USA v. Kolasinski, et al.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
DANIEL HELTON,
Defendant.
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Case No. 1:23-cr-00215-2
Case No. 1:25-cv-2024
Judge J. Philip Calabrese
Magistrate Judge
James E. Grimes Jr.
OPINION AND ORDER
A grand jury indicted Daniel Helton and a co-defendant with various drug
offenses. 	Following a guilty plea, the Court sentenced Mr. Helton to 80 months in
prison. 	Based on a firearm enhancement applied under the advisory guidelines at
sentencing and a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, he petitions for relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. For the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES the motion.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The indictment charged Mr. Helton with conspiracy to distribute and possess
with 	intent 	to 	distribute 	methamphetamine 	(Count 	1), 	distribution 	of
methamphetamine 	(Count 	2 	and 	Count 	3), 	and 	maintaining 	a 	drug 	premises
(Count 4).
A. 	Change of Plea
On May 15, 2024, Mr. Helton pled guilty to Count 1, Count 2, and Count 3, as
amended, pursuant to a written plea agreement under Rule 11(c)(1)(A) and (B) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 	That plea agreement contained a provision
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waiving Mr. Helton’s right to appeal or to seek relief under Section 2255 except in
certain limited circumstances not present here. Specifically, the agreement provided:
Defendant acknowledges having been advised by counsel of Defendant’s
rights, in limited circumstances, to appeal the conviction or sentence in
this case, including the appeal right conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 3742, and
to challenge the conviction or sentence collaterally through a post-
conviction proceeding, including a proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Defendant expressly and voluntarily waives those rights, except as
specifically reserved below. . . . Nothing in this paragraph shall act as a
bar 	to 	Defendant 	perfecting 	any 	legal 	remedies 	Defendant 	may
otherwise have on appeal or collateral attack with respect to claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel[.]
(See Plea Agreement ¶ 18.) 	Later in the plea agreement, Mr. Helton represented
that, after consulting with his attorney, he was satisfied with the legal services he
received and the advice provided to him. (Id. ¶ 27.)
During the change-of-plea colloquy, the Court directly inquired about the
provision waiving Mr. Helton’s right to bring a collateral attack under Section 2255.
Specifically, the Court asked Mr. Helton if he read and understood that provision of
his plea agreement. 	Mr. Helton said, under oath, that he did. 	Also, he said he
discussed it with his attorney and understood the issues he could and could not
pursue under that provision. When given the opportunity to ask any questions about
that waiver, Mr. Helton had none. 	Also at the change-of-plea hearing, Mr. Helton
represented, under oath, that he was satisfied with the representation he received
from his attorney.
In the plea agreement, the factual basis for the plea, to which Mr. Helton
agreed, included that a confidential informant met him and his co-defendant at
Mr. Helton’s residence and purchased methamphetamine on two occasions, days
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apart. A warrant executed at Mr. Helton’s residence turned up, among other things,
a .22 caliber rifle and one round of .308 caliber ammunition. (Plea Agreement ¶ 20.)
B. 	Sentencing (September 23, 2024)
The guideline calculation in the presentence report started with a base offense
level of 32 and added 2 points for maintaining a drug premises and 2 points for
possessing a firearm. Defense counsel objected to the 2-point firearm enhancement,
making the arguments (set forth below) that Mr. Helton makes now. 	Additionally,
he maintained that the firearm was located in a bedroom closet and played no role in
the offense. At sentencing on September 23, 2024, after arguments from counsel, the
Court overruled the objection and applied the two-level enhancement to the base
offense level.
Therefore, the Court calculated a total offense level of 33, which with a criminal
history category of V yielded an advisory guideline range of 210 to 262 months. Had
the Court sustained the objection, the advisory guideline range would have been 168
to 210 months. 	The Court sentenced Mr. Helton to 80 months in the custody of the
Bureau of Prisons.
C. 	Section 2255 Petition
A year after sentencing, on September 23, 2025, Mr. Helton filed a petition
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which he placed in the prison mail on September 6, 2025. In
his petition, he advances three grounds for relief. First, Mr. Helton contends that he
received an improper sentencing enhancement based on his co-defendant’s possession
of a firearm—an offense with which he was not charged and to which he did not plead
guilty. 	Second, and relatedly, he argues that the record fails to establish by a
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preponderance of the evidence that he possessed a firearm. Third, he claims that his
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge this enhancement. 	Absent that
allegedly deficient performance, Mr. Helton maintains that his sentence would have
been lower.
ANALYSIS
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a), a federal prisoner may move to vacate, set aside, or
correct his judgment of conviction and sentence. To challenge his conviction, Section
2255 requires the federal prisoner’s claim to fall into one of four circumstances:
[1] [T]he sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws
of the United States, or [2] that the court was without jurisdiction to
impose such sentence, or [3] that the sentence was in excess of the
maximum authorized by law, or [4] is otherwise subject to collateral
attack[.]
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
A petitioner seeking to challenge his conviction under Section 2255 “must
demonstrate the existence of an error of constitutional magnitude which had a
substantial and injurious effect of influence on the guilty plea or the jury’s verdict.”
Griffin 	v. 	United 	States, 	330 	F.3d 	733, 	736 	(6th 	Cir. 	2003) 	(citing 	Brecht 	v.
Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637 (1993)). “Relief is warranted only where a petitioner
has shown ‘a fundamental defect which inherently results in a miscarriage of justice.’”
Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974)).
The Court liberally construes the allegations of a pro se Section 2255 petition.
McCormick v. Butler, 977 F.3d 521, 528 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Franklin v. Rose, 765
F.2d 82, 85 (6th Cir. 1985)). 	“But the liberal-construction rule does not ‘abrogate
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basic pleading essentials,’ such as the requirement that a [Section] 2255 petitioner
state the factual bases underpinning every claim for relief.” Jimenez v. United States,
No. 21-5201, 2022 WL 2610337, at *3 (6th Cir. July 8, 2022) (internal citation
omitted). 	Even 	if 	liberally 	construed, 	“conclusory 	allegations 	alone, 	without
supporting factual averments, are insufficient to state a valid claim under [Section]
2255.” Gabrion v. United States, 43 F.4th 569, 578 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Jefferson
v. United States, 730 F.3d 537, 547 (6th Cir. 2013)).
When a factual dispute arises in a Section 2255 proceeding, a court must hold
an evidentiary hearing “unless the motion can be ‘conclusively determined either by
the motion itself or by the files and records in the trial court.’” 	MacLloyd v. United
States, 684 Fed. Appx. 555, 559 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Machibroda v. United States,
368 U.S. 487, 494 (1962)). A petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing if he
fails to allege any facts that, if true, would entitle him to federal habeas relief. 	See
McSwain v. Davis, 287 F. App’x 450, 458 (6th Cir. 2008); Amr v. United States, 280
F. 	App’x 	480, 	485 	(6th 	Cir. 	2008) 	(holding 	that 	an 	evidentiary 	hearing 	was
“unnecessary” where there was “nothing in the record to indicate that [the petitioner]
would be able to prove his allegations” at a hearing). 	Nor is a hearing necessary
where a petitioner’s claims “cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted
by the record, inherently incredible, or [are] conclusions rather than statements of
fact.” 	Valentine v. United States, 488 F.3d 325, 334 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting
Arredondo v. United States, 178 F.3d 778, 782 (6th Cir. 1999)).
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I. 	Waiver
In his plea agreement, Mr. Helton knowingly and voluntarily waived his right
to pursue relief under Section 2255, except with respect to ineffective assistance of
counsel. 	Such waivers are enforceable where, as here, a defendant’s plea is made
knowingly and voluntarily. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 530 F. App'x 406, 410
(6th Cir. 2013). Both the written plea agreement, which Mr. Helton signed, and the
change-of-plea colloquy demonstrate that he knew that he was giving up the right to
bring a collateral attack to his sentence. 	Therefore, the Court enforces the waiver
and declines to consider the first and second grounds for relief that Mr. Helton
advances.
II. 	Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Petitioner must
satisfy the two-pronged test that the Supreme Court established in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1994). 	See, e.g., Wingate v. United States, 969 F.3d 251,
255 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
First, Petitioner must show that his defense attorney’s conduct was “deficient.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Specifically, Petitioner must show that counsel’s errors
were so serious that he failed to “function[] as the ‘counsel’ that the Sixth Amendment
guarantees to Petitioner.” 	Id. at 687–88. 	Counsel enjoy a presumption that they
discharge their duties in a sufficiently effective manner and exercise reasonable
professional judgment based on the circumstances at the time. 	Id. at 689–90. 	To
establish error, Petitioner must overcome this “strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. 	This
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means that courts should “resist the temptation to rely on hindsight . . . in the context
of ineffective assistance of counsel claims.” Carson v. United States, 3 F. App’x 321,
324 (6th Cir 2001).
Second, 	a 	petitioner 	must 	show 	that 	any 	deficiencies 	in 	his 	counsel’s
performance were “prejudicial” to his defense. Id. at 690. In other words, Mr. Helton
must show that his counsel’s decisions “were so serious as to deprive [him of] a fair
trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id. at 687; see also Monea v. United States, 914
F.3d 414, 419 (6th Cir. 2019). 	Like the first Strickland element, establishing
prejudice also presents a difficult burden because it requires Petitioner to show a
“reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” 	Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. 	“A reasonable
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the [original]
outcome.” Id.
A successful ineffective assistance claim requires Petitioner to establish both
elements. 	Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 697. 	Therefore, failure to establish either
element will cause Petitioner’s claim to fail. Here, Mr. Helton can establish neither.
First, Mr. Helton’s counsel did not perform deficiently. Contrary to his claim,
Mr. Helton’s counsel objected to application of the 2-level enhancement related to the
firearm found at his residence. The Court overruled that objection.
Second, in any event, Mr. Helton did not suffer any prejudice. The Court varied
downward and imposed a sentence considerably below the advisory guideline range
based on application of the factors, as articulated on the record, under 18 U.S.C.
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§ 3553. Even if Mr. Helton is correct about the guideline range (in the Court’s view,
he is not), the Court’s statements at sentencing show that it would have imposed the
same sentence regardless of the advisory guideline range.
Accordingly, 	the 	record 	easily 	establishes 	that 	Mr. 	Helton 	received
representation that satisfies his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Without a certificate of appealability, a habeas petitioner cannot appeal a final
order in a habeas proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Issuance of a certificate of
appealability requires a petitioner to make “a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). 	This means that the petitioner must
show that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s determination of the
relevant constitutional claims debatable or incorrect. 	Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S.
274, 282 (2004). 	The petitioner need not show that the appeal would succeed to be
eligible for a certificate of appealability. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337
(2003).
Because of the waiver in his plea agreement and the deferential standard
under Strickland, the Court determines that no reasonable jurist could find the
dismissal of Mr. Helton’s petition incorrect or fairly debatable. Therefore, the Court
DENIES a certificate of appealability.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Petitioner’s motion to vacate his
sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and determines that an evidentiary hearing is not
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warranted. 	Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, the Court DENIES a certificate of
appealability.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 25, 2025
J. Philip Calabrese
United States District Judge
Northern District of Ohio
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