USA v. Abdulkadir

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) CASE NO. 1:21-cr-377
)
)
PLAINTIFF, ) CHIEF JUDGE SARA LIOI
)
vs. )
)
)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
AND ORDER
FOUAD SAEED ABDULKADIR, )
)
)
DEFENDANT. )
Before the Court is the pro se motion of defendant Fouad Saeed Abdulkadir (“Abdulkadir”)
to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. (Doc. No. 134.) Plaintiff
United States of America (the “government”) opposes the motion (Doc. No. 139), and Abdulkadir
has filed a reply (Doc. No. 142) and a supplemental reply.1 (Doc. No. 143.) For the reasons set
forth herein, the motion to vacate is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 27, 2021, an indictment issued charging Abdulkadir with 27 counts of wire fraud,
23 counts of aggravated identity theft, and 2 counts of theft of public money. (Doc. No. 1
(Indictment).) The charges were associated with Abdulkadir’s alleged efforts to fraudulently
obtain more than $80,000 in benefits from three different public assistance programs: Ohio’s
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (“TANF”), the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance
1 The reply, dated September 24, 2025, and placed on the docket September 25, 2025, was filed well beyond the
August 9, 2025 deadline set by the Court in its scheduling order. (See Doc. No. 135 (Order), at 1.) Given Abdulkadir’s
custodial transfer in May 2025 (see I. infra), the Court directed the Clerk to resend any filings Abdulkadir might not
have received and sua sponte afforded Abdulkadir additional time to file a reply. (Order [non-document], 9/25/2025.).
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Program (“SNAP”), and Medicaid. (See generally id.)
After a five-day trial in December 2023, a jury returned guilty verdicts on 24 of the 27
counts of wire fraud and the 2 counts of theft of public money. (Doc. No. 100 (Jury Verdict).)
Abdulkadir was acquitted of 3 counts of wire fraud and all of the charges of aggravated identity
theft. (See id.) On April 3, 2024, the Court sentenced Abdulkadir to a within-guideline custody
term of 21 months, followed by 3 years of supervised release. (Doc. No. 121 (Judgment); Minutes
of Proceedings [non-document], 4/3/2024.)
Abdulkadir took a direct appeal, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
convictions, this Court’s limitation of certain witness testimony relating to Islamic loan customs,
and the reasonableness of his sentence. (Doc. No. 131 (Sixth Circuit Decision).) On January 16,
2025, the Sixth Circuit affirmed this Court’s judgment and rejected on the merits each of
Abdulkadir’s asserted claims. (Id. at 1.)
On April 10, 2025, Abdulkadir filed the present motion to vacate.2 With little or no factual
development, the motion appears to raise nine separate arguments. As Abdulkadir acknowledges,
the first four grounds were raised on direct appeal. (See Doc. No. 134, at 4, 5, 7, and 8.) They are
reproduced from the motion in full:
Ground One: Was there sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for wire
fraud[?]
Ground Two: Was there sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for theft of
public money and property[?]
2 The prison mailbox rule, announced in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270–72, 108 S. Ct. 2379, 101 L. Ed. 2d 245
(1988), provides that a federal prisoner's pro se motion to vacate is ordinarily deemed filed on the date that it was
submitted to prison mailing officials. See Towns v. United States, 190 F.3d 468, 469 (6th Cir. 1999). While
Abdulkadir’s motion was filed on the docket on June 6, 2025, the motion provides that it was placed in the prison
mailing system on April 10, 2025. (Doc. No. 134, at 12.)
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Ground Three: W[hether] the District Court committed reversible error in
excluding a defense witness regarding a highly relevant Muslim custom?
Ground Four: W[h]ether, in any event, the sentence imposed on Mr. Abdulkadir
is unreasonable and should be vacated[?]
(Id. at 4–8.) In response to question 13 of the form Abdulkadir used to present his motion—
inquiring whether the motion raises any ground not previously raised in some federal court—
Abdulkadir answered “Yes[.]” (See id. at 9.)
He further identified five additional grounds for relief. (See Doc. No. 134-3, at 1.) As was
the case with the first four grounds, Abdulkadir made little effort to factually develop these asserted
claims. They are reproduced here verbatim and in full:3
Ground Five: [T]he witnesses gvt. brought had ulterior motives: Mustafa was not
a Board member, his membership to the Masjid was terminated, was presented
under false pretense; i.e. wanted money for himself[.]
Ground Six: Mahmoud Amawi had ulterior motives; under penalty in civil court
he was found making false accusations against Mr. Abdulkadir who the gvt.
brought as a witness in criminal proceedings for the same accusations.
Ground Seven: Lawyer/Attorney never raised those issues[.]
Ground Eight: Ala Faahmi had ulterior motives confessed to treasurer of ICCW[.]
Ground Nine: Both board members from ICNED & ICCW issued statements &
submitted letters[.]
(Id.) According to his motion, Abdulkadir requests that the Court “vacate [the] detainer.” (Doc.
No. 134, at 12.)
Abdulkadir remained in the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) until
May 13, 2025, when he was placed in the custody of the United States Immigration and Customs
3 Abdulkadir renumbered his “new” grounds beginning with number “1”, but for the sake of clarity, the Court has
continued the numbering from the body of the motion.
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Enforcement (“ICE”) and transferred to ICE’s processing center in Philipsburg, Pennsylvania. (See
https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/, last visited 11/10/2025; Doc. No. 141 (Notice of Change of
Address).)
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A federal prisoner may attack the validity of his sentence by filing a motion to vacate, set
aside, or correct the sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the district court where he was sentenced.
Section 2255 sets forth four grounds upon which a federal prisoner may state a claim for relief:
“[1] the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or [2]
that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or [3] that the sentence was in
excess of the maximum authorized by law, or [4] [the sentence] is otherwise subject to collateral
attack[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
To prevail under § 2255, “a petitioner must demonstrate the existence of an error of
constitutional magnitude which had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the guilty
plea or the jury’s verdict.” Griffin v. United States, 330 F.3d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Brecht
v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S. Ct. 1710, 123 L. Ed. 2d 353 (1993)). “Relief is warranted
only where a petitioner has shown ‘a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete
miscarriage of justice.’” Id. (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346, 94 S. Ct. 2298, 41
L. Ed. 2d 109 (1974)).
The movant bears the burden of articulating sufficient facts to state a viable claim for relief
under § 2255. McQueen v. United States, 58 F. App’x 73, 76 (6th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). Vague
and conclusory claims that are not substantiated by allegations of specific facts with some
probability of verity are not enough to warrant relief. A § 2255 motion may be dismissed if it only
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makes conclusory statements without substantiating allegations of specific facts and fails to state
a claim cognizable under § 2255. O’Malley v. United States, 285 F.2d 733, 735 (6th Cir. 1961)
(citations omitted); see Green v. Wingo, 454 F.2d 52, 53 (6th Cir. 1972).
When a factual dispute arises in a § 2255 proceeding, an evidentiary hearing is required
“‘to determine the truth of the petitioner’s claims.’” Valentine v. United States, 488 F.3d 325, 333
(6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Turner v. United States, 183 F.3d 474, 477 (6th Cir. 1999)). The burden
borne by a § 2255 petitioner to obtain a hearing is not onerous. See Smith v. United States, 348
F.3d 545, 551 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Turner, 183 F.3d at 477). But a petitioner is not entitled to
an evidentiary hearing if he has not alleged any facts that, if true, would entitle him to federal
habeas relief. See McSwain v. Davis, 287 F. App’x 450, 458 (6th Cir. 2008); Amr v. United States,
280 F. App’x 480, 485 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that an evidentiary hearing was “unnecessary”
where there was “nothing in the record to indicate that [the petitioner] would be able to prove his
allegations” at a hearing); see also Napier v. United States, No. 93-5412, 1993 WL 406795, at *2
(6th Cir. Oct. 8, 1993) (“To be entitled to a hearing, the prisoner must set forth detailed factual
allegations which, if true, would entitle him to relief under § 2255.” (citing Machibroda v. United
States, 368 U.S. 487, 496, 82 S. Ct. 510, 7 L. Ed. 2d 473 (1962))); Cf. Valentine, 488 F.3d at 334
(finding that the burden is met where the petitioner “offers more than a mere assertion of his
innocence; he presents a factual narrative of the events that is neither contradicted by the record
nor ‘inherently incredible’”).
Moreover, a hearing is not necessary when a petitioner’s claims “‘cannot be accepted as
true because they are contradicted by the record, inherently incredible, or [are] conclusions rather
than statements of fact.’” Id. (quoting Arrendondo v. United States, 178 F.3d 778, 782 (6th Cir.
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1999)). Where, as here, the judge considering the § 2255 motion also presided over the trial, the
judge may rely on her recollections of the trial. Blanton v. United States, 94 F.3d 227, 235 (6th
Cir. 1996) (citing Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 n.4, 97 S. Ct. 1621, 52 L. Ed. 2d 136
(1977)).
The Court finds that an evidentiary hearing is not warranted in the present case. As set forth
in detail below, Abdulkadir has failed to identify facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief under
§ 2255. Moreover, the arguments offered by Abdulkadir in support of the present motion are either
contradicted by the record, procedurally defaulted, waived, forfeited, and/or are presented in a
perfunctory and conclusory manner, preventing further review by this Court.
III. LAW AND DISCUSSION
A. Jurisdiction to Consider Removal Proceedings
To the extent Abdulkadir requests that this Court vacate the detainer previously imposed
by ICE or otherwise review the immigration removal proceedings against him (see Doc. No. 134,
at 12), the Court is without the authority and jurisdiction to do so. While Abdulkadir notes that his
convictions in the present case form the basis for the ICE detainer (see Doc. No. 142, at 1–2; Doc.
No. 143, at 1–2), a motion to vacate under § 2255 is limited to challenges to the validity of a
prisoner’s sentence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). It cannot be used to address any collateral
consequences flowing from the sentence. Rather, “[c]onstitutional challenges to detention after the
issuance of a final removal order are properly heard as habeas petitions brought pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 2241.” Nassar v. Clausen, No. 1:07-cv-1066, 2008 WL 314698, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Feb.
4, 2008) (citing Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687, 121 S. Ct. 2491, 150 L. Ed. 2d 653 (2001)).
A habeas petition under § 2241 must be brought in the district where the prisoner is confined.
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Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 443, 124 S. Ct. 2711, 159 L. Ed. 2d 513 (2004) (holding that,
as a general rule, jurisdiction for a § 2241 petition “lies in only one district: the district of
confinement”). Since Abdulkadir is confined in the Western District of Pennsylvania (see Doc.
No. 141), he must file his § 2241 habeas petition there.4 See also Miller v. Mannion, No. 1:22-cv-
840, 2022 WL 3044650, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 11, 2022) (“Courts . . . have repeatedly recognized
that the Moshannon Valley Correctional Center is in the Western District of Pennsylvania[.]”
(collecting cases)).
Notwithstanding the fact that Abdulkadir is no longer in BOP custody, this Court retains
jurisdiction to entertain challenges to his convictions and sentence. Section 2255 provides an
avenue for relief for a prisoner “in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of
Congress[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a) (emphasis added). “Because [Abdulkadir] has yet to finish his
term of supervised release and, to date, has yet to be deported, he remains ‘in custody’ under §
2255, and the Court has jurisdiction to address his § 2255 motion.” Oboh v. United States, 769 F.
Supp. 3d 796, 812–13 (E.D. Tenn. 2025) (collecting cases). Accordingly, the Court will address
the grounds raised in the motion to vacate as they relate to Abdulkadir’s convictions and sentence.
B. Issues Previously Raised on Direct Appeal (Grounds One through Four)
As noted, Abdulkadir’s first four grounds for relief—challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence, evidentiary rulings regarding witness testimony, and the reasonableness of the
4 Had Abdulkadir remained in BOP custody during the litigation of the motion to vacate, any attack upon his ICE
detainer would have been premature. “The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has concluded that a
district court lacks jurisdiction over a habeas petitioner’s challenge to an immigration detainer while the petitioner is
still in BOP custody and is not in ICE custody.” Ri esqo Penate v. Garland, No. 1:22-cv-460, 2023 WL 142300, at *2
(W.D. Mich. Jan. 10, 2023) (citing, among authorities, Prieto v. Gluch, 913 F.2d 1159, 1162–63 (6th Cir. 1990)). Now
that Abdulkadir is in ICE custody, he may challenge his immigration status, though he must do so in the jurisdiction
in which he is held.
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sentence—were previously raised and rejected on direct appeal. “A § 2255 motion may not be
used to relitigate an issue that was raised on appeal absent highly exceptional circumstances” that
are not present here. DuPont v. United States, 76 F.3d 108, 110 (6th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks
and citations omitted); see Jones v. United States, 178 F.3d 790, 796 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[A] § 2255
motion may not be employed to relitigate an issue that was raised and considered on direct appeal
absent highly exceptional circumstances, such as an intervening change in the law.” (citations
omitted)). Abdulkadir has not identified an intervening change in the law, or any other highly
exceptional circumstances, that would permit the Court to revisit issues that were definitively
decided on direct review.
In his reply, Abdulkadir suggests that although Grounds One through Four “may appear
similar to those raised on direct appeal,” they are different because he “now frames these issues as
constitutional violations under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, rather than mere evidentiary
matters.” (Doc. No. 142, at 2; see Doc. No. 143, at 2.) Of course, Abdulkadir conceded in his
motion that these claims were previously raised on direct appeal (see Doc. No. 134, at 4, 5, 7, and
8), and there is nothing in his perfunctory recitation of these grounds that would suggest that they
are anything other than the same issues previously raised and decided on direct appeal.
Abdulkadir’s hollow attempt to repackage these claims as constitutional violations is unavailing.
See, e.g., Clemons v. United States, No. 3:1-cv-496, 2005 WL 2416995, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Sept.
30, 2005) (finding that a prisoner may not couch previously litigated claims, such as sufficiency
of the evidence, as constitutional violations to revisit them in a § 2255 motion (citing DuPont, 76
F.3d at 110)); see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067
(1976) (constitutional claims cannot be subjected to collateral review where a defendant had a “full
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and fair” opportunity to litigate them on direct appeal).
If, however, Grounds One through Four did raise new issues, they would be forfeited. A
criminal defendant may not utilize a § 2255 motion as a substitute for a direct appeal. Regalado v.
United States, 334 F.3d 520, 528 (6th Cir. 2003); Capaldi v. Pontesso, 135 F.3d 1122, 1124 (6th
Cir. 1998) (“An application under § 2255 . . . should not be considered a substitute for direct
appeal.” (citation omitted)); see Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 634, 113 S. Ct. 1710. 123
L. Ed. 2d 353 (1993); Watson v. United States, 165 F.3d 486, 488 (6th Cir. 1999). “[T]he general
rule [is] that claims not raised on direct appeal may not be raised on collateral review unless the
petitioner shows cause and prejudice.” Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504, 123 S. Ct.
1690, 155 L. Ed. 2d 714 (2003) (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 621–22, 118 S. Ct.
1064, 140 L. Ed. 2d 828 (1998); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167–68, 102 S. Ct. 1584,
71 L. Ed. 2d 816 (1982)). A prisoner can also overcome a procedural default if he demonstrates
that he is “actually innocent.” Regaldo, 334 F.3d at 528 (citations omitted). The hurdle a petitioner
faces to overcome a procedural default is “intentionally high[,] . . . for respect for the finality of
judgments demands that collateral attack generally not be allowed to do service for an appeal.”
Elzy v. United States, 205 F.3d 882, 884 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Frady, 456 U.S. at 165).
Abdulkadir has failed to clear the high hurdle of showing cause and prejudice to overcome
the procedural default. He offers no arguments relative to cause for failing to raise any of the
alleged constitutional claims in Grounds One through Four. Applying a generous construction to
his briefing, the Court finds that he appears to offer a prejudice argument for Ground Three.
Specifically, he argues that the Court’s decision to preclude Nasir Abdulrahman from testifying
regarding Muslim lending practices violated his constitutional right to present a complete defense
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because it would have demonstrated that the “money that appeared to be income was actually part
of a cultural lending practice.” (Doc. No. 142, at 4; Doc. No. 143, at 4.) To the extent this
evidentiary issue could be reasserted as a constitutional issue, Abdulkadir fails to explain how
Abdulrahman, a lay person without “specialized knowledge, training, experience, or education”
on Muslim lending practices, was qualified to offer such testimony. (See Doc. No. 131, at 5 (citing
the district court’s evidentiary ruling).) Abdulkadir was not prohibited from offering qualified
expert testimony on the subject of Muslim lending practices; he was merely precluded from
offering it through an unqualified lay witness in violation of Fed. R. Evid. 702. See United States
v. Lucas, 357 F.3d 599, 606 (6th Cir. 2004) (the right to offer “a complete defense does not imply
a right to offer evidence that is otherwise inadmissible under the standard rules of evidence”
(citations omitted)).
Because Grounds One through Four were raised and decided on direct appeal, and they
were otherwise procedurally defaulted, they are denied.
C. New Issues Raised in the Motion (Grounds Five through Nine)
Collectively, Grounds Five through Nine appear to attack trial counsel’s failure to uncover
and explore on cross-examination biases held by certain government witnesses. (See Doc. No. 134-
3, at 1.) Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are properly raised for the first time in a § 2255
motion to vacate. Spearman v. United States, 43 F. App’x 906, 908 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[T]his court
has consistently held that the proper vehicle for raising an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
is . . . a motion to vacate under § 2255.” (citation omitted)); see also Massaro, 538 U.S. at 504 (“§
2255 motion is preferable to direct appeal for deciding claims of ineffective assistance.”).
“To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, [a petitioner] must satisfy the
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two-pronged test announced in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed.
2d 674 (1984).” Wingate v. United States, 969 F.3d 251, 255 (6th Cir. 2020). Specifically, the
petitioner must demonstrate: (1) that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness, and (2) that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced the defendant, resulting in
an unreliable or fundamentally unfair outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88; see also Williams
v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390–91, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 146 L. Ed. 2d 389 (2000). The Court may address
the Strickland prongs in any order and need not address both prongs if the petitioner “makes an
insufficient showing on one.” See Wingate, 969 F.3d at 955 (quotation marks and citation omitted).
“Surmounting Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S.
356, 371, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 176 L. Ed. 2d 284 (2010) (citations omitted). “Judicial scrutiny of
counsel’s performance must be highly deferential.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. A court
considering a claim of ineffective assistance must “indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance[.]” Id. Counsel’s
performance must be evaluated from the perspective existing at the time of the representation, not
from the perspective of hindsight. Id. Indeed, a prisoner must show that counsel made errors so
serious that he was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and that
counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive him of a fair trial. Id. at 687–88; United States v.
Hanley, 906 F.2d 1116, 1120–21 (6th Cir. 1990); Flippins v. United States, 808 F.2d 16, 18 (6th
Cir. 1987); see also United States v. Morrow, 977 F.2d 222, 229 (6th Cir. 1992) (“Counsel is
constitutionally ineffective only if performance below professional standards caused the defendant
to lose what he otherwise would probably have won.” (citing Strickland, supra)).
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While Abdulkadir’s ineffective assistance of counsel claims are properly before this Court,
they each fail for a number of reasons.
1. Ineffective Assistance Claims are Conclusory
First, each ground is raised in the motion to vacate in conclusory fashion, impeding any
merits review by this Court. While Abdulkadir surmises, without support, that certain witnesses
had “ulterior motives”, he fails to sufficiently detail what those motives were and how his counsel
should have known of their existence. (See Doc. No. 134-3, at 1.) Likewise, he claims that
Mahmoud Amawi testified in a separate proceeding that he made false accusations against
Abdulkadir, but he fails to produce this testimony or even identify the separate proceeding in which
these alleged confessions were made. (See id.) Such perfunctory treatment of a ground fails to state
a viable claim for relief under § 2255. A motion to vacate may be dismissed if it only makes
conclusory statements without substantiating allegations of specific facts. Thomas v. United States,
849 F.3d 669, 679 (6th Cir. 2017) (“A party waives issues that he adverts to in a perfunctory
manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation.” (citation omitted)); see
United States v. Sandridge, 385 F.3d 1032, 1035–36 (6th Cir. 2004) (similar) (citation omitted);
McPhearson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995–96 (6th Cir. 1997) (“It is not sufficient for a party to
mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court . . . to put flesh on its
bones.” (quotation marks and citations omitted)).
In his reply, Abdulkadir attempts to develop these claims, but, even then, his belated
arguments fall short. He suggests that trial counsel should have: “question[ed] Witness A about
financial incentives related to [p]etitioner’s conviction[,]” “introduce[d] evidence of Witness B’s
false prior accusations in similar contexts[,]” and “question[ed] Witness C about contradictory
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statements made in other proceedings.” (Doc. No. 142, at 3; Doc. No. 143, at 3.) Yet, Abdulkadir
fails to describe the financial incentives, identify the prior false accusations, or produce (or even
describe) the contradictory statements made in other proceedings. He also fails to explain how any
of these lines of questioning would have changed the result at trial. The lack of any details to flesh
out these claims is contrary to Rule 2 of the Governing Rules for § 2255 Motions, which requires
a motion to “specify all grounds for relief available to the moving party” and “state the facts
supporting each ground.” A habeas petition which fails to state the supporting facts is legally
insufficient on its face and may be dismissed. Slyton v. United States, No. 1:00-cr-27, 2011 WL
1364049, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. April 11, 2011) (citing, among authority, Wingo, 454 F.2d at 53;
O’Malley, 285 F.2d at 735); see also Pillette v. Berghuis, 408 F. App’x 873, 887–88 (6th Cir.
2010) (speculation that a witness would provide favorable testimony cannot establish “either
unreasonable performance or prejudice”).5
2. Ineffective Assistance Claims Fail on the Merits
Second, even if these claims were not conclusory—and although a failure to properly cross-
examine a witness could form the basis for a finding of ineffective assistance, see Jackson v. Houk,
687 F.3d 723, 742–43 (6th Cir. 2012)—such decisions typically are not subject to second guessing
and are entitled to be presumed sound trial strategy. See Dunham v. Travis, 313 F.3d 724, 732 (2d
Cir. 2002) (“Decisions about ‘whether to engage in cross-examination, and if so to what extent
5 In his reply brief, Abdulkadir also offers for the first time an argument that counsel failed to present “critical
documentary evidence” that would have “directly refuted the Government’s theory of the case.” (Doc. No. 142, at 2;
Doc. No. 143, at 2.) He only describes the documents in general terms, however, referring to “[n]otarized documents
specifying the loans that were given to [p]etitioner,” documents “submitted to Job and Family Services showing
[p]etitioner’s business and income situation,” and “[b]usiness tax forms and personal tax returns that would have
clarified [p]etitioner’s actual income and financial status.” (Id. at 2–3.) Even if it were appropriate for the Court to
consider an argument raised for the first time in a reply brief (see III. D. infra), Abdulkadir has failed to identify these
documents with any specificity or explain how they would have led to a different result at trial.
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and in what manner, are . . . strategic in nature’ and generally will not support an effective
assistance of counsel claim.” (quoting United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1321 (2d Cir.
1987)); see also United States v. Friedman, 7 F.3d 235 (Table), Nos. 92-3916, 92-3917, 1993 WL
386797, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 30, 1993) (“[T]actical decisions must be particularly egregious before
they will provide a basis for relief.” (citing Martin v. Rose, 744 F.2d 1245, 1249 (6th Cir. 1984)).
Here, the record is clear that defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined each witness
Abdulkadir claims had an ulterior motive. (Doc. No. 93 (Trial Transcript), at 60–62, 99–102, 161–
194.) There is nothing in the record to suggest that counsel did not exercise sound strategy in
fashioning and executing their cross-examination of these witnesses. Trial counsel’s performance
is not deficient simply because their efforts were ultimately unsuccessful in persuading the jury.
See also Hodge v. Haeberlin, 579 F.3d 627, 645 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that counsel’s
performance did not “f[a]ll below the standard set in Strickland merely because counsel was unable
to persuade the trial court to rule in [the defendant’s] favor”). Abdulkadir has not adduced any
evidence to overcome the presumption that his counsel exercised sound trial strategy, and, as a
result, he has not shown any deficiency in his counsel’s performance.
For all of these reasons, Grounds Five through Nine are denied.
D. Issues Raised in the Reply Brief
Abdulkadir also appears to raise several new claims in his reply brief. In particular, he
argues for the first time that the government withheld evidence regarding its witnesses’ ulterior
motives for testifying, and that the Court did not afford new counsel sufficient time to prepare for
trial. (Doc. No. 142, at 4; Doc. No. 143, at 4.) It is well settled that matters raised for the first time
in a reply brief are waived or forfeited. Sanborn v. Parker, 629 F.3d 554, 579 (6th Cir. 2010); see
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United States v. Crozier, 259 F.3d 503, 517 (6th Cir. 2001) (“We will generally not hear issues
raised for the first time in a reply brief” (citation omitted)); Hunt v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., 244
F.R.D. 394, 397 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (citations omitted)); see, e.g., Killian v. United States, No. 1:13-
cr-33, 2018 WL 1475607, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Mar. 26, 2018) (finding issue of ineffectiveness raised
for the first time in a reply brief in support of a motion to vacate waived (citations omitted));
Hadley v. United States, No. 1:06-cr-5, 2010 WL 2573490, at *6 (W.D. Mich. June 22, 2010)
(declining to address an additional effective assistance of counsel claim because it was raised for
the first time in a reply brief (citations omitted)). For this reason alone, these claims are denied.
Even if the Court reached these claims, however, they would fail. In support of his claim
under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S. Ct. 1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1966), Abdulkadir cites
the legal standard for asserting a Brady violation, but fails to offer any factual development of this
ground for relief. (Doc. No. 142, at 4 (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S. Ct.
763, 31 L. Ed. 2d 104 (1972) (holding that evidence affecting a witness’s credibility falls within
the Brady rule when “the reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or
innocence”)); Doc. No. 143, at 4 (same).) In particular, he neglects to identify the evidence in the
government’s possession that would have shed light on its witnesses’ alleged ulterior motives for
testifying against Abdulkadir. As previously noted, a lack of any details to flesh out a claim violates
the rules governing § 2255 motions, and is legally insufficient on its face to support any relief. See
McFarland, 512 U.S. at 856.
As for his claim that the Court afforded new counsel insufficient time to prepare (see Doc.
No. 142, at 3; Doc. No. 143, at 3), the record offers no support. Abdulkadir retained and discharged
numerous attorneys during the course of this case. At the request of his various attorneys, the Court
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granted a number of extensions, including extensions designed to afford new counsel sufficient
time to prepare. (See Order [non-document], 1/19/2022; Order [non-document], 2/28/2022; Order
[non-document], 4/15/2022; Order [non-document], 5/20/2022; Minute Order [non-document],
6/2/2022 (extending dates and deadlines to accommodate new counsel); Doc. No. 34 (Ends of
Justice Order) (same); Doc. No. 40 (Ends of Justice Order) (extending all dates and deadlines));
Doc. No. 48 (Ends of Justice Order) (extending various dates and deadlines).)
When Abdulkadir’s last retained attorney—Kevin Cafferkey—moved to withdraw for
personal reasons (see Doc. No. 51), the Court held a hearing on the motion. (Minutes of
Proceedings [non-document], 9/5/2023.) At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court granted the
motion to withdraw and appointed Attorney Darin Thompson of the Federal Public Defender’s
Office to represent Abdulkadir. (Id.; see Order [non-document], 9/5/2023 (appointing FPD Darin
Thompson).) Thereafter, the Court conducted two telephonic conferences with the government’s
attorney and Attorney Thompson to discuss the additional time defense counsel would need to
prepare for trial. (Minutes of Proceeding [non-document], 9/12/2023; Minutes of Proceeding [non-
document], 9/19/2023.) After conferring with counsel, the Court granted Attorney Thompson’s
unopposed motion to continue the dates and deadlines in the case, which had the effect of
extending the trial date by one month. (Doc. No. 57 (Ends of Justice Order); Doc. No. 58 (Third
Amended Trial Order); see Doc. No. 56 (Motion).) The Court subsequently granted a second
motion from defense counsel to further extend the dates and deadlines in the case, which resulted
in a second 30-day continuance of the trial date. (Minutes of Proceedings [non-document],
10/20/2023; Doc. No. 68 (Ends of Justice Order); see Doc. No. 67 (Motion).) Defense counsel
made no further requests to extend the trial.
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Moreover, there is no evidence that defense counsel was unprepared for trial. Rather, the
record is clear that Attorney Thompson, who was joined at trial by Federal Public Defender
Stephen Newman, was thoroughly prepared and both attorneys provided Abdulkadir effective
assistance throughout the trial and at sentencing. Because Abdulkadir has failed to demonstrate
that his counsel was given insufficient time to prepare for trial, his claims that the Court abused its
discretion would fail on the merits.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Abdulkadir’s motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence
(Doc. No. 134) is denied. Further, for the same reasons, the Court concludes that “jurists of reason”
would not find it “debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a
constitutional right” or that the Court’s findings that Abdulkadir’s claims are either waved,
forfeited, procedurally defaulted, or alluded to in a perfunctory manner, thus precluding further
review, are “correct[.]” See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 146 L. Ed. 2d
542 (2000). Additionally, the Court has detailed above why Abdulkadir’s grounds for relief are
otherwise belied by the record such that “reasonable jurists” would not debate the Court’s denial
of his motion to vacate. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. Accordingly, the Court certifies that an appeal
from this decision could not be taken in good faith, and that there is no basis upon which to issue
a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 10, 2025
HONORABLE SARA LIOI
CHIEF JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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