Murray v. State University of New York State University College at Brockport et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
DONALD F. MURRAY,
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff,
v. 	6:22-CV-06306 CJS CDH
STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK STATE
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE AT BROCKPORT,
ERICK HART, and KATHRYN WILSON,
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff 	Donald 	F. 	Murray 	(“Plaintiff”) 	has 	sued 	defendant 	the 	State
University of New York State University College at Brockport (“SUNY Brockport”)
for age discrimination and retaliation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 623, et seq. (Dkt. 1).1
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s motion to compel the deposition of
SUNY Brockport’s president, Heidi Macpherson (“President Macpherson”), and to
compel supplemental responses to Plaintiff’s discovery demands. 	(Dkt. 46). For the
1 	Plaintiff has also named as defendants “Erick Hart . . . in his official capacity,
as SUNY Brockport’s Athletic Director,” and “Dr. Kathryn ‘Katy’ Wilson . . . in her
official capacity, as SUNY Brockport’s Vice President for Enrollment Management
and Student Affairs.” (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 6-7). Of course, “an official-capacity suit is, in all
respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against the entity” and “is not a suit
against the official personally, for the real party in interest is the entity.” Kentucky
v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985) (emphasis in original). The Court collectively
refers to SUNY Brockport, Erick Hart in his official capacity, and Dr. Kathryn Wilson
in her official capacity as “Defendants.”
Case 6:22-cv-06306-CJS-CDH Document 52 Filed 07/08/25 Page 1 of 10

- 2 -
reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Specifically, the Court denies Plaintiff’s request to compel the deposition of President
Macpherson 	but 	grants 	Plaintiff’s 	request 	for 	supplementation 	of 	Defendants’
document production.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff was “a tenured faculty member and Head Wrestling Coach at SUNY
Brockport for fifty years[.]” (Dkt. 1 at ¶ 8; see also Dkt. 48-4 at 5 (“[Plaintiff] continued
his full-time employment as a Professor of Kinesiology at Brockport and remains
employed in that capacity to this day.”). Plaintiff claims that as far back as 2013,
Erick Hart (“Hart”), SUNY Brockport’s Athletic Director, made Plaintiff’s “age and
retirement an issue,” due to an “apparent preference for younger coaches.” (Dkt. 1 at
¶¶12-15). According to Plaintiff, “Hart’s attacks culminated in both a University and
NCAA [National Collegiate Athletic Association] investigation.” (Id. at ¶ 19). The
University investigation purportedly began in September 2020, was “initiated upon
pretext,” and “resulted in full exoneration of [Plaintiff] and the absence of any
University disciplinary action.” (Id. at ¶¶ 20-21). It involved “allegations related to
supposed COVID[-19 guideline] violations[.]” (Id. at ¶ 52).
The NCAA investigation was initiated when “the University ‘self-reported’
[Plaintiff] and the University Wrestling Program to the NCAA.” (Id. at ¶ 23). SUNY
Brockport allegedly thereafter submitted to the NCAA a list of recommended
penalties 	as 	part 	of 	a 	summary 	disposition 	process, 	resulting 	in 	a 	“de 	facto
Case 6:22-cv-06306-CJS-CDH Document 52 Filed 07/08/25 Page 2 of 10

- 3 -
termination” of Plaintiff as Head Wrestling Coach by “removing [him] from coaching
for three years.” (Id. at ¶¶ 24-25; 119-21).
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This case has been referred to the undersigned for all non-dispositive pre-trial
matters. (Dkt. 13; Dkt. 43).
On July 30, 2024, Plaintiff moved to compel supplemental responses to his
document 	demands 	and 	to 	set 	a 	date 	certain 	for 	the 	deposition 	of 	President
Macpherson. (Dkt. 36). Magistrate Judge Marian W. Payson, to whom the matter was
then referred, entered a Decision and Order on August 1, 2024, concluding that the
parties had “not fully exhausted their obligation to meet and confer in good faith prior
to seeking Court intervention to resolve the issues raised by the motion” and denying
the motion without prejudice. (Dkt. 37).
Judge Payson held an informal, telephonic discovery conference on October 9,
2024, at which these issues were discussed. (See Dkt. 40). The parties disagree about
what 	was 	said 	at 	this 	conference. 	Plaintiff 	maintains 	that 	Judge 	Payson
“recommended 	that 	the 	deposition 	of 	Heidi 	Macpherson 	should 	proceed, 	in
conjunction with Interrogatories to pinpoint the scope of the deposition, and extended
discovery 	deadlines 	to 	permit 	the 	parties 	to 	schedule 	Interrogatories 	and 	the
Macpherson Deposition.” (Dkt. 46-1 at ¶ 5). Defendants contend that Judge Payson
“made suggestions regarding how the parties could resolve the matter, including the
use of Interrogatories and a possible brief deposition,” but “did not render a decision
since no motion was before her.” (Dkt 48-4 at 6).
Case 6:22-cv-06306-CJS-CDH Document 52 Filed 07/08/25 Page 3 of 10

- 4 -
Plaintiff served interrogatories directed to President Macpherson on October
29, 2024. (Dkt. 46-1 at ¶ 6). Defendants served responses on February 19, 2025,
signed by President Macpherson. (Dkt. 46-4 at 2-9).
On March 13, 2025, Plaintiff’s counsel sent the Court a letter detailing the
outstanding discovery disputes in this matter. Defense counsel sent a responsive
letter. After reviewing these communications, the Court instructed Plaintiff to file a
formal motion.
Plaintiff filed the pending motion on March 18, 2025. (Dkt. 46). Defendant filed
a response on April 1, 2025 (Dkt. 48), and Plaintiff filed a reply on April 7, 2025 (Dkt.
49).
DISCUSSION
I. 	Request to Depose President Macpherson
Generally, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter
that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs to the
case[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). “Relevance for discovery purposes is an extremely
broad concept which has been construed to encompass any matter that bears on, or
reasonably could lead to other matters that could bear on, any issue that is or may be
in the case.” Mitchell v. Fishbein, 227 F.R.D. 239, 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (quotation and
alteration omitted). “Though the burden of demonstrating relevance is on the party
seeking discovery, if a party objects to discovery requests, that party bears the burden
of showing why discovery should be denied[.]” Shiber v. Centerview Partners LLC, No.
21-CV-3649 (ER), 2023 WL 3071554, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2023) (citation omitted).
Case 6:22-cv-06306-CJS-CDH Document 52 Filed 07/08/25 Page 4 of 10

- 5 -
“Given the broad scope of discovery in federal civil litigation, ‘it is exceedingly
difficult to demonstrate an appropriate basis for an order barring the taking of a
deposition.’” Kamps v. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobson L.L.P., No. 09 CIV
10392 RMB, 2010 WL 5158183, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2010) (quoting Naftchi v. New
York Univ. Med. Ctr., 172 F.R.D. 130, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)). “A witness ordinarily
cannot escape examination by denying knowledge of any relevant facts, since the
party 	seeking 	to 	take 	the 	deposition 	is 	entitled 	to 	test 	the 	witness’s 	lack 	of
knowledge.” Id. (quoting 8A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2037 (3d ed. 2017)).
However, a different rule applies where a party seeks to depose a “high-
ranking government official.” Lederman v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Parks & Recreation, 731
F.3d 199, 203 (2d Cir. 2013). Such officials “are generally shielded from depositions
because they have greater duties and time constraints than other witnesses,” and if
courts 	did 	not 	impose 	appropriate 	limitations, 	“such 	officials 	would 	spend 	an
inordinate amount of time tending to pending litigation.” Id. (quotations omitted).
Accordingly, “to depose a high-ranking government official, a party must demonstrate
exceptional circumstances justifying the deposition—for example, that the official has
unique first-hand knowledge related to the litigated claims or that the necessary
information cannot be obtained through other, less burdensome or intrusive means.”
Id. (emphasis added).
The Lederman standard places a “heavy burden” on the party seeking to depose
a high-ranking government official. Chin v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Correction, 741 F. Supp.
Case 6:22-cv-06306-CJS-CDH Document 52 Filed 07/08/25 Page 5 of 10

- 6 -
3d 18, 25 (E.D.N.Y. 2024). Such parties generally must demonstrate that the
individual they seek to depose has “unique personal information that is essential to
their case or that the information they seek cannot be obtained from a less
burdensome source.” Id. (denying motion to compel where the plaintiff “failed to show
why 	any 	lingering 	questions 	could 	not 	be 	resolved 	through 	other 	discovery
mechanisms”); see also Moriah v. Bank of China Ltd., 72 F. Supp. 3d 437, 440
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate exceptional circumstances that
would allow a deposition of [the subpoenaed government official] because they cannot
establish that [the subpoenaed government official] has unique first-hand knowledge
related in any manner to this litigation.”) (quotation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff does not contest that President Macpherson qualifies as a high-
ranking government official and that the Lederman standard applies. Plaintiff argues
that he has satisfied the Lederman standard because President Macpherson was
“personally involved” in the actions of which he complains. (Dkt. 46-1 at ¶ 15). More
specifically, Plaintiff contends that deposition testimony by “Defendant Erick Hart,
Susan Hoffman, Dr. Cathy Houston-Wilson, and Tamara Gouger . . . established that
Heidi Macpherson, as SUNY Brockport’s President, was directly involved in the
September 2020 decision to suspend the SUNY Brockport Wrestling Program,
immediately 	remove 	Murray from 	the 	SUNY 	Brockport 	campus, 	and 	suspend
Murray’s 	teaching 	and 	coaching 	duties 	in 	lieu 	of 	an 	alternate 	off-campus
assignment.” (Id. at ¶ 17). Plaintiff further asserts that any inconvenience to
Case 6:22-cv-06306-CJS-CDH Document 52 Filed 07/08/25 Page 6 of 10

- 7 -
President Macpherson can be minimized because her “deposition can be conducted
virtually and should last about an hour.” (Id. at ¶ 16).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not satisfied the applicable standard, and
that mere involvement by President Macpherson in the relevant events is insufficient
to warrant her deposition. (Dkt. 48-4 at 17). They have submitted a declaration from
President Macpherson in which she states under penalty of perjury that she has “no
unique knowledge or information regarding any of the issues surrounding this
lawsuit” and “did not personally make the decision to suspend the wrestling team for
possible COVID rules violations in September of 2020.” (Dkt. 48-2 at ¶¶ 17, 19).
As noted above, “the party seeking to take the deposition[] bears the burden of
demonstrating the exceptional circumstances that justify the high-level deposition.”
Loc. 2507, Uniformed EMTs, Paramedics & Fire Inspectors v. City of N.Y., __ F. Supp.
3d __, No. 22 CIV. 10336 (AT) (GWG), 2025 WL 1719210, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 20,
2025) (quotations omitted). The Court finds that Plaintiff has not satisfied that
burden here. At best, the evidence cited by Plaintiff creates an issue of fact as to
whether President Macpherson was the ultimate decision-maker with respect to the
suspension of the wrestling team in September 2020. 	But even assuming that was
the case, “[t]he fact that [a high-ranking government official] was the ultimate
decision-maker 	regarding 	the 	alleged 	policy 	is 	not 	a 	sufficiently 	exceptional
circumstance to compel a deposition.” Boggs v. Town of Riverhead, No. 2:17-CV-05411
ADS SIL, 2020 WL 1929076, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2020); see also Local 2507, 2025
WL 1719210, at *2 (“It is also of no moment that the Commissioner was the ultimate
Case 6:22-cv-06306-CJS-CDH Document 52 Filed 07/08/25 Page 7 of 10

- 8 -
decision-maker responsible for decisions that may be relevant here, such as assigning
the Fire Cadets to EMS positions.”). The relevant inquiry is whether the necessary
information is “readily discernable from other sources.” Local 2507, 2025 WL
1719210, at *2. Here, the evidence cited by Plaintiff confirms that other SUNY
Brockport personnel were involved in the meetings and discussions that led to the
suspension of the wrestling team and the report to the NCAA. Plaintiff has not
demonstrated that the information he seeks cannot be obtained from these sources,
and 	thus 	he 	has 	not 	demonstrated 	exceptional 	circumstances 	as 	required 	by
Lederman.
The Court’s resolution of this matter is not bound by the informal discovery
conference 	held 	by 	Judge 	Payson 	in 	October 	2024. 	Such 	informal 	discovery
conferences serve as a case management tool whereby the Court may assist the
parties in resolving a dispute without the need for formal motion practice. But they
are not a substitute for formal motion practice, and Judge Payson did not issue any
order or binding ruling as a result of that conference. The purpose of requiring a
formal motion is to ensure that the Court has a full and complete record and
understanding of all issues before making an authoritative ruling. On the full and
complete record, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has not demonstrated that a
deposition of President Macpherson is warranted in this matter. Accordingly, his
request for an order compelling President Macpherson’s deposition is denied.
Case 6:22-cv-06306-CJS-CDH Document 52 Filed 07/08/25 Page 8 of 10

- 9 -
II. 	Request to Compel Production
If a party fails to produce documents requested under Rule 34, the party
seeking discovery may move for an order compelling production. Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(a)(3)(B)(iv). Plaintiff has moved for an order compelling Defendants to produce
communications between SUNY Brockport and the NCAA, as well as documents
noted in a March 12, 2025 email from Plaintiff’s counsel to defense counsel. (Dkt. 46-
1 at ¶¶ 22-23). Defendants have not opposed this portion of Plaintiff’s motion, but
instead stated in their response filed on April 1, 2025, that they were “endeavoring
to comply with all demands and seek[ing] additional time to do so, not to exceed thirty
days.” (Dkt. 48 at ¶ 2).
In light of Defendants’ failure to oppose this portion of Plaintiff’s motion, the
Court grants Plaintiff’s request to compel a supplemental production. Within 14 days
of 	entry 	of 	this 	Decision 	and 	Order, 	Defendants 	shall 	produce 	the 	requested
documents.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motion to compel discovery (Dkt. 46)
is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff’s request for an order compelling the
deposition 	of 	President 	Macpherson 	is 	denied. 	Plaintiff’s 	request 	to 	compel 	a
supplemental document production is granted, and Defendants are ordered to
produce the additional documents identified in Plaintiff’s motion within 14 days of
entry of this Decision and Order.
Case 6:22-cv-06306-CJS-CDH Document 52 Filed 07/08/25 Page 9 of 10

- 10 -
SO ORDERED.
COLLEEN D. HOLLAND
United States Magistrate Judge
Dated: Rochester, New York
July 8, 2025
O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	O	OLLEEN D H	H	HOL	OL	OL	O 	LA	LA	LAND
Case 6:22-cv-06306-CJS-CDH Document 52 Filed 07/08/25 Page 10 of 10