Pino-Hernandez v. Attorney General

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
Patrico Pino-Hernandez, ) CASE NO. 4:26 CV 1783
)
Petitioner, ) JUDGE PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
)
vs. )
)
Attorney General, )
) Memorandum Opinion and Order
)
)
Respondent. )
INTRODUCTION
This matter is before the Court upon petitioner Patrico Pino-Hernandez’s Petition for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. No. 1.) Petitioner seeks review of his
detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement during his removal proceedings. For the
reasons that follow, the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is GRANTED.
BACKGROUND
Petitioner Patrico Pino-Hernandez (“Petitioner”) is a native of El Salvador. On May 6, 2018,
a border patrol agent encountered Petitioner in the Rio Grand Valley along the United States-
Mexico border. Petitioner admitted to the border patrol agent that he did not have the necessary
legal documents to enter the United States and admitted to illegally crossing into the United States
without being inspected at a designated port of entry. The border patrol agent determined that
Petitioner was “an immigrant not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit,
border crossing card, or other valid entry document” and issued a Notice and Order of Expedited
Removal.
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Thereafter, an asylum officer found that Petitioner demonstrated a credible fear of
prosecution or torture and a Notice to Appear was issued on July 3, 2018. Importantly, Petitioner
was allowed to post bond and was released from detention on July 19, 2018, while his asylum
application progressed. Petitioner’s application for asylum and withholding was denied around
December 12, 2023, and he was ordered removed. Petitioner appealed the denials and removal
order to the Board of Immigration Appeals. As far as this Court can tell, that appeal remains
pending.
Petitioner was detained by Respondent1 on or about May 14, 2026. He alleges that he has
been detained since that date without being afforded a bond hearing.
Petitioner brings the instant Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”), alleging that
his continued detention without a bond hearing is unlawful. Respondent filed a Return of Writ,
which moves to dismiss the Petition.
DISCUSSION
Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that his continued detention without being
afforded a bond hearing is unlawful. Respondent contends the Petition should be dismissed because
Petitioner is properly detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), which mandates detention for
1 Petitioner named the United States Attorney General as the Respondent in his Petition. A writ of
habeas corpus may only be issued by the person having custody of the detainee. Here, that person is
the Field Office Director for the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency
(“ICE”). Roman v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 314, 320 (6th Cir. 2003). Accordingly, this Court substitutes
the Attorney General for Field Director Robert Lynch. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 (“Misjoinder of parties is
not a ground for dismissing an action. On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just
terms, add or drop a party. The court may also sever any claim against a party.”).
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certain asylum seekers during the pendency of their applications.2 Respondent’s argument is
misguided and ignores the eight years that Petitioner was released on bond.
Section 1225(b)(1) creates certain detention regimes for “aliens arriving in the United States
and certain other aliens who have not been admitted or paroled.” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). Section
1225(b)(1)(A) first prescribes that “[i]f an immigration officer determines that an alien . . . who is
arriving in the United States . . . is inadmissible . . . and the alien indicates either an intention to
apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution, the officer shall refer the alien for an interview by an
asylum officer under subparagraph (B).” Section 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) then provides that, “[i]f the
officer determines at the time of the interview [for asylum] that an alien has a credible fear of
persecution . . . the alien shall be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.”
Here, it is undisputed that on July 19, 2018, Petitioner was released into the United States on
bond after an asylum officer found that he demonstrated a credible fear of prosecution or torture.3
Because Petitioner was released on bond in the United States for almost eight years, he cannot be
2Alternatively, Respondent contends that this Court lacks jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to
review the agency’s application of Section 1225(b)(1). Because this Court finds that Petitioner is
not subject to detention under Section 1225(b)(1), Respondent’s alternative argument is
inapplicable. Respondent does not contend any other statute strips this Court of jurisdiction to
review Petitioner’s habeas petition.
3 The statutory basis for Petitioner’s bond is not clear from either the Petition or Respondent’s
Return of Writ. This Court notes, however, that if Petitioner was released on bond pursuant to
Section 1226(a), several other courts have found such release bars later re-detention under Section
1225. See, e.g., Kumar v. Stevens, 2026 WL 1129594, at *10 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 27, 2026) (collecting
cases), report and recommendation adopted by 2026 WL 2184779, at *5 (N.D. Ohio July 29, 2026)
(collecting cases). Further, if he was instead released on parole pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(2),
this Court notes that several other courts have found that a parolee’s whose Section 1182(d)’s
parole is terminated is not an arriving alien and no longer subject to the mandatory detention
provision of Section 1225(b)(1). E.g., Qasemi v. Francis, 2025 WL 3654098, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
17, 2025) (collecting cases).
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said to be an alien who is “arriving in the United States” pursuant to the plain language of Section
1225(b)(1). Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113, 118 (2009) (“As with any question of statutory
interpretation, our analysis begins with the plain language of the statute.”). To hold otherwise
would effectively read the words ‘arriving in the United States” out of the statute, circumventing
the cardinal principle of statutory construction that instructs courts to give effect, if possible, to
every clause and word of a statute. See United States ex rel. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599
U.S. 419, 432 (2023) (“[E]very clause and word of a statute should have meaning.” (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).4
This commonsense conclusion is the same reached by district courts across the country that
have addressed factually analogous petitions.5 E.g., Qasemi v. Francis, 2025 WL 3654098, at *6
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2025) (“Applying the plain meaning of ‘arriving in the United States’ here,
there can be no doubt that upon his parole into the interior of the country, Qasemi had arrived in the
United States and was no longer a noncitizen arriving in the United States. It would try any plain
understanding of the term arrival to classify an individual like Qasemi who has lived and worked in
the United States for over a year prior to his re-detention as an arriving alien.”); Singh v. Albarran,
2025 WL 3640678, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 16, 2025) (collecting cases).
4 Further, Section 125(b)(1) is titled “Inspection of aliens arriving in the United States and certain
other aliens who have not been admitted or paroled.” “[T]he title of a statute and the heading of a
section are tools available for the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of the statute.” Dubin v.
United States, 599 U.S. 110, 120-21 (2023) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
5 This Court is aware of one court within this district that has reached a different conclusion in a
factually adjacent case. Garcia Gonzalez v. Raycraft, 2026 WL 1785221, at *2 (N.D. Ohio June 22,
2026). But in Garcia Gonzalez, the petitioner did not apply for asylum until he was detained by ICE
and the court did not explicitly address the impact of the petitioner’s earlier release on parole.
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Respondent does not otherwise identify any statutory authority for Petitioner’s detention.
Accordingly, Petitioner’s present detention is unlawful.6
CONCLUSION
For all the aforementioned reasons, Patrico Pino-Hernandez’s Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus is GRANTED. By 5:00 p.m. on October 16, 2026, Respondent shall release Petitioner from
pre-removal detention.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
PATRICIA A. GAUGHAN
United States District Judge
6 Because this Court finds that Petitioner’s detention is not valid under Section 1225(b)(1), this
Court need not address whether his detention violates Due Process.
Date: 10/9/2026
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