USA v. Woodward

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.,
Plaintiff,
v.
JAMES WOODWARD,
Defendant.
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CASE NO. 5:22-cr-305
JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND
ORDER
Pending before the Court is Defendant James Woodward’s pro se motion to vacate, set
aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (“Motion to Vacate”) (ECF No. 39).
The Government filed a response in opposition on October 8, 2025. (ECF No. 43). The Court
ordered Woodward to file a reply by November 24, 2025. (Order [non-document] dated Oct. 9,
2025). 	Woodward, however, did not reply. 	For the reasons below, the Motion to Vacate is
DENIED.
I. 	BACKGROUND
On June 9, 2022, a federal grand jury issued an indictment charging Woodward with two
counts: (i) receipt and distribution of visual depictions of real minors engaged in sexually explicit
conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (Count 1); and (ii) possession of child pornography,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) (Count 2). (ECF No. 1). Woodward entered a guilty
plea to Counts 1 and 2 of the indictment at the June 7, 2023 Change of Plea Hearing. (Minutes of
Proceedings [non-document] dated June 7, 2023). On December 14, 2023, the Court sentenced
Woodward to a 292-month total term of imprisonment, with 292 months as to Count 1, and 240
months as to Count 2, both to be served concurrently to each other. 	(ECF No. 31; Minutes of
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Proceedings [non-document] dated Dec. 14, 2023). When calculating Woodward’s offense level
under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, the Court found that a five-level enhancement under
U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(3)(B)—which is based on distribution of child pornography for any valuable
consideration, but not pecuniary gain—should be applied. (ECF No. 35, PageID #377).
Woodward timely appealed to the Sixth Circuit. 	(ECF No. 33). 	On appeal, Woodward
raised three arguments: (i) the five sentencing enhancements applied to his sentence should not
have been added because they are not unique “specific offense characteristics” to his case; (ii) the
Court was required to view Woodward’s objections to the “specific offense characteristics” under
the rule of lenity; and (iii) Woodward’s sentence was cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment. App. Opening Brief, Doc. 13, United States v. Woodward, No. 23-4018 (6th
Cir. Mar. 28, 2024). On July 18, 2025, the Sixth Circuit issued an opinion affirming Woodward’s
sentence. (See ECF No. 38); Opinion, United States v. Woodward, No. 23-4018 (6th Cir. July 18,
2024).
On August 1, 2025, Woodward filed his Motion to Vacate, raising two grounds for relief
related to his sentence for distribution and possession of child pornography. 	(ECF No. 39). 	In
Ground One, Woodward argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel which “caused
prejudiced results.” 	(Id. at PageID #425). 	In Ground Two, Woodward fails to provide any
arguments or supporting facts and simply states his claim is: “To preserve the right to revisit
matters concerning double jeopardy and the application of multiple assessments.” (Id. at PageID
#426). 	For relief, Woodward requests that the Court “vacate the sentence and make proper
amendments.” (Id. at PageID #430).
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On October 8, 2025, the Government opposed the Motion to Vacate. (ECF No. 43). The
Court set the deadline for Woodward to file a reply in support of the Motion to Vacate as November
24, 2025. (Order [non-document] dated Oct. 9, 2025). He did not file a reply.
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
Section 2255 provides a means by which a prisoner in federal custody may challenge his
conviction or sentence on the ground that it was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States. 	A federal prisoner that moves to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 must demonstrate one of four authorized grounds for relief: (1) “the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States”; (2) “that the
court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence”; (3) “that the sentence was in excess of
the maximum authorized by law”; or (4) the sentence “is otherwise subject to collateral attack.”
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). “To prevail under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a defendant must show a ‘fundamental
defect’ in the proceedings which necessarily results in a complete miscarriage of justice or an
egregious error violative of due process.” Gall v. United States, 21 F.3d 107, 109 (6th Cir. 1994).
A defendant/petitioner must also demonstrate “the existence of an error of constitutional
magnitude which had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the guilty plea or the jury’s
verdict.” 	Griffin v. United States, 330 F.3d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 2003). 	“A petitioner seeking to
vacate a sentence pursuant to § 2255 has the burden of sustaining his contentions by a
preponderance of the evidence.” 	McNeil v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 2d 801, 804 (N.D. Ohio
1999) (citing Wright v. United States, 624 F.2d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 1980)).
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III. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Ground One – Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In Ground One, Woodward raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (ECF No. 39,
PageID #425). Courts analyze ineffective assistance of counsel based on the two-prong test from
Strickland v. Washington. 1 See Clardy v. Pounds, 126 F.4th 1201, 1209 (6th Cir. 2025) (using the
Strickland test to analyze a petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim). First, a petitioner
must show that counsel’s performance was deficient, which requires that counsel made errors so
serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. 	Second, the petitioner must show that deficient performance
prejudiced the outcome of the case. 	Id. 	A determination of prejudice requires a “reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have
been different.” 	Id. at 694. 	Demonstrating sufficient prejudice is a “high burden.” 	Monea v.
United States, 914 F.3d 414, 419 (6th Cir. 2019) (“Proving prejudice is not easy.”).
When “an underlying legal claim lacks merit, the failure of the [petitioner’s] trial counsel
to raise that claim does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.” Tackett v. Trierweiler,
956 F.3d 358, 375 (6th Cir. 2020). Furthermore, “[n]o prejudice flows from the failure to raise a
meritless claim.” Mahdi v. Bagley, 522 F.3d 631, 638 (6th Cir. 2008).
Woodward’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel appears to be separated into four
sub-claims. (ECF No. 39, PageID #425). Woodward argues that he received ineffective assistance
of counsel when his counsel: (i) miscalculated his criminal history and offense level, influenced a
change of plea prior to receiving a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”), and stated that the
Court would show leniency; (ii) gave warnings about the prosecution including the “Wickr
1 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
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Conversation” and restated that the Court would be lenient; (iii) failed to challenge the addition of
the five-point enhancement from the Wickr Conversation; and (iv) failed to object to “irrelevant
bias questioning and statements by [the Court] during sentencing.” (Id.). The first two sub-claims
focus on statements and representations made by Woodward’s counsel before he entered a guilty
plea and appear to be arguments that counsel improperly influenced Woodward to enter a guilty
plea. (Id.). The Court will address the first two sub-claims together before moving to the final
sub-claims.
1. 	Pre-Plea Representations
In the first two sub-claims, Woodward states that his counsel was ineffective for:
(i) miscalculating his criminal history and offense level prior to receiving a PSR; (ii) stating the
Court would be lenient during sentencing; (iii) stating the sentence would be around 11 to 14 years;
(iv) warning Woodward that going to trial would result in a harsh sentence; and (v) warning
Woodward that the prosecution threatened to “supersede the PSR” to include the Wickr
Conversation. (ECF No. 39, PageID #425). As an initial matter, these sub-claims fail because the
only relief that Woodward requests is a vacatur of his sentence. (Id. at PageID #430). The Motion
to Vacate does not request a vacatur of Woodward’s conviction or a withdrawal of his guilty plea.
Any alleged ineffective assistance of counsel related to influencing Woodward to enter a guilty
plea had no effect and has no relation to the sentence imposed by the Court. Thus, the instant sub-
claims are irrelevant to the Motion to Vacate and the relief requested. On this basis alone, the sub-
claims could be denied.
The Court also finds that these sub-claims fail because Woodward has not raised a claim
that his guilty plea was invalid and should be withdrawn. Even if he had raised such a claim, it
would fail on the merits. A guilty plea is valid only if it is entered knowingly, voluntarily, and
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intelligently. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747 (1970);
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242–44, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). A valid guilty
plea “represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to
the defendant.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31, 91 S. Ct. 160, 27 L. Ed. 2d 162 (1970).
Such a plea must also reflect “sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences” of entering the plea. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748. A court must assess the validity of
the plea by reviewing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the plea. Id. at 749.
The transcript of Woodward’s plea hearing reflects that his guilty plea was knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent. 	During the change of plea hearing, Woodward confirmed that no
promises had been made to induce him to enter a guilty plea and that his plea was knowing,
voluntary, and of his own free will. (ECF No. 42, PageID #459–60). Woodward stated that he
was satisfied with the representation of his counsel. 	(Id. at PageID #459). 	The Court had a
thorough discussion with Woodward about the Guidelines calculations, how those calculations are
performed, how any calculations provided at the plea hearing were merely an estimate of the
applicable offense level and criminal history category, and that the final determination could and
would not be made until after the Probation Office had prepared and submitted a PSR. 	(Id. at
PageID #466–75). Woodward also confirmed several times that he understood he was facing a
15-year minimum sentence. (Id. at PageID #461, 476).
Woodward is bound by the statements he made during the plea colloquy. See United States
v. Todaro, 982 F.2d 1026 (6th Cir. 1993). His sworn statements before the Court during his change
of plea hearing are also entitled to a strong presumption of truth, and Woodward has presented
insufficient evidence to overcome that presumption. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74, 97 S.
Ct. 1621, 52 L. Ed. 2d 136 (1977) (“Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption
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of verity.”). Despite Woodward’s assertions that his counsel made several pre-plea representations
that may have influenced his decision to plead guilty, the discussion at the plea colloquy and
Woodward’s own statements demonstrate that he fully understood the relevant circumstances and
direct consequences of a guilty plea, he was fully aware of the specific charges against him and
the potential penalties he faced, and that he made an intelligent and knowing decision among
alternative courses of action. See Alford, 400 U.S. at 31; Brady, 397 U.S. at 748; see also Tiran v.
McQuiggin, No. 11-1850, 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 27464, at *5–6 (6th Cir. July 18, 2012) (“A
defendant’s statements on the record during a plea colloquy that he understands the nature and the
consequences of the plea provide strong evidence that a plea was intelligent and knowing.”). Thus,
any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based on the alleged pre-plea statements fails.
Alternatively, courts have consistently held that a counsel’s inaccurate prediction of the
offense level, criminal history category, and estimated sentence does not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel under Strickland. See, e.g., United States v. Awad, No. 91-1856, 1992 U.S.
App. LEXIS 32296, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 30, 1992) (“However, counsel’s alleged inaccurate
prediction of the sentencing guideline range, standing alone, does not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel.”); United States v. Martinez, 169 F.3d 1049, 1053 (7th Cir.1999) (“[A]n
attorney’s mere inaccurate prediction of sentence does not demonstrate the deficiency component
of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.”); Thomas v. United States, 27 F.3d 321, 325–26
(8th Cir. 1994); Gonzalez v. United States, 33 F.3d 1047, 1051–53 (9th Cir.1994) ( holding that a
petitioner cannot claim prejudice by a counsel’s gross miscalculation of the sentencing guidelines
range where the district court informed the defendant of the possible penalties faced if a guilty plea
was entered, the defendant confirmed his understanding, and the defendant stated his satisfaction
with counsel’s representation); Doganiere v. United States, 914 F.2d 165, 168 (9th Cir.1990)
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(holding that an attorney’s inaccurate prediction of the sentence did not constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel or demonstrate prejudice). The record also belies Woodward’s claim, as his
counsel stated that they had discussed, at great length, the mandatory minimum 15-year sentence
on Count 1, which undercuts his statement that his counsel predicted a sentence in the range of 11
to 14 years. 	(ECF No. 42, PageID #469). 	As discussed above, Woodward confirmed he
understood that he faced a minimum 15-year sentence during the plea hearing.
As for counsel’s statements about the prosecution threatening to file a superseding
indictment, promises of leniency, or the threat of a harsher sentence if the case went to trial,
Woodward fails to provide sufficient factual averments or legal arguments to support his claim
that these actions constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court finds that these statements
did not unduly influence Woodward to enter a guilty plea, particularly in light of the record and
Woodward’s own statements during the plea colloquy, and they otherwise do not constitute
ineffective assistance of counsel. 	See Highers v. Kapture, 93 F. App’x 48, 50 (6th Cir. 2004)
(“Moreover, there is no constitutional requirement that a defendant be affirmatively disabused of
the idea that he will get more lenient treatment if he waives a jury trial.” (citing United States v.
Martin, 704 F.2d 267, 274 (6th Cir. 1983)). For the above reasons, the first two sub-claims fail.
2. 	Failure to Challenge Five-Point Enhancement
In this sub-claim, Woodward states that his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge
the five-point enhancement in the PSR. (ECF No. 39, PageID #425). Woodward is referring to
the five-level enhancement under U.S.S.G § 2G2.2(b)(3)(B) for distribution in exchange for any
valuable consideration, but not for pecuniary gain. (ECF No. 30, PageID #315, ¶ 24). This sub-
claim 	fails 	because 	the 	record 	contradicts 	Woodward’s 	assertion. 	Woodward’s 	counsel
specifically objected to the PSR’s inclusion of the five-point enhancement under U.S.S.G
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§ 2G2.2(b)(3)(B). 	(ECF No. 30, PageID #338). 	Moreover, Woodward’s counsel subsequently
objected 	to 	the 	inclusion 	of 	all 	the 	sentencing 	enhancements, 	including 	the 	five-point
enhancement, during the sentencing hearing. 	(ECF No. 35, PageID #366–69). 	Woodward’s
counsel even argued against the inclusion of the five-point enhancement in the appeal before the
Sixth Circuit. App. Opening Brief, Doc. 13 at Page 18, United States v. Woodward, No. 23-4018
(6th Cir. Mar. 28, 2024). Thus, this sub-claim fails.
3. 	Failure to Object to Comments during Sentencing
In this final sub-claim, Woodward states that his counsel was ineffective because he did
not object to “irrelevant bias questioning and statements” by the Court during the sentencing
hearing. (ECF No. 39, PageID #425). Woodward does not cite or otherwise identify the specific,
allegedly biased questions and statements made during the sentencing hearing. 	Because
Woodward fails to provide any factual support or specific details to support his claim, his claim is
legally insufficient on its face. See Gabrion v. United States, 43 F.4th 569, 578 (6th Cir. 2022)
(“Conclusory allegations alone, without supporting factual averments, are insufficient to state a
valid claim under § 2255.” (quoting Jefferson v. United States, 730 F.3d 537, 547 (6th Cir. 2013)
(cleaned up)); Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases Under Section 2254 (2025).
This sub-claim also fails because Woodward has not explained how the allegedly biased questions
and statements affected the outcome of his sentencing. Thus, he has also failed to establish the
requisite prejudice for an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.
In sum, the sub-claims in Ground One fail because they are irrelevant to the relief requested
in the Motion to Vacate. Woodward did not move to withdraw his guilty plea, and any potential
claim for withdrawal of Woodward’s guilty plea would fail on the merits. 	The claims lack
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sufficient factual and legal support, or they otherwise fail on the merits. Therefore, Woodward’s
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fail and Ground One is DENIED.
B. 	Ground Two – To Preserve Double Jeopardy and Multiple Assessment Claims
Ground Two is titled: “To preserve the right to revisit matters concerning Double Jeopardy
and the application of multiple assessments.” 	(ECF No. 39, PageID #426). 	Under supporting
facts, Woodward simply states that his claim is “[t]o preserve the ability to revisit matter in a
certiorari or en banc matter.” 	(Id.). 	The Government argues that the Court should deny
Ground Two because Woodward fails to provide factual or legal support for this claim. 	(ECF
No. 43, PageID #511–12). The Court agrees with the Government.
It is unclear whether Woodward intended to make any argument in Ground Two or if he
simply intended to preserve certain claims for future appellate review. 	Regardless, Woodward
fails to state a valid claim in Ground Two because he has failed to provide any factual support or
legal argument for his claim. 	See Gabrion, 43 F.4th at 578; Rule 2(c) of the Rules Governing
Habeas Corpus Cases Under Section 2254 (2025). Because Woodward’s claim fails as a matter
of law, Ground Two is DENIED.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Woodward’s Motion to Vacate (ECF No. 39) is DENIED. The
Court also finds that “reasonable jurists” would not debate the dismissal of the Motion to Vacate
and therefore CERTIFIES that an appeal from this decision cannot be taken in good faith.
Therefore, there is no basis upon which to issue a certificate of appealability. 	Fed. R. App.
P. 22(b); 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c).
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 8, 2025
____________________________________
CHARLES E. FLEMING
U.S. DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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