Davis v. Duncan et al

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
AARON DAVIS, 	CASE NO. 3:22 CV 614
Plaintiff,
v. 	JUDGE JAMES R. KNEPP II
TYLER W.A. DUNCAN, et al.,
Defendants. 	ORDER
Introduction and Background
Currently pending before the Court is Plaintiff Aaron Davis’s Motion and Supplemental
Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification of Final Judgment as to Dismissed Defendants. (Docs. 64, 66).
No Defendant has filed any opposition to the Motion or Supplemental Motion, and the period in
which to do so has expired. L.R. 7.1(d). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff’s
Motion and enters final judgment pursuant to Federal Civil Rule 54(b) as to the claims against the
County Defendants (Marion County, Hardin County, Dale Osborn, Brandon Taylor, and the
Marion-Hardin Corrections Commission).
By way of brief background, this case involves the April 17, 2020, alleged use of excessive
force by former Correctional Officer Tyler W.A. Duncan against Plaintiff while Plaintiff was
incarcerated at the Multi-County Correctional Center (“MCCC”). See Doc. 1. In his Complaint,
Plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force and unreasonable seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment (Count One) and for failure to protect under the Eighth
Amendment (Count Two). Id. at 10-12. He separately brought a claim against Dale Osborn
(Executive Director of MCCC) in his individual capacity for supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C.
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§ 1983 alleging deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment (Count Three).
Finally, Plaintiff brought a Monell claim against the Counties and MHCC (Count Four). Id. at 10-
11, 12-15. 1 The County Defendants (i.e., all Defendants except Duncan) moved for summary
judgment. (Doc. 53). This Court granted the motion in its entirety. (Doc. 62). In that opinion, the
Court determined Plaintiff had not demonstrated a material question of fact regarding his Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference claim, his supervisory liability claim against Defendant
Osborn, or his Monell claims against the entity Defendants on failure to train, negligent hiring or
supervision, or pattern or practice theories of liability. See id. Duncan did not move for summary
judgment. Duncan was previously convicted, on a guilty plea, of felonious assault in violation of
Ohio Revised Code § 2903.11(A)(1) as a result of the incident at issue. See State of Ohio v.
Duncan, No. 2020 CR 0237 (Marion Cnty. Ct. of C.P.).
Rule 54 Standard
Federal Civil Rule 54(b) provides:
(b) J UDGMENT ON M ULTIPLE CLAIMS OR I NVOLVING M ULTIPLE PARTIES . When an
action presents more than one claim for relief—whether as a claim, counterclaim,
crossclaim, or third-party claim—or when multiple parties are involved, the court
may direct entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or
parties only if the court expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.
Otherwise, any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer
than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not
end the action as to any of the claims or parties and may be revised at any time
before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims and all the parties’ rights
and liabilities.
“Proper certification under Rule 54(b) is a two-step process.” EJS Props., LLC v. City of Toledo,
689 F.3d 535, 537 (6th Cir. 2012). “First, the district court must expressly direct the entry of final
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the claims or parties in a case. Second, the district
1. Plaintiff also originally brought, but later abandoned, claims against MCCC employee Brandon
Taylor. See Doc. 62, at 11-12.
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court must expressly determine that there is no just reason to delay appellate review.” Id. (quoting
Gen. Acquisition, Inc. v. GenCorp, Inc., 23 F.3d 1022, 1026 (6th Cir. 1994)). The Sixth Circuit
has set forth a “nonexhaustive list of factors” for a court to consider when deciding whether to
certify a claim under Rule 54(b):
(1) the relationship between the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims; (2) the
possibility that the need for review might or might not be mooted by future
developments in the district court; (3) the possibility that the reviewing court might
be obliged to consider the same issue a second time; (4) the presence or absence of
a claim or counterclaim which could result in set-off against the judgment sought
to be made final; (5) miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and solvency
considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense,
and the like.
Corrosioneering, Inc. v. Thyssen Env’t Sys., Inc., 807 F.2d 1279, 1283 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting
Allis-Chalmers v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360, 364 (3d Cir. 1975)). “Rule 54(b) is not to
be used routinely, or as a courtesy or accommodation to counsel.” Id. at 1282 (internal citations
omitted). And, “[t]he power which this Rule confers upon the trial judge should be used only ‘in
the infrequent harsh case’ as an instrument for the improved administration of justice.” Id. (quoting
Panichella v. Penn. R.R. Co., 252 F.2d 452, 455 (3d Cir. 1958)).
Analysis
Starting with the first step of the Rule 54(b) analysis, the Court finds there has been a final
judgment as to one or more but fewer than all claims in this case. The Court has granted summary
judgment to the five County Defendants on all claims against them. See Doc. 62. Remaining only
is the claim against individual Defendant Tyler Duncan, the former correctional officer who is
alleged to have used excessive force.
Turning to the second step of the Rule 54(b) analysis, which asks whether there is “no just
reason for delay,” the Court finds the balance of factors weighs in favor of certification here. First,
although the adjudicated and nonadjudicated claims are related in that they arise out of the same
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April 17, 2020, use of force incident and thus have some factual overlap, they are legally distinct.
The adjudicated Monell and supervisory liability claims were based on facts relating to institutional
policies and customs (allegedly inadequate training, negligent hiring and supervision, and a pattern
of similar incidents) and a supervisor’s knowledge, whereas the remaining claim against Duncan
individually centers on Duncan’s own conduct during the specific use-of-force incident. Because
the Court resolved the Monell and supervisory liability claims in favor of Defendants, the question
of whether Duncan violated Plaintiff’s Constitutional rights stands alone both legally and
procedurally. The Court finds that although there is certainly some modest factual overlap, the
legal issues are sufficiently distinct to justify certification in balance with the remaining factors.
Second, the need for review of supervisory liability or Monell liability will not be mooted by future
developments regarding the remaining claims against Duncan in this Court. Plaintiff indicates he
will appeal the Court’s order granting judgment to the County Defendants regardless of the
outcome of the remaining claim pending against Duncan. See, e.g., Grote v. Kenton Cnty., 85 F.4th
397, 414 (6th Cir. 2023) (“[I]t is proper to consider possible constitutional violations committed
by a municipality qua municipality even in the absence of a showing of a constitutional violation
by any one individual officer.”).2 Third, if the Court certifies a final judgment as to the County
Defendants, the Circuit Court will not have to consider the same issue a second time. Appellate
review of the claims against the County Defendants at this stage will involve, as stated, questions
of institutional policy and custom and of the sufficiency of the evidence presented at the summary
judgment stage. A post-trial appeal of Duncan’s liability will turn on just that, Duncan’s personal
liability (and any trial-related disputes). Fourth, no set-off or counterclaims are at issue here.
2. Moreover, given the criminal felonious assault conviction against Duncan arising out of the
same incident alleged to be excessive force here, the Court finds it unlikely that a jury would find
Duncan did not use excessive force.
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Finally, the Court is to consider miscellaneous factors such as delay, economic and
solvency considerations, shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, etc.
The Court finds this final factor tips the balance in favor of certification here. This case is in an
unusual procedural posture, where all but the alleged individual constitutional tortfeasor have been
granted summary judgment and there has been no assertion of qualified immunity by that
individual.3 Thus, to obtain a final judgment on all claims in the instant case absent certification,
Plaintiff must proceed to trial against Duncan on the sole remaining claim. Plaintiff contends this
would result in economic hardship, “namely, the prospect of an expensive, duplicative trial.” (Doc.
66, at 16). If the Court does not certify its prior decision, Plaintiff, a former prisoner bringing suit
against a correctional officer who has been criminally convicted of assault, will be required to bear
the expense of a trial against the individual Defendant before bringing any appeal of the dismissed
Monell claims. And should he be successful on the appeal of those claims, he will then be required
to bear the expense of a second trial. Certification will permit final adjudication of the claims
against the County Defendants and then allow for either a joint trial on the individual excessive
force issue and any remanded issues, or simply streamline a single trial on the excessive force
claim. In sum, this Court finds the above case is “the infrequent harsh case” in which departure
from the general rule against piecemeal appeals is justified.
For the foregoing reasons, good cause appearing, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion and Supplemental Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification
of Final Judgment (Docs. 64, 66), be and the same hereby are, GRANTED; and it is
3. Duncan did not move for summary judgment or assert a qualified immunity argument prior to
this Court’s November 8, 2024, dispositive motion deadline.
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FURTHER ORDERED that, there being no just reason for delay, final judgment is entered
in favor of Defendants Marion County, Hardin County, Dale Osborn, Brandon Taylor, and the
Marion-Hardin Corrections Commission on all claims against them as set forth in the Court’s prior
Memorandum Opinion and Order. (Doc. 62).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ James R. Knepp II
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Dated: December 8, 2025
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