Carter v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
CASHAY CARTER, ) CASE NO. 1:25-cv-66
)
)
Plaintiff, ) CHIEF JUDGE SARA LIOI
)
)
vs. )
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
)
)
)
)
Defendant. )
Before the Court is the report and recommendation (“R&R”) of Magistrate Judge Carmen
E. Henderson recommending that the Court affirm the decision of the defendant, the Commissioner
of Social Security (the “Commissioner”), denying the application of plaintiff, Cashay Carter
(“Carter”), for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). (Doc. No. 14 (R&R).) The R&R was filed
on September 29, 2025. On October 1, 2025, the case was stayed due to the lapse in appropriations
funding the federal government. (Order [non-document], 10/1/2025). On November 14, 2025, the
stay was lifted due to the availability of appropriations funding the federal government. (Order
[non-document], 11/14/2025). That same day (November 14, 2025), Carter filed a timely objection
to the R&R (Doc. No. 15), and soon thereafter the Commissioner filed a response (Doc. No. 16).
Upon de novo review, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court overrules Carter’s objections,
accepts the R&R, affirms the decision of the Commissioner, and dismisses the case.
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I. BACKGROUND1
On June 2, 2022, Carter filed an application for SSI. (Doc. No. 8 (Administrative
Transcript), at 261.)2 She alleged disability owing to a number of conditions, including bipolar
disorder, schizoaffective disorder, major depressive disorder, unspecified trauma and stressor
related disorder, and unspecified personality disorder. (Id.) Carter alleged a disability onset date
of March 1, 1998. (Id.) Carter’s application for SSI was denied initially and upon reconsideration.
(Id. at 73–76, 84–86.) Carter then requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge
(“ALJ”). The hearing was held on October 3, 2023. (Id. at 36.) The hearing transcript is in the
record. (Id. at 36–52.)
The ALJ issued his decision on November 6, 2023. (Id. at 18–27.) The ALJ found that
Carter suffered from severe impairments, including major depression, unspecified personality
disorder, unspecified trauma and stressor related disorder, and schizophreniform illness. (Id. at
23.) But the ALJ also determined that these impairments did not meet or medically equal the
severity of any one of the listed impairments in the Social Security regulations, and that Carter
retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a full range of work at all exertion
levels with certain non-exertional limitations. (Id. at 23–25.) The ALJ concluded that Carter could
perform her past relevant work as a dining room attendant and kitchen helper. (Id. at 30.) In
addition to these jobs, the ALJ also found that Carter could perform a significant number of other
jobs existing in the national economy, such as hospital cleaner, packager, and window cleaner, and
1 The R&R contains a more detailed recitation of the factual background in this case. (See Doc. No. 14.) This Court
includes only the factual and procedural background pertinent to Carter’s objections.
2 All page number references herein are to the consecutive page numbers applied to each individual document by the
Court’s electronic filing system.
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was, therefore, not disabled as defined under § 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. (Id. at
31.) Carter subsequently requested a review of the ALJ’s action. (Id. at 13–14.) On November 19,
2024, the Appeals Council denied Carter’s request for review. (Id. at 5–7.) Carter timely filed the
instant action, seeking judicial review. (Doc. No. 1 (Complaint).) Carter, represented by counsel,
filed a brief on the merits (Doc. No. 10), the Commissioner filed a response brief on the merits
(Doc. No. 12), and Carter filed a reply brief (Doc. No. 13). On September 29, 2025, the magistrate
judge issued her R&R, recommending that the Court affirm the Commissioner’s decision. (Doc.
No. 14, at 20.)
The magistrate judge found that the ALJ erred in concluding that Carter’s past work as a
dining room attendant and kitchen helper were substantial gainful activity (“SGA”) because
Carter’s earnings did not reach the Social Security Administration’s threshold SGA activity
amounts during any relevant year. (Id. at 12.) Subsequently, those activities could not be construed
as past relevant work. (Id.) Nevertheless, the magistrate judge concluded that this constituted
harmless error because the ALJ proceeded to make an alternative finding that Carter could perform
other unskilled occupations that did not rely on her past relevant work. (Id. at 13.)
The magistrate judge also determined that the ALJ erred in failing to ask the vocational
expert about the possible conflict between her testimony and the Department of Labor’s Dictionary
of Occupational Titles’ (DOT) description of a packager. (Id. at 18.) The magistrate judge found
this error to be harmless as well because a conflict existed only as to one of the three jobs identified
by the vocational expert. (Id. 17.) Because there was substantial evidence in the record that Carter
could perform the duties of a hospital cleaner and window cleaner, and there was no apparent or
obvious conflict between the vocational expert’s testimony and the DOT descriptions, the
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magistrate judge recommended that the Commissioner’s decision be affirmed. (Id. at 17–20.)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court’s review of the magistrate judge's R&R is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 636(b),
which requires a de novo decision as to those portions of the R&R to which objection is made.
“An ‘objection’ that does nothing more than state a disagreement with a magistrate’s suggested
resolution, or simply summarizes what has been presented before, is not an ‘objection’ as that term
is used in this context.” Aldrich v. Bock, 327 F. Supp. 2d 743, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2004); see also
Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) (“The district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate
judge's disposition that has been properly objected to.”); Local Rule 72.3(b) (any objecting party
shall file “written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings,
recommendations, or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections[ ]”).
Judicial review is limited to a determination of whether the ALJ applied the correct legal
standards and whether there is “substantial evidence” in the record as a whole to support the
decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Kyle v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 609 F.3d 847, 854–55 (6th Cir. 2010)
(citation omitted). “Substantial evidence is less than a preponderance but more than a scintilla; it
refers to relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.” Gentry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 741 F.3d 708, 722 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing Rogers v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)).
A reviewing court is not permitted to resolve conflicts in evidence or to decide questions
of credibility. DeLong v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 748 F.3d 723, 726 (6th Cir. 2014); Bass v.
McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 509 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). Nor need the reviewing court
necessarily agree with the Commissioner’s determination in order to affirm it. “Even if [the c]ourt
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might have reached a contrary conclusion of fact, the Commissioner’s decision must be affirmed
so long as it is supported by substantial evidence.” Kyle, 609 F.3d at 854–55 (citation omitted).
This is true even if substantial evidence also supports the claimant’s position. See McClanahan v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 474 F.3d 830, 833 (6th Cir. 2006); Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th
Cir. 2001) (“The findings of the Commissioner are not subject to reversal merely because there
exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion.” (citation omitted)).
Even when there is substantial evidence, however, “‘a decision of the Commissioner will
not be upheld where the [Social Security Administration] fails to follow its own regulations and
where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.’”
Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bowen v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007) (further citations omitted)). Likewise, a
court “cannot uphold an ALJ’s decision, even if there ‘is enough evidence in the record to support
the decision, [where] the reasons given by the trier of fact do not build an accurate and logical
bridge between the evidence and the result.’” Fleischer v. Astrue, 774 F. Supp. 2d 875, 877 (N.D.
Ohio 2011) (quoting Sarchet v. Chater, 78 F.3d 305, 307 (7th Cir. 1996); and citing Wilson v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544–46 (6th Cir. 2004) (finding it was not harmless error for
the ALJ to fail to make sufficiently clear why he rejected the treating physician’s opinion, even if
substantial evidence not mentioned by the ALJ may have existed to support the ultimate decision
to reject the treating physician’s opinion)).
III. DISCUSSION
Carter submits two objections to the R&R, arguing that: (i) the recommendation that the
ALJ’s Step Four and Five errors were harmless was erroneous; and (ii) the R&R failed to address
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the unreliability of the vocational testimony.
A. Whether the ALJ’s Errors Were Harmless
Carter argues that the ALJ’s errors were not harmless because “each of [the alternative jobs
of hospital cleaner, packager3, and window cleaner] had requirements that conflicted with the
limitations found by the ALJ in the RFC[.]” (Doc. No. 15, at 3.) Specifically, Carter asserts that
the ALJ limited her from performing “tasks involving . . . being responsible for the safety o[r]
welfare o[f] others[.]” (Id.) But Carter avers that “both [jobs of hospital cleaner and window
cleaner] clearly involve responsibility for the safety and welfare of other individuals and things”
and the ALJ’s failure to identify the conflict between Carter’s RFC and the DOT descriptions of
these jobs results in the ALJ’s determination not being supported by substantial evidence. (Id. at
4–6.)
The Commissioner counters by arguing that “the ALJ’s RFC was not that [p]laintiff could
not perform any activity that might impact ‘the safety or welfare of others[.]’ Rather, the ALJ
limited [p]laintiff to superficial interaction with others, which the ALJ described as interactions
that did not require ‘tasks involving . . . being responsible for the safety or welfare of others[.]’”
(Doc. No. 16, at 2 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).) Interpreted in this fuller context, the
Commissioner contends that the ALJ did not err in his decision because “[n]othing about the
hospital cleaner occupation or the window cleaner occupation suggests that these occupations
involve interpersonal interaction impacting ‘the safety or welfare of others.’” (Id. (emphasis in
original).)
3 The role of packager is not at issue in this objection because the magistrate judge concluded the packager position
conflicted with Carter’s limitations stated in the RFC (Doc. No. 14, at 18), and the Commissioner does not dispute
this finding. (Doc. No. 16, at 2 n.1.)
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As an initial matter, Carter reiterates the same argument she made in her brief. (Compare
Doc. No. 15, at 3–4, with Doc. No. 10, at 11–12.) Her argument that the alternative jobs
contradicted with the ALJ’s limitations was raised her merits brief (Doc. No. 10, at 11–12) and
considered by the magistrate judge (Doc. No. 14, at 19–20 (concluding that “[t]he alleged conflicts
between Carter’s limitation and the description of the hospital cleaner and window washer
positions are not obvious or apparent” and “[t]herefore, the ALJ did not err in failing to address
the alleged discrepancies”)). Objections that simply “rehash” arguments made in the plaintiff's
brief are not proper objections under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). See Aldrich, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 747
(“An ‘objection’ that does nothing more than state a disagreement with a magistrate’s suggested
resolution, or simply summarizes what has been presented before, is not an ‘objection’ as that term
is used in this context.”); see also Alston v. Voorhies, No. 7-cv-2284, 2010 WL 3895069, at *10
(N.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2010) (collecting cases) (declining to address arguments analyzed in the R&R
that were reasserted in the plaintiff’s objections).
Even if the objection were proper, Carter’s argument is unpersuasive. The pertinent part of
the ALJ’s decision describing Carter’s RFC is reproduced below:
After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the
claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all
exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: can perform
simple, routine, and repetitive tasks but not at a production rate pace (e.g., assembly
line work); occasional interaction with supervisors and coworkers; infrequent,
superficial interaction with the public (“infrequent” is further defined as 2 hours or
less in an 8-hour day and “superficial” is further defined as doing no tasks involving
arbitration, negotiation, confrontation, directing the work of others, persuading
others, or being responsible for the safety or welfare of others); and can make
simple work-related decisions.
(Doc. No. 8, at 25.) Read in context, the Court concludes that limitation regarding “tasks . . . being
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responsible for the safety or welfare of others” specifically refers to interpersonal interactions. The
parenthetical that includes the language at issue defines the preceding term “infrequent, superficial
interaction.” A plain reading of the ALJ’s decision, therefore, would support the Commissioner’s
argument that Carter’s RFC limited her from engaging in occupations involving interpersonal
interactions concerning the safety or welfare of others.
Neither of the DOT descriptions of hospital cleaner or window cleaner occupations conflict
with Carter’s interpersonal interaction limitation. The DOT describes a hospital cleaner as
someone who:
[c]leans hospital patient rooms, baths, laboratories, offices, halls, and other areas:
Washes beds and mattresses, and remakes beds after dismissal of patients. Keeps
utility and storage rooms in clean and orderly condition. Distributes laundered
articles and linens. Replaces soiled drapes and cubicle curtains. Performs other
duties as described under CLEANER (any industry) I Master Title. May disinfect
and sterilize equipment and supplies, using germicides and sterilizing equipment.
323.687-010 Cleaner, Hospital, DICOT 323.687-010. Similarly, a window cleaner is described as
someone who:
[c]leans windows, glass partitions, mirrors, and other glass surfaces of building
interior or exterior, using pail of soapy water or other cleaner, sponge, and
squeegee. Crawls through window from inside and hooks safety belt to brackets for
support, sets and climbs ladder to reach second or third story, or uses bosun's chair,
swing stage, or other scaffolding lowered from roof to reach outside windows, or
stands to reach first floor or inside windows.
389.687-014 Cleaner, Window, DICOT 389.687-014.
A conflict exists between an expert’s testimony and the DOT’s listings only when it is
obvious or apparent. Gutierrez v. Colvin, 844 F.3d 804, 808 (9th Cir. 2016). “This means that the
testimony must be at odds with the [DOT’s] listing of job requirements that are essential, integral,
or expected.” Id. Where the job itself is a familiar one, less scrutiny by the ALJ is required. Id.
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Here, neither of these occupations apparently or obviously involve interpersonal interactions
involving “tasks . . . being responsible for the safety or welfare of others.” As such, the Court finds
no conflict between the RFC limitations identified by the ALJ and these two alternative jobs that
would render the ALJ’s decision erroneous for failure to follow its own regulations or for lack of
substantial evidence. Accordingly, Carter’s first objection is overruled.
B. Whether the R&R Failed to Address the Unreliability of the Vocational
Testimony
Next, Carter contends that the vocational expert’s testimony was unreliable. (Doc. No. 15,
at 7.) Carter states that in her original briefing, she asked the Court to “look at the [vocational
expert’s] and ALJ errors in combination as they demonstrate a decisionmaker with an intention to
deny [p]laintiff’s case, regardless of the evidence before him.” (Id.) Carter objects to the magistrate
judge’s purported failure to address the reliability of the vocational expert’s testimony or make
any recommendation. (Id. at 7–8.)
The Commissioner insists that Carter never raised such a separate argument. (Doc. No. 16,
at 3.) Instead, “[p]laintiff[’s] reliability argument was predicated in part on the claim that the
window and hospital cleaner occupations conflicted with the ALJ’s RFC assessment.” (Id.) But
because the magistrate judge rejected plaintiff’s argument that there was an apparent conflict,
“[p]laintiff’s claim that the [vocational expert’s] testimony was unreliable necessarily failed.” (Id.
at 3–4.)
The Court agrees with the Commissioner’s characterization that Carter’s purported
challenge was not a separate independent argument. Carter’s argument regarding the vocational
expert’s credibility was not a separate section but instead nestled within the second argument
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section, structurally implying that it is not an independent argument. More to the point, while
Carter claimed that the vocational expert’s testimony was unreliable, this assertion was based on
the notion that “each of [the alternative jobs] exceeded the [p]laintiff’s restrictions in the RFC.”
(Id. at 13.) The magistrate judge rejected this argument, rendering any discussion of the reliability
of the vocational expert’s purported flawed testimony unnecessary.
Finally, to the extent Carter brings an objection alleging that “the [vocational expert] and
ALJ errors in combination . . . demonstrate a decisionmaker with an intention to deny [p]laintiff’s
case, regardless of the evidence before him[,]” the Court considers this objection as improper. See
Local Rule 72.3(b) (directing objecting parties to file “written objections which shall specifically
identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations, or report to which objection is
made and the basis for such objections”). Furthermore, Carter offers no evidence in support of her
assertion that the ALJ was predisposed to rule against her beyond the fact that he issued an
unfavorable decision. Therefore, the Court overrules this objection.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Carter’s objections to the R&R (Doc. No. 15) are
OVERRULED, the R&R (Doc. No. 14) is ACCEPTED, and the Commissioner’s decision is
AFFIRMED. This case is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 22, 2025
HONORABLE SARA LIOI
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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