Enrique Leon Macias v. Raycraft et al.

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
ENRIQUE LEON MACIAS,
Plaintiff,
v.
KEVIN RAYCRAFT, et al.,
Defendants.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Case No. 4:25-cv-2642
JUDGE DAN AARON POLSTER
OPINION & ORDER
Plaintiff Enrique Leon Macias filed on December 5, 2025, an emergency petition for writ
of habeas corpus by a person in federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) and a
motion for a temporary restraining order. ECF 1, 2. That same day, the Court held a hearing via
zoom with Plaintiff’s counsel and counsel for the Government. For the reasons discussed below
and on the record, this Court hereby ORDERS that ICE schedule an individualized bond hearing
for Plaintiff within the seven (7) days of the hearing, up to and including December 12, 2025. All
other relief requested is denied as moot.
I. 	Introduction
Plaintiff was detained on or about March 11, 2025, and has been in ICE custody
continuously since that date. ECF 2-1 at 1. He is currently detained at the North East Ohio
Correctional Facility, located in the Northern District of Ohio. Id. at 3. The Department of
Homeland Security placed Plaintiff in removal proceedings before the Cleveland Immigration
Court pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. ECF 1-2. ICE has charged Mr. Leon Macias with being
inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as someone who entered the United States without
being admitted or paroled, and 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I), as someone who is not in possession
Case: 4:25-cv-02642-DAP Doc #: 5 Filed: 12/09/25 1 of 5. PageID #: <pageID>

2
of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, border crossing identification card, or other
valid entry document required by this chapter.
Once in ICE custody, Plaintiff requested a bond redetermination hearing before an
immigration judge (“IJ”). Id. at 4. A bond hearing was held on November 25, 2025, and Plaintiff
was denied bond. Id. The denial was not based on the merits of Plaintiff’s particular situation; that
is, the IJ did not make a determination that Plaintiff presented a risk of flight or danger to the
community. Id.; see Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 527 (2021) (“To secure release,
the alien must show that he does not pose a danger to the community and that he is likely to appear
for future proceedings.”). Rather, the IJ determined that he lacked jurisdiction to make a bond
determination in Plaintiff’s case. ECF 2-1 at 3. Plaintiff has remained in custody since, and is
scheduled for a final removal hearing on December 12, 2025. Id. at 1.
II. 	Background
The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) governs, inter alia, the Government’s ability
to detain inadmissible noncitizens by creating two broad categories. Section 235 of the INA, 8
U.S.C. § 1225, generally applies to “certain [noncitizens] seeking admission into the country”;
Section 236 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. § 1226, applies to “certain [noncitizens] already in the country
pending the outcome of removal proceedings.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018)
(emphasis added in both). While there are a variety of differences between the two sections, the
most salient in this matter is that only noncitizens detained under § 1226(a) are entitled to receive
bond hearings at the outset of detention. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1); see also Jennings, 583 U.S. at
306.
For roughly the past thirty years, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) has taken
the position that “[d]espite being applicants for admission, [noncitizens] who are present without
Case: 4:25-cv-02642-DAP Doc #: 5 Filed: 12/09/25 2 of 5. PageID #: <pageID>

3
having been admitted or paroled (formerly referred to as [noncitizens] who entered without
inspection) will be eligible for bond and bond redetermination” under § 1226. ECF 2-1 at 5
(quoting 62 Fed. Reg. 10312, 10323 (Mar. 6, 1997) (interim Immigration and Naturalization
Service rule implementing recent amendments to the INA)). However, on July 8, 2025, DHS
issued a notice reversing that position and requiring “ICE employees to consider anyone arrested
in the United States and charged with being inadmissible as an ‘applicant for admission’ under 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A).” Bautista v. Santacruz, --- F.Supp. 3d ---, 2025 WL 3289861, at * 1 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (“Bautista I”). “Under § 1225(b)(2)(A), ‘applicants for admission’ are subject
to mandatory detention for proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) and not entitled to the due
process protections found within § 1226(a).” Id.
On November 20, 2025, a district court in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California held that this new policy conflicted with the plain statutory language of the
INA and violated Due Process. Specifically, the district court held that “applicants for admission,”
as used in § 1225(a), refers only to those noncitizens who have not “lawful[ly entered] into the
United States after inspection and authorization by an immigration officer.” Bautista I, 2025 WL
3289861, at *9 (emphasis in original) (quoting § 1101(a)(13)(A), which is the INA’s definition of
“applicants for admission”). Accordingly, “[i]ndividuals who have not been inspected and
authorized by an immigration officer lack the trait to be categorized as ‘applicants for admission’”
and must be afforded an individualized bond hearing under § 1226(a). Id.
Just a few days later, on November 25, 2025, that same district court certified a nationwide
class. Bautista v. Santacruz, --- F.R.D. ---, 2025 WL 3288403, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 25, 2025)
(“Bautista II”). The Bautista II class is defined as follows:
Bond Eligible Class: All noncitizens in the United States without
lawful status who (1) have entered or will enter the United States
Case: 4:25-cv-02642-DAP Doc #: 5 Filed: 12/09/25 3 of 5. PageID #: <pageID>

4
without inspection; (2) were not or will not be apprehended upon
arrival; and (3) are not or will not be subject to detention under 8
U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231 at the time the Department
of Homeland Security makes an initial custody determination.
Id. The class certification extended the Bautista I declaratory judgment that the new DHS policy
violated the INA and Due Process, and entitled all class members to the same declaratory relief
granted in Bautista I. Id. In essence, all class members must be treated under § 1226(a).
III. 	Analysis
Plaintiff maintains that he is a member of the Bautista II class. He states that he is a
noncitizen without lawful status in the United States, and that he “entered the United States without
inspection over 29 years ago and was not apprehended upon arrival.” ECF 1 ¶ 5b. He further states
that he “is not detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), § 1225(b)(1), or § 1231.” Id. ¶ 5c. At the Court’s
hearing on December 5, 2025, the Government did not dispute that Plaintiff appears to be a
member of the Bautista II class.1 Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff is, indeed, a member
of the Bautista II class and therefore entitled to the declaratory relief that he is being detained
under § 1226(a), rather than § 1225.
At the outset, Plaintiff requests that this Court order his release from ICE detention because
ICE “continue[s] to flagrantly defy the judgment in that case and continue to subject [Plaintiff] to
unlawful detention despite his clear entitlement to consideration for release on bond as a Bond
Eligible Class member.” ECF 1 ¶ 8. However, this Court has no authority to require that ICE
release Plaintiff from detention outright. The rights violation in the instant matter is not that
1 Specifically, counsel for the Government stated that, while he did not have sufficient evidence at this
time to say for sure that Plaintiff is a member of the Bautista II class, he had no reason to believe that he
was not.
Case: 4:25-cv-02642-DAP Doc #: 5 Filed: 12/09/25 4 of 5. PageID #: <pageID>

5
Plaintiff was unlawfully arrested or detained to begin with, but rather that his continued detention
without being provided an individualized bond hearing under § 1226(a) is unlawful.
Defendants are bound by the decision in Bautista I, see id. ¶ 30, which the California
district court extended to all class members in Bautista II. However, the Government disputes that
Bautista II must be given immediate effect. The Court finds that there is no harm to the
Government if Plaintiff is provided an individualized bond hearing. ICE is not being ordered to
immediately release Plaintiff, nor are they being ordered to halt or otherwise amend their current
timeline for Plaintiff’s removal proceedings. Rather, Plaintiff is only seeking that due process right
to which he is lawfully entitled. The Court therefore finds it appropriate to grant Plaintiff’s
alternative request for relief and be granted an individualized bond hearing before a neutral IJ.
IV. 	Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above and stated on the record, this Court hereby ORDERS ICE
to schedule an individualized bond hearing for Plaintiff, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). The bond
hearing must happen within the seven (7) days of the Court’s hearing, up to and including
December 12, 2025. Any and all other relief requested is denied as MOOT.
The Court notes that it is granting this relief over the Government’s objection. While the
Government does not object to the seven-day time frame for the bond hearing, the Government
does object to granting relief at all. The Government provided detailed reasoning for its objection
on the record.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 9, 2025
s/Dan Aaron Polster
United States District Judge
Case: 4:25-cv-02642-DAP Doc #: 5 Filed: 12/09/25 5 of 5. PageID #: <pageID>