USA v. Crapsi

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
JOSEPH L. CRAPSI,
Defendant.
24-CR-138-LJV-JJM
DECISION & ORDER
On October 16, 2024, the defendant, Joseph L. Crapsi, was indicted on one
count of aiming a laser pointer at an aircraft in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 39A. Docket
Item 16. Later that day, this Court referred the case to United States Magistrate Judge
Jeremiah J. McCarthy for all proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) and (B).
Docket Item 18.
On March 24, 2025, Crapsi filed, among other motions, a motion to suppress
evidence related to his arrest—including physical evidence seized from his bedroom
immediately after his arrest—as well as statements that he made following the arrest.
Docket Item 33. The government then responded, Docket Item 35, and Crapsi replied,
Docket Item 37. After hearing oral argument, see Docket Item 39, Judge McCarthy
issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) finding that this Court should grant in
part and deny in part Crapsi’s motion to suppress, Docket Item 46. More specifically,
Judge McCarthy recommended denying the motion to suppress based on Crapsi’s
arrest, id. at 3, but granting the motion to suppress the laser pointer seized from
Crapsi’s bedroom, id. at 6, as well as the fruit of that poisonous tree: Crapsi’s
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statements demonstrating how to use the laser pointer, id.1 Finally, Judge McCarthy
found that “Crapsi [had] fail[ed] to sufficiently identify the other alleged statements which
he seeks to suppress” and that “his request for that relief should be denied.” Id.
Both parties objected to the R&R. Docket Items 51 and 53. Crapsi objected to
Judge McCarthy’s recommendation to deny the motion to suppress statements made
and evidence seized in connection with Crapsi’s arrest and to deny the motion to
suppress additional statements. Docket Item 53. The government objected to Judge
McCarthy’s recommendation to suppress the laser pointer and Crapsi’s demonstration
of how to use it. Docket Item 51. After both parties responded to the other side’s
objections, Docket Items 55 and 56, and replied, Docket Items 57 and 58, this Court
heard oral argument and reserved decision. See Docket Item 60.
A district court may accept, reject, or modify the findings or recommendations of
a magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3). The court must
review de novo those portions of a magistrate judge’s recommendation to which a party
objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Crim. P. 59(b)(3).
This Court has carefully and thoroughly reviewed the R&R; the objections,
responses, and replies; and the materials submitted to Judge McCarthy, including the
video footage submitted by the government. Based on that de novo review, this Court
adopts the R&R insofar as it recommends finding that Crapsi’s arrest was supported by
probable cause. This Court also adopts the R&R’s recommendation to deny Crapsi’s
motion to suppress statements other than the laser pointer demonstration but modifies
the reasons for that conclusion as explained below. The Court respectfully declines to
1 Page numbers in docket citations refer to ECF pagination.
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adopt the R&R’s recommendation to suppress the laser pointer, however; denies
Crapsi’s motion to suppress the laser pointer; and grants in part and denies in part
Crapsi’s motion to suppress his demonstration of how to use the laser pointer.
DISCUSSION2
I. 	CRAPSI’S ARREST
As explained above, Crapsi objects to Judge McCarthy’s finding that the officers
had probable cause to arrest him. Docket Item 53 at 9-10. This Court agrees with
Judge McCarthy.
“Probable cause to arrest requires that the totality of facts and circumstances
known to the police permit a person of reasonable caution to conclude that there is a
‘fair probability’ that the person to be seized has committed or is committing a crime.”
United States v. Patterson, 25 F.4th 123, 136 (2d Cir. 2022) (quoting Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983)). Probable cause does not “require[] the more-likely-than-not
showing demanded by the preponderance standard.” Id. at 135 (citing Gates, 462 U.S.
at 235). Here, as the government observes, “[a]t the time of [Crapsi]’s arrest, the police
had learned the following facts”:
1. The pilot of Delta Flight 2334 reported that someone had pointed a laser
towards his aircraft while he was landing;
2. The pilot reported that the laser had come from the general direction of
the defendant’s home;
3. Nearly contemporaneous with the pilot’s report, the defendant’s neighbor
reported seeing a laser shining through the defendant’s window on multiple
occasions; and
2 The Court assumes the reader’s familiarity with the factual background, see
Docket Item 46 at 1-3, and will refer to facts only as necessary to explain its decision.
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4. The neighbor reported seeing the laser shining towards the sky.
Docket Item 55 at 7. That is sufficient to meet the relatively low standard for probable
cause.3
The Court also agrees with Judge McCarthy and the government that “exigent
circumstances required that the arrest be made before a warrant could be obtained.”
See United States v. Cattouse, 846 F.2d 144, 146 (2d Cir. 1988) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). Pointing a laser at an aircraft is dangerous, and waiting for
an arrest warrant could have “risked the lives of hundreds of airline passengers.” See
Docket Item 55 at 7.
For all those reasons, this Court adopts the portion of the R&R recommending
that this Court deny Crapsi’s motion to suppress any and all evidence connected to his
arrest.
II. 	THE LASER POINTER
When the officers arrested Crapsi, they seized a laser pointer from his bedroom.
See Docket Item 46 at 3. The government says that the laser was properly seized
because exigent circumstances permitted the officers to accompany Crapsi to his room
and, once there, they saw the laser in plain sight. See Docket Item 51 at 7-15. Judge
McCarthy disagreed and recommended that the laser be suppressed because there
3 The officers also observed “a green glow” coming from Crapsi’s bedroom. See
Docket Item 51 at 4. At oral argument, the parties disagreed as to whether the officers
could reasonably have thought this was from a laser pointer as opposed to what it
actually was from—green string lights. The Court need not decide this issue, however,
because even without observing the “green glow,” the officers had probable cause to
arrest Crapsi.
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were no “‘real time’ exigencies . . . at the time of the search.” Docket Item 46 at 5. “By
then,” Judge McCarthy explained, “Crapsi had already left his bedroom, eliminating the
chance that he could destroy the laser or point it at an aircraft.” Id. And Judge
McCarthy noted that “[t]he government fails to explain why officers could not have
secured the bedroom until they obtained a search warrant, either in person or by
telephone.” Id.
In its objection, the government argues that “it does not matter whether, in
hindsight, we know that [Crapsi] would not return to his bedroom after he left; the Fourth
Amendment instead requires the Court to view the facts from the officers’ perspective.”
Docket Item 51 at 11. And the government says that “here, the officers could not be
sure that [Crapsi] would not return to his bedroom to retrieve something, particularly
given that he had already left and returned to his bedroom on one occasion.” Id. “In
addition,” the government says, “the officers did not know when [Crapsi] would be
released from custody, thereby giving him an opportunity to return home and destroy
the laser; indeed, after being booked and given an appearance ticket, [Crapsi] was
released at approximately 2:44 a.m.—less than two hours after his arrest.” Id.
After careful consideration, this Court agrees with the government. First, the
Court finds that the exigency exception allowed the officers to accompany Crapsi to his
bedroom to get his clothes to ensure that he did not take, hide, or destroy evidence.
See United States v. Delva, 858 F.3d 135, 153-54 (2d Cir. 2017) (explaining that
“[a]mong the most common exigencies found to validate entry into a home with
probable cause but without a warrant [is] . . . the need to prevent the destruction of
evidence” and that “[o]ther exigencies . . . may include the need to reenter or remain in
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the premises for the purpose of having the arrestee appropriately clothed”); cf. United
States v. MacDonald, 916 F.2d 766, 768 (2d Cir. 1990) (upholding warrantless entry
into residence where “any delay in arresting the suspects would be likely to result in the
destruction of evidence, particularly the cocaine, which could be disposed of easily, by
being flushed down the bathroom toilet”). So the officers had legitimate reason to be in
Crapsi’s bedroom with him. And “[w]here the initial intrusion that brings the police within
plain view of [the seized] article is supported . . . by one of the recognized exceptions to
the warrant requirement, the seizure is . . . legitimate.” Horton v. California, 496 U.S.
128, 135 (1990).
Although it is true, as Judge McCarthy found, that the officers did not seize the
laser pointer until after Crapsi had left the room, that does not change the fact that their
“initial intrusion” into the room was authorized by exigent circumstances. And the
officers did not search the room but saw the laser pointer almost immediately after
Crapsi left. What is more, as the government observes, the situation at that time was
still relatively fluid in that the officers did not know when Crapsi would return. For all
those reasons, the Court finds that because the circumstances met the exigency
exception, the officers were not required to obtain a warrant to go to Crapsi’s room.
So the question that remains is this: was the laser pointer in plain sight? The
Court has carefully reviewed the relevant body camera footage and, based on that de
novo review, finds that the government has established by a preponderance of the
evidence that the laser pointer was in plain view.4 See United States v. Alisigwe, 2023
4 The government argues that to the extent Judge McCarthy’s finding that “the
officers in the room found the laser lying on his bed” was a finding that the laser pointer
was in plain view—that is, a finding of fact—that finding should be reviewed for clear
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WL 8275923, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2023) (explaining that government must prove
exception to warrant requirement by preponderance of the evidence).
The camera footage shows Crapsi leaving the bedroom and one of the officers
saying “looks like he’s all set here.” Government’s Exhibit A, Video_2024-03-
01_0055_X60AC645D, at 7:23. The officer then says: “is it on his bed . . . just look to
see if it’s right here in plain sight.” Id. at 7:25. The officers walk over to the bed and
shine their flashlights on it. Almost immediately, an officer says: “Yeah, this is it right
here. That’s the one. You can tell how it’s got that danger warning on it because it’s a
high intensity laser.” Id. at 7:34. Although the bed is not in the frame of the video, it still
is clear from the video that the officers do not move or manipulate anything on the bed.5
And that is especially so given the preponderance of the evidence standard.
For all those reasons, this Court respectfully disagrees with Judge McCarthy and
denies Crapsi’s motion to suppress the laser pointer.
III. 	CRAPSI’S STATEMENTS
A. 	Demonstration of How to Use the Laser Pointer
Following Crapsi’s arrest on March 1, 2024, he was taken to a booking room at
the Niagara Frontier Transportation Authority (“NFTA”) police station and seated on a
error. See Docket Item 55 at 1 (quoting Docket Item 46 at 3). But as the government
itself acknowledges, “Judge McCarthy did not explicitly state that the officers found the
laser pointer in plain view.” Id. Therefore, the Court reviews this issue de novo.
5 Because the Court finds that exigent circumstances allowed the officers to enter
Crapsi’s room and that the officers found the laser pointer in plain sight, the Court need
not determine whether Crapsi’s mother gave implied consent to enter. See Docket Item
46 at 5-6 (Judge McCarthy’s concluding that there was no implied consent).
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bench as officers entered and exited the room.6 See Docket Item 51 at 20;
Government’s Exhibit B. Because Crapsi is deaf, the officers asked him the routine
booking questions by writing back and forth. See Docket Item 51 at 20; Government’s
Exhibit B at 9:32. After that, Crapsi remained seated on the bench while several officers
stood around a desk and talked a few feet away. See Government’s Exhibit B at 11:45.
One of the officers removed the laser pointer from its box and shined it away from
Crapsi; another officer then asked for the laser pointer, and the first officer handed it to
him. See id. The officers did not address or question Crapsi, but Crapsi spontaneously
interjected, speaking and using his hands to demonstrate how to use the laser pointer.
See id. at 12:18.
An officer then asked Crapsi a clarifying question about what he was
demonstrating, and Crapsi answered. See id. at 12:25. The officer handed the laser
pointer to Crapsi, who demonstrated how to use or adjust it. See id. at 12:32. The
officers took the laser pointer back from the Crapsi, put it back together, and returned it
to its box. See id. at 13:05.
Judge McCarthy found that the demonstration of the laser should be suppressed
as fruit of the poisonous tree. Docket Item 46 at 6. Because this Court declines to
suppress the laser pointer, however, it must determine whether the demonstration
violated Crapsi’s rights under the Fifth Amendment.
6 Initially, officers from the Cheektowaga Police Department responded to a
report by Crapsi’s neighbor that a laser was being shined into the neighbor’s house and
at the sky. See Docket Item 51 at 3. The NFTA police got involved when they received
the report from the pilot that his plane had been struck by a laser. See id. at 4.
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Miranda warnings are required not only for formal interrogation but also when the
defendant “was subjected to the ‘functional equivalent’ of questioning.” Rhode Island v.
Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 302 (1980). To determine whether police conduct was functionally
equivalent to interrogation, courts “consider [the] conduct in light of the totality of the
circumstances” and “assess[] whether the police ‘should have known’ that their actions
were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.” United States v. Stroman,
420 F. App’x 100, 102 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order) (some internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Acosta v. Artuz, 575 F.3d 177, 191 (2d Cir. 2009)). In other words,
if—prior to being given a Miranda warning—the defendant was “subjected by the police
to words or actions that the police should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from him,” that violates the Fifth Amendment. Innis, 446 U.S. at
303.
The government argues that “[t]he officers’ conduct, as well as their positioning in
a circle away from [Crapsi], demonstrates that they had no reason to believe that their
conduct would elicit a response from [Crapsi].” Docket Item 51 at 23. This Court
agrees—up to a point. More specifically, the Court agrees that Crapsi’s initial
spontaneous interjection into the officers’ conversation—where he used his hands to
instruct the officers about how to use the laser pointer—was not in response to anything
the officers did or said that was reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. Cf.
Isasi v. Herbert, 176 F. App’x 143, 145 (2d Cir. 2006) (summary order) (finding no Fifth
Amendment violation where the defendant “‘blurted’ out his statement to the detective”
such “that his statement was ‘spontaneous’ and not ‘triggered by police conduct which
should reasonably have been anticipated to evoke a declaration from the defendant’”
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(citation omitted)). But one of the officers then did two things: he asked Crapsi a
question, and he handed Crapsi the laser pointer, which is, as Crapsi observes, “the
alleged instrumentality of the off[ense].” See Docket Item 33 at 8. Those actions—
asking Crapsi a question about how to use the laser pointer and handing it to him—
were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response, and the officers should have
known as much.7 Cf. United States v. Lovell, 317 F. Supp. 2d 663, 669 (W.D. Va. 2004)
(concluding that showing rifle to defendant was “functional equivalent” of interrogation).
This Court therefore grants in part and denies in part Crapsi’s motion to suppress
his demonstration of the laser pointer. More specifically, the Court denies the motion as
to Crapsi’s initial interjection but grants the motion for all statements and actions
following the officer’s asking Crapsi a question and handing him the laser pointer.
B. 	Statements to Crapsi’s Mother
After Crapsi was given a Miranda warning at the police station, the officers left
the room and Crapsi spoke with his mother. As the government observes, statements
to third parties that are not part of an interrogation are not covered by Miranda. See
Docket Item 51 at 23; see also United States v. Romero, 897 F.2d 47, 52 (1990)
(“Miranda does not apply to incriminating statements made to private persons in the
absence of police subterfuge or intimidation.”). Crapsi does not allege that his
conversation with his mother was the result of any subterfuge or intimidation. Thus, the
Court denies Crapsi’s motion to suppress his statements to his mother.
7 What is more, there is good reason to believe that had Crapsi been given a
Miranda warning, he would not have continued to make incriminating statements. After
all, once given his Miranda warning, he declined to talk further with the police. See
Docket Item 51 at 22.
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C. 	Statements to the FBI
Crapsi also was interviewed by the FBI on March 15, 2024. See Docket Item 55
at 5. The government has agreed not to use these statements in its case in chief and
therefore argues that the motion to suppress them is moot. Id. at 5-6. Crapsi says that
the Court still should address the voluntariness of the statements since the government
may seek to use them for impeachment. Docket Item 53 at 6. The government
counters that this question can await another day. Docket Item 55 at 5.
This Court agrees with the government and denies as moot Crapsi’s motion to
suppress the March 15 statements. If the government intends to use those statements
as impeachment at trial, the Court will address their voluntariness in motions in limine.
CONCLUSION
For all the above reasons, this Court adopts the R&R in part. More specifically,
the Court grants Crapsi’s motion to suppress as to his demonstration of the laser pointer
after the officer asked him a question and handed the pointer to him but otherwise
denies Crapsi’s motion.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: 	September 12, 2025
Buffalo, New York
/s/ Lawrence J. Vilardo
LAWRENCE J. VILARDO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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