United States of America v. Martin

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
V.
ALICE F. MARTIN,
Defendant .
CASE NO. 1:24 CV 157
JUDGE DONALD C. NUGENT
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant, Alice Martin's Motion for Release Pending
Appeal. (ECF #42). The Government filed a Response in opposition to that motion. (ECF #43).
For the reasons that follow, Ms. Martin's motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
On May 1,2024, Defendant, Alice Martin was indicted on six coimts of Attempt to
Evade and Defeat Income Tax, and one count of Attempt to Evade and Defeat the Payment of ax,
all in violation of 26 U.S.C. §7201. On August 18,2025, pursuant to a written plea agreement,
she pled guilty to two of these counts. (ECF #24). The plea agreement identified the tax fraud
count as a base offense level of twenty (20) based on the tax loss amoxmt. (ECF #24, PagelD
103). The plea agreement also included a waiver of appeal in which Ms. Martin waived her right
to appeal any issue other than: (1) punishment in excess of the statutory maximum; (2) any
sentence that exceeds the maximum of the sentencing imprisonment range determined under the
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advisory Sentencing Guidelines in accordance with the sentencing stipulations and computations
in the agreement, using the applicable Criminal History Category; and, (3) claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct. (ECF #24).
Ms. Martin was sentenced on December 2,2025. Her sentence was calculated based on a
base offense level of 20, with a sophisticated means enhancement applied pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§2T 1.1 (b)(2). The enhancement increased the offense level to a 22. Although the plea
agreement indicated that the government would seek a three level reduction for acceptance of
responsibility, their obligation existed only so long as Ms. Martin's "conduct continues to reflect
[her] acceptance of responsibility." At sentencing, the government argued against the full
reduction for acceptance of responsibility, based on conduct Ms. Martin engaged in that was
arguably inconsistent with a full acceptance of the wrongfulness of her actions. At the
sentencing hearing, the Court's determined that, although she entered into a plea agreement, Ms.
Martin attempted to avoid full responsibility for her actions by transferring all of her assets mere
days before her change of plea hearing, in an attempt to hide them from the U.S. Probation
Officer. The Court further formd that she had refused to disclose financial information sought by
the government, as required by the financial statement provisions of the plea agreement. The
Court, therefore, agreed that Ms. Martin's post-plea conduct was inconsistent with a full
acceptance of responsibility and fovmd that she was entitled to only a one point reduction.
After the acceptance reduction, the offense level was reduced from 22 to 21. Because
she had no criminal history points, the Court also applied U.S.S.G. §4C1.1 to reduce offense
level by an additional two levels. Starting from the agreed base offense level of 20, as provided
in the plea agreement, after all other adjustments had been made, Ms. Martin was sentenced at an
offense level of 19. The guideline range for an offense level 19, criminal history category one
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was 30-37 months. She received the minimum advisory guideline sentence of thirty months.
APPLICABLE LAW
Pursuant to Section 3143(b)(1) the Bail Reform Act of 1984, a defendant who has been
found guilty and sentenced to a term of imprisonment shall be detained pending appeal unless the
trial court finds:
(A) by clear and convincing evidence that the person is not likely to flee or pose a
danger to the safety of any other person or the community if released...; and
(B) that the appeal is not for the purpose of delay and raises a substantial question
of law or fact likely to result in -
(i) reversal,
(ii) an order for a new trial,
(iii) a sentence that does not inelude a term of imprisonment, or
(iv) a reduced sentence to a term of imprisonment less than the total of
the time already served plus the expected duration of the appeal
process.
18 U.S.C. §3143(b)(1). The statute creates a presumption against release pending appeal. See,
United States v. Vance, 851 F.2d 166,169-70 (6* Cir. 1988). To overcome this presumption, the
defendant bears the burden of proving that the one of the exceptions set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§3143(b)(l) applies. Id. (citing United States v. Pollard, 778 F.2d 1177,1181 (6"" Cir. 1985)).
ANALYSIS
A. Flight Risk/Danger to the Communitv
The government agrees that there is no reason to believe that Ms. Martin would pose a
danger to the community if released on bond pending appeal. However, it argues that she has not
proven by clear and convincing evidence that she is not a flight risk. Ms. Martin cites several
factors that support her contention that she is not a flight risk. These inelude her longstanding
ties to her community, her prior compliance with the terms of her bond, and her status as primary
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caregiver for her mother and her husband, who both suffer from serious health issues. The
government does not contest that these factors exist or that they could weigh against a finding
that Ms. Martin is a flight risk. The government does point out, however, that because she has
now been convicted and sentenced, she may now have a greater incentive to flee in order to
avoid incarceration. The factors weigh against a finding that Ms. Martin is likely to flee during
the course of her appeal, however, even if Ms. Martin does not pose a risk of danger, and her
circumstances do not indicate a likelihood that she would attempt to flee, she has not satisfied the
other requirements for receiving a bond pending appeal.
B. Substantial Question of Law
Ms. Martin's appeal does not raise a substantial question of law or fact that is likely to
result in a change to her sentence. In order to determine whether an appeal satisfies the
conditions of 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1)(B), the Sixth Circuit applies a two-part test: whether the
appeal issue is "substantial" and whether it is "so integral to the merits of the conviction that it is
more probable than not that reversal or a new trial will occur if the question is decided in the
defendant's favor." United States v. Pollard, 778 F.2d 1177,1182 (6"* Cir. 1985). A question is
"substantial" if it constitutes a "close question or one that could go either way." Powell, 761,
F.2d 1227. Although the Court need not believe that the appeal will necessarily be decided in the
defendant's favor, "[i]t is not sufficient to show simply that reasonable judges could differ... or
that the issue is fairly debatable or not frivolous." Id. at 1234.
1. Waiver of Appellate Rights
First and foremost, Ms. Martin is unlikely to obtain reversal on appeal because she
waived her appeals, except on very specific issues that do not apply in this case. Her sentence
does not exceed the statutory maximum sentence, nor does it exceed the maximum of the
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sentencing imprisonment range determined in accordance with the sentencing stipulations and
computations in the plea agreement. The plea agreement set a base offense level of 20, which,
with a criminal history category of one, would have provided a range of 33-41 months. Ms.
Martin was sentenced to a sentence of 30 months, which clearly does not exceed the range
established by the stipulations and computations in the plea agreement.
Although she claims that additional reductions should have been applied, reducing her
offense level to a 15, the plea agreement did not guarantee any reduction for acceptance of
responsibility. Further, the plea agreement specifically indicated that although the starting base
offense level should be 20, any adjustments the Court deemed appropriate at sentencing would
be final, and would not invalidate the appellate waiver. (ECF #24, PagelD 103-104). The
enhancements and reductions applied by the Court were, therefore, anticipated by and included in
the "sentencing stipulations and computations in this agreement," as referenced in the appellate
waiver provision. Further, Ms. Martin does not raise any cognizable claims for ineffective
assistance of coimsel or prosecutorial misconduct. Having waived the appeallate issue outlined
in her request for release, Ms. Martin raises no substantial appeallate issues that would be likely
to result in a reversal, new trial, or other adjustment to her prescribed sentence.
2. Appellate Issues
Even if the Court of Appeals were to entertain her appeal, Ms. Martin has not raised any
issues that rise to the level of substance and impact necessary to justify the issuance of a bond,
a. Tax Loss Determination
Ms. Martin alleges that the Court mistakenly raised her total offense level based on a
miscalculation of the tax loss. This is easily dispelled on the face of the plea agreement. The
plea agreement agreed to a base offense level of 20 based on an attempt to evade and defeat
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income tax resulting in a tax loss greater than $550,000, and less than $1,500,000. (ECF #24,
PagelD 103). The PSR also contemplated a loss within that range, identifying the amount of loss
as $1,296,840.17, which is correlated to a base offense level 20, as anticipated in the plea
agreement. (ECF #30, at 7). Although the Court issued a restitution order for a higher amount
after adding in accumulated interest, it did not raise the base offense level based on the final
amount calculation. Therefore, as the loss ealculation did not have any effeet of increasing the
base offense level contemplated by the plea agreement, it does not qualify as a substantial
question of law or fact that would impact the validity of her conviction or the appropriateness of
her sentence.
b. Sophisticated Means/Aggravated Role Enhancements
Ms. Martin argues that the Court was mistaken in applying enhancements for
"sophisticated means" and "aggravated role." Although the PSR does discuss both
enhancements, the Court applied only the "sophisticated means" enhancement and not the
"aggravated role" enhancement. There was more than sufficient evidence to support the
application of the "sophisticated means" enhancement. The tax evasion was accomplished by an
intricate scheme in which Ms. Martin implemented a sophisticated web of illegal business
practices, with the intent to avoid the payment of taxes. Ms. Martin misrepresented the income
she was bringing in through her trucking company, Martin Logistics, while secretly running the
company under a different name. The company used to shield the income was purportedly
different owner, who was employed and controlled by Ms. Martin. The income was routed
through a bank account held in yet a different business' name, controlled exclusively by Ms.
Martin. The criminal conduct was possible only through the use of these sophisticated
fabrications and obfuscations meant to preclude proper tracing of the taxable income. The facts
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clearly support a "sophisticated means" enhancement
It is true that the government agreed not to seek the enhancement as part of the plea
agreement. However, it is equally true that the plea agreement also clearly states that the final
decision as to what offense level applies, including whether to apply departures or enhancements,
would be made by the Court. (ECF #24, PagelD 102,115). The Court's variation from the
offense level recommended by the parties does not invalidate the plea or call the sentence into
question.
Further, the "sophisticated means" enhancement raised Ms. Martin's offense level by
only two levels. Therefore, even without this enhancement, Ms. Martin would have been
sentenced as an offense level 17 and a thirty month sentence would still fall within the
recommended guideline range. Thirty months is the low end of an offense level 19, and is the
high end of an offense level 17, criminal history category one. Based on the facts and
circumstances of her case, the Court found that thirty months was an appropriate sentence which
was sufficient but not greater than necessary to address the seriousness of her crime. That
sentence would have been appropriate whether it was issued at the bottom of the range for an
offense level 19 or the top of the range for an offense level 17. Therefore, even if she were to
prevail on this appeal issue, it would not have had any significant impact on the severity of her
sentence. This issue is not a substantial issue that would justify Ms. Martin's release pending
appeal.
c. Denial of Acceptance of Responsibility
Ms. Martin claims that the Court erred by denying her the three level reduction in her
offense level based on her acceptance of responsibility. Ms. Martin did enter a guilty plea
pursuant to a written plea agreement, accepting her own culpability and avoiding the need for
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trial, which prompted the Court to give her the benefit of a one point reduction. However, her
conduct, both before the plea and after, did not continue comport with a full acceptance or
recognition of the wrongfulness of her criminal conduct. After the plea was entered the
government became aware that Ms. Martin had transferred millions of dollars of assets out of her
name in order to avoid collection by the IRS. She consolidated all of her real estate holdings and
ownership interest in multiple vehicles across six new entities she created and owned, then
transferred full ownership of all six entities to her husband. She also transferred ownership of a
Florida vacation home worth over $1.3 million to her husband for no consideration. These
actions not only shielded the assets from IRS collection efforts, but also violated a preservation
of assets notice sent to Ms. Martin from the United States Attorney's Office shortly after her
indictment in this case. The letter warned her against making fraudulent transfers to avoid the
collection of restitution, and specifically warned against transferring the Florida vacation home.
In addition to the transfer of assets, Ms. Martin has failed to uphold her obligation under
the plea agreement to provide full financial disclosures. The disclosures she has provided are
incomplete and do not include the bank statements associated with Martin Logistics, which is the
entity at the core of the tax evasion claims. Ms. Martin's claims that she was upfront about these
transfers and was not hiding any information from the government is belied by the information
gathered by her Probation Officer and reported in the pre-sentence report. Further, whether the
transfers were disclosed or not, they still evidence an intent to avoid restitution which runs
counter to a full acceptance of responsibility for the wrongfulness of her actions.
There is more than enough evidence on the record to support the Court's refusal to give
her an additional two level reduction for her acceptance of responsibility. Further, as with the
"sophisticated means" enhancement, if the Court had erred, the two level reduction would have
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resulted in a total offense level of 17 rather than 19. If Ms. Martin would have been sentenced as
an offense level 17, a thirty month sentence would still fall within the recommended guideline
range. For these reasons, this issue is not a substantial appeallate issue that would be likely to
result in a reversal, new trial, or other adjustment to her prescribed sentence
CONCLUSION
Ms. Martin waived her appellate rights as part of her plea agreement, as discussed above.
Further, the Court's determination of the tax loss, the decision to apply the Sophisticated Means
enhancement, and the decision to award only one point for acceptance of responsibility were all
supported by the evidence, and were not a close call. Therefore, there are no substantial appeal
issues that would justify Ms. Martin's release pending appeal, nor would they have a significant
impact of the imposition or duration of her sentence. In addition, her health issues were also
known at the time of her sentencing and can be adequately addressed by the Bureau of Prisons.
They do not justify her release pending appeal. The Court, therefore, finds that Ms. Martin has
not met her burden of proving an exception to the presumption against release pending appeal
under 18 U.S.C. § 3143(b)(1). For all the reasons set forth above, Ms. Martin's Motion for
Release Pending Appeal is, hereby, DENIED. (ECF #42). IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
DONALD C. NUGE|
United States Districijudge
If, lott
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