Harris v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
CHERYL HARRIS,
Plaintiff,
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.
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CASE NO. 1:24-cv-2236
JUDGE CHARLES E. FLEMING
MAGISTRATE JUDGE AMANDA M.
KNAPP
OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING
MAGISTRATE’S REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is Magistrate Judge Amanda M. Knapp’s Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”) recommending that the Court should affirm the final decision of the Commissioner of
the Social Security Administration (“Commissioner”). (ECF No. 14). Plaintiff Cheryl Harris filed
timely objections. (ECF No. 14). Upon consideration of the objections, the Court ADOPTS the
R&R in its entirety and AFFIRMS the final decision of the Commissioner.
I. 	BACKGROUND
The Court adopts and incorporates the detailed recitation of the factual and procedural
background contained in the R&R, to which Harris raised no objections. (ECF No. 14, PageID
#1849–66). The Court will only briefly summarize the relevant background.
In October 2019, Harris filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and
Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), alleging a disability onset date of September 30, 2017.
(ECF No. 9, PageID #106–07, 284–92). In February 2022, Harris amended the alleged onset date
to July 29, 2020. 	(Id. at PageID #320). 	The Social Security Administration denied Harris’s
application at the initial level, (id. at PageID #155–64), and upon reconsideration, (id. at PageID
#174–89).
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Harris requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”); ALJ Noceeba
Southern held a hearing on February 10, 2022. (Id. at PageID #88–105, 190). On April 7, 2022,
the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision, finding that Harris was not disabled, as defined in the
Social Security Act, from the alleged onset date to the date of the decision. (Id. at PageID #65–81).
After Harris filed a complaint challenging the unfavorable decision in the Northern District of
Ohio, the district court issued an order of remand based on the parties’ joint stipulation to remand.
(Id. at PageID #881–83). 	On January 23, 2024, the Appeals Council vacated the unfavorable
decision and remanded the case to an ALJ for issuance of a new decision. (Id. at PageID #903–04).
On remand, ALJ Matthew Winfrey held a telephonic hearing on August 8, 2024. (Id. at
PageID #816–51). On August 28, 2024, the ALJ issued a partially favorable decision, finding that
Harris was not disabled prior to July 23, 2023, but became disabled on that date and continued to
be disabled through the date of the decision. (Id. at PageID #776–803).
In doing so, the ALJ determined at Step Four that Harris, prior to July 23, 2023, had the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work with the following limitations:
[Harris] could occasionally climb ramps and stairs. 	She should avoid climbing
ladders, ropes, and scaffolds. [Harris] could up to frequently stoop, kneel, crouch,
and crawl. 	[Harris] should avoid exposure to workplace hazards, such as
unprotected heights, and dangerous, unprotected, moving, mechanical parts.
[Harris] should have no more than occasional exposure to concentrated irritants
such as visible dust clouds, noxious odors, caustic fumes, and other pulmonary
irritants.
(Id. at PageID #786). 	Of relevance here, the ALJ determined that Certified Nurse Practitioner
(“CNP”) Wickham’s February 2022 opinion as to Harris’s physical limitations, particularly as to
her ability to lift/carry no more than five pounds, was only partially persuasive because it was
“more restrictive than the objective treatment notes of the time support.” (Id. at PageID #794–95).
The ALJ also declined to adopt Dr. Katsaros opinion that Harris was limited to lifting/carrying
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objects of five pounds or less because such a limitation was unsupported by the record. 	(Id. at
PageID #799). On December 23, 2024, Harris filed this action to obtain judicial review. (ECF
No. 1).
On 	November 	25, 	2025, 	Magistrate 	Judge 	Amanda 	M. 	Knapp 	issued 	her 	R&R
recommending that the Court should affirm the final decision of the Commissioner. (ECF No. 14).
Harris timely filed an objection to the R&R on December 8, 2025. (ECF No. 15).
II. 	LEGAL STANDARD
A. 	Objections to the R&R
Under the Federal Magistrates Act, a district court must conduct a de novo review of those
portions of the report and recommendation to which the parties have objected. 	28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1)(C); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). Absent objection, a district court may adopt a report and
recommendation without further review. See Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 939 (1991);
Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 141–42 (1985). Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 72(b)(3), a district
judge:
[M]ust determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition that has
been properly objected to. 	The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the
recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the
magistrate judge with instructions.
Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 72(b)(3). 	An objection must address specific issues within the magistrate
judge’s report and recommendation. Howard v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 932 F.2d 505, 509
(6th Cir. 1991). That means that a petitioner must direct “the district judge’s attention to specific
issues decided by the magistrate contrary to [the petitioner’s] position.” Ayers v. Bradshaw, No.
3:07-cv-2663, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27218, 2008 WL 906100, at *2 (N.D. Ohio, Mar. 31, 2008)
(quoting Neuman v. Rivers, 125 F.3d 315, 323 (6th Cir. 1997)); see also Bulls v. Potter, No. 5:16-
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cv-2095, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30163, 2020 WL 870931, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2020)
(providing that objections “must be specific in order to trigger the de novo review”).
General objections are insufficient to meet the specificity requirement; objections “must
be clear enough to enable the district court to discern those issues that are dispositive and
contentious.” Spencer v. Bouchard, 449 F.3d 721, 725 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting Miller v. Currie,
50 F.3d 373, 380 (6th Cir. 1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Howard, 932 F.2d
at 509 (providing that a general objection to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation “has
the same effects as would a failure to object”). “An ‘objection’ that does nothing more than state
a disagreement with a magistrate’s suggested resolution, or simply summarizes what has been
presented before, is not an ‘objection’ as that term is used in this context. Aldrich v. Bock, 327 F.
Supp. 2d 743, 747 (E.D. Mich. 2004).
B. 	Review of ALJ’s Decision
According to 42 U.S.C. 405(g), courts reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision
determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence and whether proper legal standards were
applied: “The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by
substantial evidence, shall be conclusive.” As the Commissioner explains in his brief, “substantial
evidence” is not a high threshold. Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 102–03 (2019). “It means—
and means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.” 	Id. (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 	“[T]he
Commissioner’s decision cannot be overturned if substantial evidence, or even a preponderance
of the evidence, supports the claimant’s position, so long as substantial evidence also supports the
conclusion reached by the ALJ.” Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2003).
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The reviewing court is limited to evaluating whether the ALJ’s explanations “are
reasonable and supported by substantial evidence in the record; the court “accord[s] the ALJ’s
determinations of credibility great weight and deference particularly since the ALJ has the
opportunity, which [the court does] not, of observing a witness’s demeanor while testifying.” Id.
at 476. The ALJ thus enjoys a “zone of choice” to decide between the parties’ competing positions
“without the fear of appellate court interference.” Arnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 76 F. App’x 713,
716 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Mullen v. Brown, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986)).
III. 	DISCUSSION
In her objection, Harris notes that the R&R recommends affirming the Commissioner’s
non-disability decision; she specifically highlights the Magistrate Judge’s conclusion that “the ALJ
properly explained why the lifting/carrying/walking/standing limitations opined by the medical
sources were not adopted.” (ECF No. 15, PageID #1875). Harris then provides the same argument
she put forth in her reply brief, word for word:
“[T]he ALJ failed to properly explain why the “lifting/carrying/standing/walking”
limitations were not adopted, other than explaining that the “reduction in exertional
capacity” is consistent with abnormal findings in the medical record, including
shuffling gait and positive straight leg raise. (Id.) The ALJ particularly failed to
provide a clear rationale for not adopting the limitation to lifting only five pounds,
which is not harmless because of the consistency between the opinions CNP
Wickham and Dr. Katsaros with regard to Harris’s limited ability to lift/carry no
more than five pounds. (Id.).”
(Compare id., with ECF No. 13, PageID #1845). This is not a proper objection because Harris is
simply rehashing and providing the same arguments that she put forth to Magistrate Judge Knapp.
See Nasser v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 598 F. Supp. 3d 614, 626 (E.D. Mich. 2022), aff’d, 2022 U.S.
App. LEXIS 33278 (6th Cir. Dec. 1, 2022) (“This objection seemingly rehashes Plaintiff’s
disagreement with the ALJ’s finding[s] . . . . This challenge is not a proper objection to the Report
and Recommendation, as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), because it merely rehashes [Plaintiff]’s
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arguments. Because [the] objection is not proper, it will be overruled.”) (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted); Davis v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:24-cv-1447, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
117304, at *13–14 (N.D. Ohio June 20, 2025) (citations omitted); Bell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No.
1:23-cv-256, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28159, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 20, 2024) (“Again, this
argument mirrors the arguments Bell presented in her briefing. 	This objection is therefore
improper, amounting to a rehash of arguments already made to the magistrate judge.” (citations
omitted)).
Harris goes on to state that courts must review the rationale and findings provided in the
ALJ’s decision and the Commissioner cannot substitute post-hoc rationale for the disability
decision. (ECF No. 15, PageID #1875). This is also not a proper objection because Harris is solely
pointing to alleged mistakes in the ALJ’s decision and has not identified any error in the R&R.
Harris has not stated or argued that Magistrate Judge Knapp improperly relied on post-hoc
rationale to support her conclusions in the R&R; nor does she name any specific post-hoc rationale
relied upon in the R&R. Because the objection does not identify any error in the R&R itself, there
is no proper objection before the Court. See Aldrich, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 747; Gregory v. Kilolo
Kijakazi. Acting Comm’r of Soc. SEC, No. 1:23-cv-410, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55166, at *10–11
(N.D. Ohio Mar. 27, 2024) (“Without identifying why she believes the R&R was wrong, Plaintiff’s
objections are not sufficiently specific.”). 	Moreover, the R&R specifically addressed this
argument:
In her reply brief, Ms. Harris contends that the Commissioner improperly relies on
post-hoc rationale to argue that the ALJ sufficiently explained why he did not adopt
the limitations set forth in Dr. Katsaros’s opinion. (ECF Doc. 13, pp. 1-2.) But the
undersigned finds the Commissioner’s argument to be premised on record evidence
explicitly considered and discussed by the ALJ in evaluating the medical opinion
evidence and assessing Plaintiff’s RFC.
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(ECF No. 14, PageID #1872 n.6). Harris does not object to this finding in the R&R. She does not
explain how the Magistrate Judge’s finding was in error nor does she provide sufficient arguments
to support her contention that the ALJ failed to provide proper rationale.
Even if Harris’s objections were proper, the Court would still find them unpersuasive. The
responsibility for determining a claimant’s RFC rests solely with the ALJ based on his own
evaluation of the relevant medical and non-medical evidence. See Adams v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
No. 23-3284, 2023 U.S. App. LEXIS 25863, at *9 (6th Cir. Sep. 28, 2023); Shepard v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 705 F. App’x 435, 442–43 (6th Cir. 2017); Rudd v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 531 F. App’x
719, 728 (6th Cir. 2013). 	The applicable regulations require an ALJ to consider all medical
opinions when formulating the RFC; that said, an ALJ need only explain why a specific medical
opinion was not adopted if the RFC assessment conflicts with that medical opinion. SSR 96-8p,
1996 SSR LEXIS 5, at *20; see Vaden v. Berryhill, No. 1:17CV1656, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
144439, at *22–23 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 2018) (citing SSR 96-8p). Harris’s argument fails because
the ALJ satisfied his burden under SSR 96-8p by thoroughly explaining his rationale for declining
to adopt the exertional limitations on lifting/carrying five pounds or less opined by CNP Wickham
and Dr. Katsaros.
As noted in the R&R, the ALJ acknowledged that CNP Wickham and Dr. Katsaros both
opined that Harris was limited to lifting and carrying objects of five pounds or less and then
provided explanations about why he declined to adopt such limitations, citing specific evidence on
the record. 	(ECF No. 14, PageID #1869–70 (citing ECF No. 9, PageID #794–95, 799)).
Magistrate Judge Knapp found that the ALJ sufficiently explained his reasons for declining to
adopt the five-pound restriction, offering the following analysis:
The undersigned finds that the ALJ’s analysis of CNP Wickham’s and Dr.
Katsaros’s opinions (Tr. 739-40, 744), considered in combination with his earlier
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analysis of the medical evidence of record (Tr. 734-35), articulate a sufficient and
clear rationale for the ALJ’s decision not to adopt the more restrictive exertional
limitations, including the limitation to lifting/carrying five pounds. 	First, as
detailed above, when evaluating CNP Wickham’s and Dr. Katsaros’s opinions, the
ALJ observed the following:
• While the claimant had noted some cervical spine degeneration and
reported some presence of neck pain, radicular neck pain into the upper
extremities was not routinely reported to providers (Tr. 739);
• The claimant routinely exhibited normal muscle tone and bulk and showed
intact coordination and motor functioning (id.);
• The claimant showed 5/5 strength in the upper extremities (id.);
• The claimant displayed intact coordination, intact motor function, intact
muscle tone and bulk without atrophy, no evidence of pronator drift, and
normal reflexes, with intact sensation (Tr. 739-40);
• The claimant also at times showed no gait or stance deficits (Tr. 740);
• Even when the claimant showed some irregular gait, she also showed 5/5
strength in her extremities (id.)
• The record does not support any upper extremity strength deficits or
coordination problems (Tr. 744);
• The claimant did not show any objective nerve deficits in the upper
extremities (id.).
Ms. 	Harris 	does 	not 	challenge 	these 	findings 	or 	contend 	that 	the 	ALJ
mischaracterized the record.
* * *
While Ms. Harris may disagree with the ALJ’s decision not to adopt the very
restrictive lifting/carrying/standing/walking limitations described in the opinions of
Dr. Katsaros and CNP Wickham, she fails to demonstrate that the ALJ’s decision
lacks the support of substantial evidence. 	Jones, 336 F.3d at 477 (finding a
reviewing court cannot overturn the Commissioner’s decision, even if substantial
evidence supports a claimant’s position, “so long as substantial evidence also
supports the conclusion reached by the ALJ”). Moreover, the ALJ’s analysis of the
medical evidence and the two opinions provides a sufficiently clear rationale for
the 	ALJ’s 	decision 	not 	to 	adopt 	the 	very 	restrictive
lifting/carrying/standing/walking limitations contained in Dr. Katsaros’s and CNP
Wickham’s opinions.
(ECF No. 14, PageID #1870–72).
The Court adopts the above analysis, which Harris did not challenge in her objection. The
ALJ met his burden under SSR 96-8p by: (i) sufficiently explaining why CNP Wickham’s and Dr.
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Katsaros’s opinions were not adopted; and (ii) providing substantial evidence to support his
determination. See Jones, 336 F.3d at 477; Fleischer v. Astrue, 774 F. Supp. 2d 875, 880–81 (N.D.
Ohio 2011). Accordingly, the Court OVERRULES Harris’ objections as improper and, even if
her objections were considered proper, the Court would overrule them as meritless.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court OVERRULES Defendant’s objections (ECF No. 15),
ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s R&R (ECF No. 14), incorporates it fully herein by reference,
and AFFIRMS the final decision of the Commissioner.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: 	December 17, 2025 	____________________________________
CHARLES E. FLEMING
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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