Weiss v. Bowling Green State University, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
Chase Weiss, 	Case No. 3:22-cv-140
Plaintiff,
v. 	MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
Bowling Green State University, et al.,
Defendants.
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Before me are: (1) Movants Rodney Rogers and Stacey Allan’s motion to quash, (Doc. No.
60); (2) Plaintiff Chase Weiss’s motion to extend the discovery deadline, (Doc. No. 63); and (3)
Movant Bowling Green State University’s motion to quash. (Doc. No. 66). For the reasons stated
below, I grant the motions to quash and deny Weiss’s motion to extend the discovery deadline. But I
also order further briefing on an issue I previously decided, as outlined later in this opinion.
II. 	BACKGROUND
Through this action, Weiss alleged his procedural due process rights were violated in the
course of Bowling Green State University’s July 7 and 8, 2021 disciplinary hearing. Specifically, he
alleged:
Defendants have violated the Plaintiff’s due process rights in the following manner:
a. BGSU conducted a fundamentally unfair disciplinary process by producing a bias
UCC panel member and a bias Chair where, they participated on an anti-hazing
committee four months prior to and through the entire conduct process, responsible
for creating an anti-hazing policy which resulted in a zero-tolerance policy towards
hazing. Both a UCC panel member and the Chair were not fair and impartial
factfinders.
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b. BGSU conducted a fundamentally unfair disciplinary process by permitting the
submission of hearsay evidence to the UCC panel members and the use of hearsay
evidence at the hearing without providing the Plaintiff the opportunity to effectively
cross-examine witnesses.
c. BGSU conducted a fundamentally unfair disciplinary process by permitting the
submission of hearsay evidence of the alleged accuser to the UCC panel members
and the use of hearing evidence of the alleged accuser without providing the Plaintiff
the opportunity to cross-examine his alleged accuser.
d. BGSU conducted a fundamentally unfair disciplinary process by permitting the
use of highly prejudicial and inflammatory statements in the conduct charges and
materials provided to the UCC panel for consideration in rendering a decision in
connection with the conduct charges against DOE.
e. BGSU conducted a fundamentally unfair disciplinary process by applying the
BGSU Student Code of Conduct policies after implementing and providing training
targeting fraternity members, including DOE, in connection with a hazing and
alcohol policy in direct conflict to the provisions in the BGSU Student Code of
Conduct.
(Doc. No. 15 at 37). For these alleged procedural due process violations, he sought: declaratory
relief against BGSU and the individual Defendants in their official capacities (Count I); monetary
damages from the individual Defendants in their individual capacity (Count II); and injunctive relief
from the individual Defendants in their official capacities (Count III). (Doc. No. 15 at 35-39).
Defendants moved to dismiss all of Weiss’s due process claims as applied to all three types
of damages sought. (Doc. No. 16). On September 30, 2022, I granted Defendants’ motion in part
but denied it as to one claim against one individual Defendant – Christopher Bullins. (Doc. No. 24).
In doing so, I analyzed whether each of the alleged procedural due process violations identified by
Weiss gave rise to a cognizable procedural due process claim and concluded Weiss’s only cognizable
procedural due process claim stemmed from Weiss’s allegation that Bullins, as the Chair (or judge)
of the panel, violated Weiss’s due process rights by denying him the opportunity to cross-examine
his accuser.
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To be clear, for the reasons stated in my Memorandum Opinion and Order, any claim
relating to Spark training, allegedly biased decisionmakers, and the admission of prejudicial,
inflammatory, or hearsay statements was dismissed on September 30, 2022. (Doc. No. 24 at 14-19).
On November 29, 2022, the parties filed their Report of Parties’ Planning Meeting,
proposing a discovery deadline of August 30, 2023. (Doc. No. 31). I adopted this proposed
deadline during the December 5, 2022 Case Management Conference. (Doc. No. 33). Since that
time, I have extended the discovery deadline no less than nine times and refereed numerous
discovery disputes.
Most recently, on July 1, 2025, I extended the discovery deadline to September 30, 2025.
(See non-document Order dated July 1, 2025). On July 1, 2025, I held a telephone conference during
which Weiss’s counsel requested to extend the discovery deadline an additional three months to take
depositions. Specifically, his counsel represented that in that time, she intended to depose Bullins
and, depending on his deposition, might also want to depose the five members of the disciplinary
hearing panel. With no objection by counsel for Bullins, I granted Weiss’s counsel’s request and
extended the discovery deadline to September 30, 2025.
Before 5:00 p.m. on the day of the conference, Bullins’s counsel emailed Weiss’s counsel
proposed dates for Bullins’s deposition: “August 4, 6, 8 (afternoon only), or 11.” (Doc. No. 65-1).
Neither of Weiss’s attorneys responded to the dates proposed.
The only communication sent from Weiss’s counsel to Bullins’s in the month of July 2025
occurred through four emails Weiss’s counsel sent between July 23, 2025 and July 24, 2025, which
consisted of Weiss’s Bates-stamped discovery responses. (Doc. Nos. 65-2, 65-3, 65-4, and 65-5). Of
note, on July 1, 2025, I ordered “Plaintiff [to] provide Defendant with Bates-stamped versions of all
written discovery no later than July 18, 2025.” (See non-document Order dated July 1, 2025).
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August 6, 2025 was the first time Weiss’s counsel made any attempt to schedule the
deposition of Bullins. On this date, Weiss’s counsel emailed Bullins’s counsel asking Bullins’s
counsel to “provide [Weiss’s counsel] with possible deposition dates through the end of August and
early September.” (Doc. No. 65-6). Less than twenty-four hours later, Bullins’s counsel responded,
Chris Bullins can be available either August 29 or September 12 for his deposition.
Both days are currently open so he is available to schedule for either morning or
afternoon. He is anxious to get it scheduled as he advises his calendar will fill up
with the start of the semester (I had reached out back on July 1 to you proposing
other August dates - attached - but hadn’t heard back).
Please let us know if either Aug. 29 or Sept. 12 will work. If not, we may have to
look more specifically at morning only/afternoon only days.
(Id.). But another week passed before Weiss’s counsel responded. Only after Bullins’s counsel sent
a follow-up email on August 13, 2025, did Weiss’s counsel respond, on August 14, 2025:
This is to confirm the deposition of Christopher Bullins on September 12, 2025.
Also, could you please provide me with additional dates that you are available,
for the remaining depositions.
(Doc. No. 65-7 at 1).
On September 11, 2025, Weiss’s counsel asked to reschedule Bullins’s deposition because
Weiss had been in a car accident and sustained injuries. (Doc. No. 65-11). On agreement of the
parties, the deposition was rescheduled for September 22, 2025.
The latest discovery dispute was brought to my attention on September 17, 2025, when non-
party Movants Rodney Rogers, Stacey Allan, Cole McKane, Sarah Jurden, and Dr. Maureen Wilson
filed a motion to quash, in whole or in part, the subpoenas issued by Weiss to take their depositions.
(Doc. No. 60). I heard arguments from counsel for Weiss and Movants on the issues raised in this
motion during a September 22, 2025 telephone conference. Based on those arguments, I granted
the motion to quash, in part. (See Doc. No. 61). I also granted Weiss’s counsel’s request to defer a
final decision on the issue of whether to quash, in full, the subpoenas issued to Rogers and Allan
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until after she had an opportunity to set forth her position in writing. In doing so, I adopted Weiss’s
counsel’s proposed opposition brief deadline of September 30, 2025.
On September 30, 2025, Weiss’s counsel filed a brief titled: “Opposition to BGSU’s Motion
To Quash Plaintiff’s Subpoena For Deposition Of President Rodney Rogers.” (Doc. No. 62). This
brief made no reference to Stacey Allan or the subpoena issued for her deposition. On that date,
Weiss’s counsel also filed a motion to extend the September 30, 2025 discovery deadline to October
31, 2025. (Doc. No. 63).
Apparently, in addition to her briefing, Weiss’s counsel also issued a subpoena to Bowling
Green State University on September 30, 2025, requesting production of documents. (See Doc. No.
66 at 6-9). Bowling Green State University subsequently filed a motion to quash this subpoena. (Id.
at 1-5).
At this time, briefing on both motions to quash, (Doc. Nos. 60 and 66), and the motion to
extend the discovery deadline is complete. (Doc. No. 63). I issue my decision on each here.
III. 	MOTION TO QUASH
“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 permits litigants to obtain discovery from nonparties via
subpoena while simultaneously protecting nonparties from excessively onerous requests for
information.” Lyons v. My Pillow, Inc., No. 23-1308, 2023 WL 8450724, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 6, 2023).
“[T]he scope of discovery through a subpoena is the same as that applicable to . . . the other
discovery rules.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45, Advisory Committee Notes (1970). That is, the general scope
of discovery through subpoena technically remains:
Unless otherwise limited by court order, . . . [p]arties may obtain discovery regarding
any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and
proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at
stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant
information, the parties’ resources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the
issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its
likely benefit.
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). But Rule 45 restricts what may be sought from nonparties by mandating
that: “[a] party or attorney responsible for issuing and serving a subpoena must take reasonable steps
to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on a person subject to the subpoena.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
45(d)(1).
Both Rule 26 and Rule 45 provide enforcement mechanisms. With respect to discovery
generally, Rule 26 mandates:
On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery
otherwise allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that:
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or can be
obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less
expensive;
(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity to obtain the information
by discovery in the action; or
(iii) the proposed discovery is outside the scope permitted by Rule 26(b)(1).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C). And with respect to subpoenas specifically, Rule 45 mandates,
“[o]n timely motion, the court for the district where compliance is required must quash or modify a
subpoena that . . . subjects a person to undue burden.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3).
Generally, “[t]he movant bears the burden of establishing that the issued subpoenas violate
Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Recycled Paper Greetings, Inc. v. Davis, No. 1:08-MC-
13, 2008 WL 440458, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 13, 2008). But “[w]hen an objection to the relevance of
the sought discovery is raised, the party seeking discovery must demonstrate that the requests are
relevant to the claims or defenses in the pending action.” Brink’s Cap., LLC v. Randazzo, No. 24-CV-
11570, 2025 WL 1975658, at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 16, 2025) (internal quotation marks and further
citation omitted). Only if the requesting party meets that burden will the objecting party be required
to “show why the request is otherwise improper.” Id.
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Because Rogers and Allan each object to the relevance of the discovery sought from them,
Weiss must first show the requests are relevant to his claim or Bullins’s defenses.
A. 	S TACEY ALLAN
The subpoena issued to Allan commanded her to appear for a deposition and bring with her:
All information, including emails, correspondence, notes, text messages, tape-
recordings, video-recordings, or otherwise, in connection with the necessary training
for fraternity/sorority life from 2020 through 2022, including all information related
to the SPARK training material and all information related to student participation
with said training from the calendar year 2019 through 2020.
(Doc. No. 58 at 3). The subpoena does not identify topics on which Weiss seeks Allan’s testimony.
But “assum[ing] the testimony sought will cover the same topics as the documents requested,” Allan
contends the testimony sought is not relevant to Weiss’s “only remaining claim in this case
concern[ing] Plaintiff’s due process right to cross-examine his accuser.” (Doc. No. 60 at 5-6). In
doing so, she notes that the document request and presumably related testimony concerns Weiss’s
previously dismissed claims regarding the Spark training. (Id. at 6 (citing Doc. No. 24 at 17-18)).
Weiss offers no argument is his opposition brief to show Allan’s testimony is relevant to his
remaining claim. (See Doc. No. 62). Without such a showing of relevance, I conclude Weiss has
failed to meet his burden and grant Allan’s motion to quash the subpoena issued to her.
B. 	R ODNEY R OGERS
Remaining is the subpoena issued to Rogers commanding him to appear for a deposition
and bring with him:
All information, including correspondence, notes, text messages, tape-recordings,
video-recordings, or otherwise, in connection with your duties as a panel member
regarding the disciplinary hearing for former BGSU student, Chase Weiss, on or
about July 7 and July 8, 2021.
(Doc. No. 55 at 3). The subpoena does not identify topics on which Weiss seeks Rogers’s
testimony. But like Allan, Rogers assumes the topics will track the document request and that Weiss
expects him to testify about his alleged “duties as a panel member regarding the disciplinary
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hearing.” (Doc. No. 60 at 4 (quoting Doc. No. 55 at 3)). Rogers asserts he not only was not a panel
member to the hearing, but also “had no role, whatsoever, in [the] disciplinary hearing.” (Doc. No.
60 at 4). 	Rogers also asserts he was not involved in the panel’s decision to discipline Weiss, did not
review the panel’s decision, and was not involved in Weiss’s appeal of the panel’s decision. (Id.).
In his opposition brief, Weiss does not challenge Rogers’s assertion that he was not a panel
member on the disciplinary hearing. But Weiss maintains Rogers was involved in the disciplinary
hearing and seeks:
to further question him regarding his involvement in Plaintiff’s conduct hearing
causing Plaintiff to be subject to a clearly unfair and biased panel (panel sat on
previous conduct hearings related to the same incident), with a panel where at least
one of the members and the Dean of Students co-chaired on an anti-hazing
presidential group and then imposed a zero tolerance standard presiding on the
Plaintiff’s conduct hearing, and, impacting and allowing the consideration of
evidence related to his alleged accuser, although Plaintiff was not permitted to cross-
examine him and received a severe penalty, being suspended for eight years from the
university.
(Doc. No. 62 at 5). In support, Weiss offers a “chronological order of events” that ultimately
resulted in his suspension. But as correctly noted by Rogers, Weiss cites no evidence to support this
version of events.
Even taking Weiss’s version of the chronological events as true, he has failed to show the
testimony he seeks from Rogers is relevant to his single remaining claim against Bullins or Bullins’s
defenses to that claim. Instead, the testimony he seeks relates to his previously dismissed claim
regarding allegedly biased decisionmakers. (See Doc. No. 24 at 18-19). Because Weiss does not seek
Rogers’s testimony on any issue related to the denial of an opportunity to cross-examine his accuser,
I must conclude he has failed to show the testimony sought from Rogers is within the scope of
discovery and grant the motion to quash the subpoena issued to Rogers.
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Because Weiss does not seek testimony or documents from Rogers or Allan that is within
Rule 26(b)(1)’s scope of discovery for his single remaining claim, Movants’ motion to quash is
granted.
IV. 	MOTION TO E XTEND THE DISCOVERY DEADLINE
In accordance with the discussion during the September 22, 2025 telephone conference, I
ordered that “with the exception of the[ ] two disputed depositions, discovery must be completed by
the current discovery deadline – September 30, 2025.” (Doc. No. 61 at 2). I also ordered:
Should the parties agree to conduct any discovery after the September 30, 2025
deadline but before I hold the [further anticipated] status conference, they must file a
written stipulation to such an extension. This stipulation must describe with
particularity the scope of the stipulated discovery and state the deadline(s) by which
this discovery will be completed.
(Id.).
Without consulting with Bullins’s counsel regarding the possibility of conducting discovery
after the September 30, 2025 deadline, Weiss’s counsel filed a motion on the date of the discovery
deadline seeking a further thirty-day extension, asserting:
The reason for said request is that Plaintiff has discovered information at the
depositions taken last week, which are paramount to his case. Plaintiff further asserts
that he was in a serious car accident and suffered from a severe burn from the airbag
and a concussion which caused him to have to reschedule depositions to a later date.
Finally, Plaintiff has filed an Opposition to A Motion to Quash, seeking to take
depositions of non-parties.
(Doc. No. 63). Bullins filed an opposition brief to Weiss’s motion and supporting exhibits. (Doc.
No. 65). Weiss’s counsel filed a reply brief ten days after it was due. (Doc. No. 68). See Local R.
7.1(e).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 provides that the case “schedule may be modified only
for good cause and with the judge’s consent.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4). Good cause exists to extend
a deadline when the deadline “cannot reasonably be met despite the diligence of the party seeking
the extension.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 16, Advisory Committee Notes (1983).
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Here, Weiss’s counsel has failed to show “good cause” for a further extension of the already
repeatedly-extended discovery deadline.
First, as discussed above, I grant the motion to quash the subpoenas issued to Rogers and
Allan; therefore, Weiss’s third argument in support of his motion for an extension is moot.
Second, in neither the initial motion nor the reply does Weiss’s counsel identify what
information was first discovered at the depositions taken the week prior to the discovery deadline,
let alone explain how that recently-discovered information is “paramount to his case.”
Finally, while I am not unsympathetic to Weiss’s car accident and resulting injury, the
evidence submitted by Bullins shows Weiss’s inability to meet the September 30, 2025 discovery
deadline was primarily due to Weiss’s counsel’s failure to diligently pursue the discovery for which
she sought a three-month extension to conduct. During the July 1, 2025 telephone conference,
Weiss’s counsel represented that the need to conduct additional depositions was dependent on the
outcome of Bullins’s deposition.
But Weiss’s counsel ignored Bullins’s counsel’s attempts to promptly schedule that
deposition for the beginning of August, did not make an affirmative attempt to schedule the
deposition herself until more than a month after the July 1, 2025 telephone conference, subsequently
was unresponsive when Bullins’s counsel provided her with dates of availability, and eventually
chose the latest of those available dates – September 12, 2025 – rather than the earlier date of
August 29, 2025. (Doc. Nos. 65-1, 65-6, 65-7). In short, even if the car accident had not occurred,
Weiss’s counsel would not have begun conducting the discovery, for which they requested three
months, until 18 days before the deadline.
In neither their motion nor their reply does Weiss’s counsel attempt to show they acted
diligently in trying to meet the September 30, 2025 discovery deadline. Nor could they. Instead, in
their reply brief, they point to events that occurred earlier in discovery that resulted in delays. (Doc.
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No. 68). This has no bearing on their diligence in meeting the September 30, 2025 discovery
deadline. Because Weiss’s counsel has failed to show good cause for a further extension, I must
deny their motion to further extend the discovery deadline.
Relatedly, because Weiss did not issue the subpoena to Bowling Green State University until
the date of the discovery deadline, I grant Bowling Green State University’s motion to quash that
subpoena. (Doc. No. 66).
It is well-settled that “[a] subpoena that seeks documents under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 45 is a discovery device subject to the same deadlines as other forms of discovery set
forth in the court’s scheduling order.” Fabery v. Mid-S. Ob-GYN, No. 06-2136 D/P, 2000 WL
35641544, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. May 15, 2008) (citing cases). “Courts act within their sound discretion
in quashing a subpoena where the discovery sought would not be produced until after expiration of
the discovery deadline.” Allstate Ins. Co. v. Papanek, 309 F. Supp. 3d 511, 514 (S.D. Ohio 2018)
(citing Sixth Circuit precedent).
Here, the discovery deadline was September 30, 2025. But Weiss’s counsel did not issue the
subpoena to Bowling Green State University until that date, demanding production by October 23,
2025 – 23 days after the discovery deadline. Because the discovery sought through the subpoena
would not have been produced until after the discovery deadline, the subpoena is quashed. See, e.g.,
Mann v. LNKBox Grp., Inc., No. 2:22-CV-2553, 2024 WL 4986996, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 5, 2024)
(quashing a subpoena sua sponte because “the production requested would occur weeks after the
deadline.”).
V. 	R ECONSIDERATION
In the course of deciding these motions, I discovered case law which caused me to question
the correctness of my previous conclusion that Ex Parte Young did not apply to allow Weiss to
pursue his procedural due process claim based on the denial of an opportunity to cross-examine his
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accuser against Bullins in his official capacity, and not just in his individual capacity. 	See, e.g., Noakes
v. Univ. of Cincinnati, No. 24-3388, 2024 WL 4579453, at *2-*3 (6th Cir. Oct. 25, 2024); Ashford v.
Univ. of Mich., 89 F.4th 960, 969-70 (6th Cir. 2024); Morgan v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of the Sup. Ct. of Tenn., 63
F.4th 510, 515-16 (6th Cir. 2023).
Because my decision on that issue is not yet “final,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b), I order the parties
to brief the limited issue of whether any form of the relief sought by Weiss from Bullins in his
official capacity for the alleged due process violation is recognized by the Sixth Circuit as
“prospective relief” such that sovereign immunity does not bar such a claim. To the extent Bullins
is no longer employed by Bowling Green State University, the briefing should address the official
capacity role he held, and who holds that role now that might be substituted as a party to this action.
See, e.g., Ashford, 89 F.4th at 970 (“[W]ith respect to a claim against an officer in their official capacity,
the suit may proceed against whoever has replaced Evans in his role as Vice Chancellor.”).
The briefing need not address the underlying alleged due process violation of denial of the
opportunity to cross-examine his accuser. And the briefing must not address conduct giving rise to
previously-dismissed claims (e.g., Spark training, allegedly biased decisionmakers, and the admission
of prejudicial, inflammatory, or hearsay statements). (See Doc. No. 24 at 14-19).
In considering this briefing, I will not apply the motion for reconsideration standard because
I have ordered this additional briefing sua sponte. Instead, I will apply the Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss standard – the same standard I applied when concluding the official capacity claim was
subject to dismissal. The parties should do the same in their briefing.
Because of the narrow scope of this additional briefing, I order that no brief exceed five
pages in length, double-spaced with normal margins. The parties should file their briefs in
accordance with the following briefing schedule:
1.) Weiss’s opening brief must be filed no later than December 1, 2025;
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2.) Bullins’s response must be filed no later than December 15, 2025; and
3.) Any reply must be filed no later than December 22, 2025.
No extension of these deadlines will be granted without a specific and compelling showing of good
cause.
VI. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I grant the pending motions to quash, (Doc. Nos. 60 and 66),
and I deny Weiss’s motion to extend the discovery deadline. (Doc. No. 63). I order further
briefing on the narrow issue outlined above.
Should Movants or Bullins seek sanctions in the form of attorney’s fees or otherwise in
connection with these motions, they should file such a motion for such relief and any supporting
documentation (e.g., time logs, documentation supporting an hourly rate, etc.) within fourteen days
of this Memorandum Opinion and Order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(f); Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(1). The
briefing on any such non-dispositive motion including page limitations and responsive brief
deadlines will be governed by Local Rule 7.1.
Discovery on Weiss’s individual capacity claim is closed and will not be reopened without a
specific and compelling showing of good cause.
If I conclude it is appropriate to revive Weiss’s official capacity claim based on the denial of
an opportunity to cross-examine his accuser, I will then consider whether any additional discovery
on that claim is warranted and the timeline for such discovery. No discovery on a not-yet revived
claim may be conducted at this time.
But to ensure timely completion of any potential additional discovery, I urge the parties to
consider what, if any, additional discovery might be necessary to support or defend against an
official capacity claim while the additional briefing is pending before me. In doing so, the parties
should be prepared to articulate why any additional discovery they may seek for the official capacity
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claim was not relevant to the claim against Bullins in his individual capacity but is relevant to the
analogous official capacity claim against him or whoever is in his role now.
Before evaluating these potential discovery needs, I strongly urge Weiss’s counsel to re-read
my September 30, 2022 Memorandum Opinion and Order. In briefing filed as late as yesterday,
they make arguments related to Spark training and allegedly biased decisionmakers. (See Doc. No.
67 and 68). Again, for the reasons stated in my Memorandum Opinion and Order, any claim
relating to Spark training and allegedly biased decisionmakers was dismissed on September 30, 2022.
(Doc. No. 24 at 15-19). If discovery is reopened for any reason and Weiss again seeks discovery on
any matter not relevant to the alleged due process violation of being denied an opportunity to cross-
examine his accuser, I will award sanctions against Weiss, his counsel, or both.
So Ordered.
s/ Jeffrey J. Helmick
United States District Judge
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