Stanley v. Capital Link Management LLC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ELAINE STANLEY,
Plaintiff,
21-CV-806-LJV-JJM
v. 	DECISION & ORDER
CAPITAL LINK MANAGEMENT LLC,
Defendant.
On July 14, 2021, the plaintiff, Elaine Stanley, filed a complaint alleging violations
of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692, et seq. Docket
Item 1. After the defendant, Capital Link Management LLC (“Capital Management”),
answered, Docket Item 4, this Court referred this case to United States Magistrate
Judge Jeremiah J. McCarthy for all proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A), Docket
Item 6.
On January 10, 2022, Capital Management’s counsel moved to withdraw, Docket
Item 12, and Judge McCarthy granted that motion, Docket Item 16. New counsel
subsequently appeared for Capital Management, see Docket Item 17; several months
later, however, that attorney also moved to withdraw, Docket Item 31, and Judge
McCarthy granted that motion, Docket Item 33. In the order granting the motion, Judge
McCarthy noted that “[b]ecause Capital Management is a limited liability company, it
may not appear or proceed in this action except by an attorney.” Id. (citing Lattanzio v.
COMTA, 481 F.3d 137, 140 (2nd Cir. 2007)). Judge McCarthy therefore ordered that
“by September 8, 2022, counsel shall enter an appearance on behalf of Capital
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Management, failing which plaintiff may seek a default judgment against Capital
Management.” Id.
New counsel did not appear, and about two years later, Stanley asked the Clerk
of Court to enter default. See Docket Item 36. After the Clerk did so, Docket Item 37,
Stanley moved for a default judgment, Docket Item 39. She seeks $1,000 in statutory
damages and states that she will “submit [a] request for attorney’s fees and costs
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3) should the Court grant [her] motion.” Docket Item
39-1 at 6.
When Capital Management missed the deadline to respond to the motion for
default judgment, this Court ordered it to show cause why the motion should not be
granted. Docket Item 42. Capital Management failed to respond to that order, and the
deadline to do so has passed. See id.
For the reasons that follow, this Court grants Stanley’s motion in part. More
specifically, the Court grants Stanley’s motion for a default judgment but awards $500 in
statutory damages instead of the $1,000 she requested. Stanley may submit her
request for reasonable attorney’s fees to Judge McCarthy within 30 days of the date of
this decision and order.
BACKGROUND
Stanley incurred consumer debt that Capital Management sought to collect.1
Docket Item 1 at ¶¶ 5-8. Toward that end, Capital Management “sent a text message to
1 Upon entry of default, the court accepts as true the complaint’s factual
allegations, except those relating to damages, and draws all reasonable inferences in
the moving party’s favor. See Finkel v. Romanowicz, 577 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2009);
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[Stanley’s] sister-in-law” in which it “wrongfully disclosed that [Stanley] owed a debt and
further disclosed details about the [d]ebt to [Stanley’s] sister-in-law.” Id. at ¶¶ 9-10; see
Docket Item 39-2 (text message that complaint alleges was sent to Stanley’s sister-in-
law, see Docket Item 1 at ¶¶ 9-10; Docket Item 39-1 at 3, stating: “Elaine Stanley, your
Check N Go account was transferred to Capital Link Management. Balance owed of
$4,976.36, we can settle the account for $1,990.54. If you are interested in resolving
this please call 1-833-755-8393. To opt out please respond STOP.”). Stanley’s “sister-
in-law is not responsible for repayment of [Stanley’s d]ebt,” and Stanley “did not give
Capital [Management] permission to speak with her sister-in-law.” Docket Item 1 at
¶¶ 11-12. This disclosure caused Stanley “a great deal of embarrassment, humiliation[,]
and distress.” Id. at ¶ 13.
DISCUSSION
A. 	Default Judgment
To obtain a default judgment, a party must secure a clerk’s entry of default by
demonstrating, “by affidavit or otherwise,” that the opposing party “has failed to plead or
otherwise defend” the case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). In considering whether to enter a
default judgment, the court accepts the factual allegations in the complaint as true and
determines whether the alleged facts state a valid claim for relief; the court also has the
discretion to require further proof of necessary facts. Au Bon Pain Corp. v. Artect, Inc.,
653 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir. 1981) (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)). As to damages,
the court should take steps, including by hearing when necessary, to establish an
Greyhound Exhibitgroup, Inc. v. E.L.U.L. Realty Corp., 973 F.2d 155, 158 (2d Cir. 1992)
(citing Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 707 (2d Cir. 1974)).
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amount with reasonable certainty. Transatlantic Marine Claims Agency, Inc. v. Ace
Shipping Corp., 109 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 1997) (discussing Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2)).
B. 	FDCPA Claims
1. 	Liability
Stanley asserts that Capital Management violated the FDCPA by contacting her
sister-in-law and revealing information about her debt. Docket Item 1 at ¶¶ 9-10, 16-26.
Taking all allegations as true, the Court finds that the complaint has adequately alleged
a violation of the FDCPA by Capital Management. More specifically, 15 U.S.C. § 1692b
prohibits a debt collector from “stat[ing] that [the] consumer owes any debt” when
“communicating with any person other than the consumer.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(2). In
fact, communications with any person other than the consumer are permitted only for
the purpose of acquiring location information. Id. §§ 1692b, 1692c(b). The text
message to Stanley’s sister-in-law clearly stated that Stanley owed a debt and was not
for the purpose of acquiring information about Stanley’s location or how she could be
reached. See Docket Item 39-2. Therefore, this Court finds that Stanley has
established a violation of the FDCPA for the purposes of default judgment.
2. 	Damages
Under the FDCPA, a court may award each plaintiff up to $1,000 in statutory
damages. 15 U.S.C. § 1629k(a)(2). Proof that the statute was violated warrants
damages, “although a court must then exercise its discretion to determine how much to
award, up to the $1,000.00 ceiling.” Savino v. Comput. Credit, Inc., 164 F.3d 81, 86 (2d
Cir. 1998).
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In calculating an appropriate award of statutory damages, the court considers
factors such as the frequency, persistence, nature, and intentionality of noncompliance
by the debt collector. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b)(1). Awards of the $1,000 statutory
maximum are rare and “are typically granted [only] in cases where the defendants’
violations are ‘particularly egregious or intimidating.’” Carbin v. N. Resol. Grp., LLC,
2013 WL 4779231, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2013) (quoting Cordero v. Collection Co.,
2012 WL 1118210, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2012)).
Here, Stanley seeks $1,000 in statutory damages.2 Docket Item 39-1 at 5-6. In
support of her request for the statutory maximum, she states that Capital Management
“blatantly violated the requirements of the FDCPA” and that its “violations . . . were not
mere technical violations, but instead deliberately and intentionally attempting to collect
a debt from [Stanley] by disclosing details about the debt to an unauthorized third party.”
Id. at 5. “This conduct,” Stanley urges, “goes to the heart of what the FDCPA is
supposed to prevent, i.e., predatory debt collection practices.” Id.
The Court finds that a damages award of $1,000 is not warranted by the facts of
this case. See Dembitzer v. Weinberg Mediation Grp. LLC, 2018 WL 4088077, at *5
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2018) (explaining that “[c]ourts of this [c]ircuit have reserved the
maximum award of $1,000 for violations that are particularly egregious” (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted), report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL
2 In her complaint, Stanley also sought actual damages based on alleged
emotional injuries from Capital Management’s conduct. Docket Item 1 at ¶¶ 14-15. In
her motion for default judgment, however, she seeks judgment for statutory damages
only. See Docket Item 39-1 at 5-6. Therefore, this Court will deem Stanley’s “claim for
actual damages to be abandoned.” See Fajer v. Kaufman, Burns & Assocs., 2011 WL
334311, at *3 n.2 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2011).
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4087921 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2018); see also Fajer v. Kaufman, Burns & Assocs., 2011
WL 334311, at *1, 3 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2011) (deeming $1,000 “excessive” where
defendant made calls to the plaintiff’s workplace and made empty threats of litigation).
Capital Management’s violation consisted of only one text message, and “nothing (other
than a conclusory assertion by [Stanley] in the [c]omplaint) indicates that [the
communication with Stanley’s sister-in-law was] intentional.” See Dembitzer, 2018 WL
4088077, at *6. That being said, a message to a third party, by its very nature,
constitutes an invasion of privacy that can cause real harm to the plaintiff. Taking all of
the circumstances into account, this Court finds that $500 is an appropriate award of
damages. See, e.g., Savino, 164 F.3d at 86 (affirming award of $500 for letter that
“violated the FDCPA but . . . was not threatening or abusive in tone”); Dembitzer, 2018
WL 4088077, at *6 (finding $500 in statutory damages appropriate where defendant “left
a message that failed to disclose it was from a debt collector, and in a second call
contacted and disclosed information about the debt to a third party”); Dona v. Midland
Credit Mgmt., Inc., 2011 WL 941204, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2011) (finding $500 in
statutory damages appropriate where defendant left message on plaintiff’s answering
machine for the purposes of collecting a debt without indicating that call was from debt
collector), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 939724 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 15,
2011).
3. 	Attorney’s Fees
Under the FDCPA, the court has the discretion to award reasonable attorney’s
fees to successful litigants. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3). Stanley states that she “will
submit her request for attorney’s fees and costs . . . should the Court grant [her]
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motion.” Docket Item 39-1 at 6. This Court refers this case back to Judge McCarthy for
consideration of that request.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Stanley’s motion for a default judgment is granted
in part; more specifically, she is awarded the amount of $500 in statutory damages.
The case is referred back to Judge McCarthy for further proceedings consistent with the
referral order of August 24, 2021, Docket Item 6. Stanley shall submit her request for
attorney’s fees to Judge McCarthy within 30 days of the date of this decision and order.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: 	February 14, 2025
Buffalo, New York
/s/ Lawrence J. Vilardo
LAWRENCE J. VILARDO
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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