Souare v. Department of Developmental Disabilities

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
ELHADJ SOUARE, 	) 	CASE NO: 5:25-cv-00694
)
) 	JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS
Plaintiff, 	)
)
v. 	) 	MEMORANDUM OF OPINION
) 	AND ORDER
DEPARTMENT OF DEVELOPMENTAL 	)
DISABILITIES, et al., 	)
) 	(Resolves Docs. 19, 22, 29, 39, 49)
Defendants. 	)
)
This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29) filed by Defendant
Laura Poundstone and the Defendants Ohio Department of Developmental Disabilities; The
Departments Director; Robert Capaldi; and Jennifer Saxton’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s
Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 39) (collectively, the “Motions”). Plaintiff Elhadj Souare
(“Souare”) filed oppositions (Docs. 43, 46) to each, and Defendants Department of Developmental
Disabilities, Robert Capaldi, and Jennifer Saxton filed an additional reply (Doc. 47).12
For the reasons stated below, the Motions are GRANTED.
1 	The Court notes that there are two motions to amend the complaint pending (Docs. 19, 22). The Court finds
that the proposed amended complaints (Docs. 19, 22-1) would not cure the deficiencies raised in the motions
to dismiss. As to the additional counts raised in the proposed fourth amended complaint (Doc. 22-1), they
contain no factual allegations or even bare recitation of elements necessary. Therefore, the arguments raised
in the motions to dismiss would apply to any proposed amendment, and granting leave to amend in this case
would not be economical or appropriate. See Leary v. Daeschner, 349 F.3d 888, 905 (6th Cir. 2003). The
motions to amend (Docs. 19, 22) are accordingly DENIED.
2 	After the reply was filed (Doc. 47), Souare filed an additional Opposition (Doc. 48) that the Court interprets
as a sur-reply. The Local Rules do not permit parties to file sur-reply briefs without leave granted for good
cause. Souare did not request leave prior to filing, therefore, the Motion to Strike (Doc. 49) filed by
Defendants Capaldi, Saxton, and the Department is GRANTED.
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I. 	FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Souare, an apparent business owner/service provider in the developmental disabilities
industry, filed this action against various employees of the State of Ohio and the Department of
Developmental Disabilities (the “Department”), following issues regarding his company’s
licensure. According to the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 14), the Department attempted to
revoke or suspend Souare’s license to do business without due process and in a retaliatory manner.
Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10–13. Souare alleges violations of due process, equal protection and 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Id. ¶¶ 14–17.
Defendants filed the instant Motions for dismissal for failure to state a claim, pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Department and Defendants Saxton
and Capaldi additionally advance arguments in support of dismissal for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and lack of service of process.
II. 	LAW AND ANALYSIS
a. 	Legal Standard
The Sixth Circuit stated the standard for reviewing a motion to dismiss in Assn. of
Cleveland Fire Fighters v. Cleveland, 502 F.3d 545 (6th Cir. 2007) as follows:
The Supreme Court has recently clarified the law with respect to what a plaintiff must plead
in order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Bell Atl. Corp. c. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007). The Court stated that “a plaintiff’s obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation
of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. at 1964-65 (citations and quotation
marks omitted). Additionally, the Court emphasized that even though a complaint need not
contain “detailed” factual allegations, its “factual allegations must be enough to raise a
right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the
complaint are true.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). In so holding, the
Court disavowed the oft-quoted Rule 12(b)(6) standard of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
45-46 (1957) (recognizing “the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of
facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief”), characterizing that rule as
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one “best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563.
Id. at 548. Instead, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (internal
quotations omitted).
If an allegation is capable of more than one inference, this Court must construe it in the
plaintiff’s favor. Columbia Natural Res. v. Tatum, 58 F.3d 1101, 1109 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing
Allard v. Weitzman, 991 F.2d 1236, 1240 (6th Cir. 1993)). This Court may not grant a Rule
12(b)(6) motion merely because it may not believe the plaintiff’s factual allegations. Id. Although
this is a liberal standard of review, the plaintiff still must do more than merely assert bare legal
conclusions. Id. Specifically, the complaint must contain “either direct or inferential allegations
respecting all the material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Scheid
v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 859 F.2d 434, 436 (6th Cir. 1988) (quotations and emphasis
omitted).
The Court need accept only the complaint’s well-pled factual allegations as true.
Nwanguma v. Trump, 903 F.3d 604, 607 (6th Cir. 2018). “[L]egal conclusion[s] couched as factual
allegation[s],” on the other hand, “need not be accepted as true.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at
555). After legal conclusions are disregarded, the complaint must set forth facts that “raise a right
to relief above the speculative level.” Id. And, although a pro se litigant’s pleadings are construed
liberally (Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)), the Court cannot “conjure up unpleaded
facts to support conclusory allegations.” Williams v. Hall, No. 21-5540, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS
21004, at *4 (6th Cir. July 27, 2022) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
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b. 	Subject Matter Jurisdiction
As a preliminary matter, the Court must address the challenge to subject matter jurisdiction
on the basis that Souare’s claims against the Department are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
See Am. Telecom Co. v. Republic of Lebanon, 501 F.3d 534, 537 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Subject matter
jurisdiction is always a threshold determination.”) Souare sued the Department of Developmental
Disabilities and its director in both their individual and official capacities.
“[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official
but rather is a suit against the official’s office.” Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
71 (1989). Therefore, as to the suit against the Director in his official capacity, this is no different
from a suit against the state itself. Id. Section 1983 “does not provide a federal forum for litigants
who seek a remedy against a State for alleged deprivations of civil liberties” and the Eleventh
Amendment bars these suits unless the State has waived its immunity or Congress has overridden
that immunity. Id. at 66. An agency or department of the State maintains the same sovereign
immunity. Ohio v. Madeline Marie Nursing Homes, 694 F.2d 449, 458 (6th Cir. 1982). Section
1983 does not abrogate this immunity (Harrison v. Michigan, 722 F.3d 768, 771 (6th Cir. 2013))
and Ohio has not waived sovereign immunity in federal court. Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389, 397
(6th Cir. 1999).
Accordingly, Souare’s claims as to the Director in their official capacity and the
Department as an entity are dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
c. 	Count One – Violation of Fourteenth Amendment (Due Process)
In his first claim, Souare briefly asserts the Defendants deprived him of his protected
property and liberty interests without notice or an opportunity to be heard. Second Am. Compl. ¶
14.
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To plead a due process claim, a plaintiff must allege “(1) a life, liberty, or property interest
requiring protection under the due process clause, (2) a deprivation of that interest (3) without
adequate process.” West v. Ky. Horse Racing Comm’n, 972 F.3d 881, 890 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). License holders generally have a property interest in their
license. Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 64 (1979). This may include, for example, a license to
practice a profession. See Bowles v. Macomb Cmty. Coll., 558 F.Supp. 3d 539, 549 (E.D. Mich.
2021).
Souare’s conclusory allegations related to Count One do nothing more than restate the
elements necessary for his claim, without providing detail as to how the individual facts of his case
support those elements. However, one of his factual allegations provides that he is “a licensed
provider of developmental disability services in Ohio.” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 9. Therefore, the
Court will construe this allegation liberally and interpret the property interest here as one in
Souare’s alleged professional license. However, Souare’s claim fails on the second element, which
requires him to plead a deprivation of his property interest. Not only does Souare again fail to
provide detail, the only “deprivation” he appears to allege is an ‘attempt to revoke or suspend [his]
license.’ Second Am. Compl. ¶ 10. An attempt to revoke is not a deprivation of rights. Therefore,
Souare has not adequately pled a due process violation. To the extent that Souare attempts to
remedy his pleading errors in his responses (Docs. 43, 46), this attempt to cure deficiencies is not
permissible. Bates v. Green Farms Condo Ass’n., 958 F.3d 470, 483–84 (6th Cir. 2020) (“If a
complaint fails to state a claim even under the liberal requirements of the federal rules, the plaintiff
cannot cure the deficiency by inserting the missing allegations in a document that is either not a
complaint or an amendment to a complaint.”)
Accordingly, the Motions are granted with respect to Count One.
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d. 	Count Two – Violation of Fourteenth Amendment (Equal Protection)
In his second claim, Souare again makes a conclusory allegation that Defendants
selectively enforced rules or targeted him in a discriminatory and arbitrary manner. Second Am.
Compl. ¶ 16.
The Fourteenth Amendment also prohibits a government entity from “deny[ing] to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV. To
adequately state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must plead that the “government treated them
disparately as compared to similarly situated persons and that such disparate treatment either
burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or has no rational basis.” Ctr. for Bio-Ethical
Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2011). The threshold element is disparate
treatment. Id. (internal citation omitted).
Like Count One, Souare’s allegations in Count Two are extremely limited and claim only
“Defendants selectively enforced rules or targeted Plaintiff in a discriminatory and arbitrary
manner.” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 16. He provides no other facts or allegations to support a theory of
disparate treatment and therefore has not adequately pled an equal protection claim. Again, to the
extent that Souare attempts to remedy his pleading errors in his responses (Docs. 43, 46), this
attempt to cure deficiencies is not permissible. Bates, 958 F.3d at 483–84.
The Motions are granted with respect to Count Two.
e. 	Count Three – Violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Souare’s last claim consists of the threadbare conclusion that the Defendants, acting under
state law, deprived him of his constitutional rights. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 17.
Defendants Capaldi, Saxton, and the Department correctly note that that 42 U.S.C. § 1983
is the vehicle to bring the constitutional claims. Doc. 39 at 21. To bring this claim, “a plaintiff
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must identify a right secured by the United States Constitution and the deprivation of that right by
a person acting under color of state law.” Troutman v. Louisville Metro Dep’t of Corr., 979 F.3d
472, 482 (6th Cir. 2020) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Under Count Three, Souare makes a conclusory statement that defendants “acted under
color of state law” when depriving him of his constitutional rights. Second Am. Compl. ¶ 17. Here,
Count Three is duplicative of Counts One and Two as the underlying bases for these claims arise
under the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, as addressed
above. Accordingly, no separate claim was made here and Souare has not sufficiently pled a
section 1983 claim.
The Motions are granted with respect to Count Three.
III. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant Laura Poundstone’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 29) and
the Defendants Ohio Department of Developmental Disabilities; The Departments Director;
Robert Capaldi; and Jennifer Saxton’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint
(Doc. 39) are GRANTED and Souare’s claims are DISMISSED. In light of this dismissal, the
Court need not address the merits of any other remaining pending motion in the case, which will
be terminated upon the closing of the case.
Further, pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 1915(a)(3), the Court certifies that Souare may not take an
appeal from the Court’s decision in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Judge John R. Adams	November 10, 2025
Date JUDGE JOHN R. ADAMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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