Townsend v. Commissioner Social Security

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1dIN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
LONZELL TOWNSEND,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant,
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
CASE NO. 3:25-CV-01149-JJH
JUDGE JEFFREY J. HELMICK
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
MAGISTRATE JUDGE
CARMEN E. HENDERSON
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. Introduction
Plaintiff, Lonzell Townsend (“Townsend” or “Claimant”), seeks judicial review of the
final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying his application for Supplemental
Security Income (“SSI”). This matter is before me pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3),
and Local Rule 72.2(b). For the reasons set forth below, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court
OVERRULE Claimant’s Statement of Errors and AFFIRM the Commissioner’s decision.
II. Procedural History
On October 19, 2022, Townsend filed an application for SSI, alleging a disability onset
date of September 25, 1960. (ECF No. 6, PageID #: 39). The application was denied initially and
upon reconsideration, and Townsend requested a hearing before an administrative law judge
(“ALJ”). (Id.). On May 30, 2024, an ALJ held a hearing, during which Claimant, represented by
counsel, and an impartial vocational expert testified. 	(See id. at PageID #: 57-78). 	At some
point during the process, Townsend amended the alleged onset date to October 19, 2022, the date
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of his application. (Id. at PageID #: 39, 284). On July 1, 2024 the ALJ issued a written decision
finding Townsend was not disabled. (Id. at PageID #: 39-52). The ALJ’s decision became final
on April 18, 2025, when the Appeals Council declined further review. (Id. at PageID #: 23).
On June 3, 2025, Townsend filed his Complaint to challenge the Commissioner’s final
decision. (ECF No. 1). The parties have completed briefing in this case. (ECF Nos. 8, 10, 11).
Townsend asserts the following assignment of error:
The ALJ’s finding at Step 4 of the sequential evaluation process
that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to only be off task
5% of the workday is not supported by substantial evidence
(ECF No. 8 at 2).
III. Background
A. Relevant Hearing Testimony
The ALJ summarized the relevant testimony from Townsend’s hearing:
The claimant is 63 years old. At the hearing, he testified that he
becomes dizzy and lightheaded, he feels like he will faint, and he
loses his balance. The claimant further testified that he gets tired,
he has to lie down, his feet cause some difficulty walking, and he
hears voices and sees things that do not exist.
(ECF No. 6, PageID #: 46).
B. Relevant Medical Evidence
The ALJ also summarized Townsend’s health records and symptoms
On November 7, 2022, the claimant complained of fatigue. (7F/8).
Upon examination, his mood and behavior were normal. (7F/10).
The claimant’s HIV was considered stable, and his medications
were continued. (7F/10). He was told to follow up with his primary
care physician for his elevated blood pressure. (7F/11). Four days
later, the claimant denied mental health issues, including suicidal
and 	homicidal 	ideation. 	(3F/2). 	A 	mental 	status 	examination
revealed 	memory 	deficits, 	poor 	insight 	and 	judgment, 	and
borderline intelligence, yet his mood was euthymic, his affect was
broad, his thought process was logical, and he was calm and
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cooperative. (3F/2-3, 10). He felt his mental health symptoms were
controlled on medication, despite having some difficulty with
comprehension. 	(3F/10). 	He 	denied 	a 	history 	of 	psychiatric
hospitalizations. (3F/10). He reported that he enjoyed walking and
staying active. (3F/3).
On December 1, 2022, the claimant denied fatigue. (7F/26). Upon
examination, he was alert and oriented to person, place, and time,
and his mood and behavior were normal. (7F/27). His blood
pressure was elevated, yet he was asymptomatic. (7F/29). A few
days later, the claimant was alert and conversational with a normal
affect. (4F/20). Scarring was found on his scalp and face, and he
had 	mildly 	lichenified 	plaque 	with 	scale, 	for 	which 	he 	was
prescribed ointment. (4F/21). On December 15, 2022, the claimant
maintained a viral suppression and immunologic response to HIV
with medication, and his blood pressure was stable on medication.
(7F/33-34).
In January 2023, the claimant attended a psychiatric appointment.
(10F/2). He complained of decreased energy, yet he acknowledged
that 	he walked 	regularly. 	(Id.). 	A 	mental 	status 	examination
showed that he was appropriately groomed, his speech was normal,
he had no issues naming objects or repeating phrases, his mood
and affect were euthymic and congruent, his concentration was
poor yet improved, his thought content and process were coherent
and goal directed with no abnormal or delusional thought content
or cognitive disturbance, his fund of knowledge was good, his
associations were intact, he exhibited no psychosis or disturbances
of perception, he expressed no suicidal or homicidal ideation, he
was oriented, his comprehension was improved, and his insight
and 	judgment 	were 	good. 	(10F/5-6). 	His 	schizophrenia 	was
considered stable, and his medications were continued. (10F/7, 9).
One month later, the claimant reported that his scalp discoid lupus
had not been getting worse, and he denied irritation, swelling,
redness, and any other symptoms. (7F/66). As the discoid lupus
was not currently active, it was monitored rather than starting the
claimant on immunosuppression medications. (7F/67).
On July 13, 2023, the claimant attended a psychiatric appointment.
(10F/34). 	A 	mental 	status 	examination 	showed 	that 	he 	was
appropriately groomed, his speech was non-pressured, his mood,
fund of knowledge, and thought process/content were normal, his
affect was blunted/flat, his concentration and attention span were
good, and no psychosis/disturbance of perception was detected.
(10F/37-38). On July 24, 2023, the claimant informed his medical
provider that he had a good energy level. (15F/7). Three days later,
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he was found to have been non-compliant with HIV antiretroviral
therapy and his hypertension medications. (14F/35). He reported
that his mood was stable, and he denied suicidal ideation. (14F/36).
One month later, the claimant’s discoid lupus erythematosus was
considered stable. (12F/17).
In 	November 	2023, 	the 	claimant 	attended 	a 	psychiatric
appointment. (13F/14). A mental status examination revealed that
he was appropriately dressed, his speech was non-pressured, he
had no issues naming objects or repeating phrases, his mood,
associations, fund of knowledge, and thought content were normal,
his affect was blunted/flat, his concentration and attention span
were good, and no psychosis or disturbance of perception was
detected. 	(13F/17-18). 	Buspar 	was 	added 	to 	his 	medications.
(13F/24).
On March 8, 2024, the claimant denied dizziness, lightheadedness,
and fatigue. (14F/9). Upon examination, no motor weakness was
detected, and his mood, behavior, thought content, and judgment
were normal. (14F/10-11). His hypertension was controlled, his
HIV was stable, and he was instructed to increase his level of
physical activity. (14F/2).
In April 2024, the claimant attended a psychiatric appointment.
(13F/48). He reported that his medications worked, and he denied
hallucinations, depression, and anxiety. (13F/48). During a mental
status 	examination, 	he 	appeared 	disheveled, 	his 	speech 	was
hyperverbal and pressured, his mood and affect were anxious, he
was distractable, his thoughts were racing, his associations were
circumstantial and tangential, yet he had no issues naming objects
or repeating phrases, there were no suicidal or homicidal concerns,
his fund of knowledge was normal, his insight and judgment were
fair, and his memory was intact (13F/51-53). His medications were
changed. (13F/56). Two days later, the claimant informed his
medical provider that he felt well and had no complaints. (15F/2).
Upon 	examination, 	his 	hand 	grasps 	were 	strong 	and 	equal
bilaterally, his mood and affect were normal, and he exhibited
normal strength in all extremities. (15F/3-4). He was advised to
exercise at least 3 times per week for 30 minutes a day. (15F/4).
One month later, the claimant attended a psychiatric appointment.
(16F/1). He reported some dizziness, yet he acknowledged that
medication 	stabilized 	his 	mood. 	(16F/4). 	He 	presented 	with
pressured speech and had difficulty staying on task, but he was
redirectable. (16F/4).
(ECF No. 6, PageID #: 47-48).
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IV. 	The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ made the following findings relevant to this appeal:
1. 	The claimant has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since
October 19, 2022, the application date (20 CFR 416.971 et seq.).
2. 	The claimant has the following severe impairments: discoid lupus
erythematosus, 	human 	immunodeficiency 	virus 	(HIV),
schizoaffective disorder, and hypertension (20 CFR 416.920(c)).
3. 	The claimant does not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of
the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1
(20 CFR 416.920(d), 416.925 and 416.926).
4. 	After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned
finds that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to
perform medium work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c) except: he
should 	avoid 	hazards, 	including 	heavy 	machinery, 	moving
machinery, and unprotected heights, he will be off task up to 5% of
the workday, he must be able to tolerate simple, routine tasks,
occasional changes with occasional decision making, he should
avoid pace rate work, no strict production quotas; he should be
able to tolerate conditions where changes are well explained in
advance; he should be able to tolerate occasional interaction with
coworkers and supervisors as it relates to job duties and job
functions; less than occasional interaction to the extent interactions
are outside the scope of job duties and job functions; interaction
with public should be avoided. Avoid positions requiring use of
managerial, mediation, and conflict resolution skills.
5. 	The claimant has no past relevant work (20 CFR 416.965).
…
9. 	Considering the claimant’s age, education, work experience, and
residual functional capacity, there are jobs that exist in significant
numbers in the national economy that the claimant can perform (20
CFR 416.969 and 416.969a).
10. The claimant has not been under a disability, as defined in the
Social 	Security 	Act, 	since 	October 	19, 	2022, 	the 	date 	the
application was filed (20 CFR 416.920(g)).
(ECF No. 6, PageID #: 41-42, 46, 51-52).
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V. Law & Analysis
A. Standard of Review
The Court’s review “is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is
supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.” Winn v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 615 F. App’x 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2015); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
“[S]ubstantial evidence is defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a
preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.’” 	Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)
(quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of HHS, 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)).
“After the Appeals Council reviews the ALJ’s decision, the determination of the council
becomes the final decision of the Secretary and is subject to review by this Court.” Olive v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:06 CV 1597, 2007 WL 5403416, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2007)
(citing Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 922 (6th Cir. 1990); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535,
538 (6th Cir. 1986) (en banc)). If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial
evidence, it must be affirmed, “even if a reviewing court would decide the matter differently.”
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059–60 (6th Cir. 1983)).
B. Standard for Disability
The Social Security regulations outline a five-step process that the ALJ must use in
determining whether a claimant is entitled to supplemental-security income or disability-
insurance benefits: (1) whether the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) if not,
whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination of impairments; (3) if so, whether
that impairment, or combination of impairments, meets or equals any of the listings in 20 C.F.R.
§ 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1; (4) if not, whether the claimant can perform her past relevant
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work in light of her residual functional capacity (“RFC”); and (5) if not, whether, based on the
claimant’s age, education, and work experience, she can perform other work found in the
national economy. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)(i)–(v); Combs v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d
640, 642–43 (6th Cir. 2006). The claimant bears the ultimate burden of producing sufficient
evidence to prove that she is disabled and, thus, entitled to benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(a).
Specifically, the claimant has the burden of proof in steps one through four. Walters v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 529 (6th Cir. 1997). The burden shifts to the Commissioner at step
five to establish whether the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform available
work in the national economy. Id.
C. Discussion
Townsend raises a single issue on appeal: “The ALJ’s finding at Step 4 of the sequential
evaluation process that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity to only be off task 5% of the
workday is not supported by substantial evidence.” (ECF No. 8 at 10). 	Townsend argues “the
ALJ did not offer any explanation whatsoever to support this ultimately dispositive issue” and
“the 	decision 	appears 	arbitrary 	and 	capricious 	when 	the 	record 	does 	not 	support 	the
reasonableness of the 5% finding.” 	(Id. at 11). 	Townsend highlights records that he asserts
show his “difficulty with comprehension and need for information to be repeated to him that was
already 	provided;” 	multiple 	assessments 	of 	poor 	and/or 	distractable 	attention 	span 	and
concentration; and reports of fatigue. 	(Id.). 	Plaintiff’s position is that “a reasonable person
cannot decipher how the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff is capable of being off-task 5% of the
workday, as opposed to 10 or 15%.” 	(Id. at 12-13). 	Further, because the vocational expert
testified that there would be no work available for an individual who would be off-task 15% of
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the workday, Plaintiff asserts the error was not harmless and requires remand for a new hearing
and decision. (Id. at 13-14).
The Commissioner responds that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s evaluation of
Townsend’s RFC, including her evaluation of the objective medical evidence, the persuasiveness
of the State agency opinions, and Townsend’s statements. 	(ECF No. 10 at 10). 	The
Commissioner argues that the ALJ considered the abnormal findings and complaints Townsend
highlights but also considered contrary evidence showing normal mental status examinations and
denials of fatigue. (Id. at 11-12). Further, the Commissioner argues the ALJ relied on opinions
from the State agency consultants and “Plaintiff has not pointed to evidence from any treating
provider opining that Plaintiff had off-task limitations greater than those found in the RFC.” (Id.
at 12). 	Thus, the Commissioner’s position is that the ALJ built an accurate and logical bridge
between the evidence and her conclusions and that “[i]n citing evidence which he believes
supports the need for an off-task limitation of 15% of the time, rather than 5%, Plaintiff is
inviting the Court to re-weigh the evidence, which it cannot do.” (Id. at 13-14).
In reply, Plaintiff argues he is not asking the Court to reweigh the evidence but rather
asking the Court to determine “whether the ALJ constructed a ‘logical bridge’ between the
evidence and the determination that Plaintiff would be off task 5% of the time instead of 15% of
the time, when it would be improper for a 15% hypothetical to be presented if it did not
accurately portray Plaintiff’s physical and mental impairments.” (ECF No. 11 at 1-2) (footnotes
omitted).
At step four, the ALJ must determine a claimant’s RFC by considering all relevant
medical and other evidence. 	20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a)(3). 	An RFC determination sets out an
individual’s work-related abilities despite his or her limitations. See id. “In rendering his RFC
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decision, the ALJ must give some indication of the evidence upon which he is relying, and he
may not ignore evidence that does not support his decision, especially when that evidence, if
accepted would change his analysis.” Fleischer v. Astrue, 774 F. Supp. 2d 875, 880 (N.D. Ohio
2011) (citing Bryan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 383 F. App’x 140, 148 (3d Cir. 2010)); see Social
Security Ruling (“SSR”) 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *7 (“The RFC assessment must always
consider and address medical source opinions. If the RFC assessment conflicts with an opinion
from a medical source, the adjudicator must explain why the opinion was not adopted.”). 	The
RFC is for the ALJ to determine; however, it is well established that the claimant bears the
burden of establishing the impairments that determine his RFC. See Her v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
203 F.3d 388, 391 (6th Cir. 1999).
Here, the ALJ set forth a mental RFC as follows:
he will be off task up to 5% of the workday, he must be able to
tolerate simple, routine tasks, occasional changes with occasional
decision 	making, 	he 	should 	avoid 	pace 	rate 	work, 	no 	strict
production quotas; he should be able to tolerate conditions where
changes are well explained in advance; he should be able to
tolerate occasional interaction with coworkers and supervisors as it
relates 	to 	job 	duties 	and 	job 	functions; 	less 	than 	occasional
interaction to the extent interactions are outside the scope of job
duties and job functions; interaction with public should be avoided.
Avoid 	positions 	requiring 	use 	of 	managerial, 	mediation, 	and
conflict resolution skills.
(ECF No. 6, PageID #: 46).
As an initial matter, while Townsend is correct that the ALJ presented a hypothetical to
the vocational expert including a 15% off-task limitation, “an ALJ need not adopt every
restriction included in a hypothetical.” 	Devona Nicole Garmon King v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 3:22-CV-01804-JJH, 2023 WL 6006360, at *6 (N.D. Ohio July 21, 2023) (citing Kessans v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 768 F. App’x 531, 536 (6th Cir. 2019)). 	In other words, “the mere fact
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that the ALJ asked the VE about certain hypothetical limitations does not mean that the ALJ is
then required to adopt them into the RFC.” Aiello v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:19-CV-01558,
2020 WL 2526956, at *3 (N.D. Ohio May 18, 2020) (citing Sayler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 574
F. App’x 595, 596 (6th Cir. 2014)); see also Lipanye v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 802 F. App'x 165,
170 (6th Cir. 2020) (“By posing the [hypothetical] question [to the vocational expert], the
administrative law judge did not make a finding or bind himself to a finding that plaintiff was
off-task at least 10% of the workday.”); Koster v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 643 F. App'x 466, 478
(6th Cir. 2016). Rather, the appropriate questions are whether substantial evidence supports the
RFC that was ultimately adopted and whether the ALJ built an accurate and logical bridge
between the 5% off-task limitation and the evidence of record.
Here, the ALJ provided explanations for her mental RFC finding throughout the decision.
For instance, in analyzing whether Townsend met or equaled a listing, the ALJ considered his
mental abilities and provided the following relevant explanation:
The 	third 	functional 	area 	is 	concentration, 	persistence, 	or
maintenance of pace. In this area, the claimant has a moderate
limitation. Concentration, persistence, or pace refers to the abilities
to focus attention on work activities and stay on task at a sustained
rate 	sufficiently 	long 	to 	permit 	the 	timely 	and 	appropriate
completion of tasks commonly found in work settings. Limitations
in concentration, persistence, or pace are best observed in work
settings, but may also be reflected by limitations in other settings.
At both prior administrative levels, the claimant had a moderate
limitation in this area. (4A/4; 1A/4). In July 2023, during a mental
status examination, his concentration and attention span were
good. (10F/37-38). However, in January 2023, the claimant’s
concentration 	was 	poor. 	(10F/5-6). 	In 	April 	2024, 	he 	was
distractible, his thoughts were racing, and his associations were
circumstantial and tangential. (13F/51-53). This evidence supports
a 	finding 	that 	the 	claimant 	has 	a 	moderate 	limitation 	in
concentration, persistence, or pace due to his mental impairment.
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(Id. at PageID #: 45). 	Additionally, the ALJ provided the following explanation for finding
Townsend’s mental health impairments were not as severe as he alleged:
At the hearing, the claimant testified that he hears voices and sees
things 	that 	do 	not 	exist. 	These 	allegations 	are 	not 	entirely
consistent with the medical record. For instance, in November
2022, the claimant indicated that his mental health symptoms were
well-controlled with medication. (3F/10). In January 2023, his
schizophrenia was considered stable. (10F/7). In April 2024, the
claimant reported that his medications worked well, and that he did
not experience hallucinations. (13F/48). Numerous mental status
examinations appear throughout the record. In January 2023, no
abnormal or delusional thought content or cognitive disturbances
were 	detected, 	and 	the 	claimant 	exhibited 	no 	psychosis 	or
disturbances of perception. (10F/5-6). Six months later, another
examination 	revealed 	no 	psychosis/disturbance 	of 	perception.
(10F/37-38). The same was true in November 2023. (13F/17-18).
All of this evidence suggests that the claimant’s mental symptoms
are not as disabling as the claimant alleged. Nevertheless, the
undersigned has accounted for them by limiting the claimant to
simple, routine tasks, occasional changes with occasional decision
making, no pace rate work, no strict production quotas, changes
are well explained in advance, social limitations, and avoidance of
managerial, mediation, and conflict resolution skills.
(Id. at PageID #: 49). The ALJ also explained her reliance on an opinion from one of the State
agency consultants in crafting the RFC:
At the reconsideration level, Kevin Lauer, PhD found that the
claimant could understand, remember, carry out, and complete
simple 	and 	routine 	1-2 	step 	tasks, 	in 	a 	predictable 	work
environment, where pace was not fast, and where there were no
strict time or production quotas, he could work in a setting that did
not involve public interaction, interaction with coworkers and
supervisors should be brief and superficial in situations that did not
require resolving conflicts, he could work in an environment where
duties were predictable and major changes were occasional and
could 	be 	explained 	in 	advance. 	(4A/5-6). 	The 	undersigned
concludes that these findings are persuasive. The findings were
supported by the evidence in the file at the time of Dr. Lauer’s
review, and they are consistent with the complete evidence in the
file. For example, in November 2022, during a mental status
examination, the claimant’s mood was euthymic, his affect was
broad, and his thought process was logical, yet he displayed
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memory deficits, his intelligence was borderline, and his insight
and 	judgment 	were 	poor. 	(3F/2-3). 	At 	another 	mental 	status
examination, the claimant’s concentration was poor. (10F/5-6). At
another time, the claimant was observed to display an anxious
mood and affect. (13F/51-53). Such evidence is consistent with
limiting the claimant to simple, routine tasks, avoiding pace rate
work, 	avoiding 	strict 	production 	quotas, 	avoiding 	public
interaction, avoiding positions that required conflict resolution
skills, changes would be explained in advance, interaction with
coworkers 	and 	supervisors 	would 	be occasional 	or 	less 	than
occasional depending on the topic of conversation.
(ECF No. 6, PageID #: 50).
Considered as a whole, the ALJ’s decision makes clear that while she found Townsend
suffered from moderate impairments in his ability to maintain concentration and pace and would
therefore be off task 5% of the time, she did not find that the evidence—including the medical
records and the state agency opinion—supported greater limitations. 	“An RFC determination
that is supported by the medical opinions of state agency physicians is generally supported by
substantial evidence.” Sittinger v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:22-CV-01927-BYP, 2023 WL
6219412, at *13 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 7, 2023), report & recommendation adopted sub nom., 2023
WL 6214530 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 2023); see also Maldonado o/b/o A.C. v. Kijakazi, No. 4:20-
CV-1878, 2022 WL 361038, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2022) (“There is ample case law
concluding that State Agency medical consultative opinions may constitute substantial evidence
supporting an ALJ's decision.”) (collecting cases), report & recommendation adopted sub nom.,
2022 WL 356557 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 7, 2022). 	Although Plaintiff highlights various records he
argues support a 15% off-task limitation, he does not cite any opinion or evidence explicitly
making such a finding. Thus, as the Commissioner argues, it is hard to interpret his argument as
anything more than a request that the Court reweigh the evidence and reach a different
conclusion, which is beyond this Court’s scope of review. See Reynolds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
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424 F. App’x 411, 414 (6th Cir. 2011) (“This court reviews the entire administrative record, but
does not reconsider facts, re-weigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in evidence, decide questions
of credibility, or substitute its judgment for that of the ALJ.”) (citing Youghiogheny & Ohio
Coal Co. v. Webb, 49 F.3d 244, 246 (6th Cir. 1995)).
Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the ALJ’s RFC is supported by substantial evidence,
and the ALJ built an accurate and logical bridge between the RFC and the evidence supporting
the 5% off-task limitation. Thus, the ALJ did not err.
VI. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court OVERRULE Townsend’s
Statement of Errors and AFFIRM the Commissioner’s decision.
Dated: December 19, 2025
_______________________________________________________
OBJECTIONS
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of
Courts within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this document. Failure to file
objections within the specified time may forfeit the right to appeal the District Court’s order. See
Berkshire v. Beauvais, 928 F. 3d 520, 530-31 (6th Cir. 2019).
Case: 3:25-cv-01149-JJH Doc #: 12 Filed: 12/19/25 13 of 13. PageID #: <pageID>