Boyd v. The City of Buffalo et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
DARRYL BOYD,
Plaintiff,
V.
THE CITY OF BUFFALO, THE COUNTY
OF ERIE, MICHAEL G. GUADAGNO,
JOHN MONTONDO, LINDA J . FIAL AS
EXECUTOR FOR THE ESTATE OF ROBERT
GRABOWSKI, MARTIN BULLOCK AS
EXECUTOR FOR THE ESTATE OF JAMES E.
HUNTER, JENNIFER FLANNERY AS
ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF
ROBERT F. ARNET, JENNIFER FLANNERY
AS ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF
FRANK C. DEUBELL, JENNIFER FLANNERY AS
ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF LEO J .
DONOVAN, JENNIFER FLANNERY AS
ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF
FRANCIS M. MANISTA, AND DAWN
M. DIRIENZO AS EXECUTOR FOR THE
ESTATE OF PAUL R. DELANO,
Defendants.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
JOHN WALKER, JR.,
DECISION AND ORDER
22-cv-00519
Plaintiff, 	DECISION AND ORDER
V.
THE CITY OF BUFFALO, THE COUNTY
OF ERIE, MICHAEL G. GUADAGNO,
JOHN MONTONDO, LINDA J. FIAL AS
EXECUTOR FOR THE ESTATE OF ROBERT
1
22-cv-00520
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GRABOWSKI, MARTIN BULLOCK AS
EXECUTOR FOR THE ESTATE OF JAMES E.
HUNTER, JENNIFER FLANNERY AS
ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF
ROBERT F. ARNET, JENNIFER FLANNERY AS
ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF FRANK
C. DEUBELL , JENNIFER G. FLANNERY AS
ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF LEO J.
DONOVAN, JENNIFER FLANNERY AS
ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF
FRANCIS M. MANISTA, AND DAWN
M. DIRIENZO AS EXECUTOR FOR THE
ESTATE OF PAUL R. DELANO,
Defendants.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs Darryl Boyd and John Walker, Jr. were convicted in 1977 of the
murder of William Crawford. Decades later, in August 2021, the New York Supreme
Court vacated both convictions. Plaintiffs-who spent 28 and 22 years in prison,
respectively-then brought the instant action alleging multiple violations of their
civil rights against the 	City of Buffalo, the 	County of Erie 	("County"), 	and the
individual 	Buffalo 	Police 	Department 	("BPD") 	employees 1 	involved 	m 	the
investigation of the Crawford murder.
In November 2024, Plaintiffs reached a settlement agreement with the City of
Buffalo and the individual BPD employees (collectively, the "City Defendants"),
predicated on Plaintiffs' dismissal of their claims against the City Defendants in this
1 As set forth in the case caption, the individual BPD defendants are : Michael G. Guadagno , John
Montondo, Linda J. Fial as Executor for the Estate of Robert Grabowski, Martin Bullock as Executor
for the Estate of James E. Hunter, Jennifer Flannery as Administrator for the Estate of Robert F.
Arnet, Jennifer Flannery as Administrator for the Estate of Frank C. Deubell, Jennifer Flannery as
Administrator for the Estate of Leo J. Donovan , Jennifer Flannery as Administrator for the Estate of
Francis M. Manista, and Dawn Dirienzo as Executor for the Estate of Paul R. Delano.
2
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action. Consistent with that agreement, the matter is presently before the Court on
Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss their claims against the City Defendants. Boyd, ECF No.
204; Walker, ECF No. 198.
For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs' motion is GRANTED, and Counts
I, 	II, 	III, VI, VIII, 	and IX of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint [ECF No. 	78] 	are
dismissed .2 	Nevertheless, 	the 	dismissal 	of 	Plaintiffs' 	claims 	against 	the 	City
Defendants does not operate to dismiss the County's cross-claim [ECF No. 82], and
the City Defendants remain subject to the Court's jurisdiction.
BACKGROUND
On December 5, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a stipulation of dismissal of all claims
against the City Defendants. Boyd, ECF No. 201; Walker, ECF No. 195. The three
central provisions of the stipulation stated:
1. 	Plaintiffs' claims against the City Defendants (Counts 1-6, 8 and
9 of the Amended Complaint) are dismissed with prejudice.
2. 	Plaintiffs are continuing to pursue their claims in the above-
captioned actions against [the County]. Nothing in the stipulation
is to be 	construed as a 	dismissal of (or impact in any way)
Plaintiffs' claims against the County, which remain pending.
3. 	This Court shall retain jurisdiction over these actions for, among
other reasons, enforcing the terms of the settlement agreement
reaching between Plaintiffs and the City.
Boyd, ECF No. 201, p. 2; Walker, ECF No. 195, p. 2.
That same day, counsel for Plaintiffs, Joel Rudin, alerted the Court by email
that the County had informed him that it objected to Plaintiffs' settlement with the
2 Plaintiffs also request the dismissal of Counts IV and V of the Amended Complaint , but the parties
already stipulated to the dismissal of those claims in May 2024, and Judge Vilardo dismissed them
with prejudice . Boyd , ECF No. 160; Walker, ECF No. 158.
3
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City Defendants. The County responded to Mr. Rudin's email, noting that Rule
41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[e]xcept as provided in
Rule 41(a)(l), an action may be dismissed at the plaintiffs request only by court order,
on terms that the court considers proper." The County then proceeded to identify two
issues that it was particularly concerned with: (1) the apportionment of liability
between the County and the City Defendants, and (2) whether Plaintiffs should file
an amended complaint to reflect the actual remaining issues in the case before trial.
The Court directed the parties to appear for a conference on December 10,
2024. Boyd, ECF No. 202; Walker, ECF No. 196. At the conference, the Court clarified
that it could not approve the stipulation of dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(l),
because the City and County had already filed motions for summary judgment, and
all parties who have appeared in the case had not signed the stipulation. Accordingly,
the Court directed Plaintiffs to file a motion to dismiss their claims under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 41(a)(2), and set forth an expedited briefing schedule. Boyd, ECF No. 203; Walker,
ECF No. 197.
Plaintiffs filed their motion to dismiss on December 12, 2024, asking the Court
to enter the stipulation and proposed order that they had already submitted . Boyd,
ECF No. 204; Walker, ECF No. 198. In response, the County argued that "[t]he Court
should not grant the Plaintiffs' motion without permitting the County to amend its
answers to include the following affirmative defenses: 1) setoff; 2) N.Y. Gen. Oblig.
Law§ 15-108; 3) Apportionment of Liability; and 4) N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 1601." Boyd, ECF
No. 208-1 at 3; Walker, ECF No. 202-1 at 3.
4
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LEGAL STANDARD
Rule 41(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the voluntary
dismissal of actions. Rule 41(a)(l) provides that a plaintiff can voluntarily dismiss an
action without a court order if he either: (i) files the notice of dismissal before the
opposing party files 	an answer or motion for summary judgment, or (ii) files 	a
stipulation signed by all parties who have appeared in the case. Rule 41(a)(2) provides
that if neither of the conditions from Rule 41(a)(l) applies, then the plaintiff must
ask the Court for an order dismissing the case and that the Court may grant the
motion on "terms [it] considers proper ."
"The grant or denial of a dismissal on motion under Rule 41(a)(2)[3] is within
the sound discretion of the trial court." McCombs v. M&T Bank Corp., 335 F.R.D. 41,
43 (W.D.N.Y. 2020) (citiation omitted). Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks dismissal
with prejudice, the Court's discretion is more limited than if the plaintiff seeks
3 There is some debate in the Second Circuit as to whether Rule 4l(a) "has application to dismissal of
a claim rather than [the entire] action." Baksh v. Captain, No. 99-CV-1806 (ILG), 2000 WL 33177209,
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2000) (citing Harvey Aluminum, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co. , 203 F.2d 105
(2d Cir 1953)). Harvey Aluminum suggested, instead , that Rule 21 was more appropriate to dismissal
of a single defendant in a multi-defendant suit. Id . "Rule 21 permits a court to add or drop parties to
an action when doing so would serve the ends of justice and further the prompt and efficient disposition
of the litigation." Boans v. Town of Cheektowaga, No. 09-CV-37A, 2009 WL 2378683, at *2 (W.D.N.Y.
Aug. 3, 2009) (citations omitted). Alternatively, the Second Circuit has observed that "it is clear that
a district court may permit withdrawal of a claim under Rule 15, subject to the same standard of
review as a withdrawal under Rule 4l(a)." Boans , 2009 WL 2378683, at *2 (quoting Wakefield v. N.
Telecom, Inc., 769 F.2d 109, 114 n. 4 (2d Cir. 1985)). Rule 15(a) states that leave to amend should be
granted "when justice so requires," and denied in instances of futility, undue delay, bad faith or
dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, or undue
prejudice to the non-moving party . Burch v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc. , 551 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir.
2008) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)) . Yet whether the motion is based on Rule 15(a),
Rule 21 or Rule 4l(a)(2) , it "is addressed to the sound discretion of the court ... and therefore requires
consideration of the interests of all parties to the action .... " Moll v. S . Charters, Inc., 81 F.R.D. 77,
81 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (citations omitted). Further , despite the debate as to the appropriate rule, "courts
in this Circuit now widely apply the majority rule , which holds that Rule 41 allows a plaintiff to dismiss
individual parties without dismissing the entire case." Jenkins v. Miller , No. 2:12-CV-184, 2023 WL
3000637, at *2 (D . Vt. Apr. 19, 2023) (collecting cases).
5
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dismissal without prejudice. See, e.g., GFE Global Fin. & Engineering Ltd. v. ECI
Ltd. (USA), Inc., 291 F.R.D. 31, 36 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (discussing "two tests ... in the
Second 	Circuit for 	determining 	whether 	dismissal 	without 	prejudice 	would 	be
inappropriate").
Indeed, some district courts have taken the view that a request for dismissal
with prejudice must be granted, on the grounds that "such a dismissal is a complete
adjudication of the claims and a bar to a further action on them between the parties,
... [and] the district court has no discretion to ... force an unwilling plaintiff to go to
trial." Bynum v. Maplebear Inc., 209 F. Supp. 3d 528, 535-36 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (quoting
9 Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2364 (3d ed.) (footnotes omitted)). Other
district courts, 	however, 	have 	taken a 	broader view, 	finding that "a voluntary
dismissal [with prejudice] may, at the discretion of the trial court, be granted if
prejudice will not result to the other party." Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Am. Bd. of Trade,
Inc ., 750 F. Supp. 100, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
The Court finds the latter view more appropriate in the present case, where
the County has asserted cross-claims against the City Defendants. Nevertheless, as
Plaintiffs point out, the Court's discretion in this instance "does not authorize [it] to
pass on the 'propriety' of' a settlement leading to dismissal of a complaint, but only
"to ascertain whether any non-settling party will suffer 'legal prejudice' if the case is
dismissed .... " In re New York City Policing During Summer 2020 Demonstrations,
No. 20-CV-8924 (CM)(GWG), 2024 WL 476367, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2024) (citing
Camilli v. Grimes, 436 F.3d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 2006)).
6
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DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs ask the Court to grant its motion to dismiss its claims against the
City Defendants, and maintain that the County lacks standing to object because it
will not be prejudiced by the dismissal. Boyd, ECF No. 204-1; Walker, ECF No. 198-
1. In.response, the County seems to argue that it will suffer legal prejudice if the City
Defendants are dismissed without first granting the County's cross-motion to amend
its answer. Boyd, ECF No. 208-1; Walker, ECF No. 202-1. After a review of the record
and the parties' papers, the Court finds suitable grounds for granting Plaintiffs'
motion to dismiss Counts I, II, III, VI, VIII, and IX with prejudice.
At the outset, the Court notes that despite Plaintiffs' request that it dismiss
Counts IV and V 4 of Plaintiffs' amended complaint, those Counts have already been
dismissed by the parties. 	On May 23, 	2024, 	all parties to this action signed a
stipulation to dismiss Counts IV and V with prejudice. Boyd, ECF No. 156; Walker,
ECF No. 154. Judge Vilardo issued a text order on May 29, 2024, ordering dismissal
of those counts. Boyd, ECF No. 160; Walker, ECF No. 158. Accordingly, Counts IV
and V have already been dismissed without need of further action by the Court.
With respect to the other requests in Plaintiffs' motion, the Court finds that
the County is not prejudiced by the dismissal of Counts I, II, III, VI, VIII, and IX
against the City Defendants. "[I]t is settled that the voluntary dismissal of an action
as against fewer than all defendants will not operate to dismiss previously asserted
cross-claims against those defendants, who remain subject to the court's jurisdiction
4 Counts IV and IV involve "Russo" and "Brady" claims against the individual BPD detectives or
their estates. ECF No. 78, if 450-65.
7
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for purposes of those and any other cross-claims that might subsequently be filed ."
Moll, 81 F.R.D. at 80-81 (citing Slotkin v. Brookdale Hospital Center, 377 F. Supp.
275, 277-78 (197 4)). That is, the dismissal with prejudice of a plaintiffs action against
one 	defendant does 	not operate to 	dismiss the 	cross-claim 	asserted by another
defendant against the "dismissed" defendant. Lipford v. New York Life Ins. Co., No.
02 CIV. 0092 (LTSHBP, 2003 WL 21313193, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2003) (also
discussing 	Slotkin, 	377 	F. 	Supp. 	at 	277-78). 	Consequently, 	the 	Court 	retains
jurisdiction in the present matter over the "dismissed" City Defendants by virtue of
the County's cross-claim. See Shaps v. D.F.D.S., No. 83 CIV. 8091 (CBM), 1985 WL
269, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 1983) ("A cross-claim, once properly made, does not cease
to be proper because the defendant to whom they were addressed ceased to be a co-
defendant.").
The 	Court 1s 	not 	persuaded by the 	County's 	implication that 	it will be
prejudiced if the Court grants Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss before the County amends
its answers to include the 	affirmative defenses listed above. 	See supra at 5. If
Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss is granted, the Court retains jurisdiction over the City
Defendants by virtue of the County's cross-claim, the City Defendants remain parties
in this action, and the County is not precluded from amending its answer prior to
trial if leave of the Court is granted pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 	Slotkin, 	377 	F. 	Supp. 	at 	278. 	By contrast, 	Plaintiffs 	and 	the 	City
Defendants would be prejudiced by holding Plaintiffs' motion in abeyance in order to
consider the merits of the County's cross-motion to amend, as the potential delay
8
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would jeopardize a material term of the parties' settlement agreement. See, e.g., ECF
No. 198-1 at 6 (stating that "payment of the majority of the settlement amount by
December 31, 2024" is a material term of their settlement agreement with the City
Defendants).
Lastly, 	the 	Court 	construes 	Plaintiffs' 	request 	that the 	Court 	adopt 	the
previously-filed stipulation as a request that Court retain jurisdiction to enforce the
settlement agreement between Plaintiffs and the City Defendants. A district court
does not "automatically retain jurisdiction to hear a motion to enforce a settlement
agreement simply by virtue of having disposed of the original case." Crispin v.
Rodriguez, No. 21-883, 2023 WL 1113536, at *2 (2d Cir. Jan. 31, 2023) (summary
order) (quoting Hendrickson v. 	United States, 	791 F.3d 354, 358 (2d Cir. 2015)).
Rather , motions to enforce 	settlement agreements require 	a separate "basis for
jurisdiction," which exists where a district court's order of dismissal either "(1)
expressly retain[s] jurisdiction over the settlement agreement, or (2) incorporate[s]
the terms of the settlement agreement in the order." Id. Absent the Court's express
retention 	of 	jurisdiction 	over 	the 	settlement 	agreement, 	enforcement 	of 	the
agreement is for state courts unless there is some independent basis for federal
jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1994) .
In the present case, the Court has not been m_ade privy to all of the terms of
the settlement agreement between Plaintiffs and the City Defendants . Nevertheless,
the Court agrees to retain jurisdiction over that agreement until its terms have been
fully executed.
9
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss their remaining
claims against the City Defendants [Boyd, ECF No. 204; Walker, ECF No. 198] is
GRANTED. However, City Defendants remain parties to this action by virtue of the
County's cross-claim.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Counts I, II, III, VI, VIII, and IX of Plaintiffs'
Amended Complaint [ECF No. 78] are dismissed; and it is further
ORDERED 	that 	the 	Court 	shall 	retain 	jurisdiction 	over 	the 	settlement
agreement between Plaintiffs and the 	City Defendants until its terms are fully
executed .
A separate scheduling order for the County's cross-motion to amend [Boyd,
ECF No. 208; Walker, ECF No. 202] shall be issued in due course.
Dated:
SO ORDERED.
December 19, 2024
Rochester, New York
~l/JJJJff&!LcH0N.MEEDITHA. VACCA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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