeated.
However, 	the 	claimant 	retained 	sufficient
concentration 	to 	complete 	basic 	addition,
subtraction, multiplication, and division problems.
The claimant’s treatment providers did not note that
the 	claimant 	had 	observably 	poor 	concentration
during 	treatment. 	Furthermore, 	the 	claimant
engaged in activities that demonstrated that his
attention and concentration were more intact than
alleged. 	The 	claimant 	watched 	videos 	and 	used
Facebook for entertainment. The claimant was able
to manage his own funds. The claimant was able to
drive. The claimant was able to take six credit hours
of college courses. Finally, the claimant did not
require significant redirection during the hearing.
(Testimony; 2E; 3F; 4F: 5F; 16F).
Nevertheless, the claimant’s treatment providers
observed that the claimant’s judgment and insight
were adequate. The claimant engaged in normal
behavior. During the consultative examination, the
claimant displayed adequate judgment and insight.
The claimant’s thought content was unremarkable.
Furthermore, the claimant was able to manage daily
tasks such preparing simple meals, cleaning, and
yardwork. 	The 	claimant 	was 	able 	to 	drive 	and
manage his own funds. Finally, the claimant was
able to help care for his ill father. (Testimony; 2E;
3F; 4F: 5F; 16F).
with his spouse. Tr. 58–59. This doesn’t support Beatty’s assertion that he
testified that he “spends most of his time alone.”
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Tr. 29; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) (the ALJ considers the claimant’s daily
activities). Elsewhere in his decision, the ALJ summarized the evidence in the
record, 	including 	Beatty’s 	improvement 	with 	medication, 	unremarkable
objective exam findings throughout the period, and the consultative examiner’s
report. Tr. 26–27 (see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2),(3) (the ALJ considers objective
evidence and “other evidence,” including medical source statements)).
Beatty highlights items in Dr. Groneck’s report, Doc. 9 at 12–13, many
of which the ALJ recited, Tr. 27 (the ALJ noting Beatty’s reports that he was
irritable, depressed, overwhelmed, and lacked energy and motivation, and
listing Dr. Groneck’s objective exam and cognitive findings). “[T]he law does
not require the ALJ to discuss every piece of evidence that is supportive or
inconsistent with the RFC. And … the ALJ cannot be expected to discuss every
piece of evidence that Plaintiff believes is inconsistent with the RFC.” Byler v.
Kijakazi, No. 5:20-cv-1822, 2022 WL 980099, at *9 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 21, 2022),
report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL 971384 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 31,
2022). Beatty disagrees with the ALJ’s conclusion, but merely citing evidence
and disagreeing with the ALJ’s conclusion does not show that the ALJ’s
decision lacks substantial evidence. See Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273
(6th Cir. 1997) (“The decision of an ALJ is not subject to reversal, even if there
is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite
conclusion, so long as substantial evidence supports the conclusion reached by
the ALJ.”).
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Beatty has not shown that the ALJ erred when he evaluated Beatty’s
reports of symptoms and limitations, or that the ALJ’s decision is unsupported
by substantial evidence.
Conclusion
For the reasons explained above, I recommend that the Court affirm the
Commissioner’s decision.
Dated: November 25, 2025
/s/ James E. Grimes Jr.
James E. Grimes Jr.
U.S. Magistrate Judge
OBJECTIONS
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with
the Clerk of Court within 14 days after the party objecting has been served
with a copy of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure
to file objections within the specified time may forfeit the right to appeal the
District Court’s order. See Berkshire v. Beauvais, 928 F.3d 520, 530–31 (6th
Cir. 2019).
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