Golloo v. Akshar et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________
MEHDI ESMAEILI GOLLOO,
Petitioner,
vs. 	9:26-CV-401
(MAD)
FREDERICK J. AKSHAR II, in his official
capacity as Sheriff, Broome County Correctional
Facility; PHILIP L. RHONEY, in his Official
Capacity as Acting Field Office Director, Buffalo
Ice Field Office; MARKWAYNE MULLIN, in his
Official Capacity as Secretary of Homeland Security;
TODD M. LYONS, in his official capacity as Acting
Director, Immigration and Customs Enforcement;
and TODD BLANCHE, in his official capacity as
Acting Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice,
Respondents.
____________________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
ECBA VOLUNTEER LAWYERS PROJECT 	AARON J. AISEN, ESQ.
45 Ellicott Street, Suite 1 	DAVID J. SLEIGHT, ESQ.
Batavia, New York 14020 	MICHAELA ANDRIATCH, ESQ.
Attorneys for Petitioner
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 	DAVID M. KATZ, AUSA
ATTORNEY
P.O. Box 7198
100 South Clinton Street
Syracuse, New York 13261-7198
Attorney for Respondents
Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
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On March 16, 2026, Petitioner Mehdi Esmaeili Golloo filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus (the "Petition"), alleging that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") has
detained him for an unreasonably long period of time without due process. Dkt. No. 1.
Respondents to the Petition are one Broome County, New York official—Sheriff Frederick J.
Akshar II—and four federal officials—Acting Field Office Director, Buffalo ICE Filed Office,
Phillip L. Rhoney, Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") Secretary Markwayne Mullin,
Acting ICE Director Todd M. Lyons, and Acting U.S. Attorney General Todd Blanche. Id.1
Petitioner also sought a temporary order barring Respondents from relocating him outside the
Northern District of New York while his petition is pending, see id. at 9, which this Court
granted, see Dkt. No. 2.
On March 16, 2026, this Court ordered Respondents to file a response and show cause as
to why the petition should not be granted. Id. Respondents filed their response to the petition on
March 30, 2026, see Dkt. No. 6, and Petitioner filed a reply on April 6, 2026, see Dkt. No. 7. The
Court has determined that a show cause hearing is not necessary and will decide this matter on
submissions without a hearing. See Palma v. Arteta, No. 25-CV-09340, 2026 WL 697015, *2
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2026) ("[W]here, as here, 'the record and submissions are adequate to resolve
Petitioner's claim,' 'there is no need for a full evidentiary hearing'") (quoting Kaplan v. United
States, No. 14-CV-1440, 2015 WL 4111246, *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2015), and then citing Chang
v. United States, 250 F.3d 79, 86 (2d Cir. 2001)).
1 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), when an officer ceases to hold office while the
action is pending, the officer's successor is automatically substituted as a respondent.
Accordingly, Markwayne Mullin is hereby substituted for Respondent Kristi Noem. Attorney
General Pamela Bondi's successor will be automatically substituted as a Respondent once a new
Attorney Generally officially replaces her. At the present time, Acting Attorney General Todd
Blanche is substituted for Respondent Pamela Bondi.
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II. BACKGROUND
Petitioner was detained on September 4, 2024, shortly after his unlawful entry into the
United States, and has remained detained since. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 2, 5, 20; Dkt. No. 6-1 at ¶ 5. He
is a citizen and national of Iran. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 1. On September 6, 2024, Petitioner received a
Notice and Order of Expedited Removal, which commenced expedited removal proceedings
under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1). See id. at ¶ 21; Dkt. No. 1-3 at 1.
Petitioner received a credible fear interview on October 24, 2024. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 23.
On October 25, 2024, removal proceedings were commenced by a Notice to Appear. See id. at ¶
3. On May 13, 2025, an immigration judge found Petitioner removable, denied relief from
removal, and issued an Order of Removal. See id. at ¶ 25; Dkt. No. 6-1 at ¶ 7. Petitioner
appealed the Order of Removal to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") on June 9, 2025.
See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 26. At this time, Petitioner remains detained pending appeal. See id. at ¶ 4;
Dkt. No. 6-1 at ¶ 9.
Petitioner concedes that he is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). See Dkt.
No. 1 at ¶¶ 7, 50. The Petition brings a single claim for relief, for violation of Petitioner's
procedural due process rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See
id. at ¶¶ 49-54.
In response to the Petition, Respondents agree that Petitioner is detained pursuant to §
1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), and argue that, because his detention under the statute is mandatory, he is not
entitled to a bond hearing during the pendency of his appeal to the BIA. See Dkt. No. 6 at 9-16.
In his reply brief, Petitioner contends that his detention has been unreasonable prolonged, thereby
giving rise to "some" due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. Dkt. No. 7 at 3-7.
III. DISCUSSION
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A. 	Legal Standard
A district court may "grant a writ of habeas corpus whenever a petitioner is 'in custody in
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.'" Veletanga v. Noem, No. 25-
CV-9211, 2025 WL 3751865, *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2025) (quoting Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d
130, 140 (2d Cir. 2003), superseded by statute on other grounds, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4)); see also
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3); see Padilla Molina v. DeLeon, No. 25-CV-06526, 2025 WL 3718728, *2
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2025) (citations omitted). "This jurisdiction includes habeas petitions filed by
immigration detainees[,]" Padilla Molina, 2025 WL 3718728, at *2 (citing Velasco Lopez v.
Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 2020)), including non-citizens, see R.P.L. v. Maldonado, 814
F. Supp. 3d 301, 304 (E.D.N.Y. 2025).
"[T]he petitioner 'bears the burden of proving that he is being held contrary to law[,] and
because the habeas proceeding is civil in nature, the petitioner must satisfy his burden of proof by
a preponderance of the evidence.'" Veletanga, 2025 WL 3751865, at *2 (quoting Dzhabrailov v.
Decker, No. 20-CV-3118, 2020 WL 2731966, *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 26, 2020)); see also Skaftouros
v. United States, 667 F.3d 144, 158 (2d Cir. 2011).
B. 	Statutory Authority for Petitioner's Detainment—8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii)
As discussed, the parties agree that the applicable statutory authority for Petitioner's
detainment is § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) of the Immigration and Nationalization Act. Respondents
contend that because detention under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) in mandatory, Petitioner is not entitled
to a bond hearing pending. See Dkt. No. 6 at 9-16. Petitioner argues that, although he has no
statutory right to a bond hearing, he is nonetheless entitled to a bond hearing because his
detention has been unreasonably prolonged. See Dkt. No. 7 at 3-7.
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Section 1225(b)(1) applies to applicants for admission that are initially determined to be
inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or lack of valid documentation. See 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(1)(A)(i). "Aliens covered by § 1225(b)(1) are normally ordered removed 'without further
hearing or review' pursuant to an expedited removal process." Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S.
281, 287 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C.§ 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)). "But if a § 1225(b)(1) alien 'indicates
either an intention to apply for asylum . . . or a fear of persecution,' then that alien is referred for
an asylum interview." Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii)). "If an immigration officer
determines after that interview that the alien has a credible fear of persecution, 'the alien shall be
detained for further consideration of the application for asylum.'" Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. §
1225(b)(1)(B)(ii)).
As the Supreme Court has explained, "[§] 1225(b)(1) aliens are detained for 'further
consideration of the application for asylum[]' . . . . Once those proceedings end, detention under §
1225(b) must end as well." Id. at 297 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii)). More specifically,
the Supreme Court determined that "§§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) mandate detention of aliens
throughout the completion of applicable proceedings and not just until the moment those
proceedings begin." Id. at 302.
Courts from several circuits have considered whether a pending asylum appeal means the
proceedings have not "ended" for purposes of § 1225(b), and have "concluded that detention
remains mandatory throughout the appeal process." Rashid v. Trump, 807 F. Supp. 3d 349, 363
(D. Vt. 2025) (citing Bermudez Paiz v. Decker, No. 18-CV-4759, 2018 WL 6928794, *6
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 27, 2018) (determining that a noncitizen, whose parole was revoked after he was
charged with drug crimes and traffic infractions, and whose asylum appeal was pending, was
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subject to detention under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii)); 2 Leke v. Hott, 521 F. Supp. 3d 597, 600-01 (E.D.
Va. 2021) (determining that asylum proceedings for the petitioner, an "arriving alien" in federal
custody, had not yet concluded because denial of his asylum application was on appeal at the
Fourth Circuit); Djelassi v. ICE Field Off. Dir., 434 F. Supp. 3d 917, 923, 928-29 (W.D. Wash.
2020) (adopting report and recommendation that determined § 1225(b)(1) applied to a petitioner
who absconded from parole, and that, although immigration officials had denied the petitioner's
asylum application, his pending appeal in the Ninth Circuit meant the proceedings had not yet
ended).
There is a lack of consensus among courts regarding whether a petitioner's earlier parole
into the United States negates the Government's detention authority under § 1225(b)(1). Compare
Poonjani v. Shanahan, 319 F. Supp. 3d 644, 648 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) ("Although Petitioner here was
paroled into the United States in 2000 and . . . has been continuously present in the United States
since that date, the parties agree . . . that Petitioner remains 'at the threshold of initial entry' for
immigration purposes"), with Ivonin v. Rhoney, No. 6:25-CV-06673, 2026 WL 199283, *4
(W.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2026) ("[W]here a petitioner's re-arrest was not a continuation of the initial
border encounter, but an independent decision to detain the individual after the expiration of his
parole, the detention pursuant to that re-arrest arises under § 1226") (emphasis in original).
However, here, Petitioner was never paroled into the United States—he has been detained
continuously since the time he was apprehended.
2 The Court notes that Magistrate Judge Barbara Moses analyzed this issue in a report and
recommendation submitted to District Judge Gregory Woods for review, but the habeas corpus
petition was withdrawn and the case was closed before Judge Woods issued any subsequent
decision.
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An asylum officer considered Petitioner's asylum claim and determined that he had a
credible fear of persecution if he were removed. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 21-24. Because of his
credible fear determination, 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) unambiguously directed that Petitioner
"shall be detained for further consideration of the application for asylum."
The government appears to have followed that procedure: an immigration officer initiated
removal proceedings, the immigration judge ordered Petitioner removed, and Petitioner has
appealed the removal order to the BIA. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 21-26. These actions fully comport
with the statutory requirements. Thus, as § 1225(b)(1) unambiguously requires that Petitioner
remain in custody, if Petitioner is entitled to habeas corpus relief, it must be attributable to his
wrongful detention under the Constitution and due process requirements, not pursuant to the INA.
C. 	Whether the Fifth Amendment Requires a Bond Hearing
With the statutory authority for Petitioner's detention settled, the Court will turn to
whether the Fifth Amendment is implicated by his continued detention.
Petitioner acknowledges that he has no statutory right a bond hearing, but argues that he is
entitled to one because his detention has become unconstitutionally prolonged. See Dkt. No. 7 at
3-7. Petitioner asks this Court to extend the reasoning in Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133 (2d Cir.
2024) to non-citizens detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(1), like himself. See id.
In Black, the Second Circuit considered the constitutionality of prolonged detention under
8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). That statute calls for the mandatory detention of noncitizens who have been
convicted of or arrested for certain crimes pending the final resolution of their removal
proceedings. See Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303 (holding that "§ 1226(c) makes clear that detention of
[noncitizens] within its scope must continue 'pending a decision on whether the [noncitizen] is to
be removed from the United States'") (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)) (emphasis in original).
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In Black, the Second Circuit analyzed, inter alia, two Supreme Court decisions, Demore
and Jennings. See Black, 103 F.4th at 140-42. In Demore, "[t]he Supreme Court . . . held that
detention under [§] 1226(c) without an initial bond determination does not, on its face, violate the
detainee's due process rights where detention is 'for the limited period of . . . removal
proceedings.'" Id. at 141 (quoting Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 531 (2003)). In Jennings, the
Court held that, as a matter of statutory interpretation, the text of § 1226(c) and § 1225(b) do not
require a bond hearing after some set amount of time and mandate detention through the end of
removal proceedings. See id. (citing Jennings, 583 U.S. at 303). "Read together, then, Demore
and Jennings instruct that (1) due process does not require an initial bond determination for those
detained under [§] 1226(c), and (2) [§] 1226's text cannot be construed to require a bond hearing
after any particular fixed period of detention." Id. at 142 (emphasis in original).
"Critically, however, Demore and Jennings le[ft] open the question whether prolonged
detention under [§] 1226(c) without a bond hearing will at some point violate an individual
detainee's due process rights[,]" and did not address "what procedures due process may require."
Id. (emphasis in original). The Second Circuit went on to answer these questions, finding that due
process "does not permit the Executive to detain a noncitizen for an unreasonably prolonged
period under [§] 1226(c) without a bond hearing; at some point, additional procedural
protections—like a bond hearing—become necessary." Id. at 145. What Black did not address,
though, is whether detention under § 1225(b) without a bond hearing will, at some point, violate
due process. 3
3 As the Supreme Court observed in Jennings, "nothing in the statutory text [of § 1225(b)(1)]
imposes any limit on the length of detention. And neither § 1225(b)(1) nor § 1225(b)(2) says
anything whatsoever about bond hearings." Jennings, 583 U.S. at 297. This, of course, is
statutory interpretation—whether the Constitution may eventually require a bond hearing was not
answered by the Supreme Court in Jennings nor the Second Circuit Black.
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Respondents argue that under the Supreme Court's decision in Department of Homeland
Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), Petitioner has no due process rights beyond those
that Congress has provided. See Dkt. No. 6 at 12-15. In Thuraissigiam, the Supreme Court
rejected a habeas petitioner's argument that the due process clause conferred rights to challenge
his expedited removal beyond those established by Congress, stating that "an alien at the
threshold of initial entry cannot claim any greater rights under the Due Process Clause."
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 107 (citing Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 660
(1892)). The petitioner had "attempted to enter the country illegally and was apprehended just 25
yards from the border." Id. The Supreme Court determined that "'the political department of the
government'" had "plenary authority" to admit or exclude aliens seeking initial entry, and thus "an
alien in respondent's position has only those rights regarding admission that Congress has
provided by statute." Id. at 139-40. Respondents argue that because Petitioner is likewise an
"arriving alien," due process affords him nothing beyond the mandatory detention scheme
established by Section 1225(b)(1). Dkt. No. 6 at 12-15.
In the wake of Thuraissigiam, there has been significant disagreement regarding whether
prolonged detention under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) can, at some point, become unconstitutional.
According to the Southern District of California, "most courts" have ruled that prolonged
mandatory detention pending removal proceedings, without a bond hearing, will violate due
process at some point. See Sadeqi v. LaRose, 809 F. Supp. 3d 1090, 1093 (S.D. Cal. 2025)
(collecting cases). In following these holdings, the Southern District of California also stated its
agreement with "those district courts that interpret Thuraissigiam as circumscribing an arriving
alien's due process rights to admission, rather than limiting that person's ability to challenge
detention." Id. (emphasis in original) (collecting cases). This Court agrees with that reasoning.
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See Patin v. Trump, No. 2:26-CV-71, 2026 WL 783664, *3 n.2 (D. Vt. Mar. 17, 2026)
("Thuraissigiam's holding is not that arriving noncitizens have no due process rights beyond what
Congress provides but that they have only those rights regarding admission that Congress has
provided by statute . . . . In other words, the due process right at issue in Thuraissigiam was the
right to be admitted to the United States, not the right to be free from arbitrary detention")
(quoting Mata Velasquez v. Kurzdorfer, 795 F. Supp. 3d 128, 147 (W.D.N.Y. 2025)) (internal
citation, quotation marks, and emphasis omitted).
The Southern District of New York also found that "the vast majority of courts to address
whether individuals detained under § 1225(b) have a right to a bond hearing have held that they
do." Al-Thuraya v. Warden, Orange Cnty. Corr. Facility, 809 F. Supp. 3d 135, 143 (S.D.N.Y.
2025) (collecting cases). Indeed, district courts in this Circuit have ordered a bond hearing, even
after finding § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) mandatory detention was applicable. See, e.g., Rashid, 807 F.
Supp. 3d at 363-66 (finding unreasonably prolonged detention under § 1225(b) violates due
process); Al-Thuraya, 809 F. Supp. 3d at 143-44 (same).4
However, there is an appreciable body of case law that holds due process does not require
arriving aliens detained pursuant to § 1225(b)(1) to receive a bond hearing. See Doe v. Bondi,
No. 1:25-CV-02712, 2025 WL 3516292, *4 (D. Colo. Nov. 4, 2025) ("Inadmissible arriving
aliens like the petitioner do not have a cognizable liberty interest in being released on parole as a
matter of procedural due process") (collecting cases); Rodriguez Figueroa v. Garland, 535 F.
4 Although the petitioners in Rashid and Al-Thuraya had been paroled in the United States and
re-apprehended, district courts across the country have still found unreasonably long §1225(b)
detention periods may violate due process, even when a petitioner, like Petitioner here, was
apprehended shortly after arrival and was never released on parole See, e.g., Sadeqi, 809 F. Supp.
3d at 1093; Madi v. Andrews, No. 1:26-CV-01095, 2026 WL 807543, *1, *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Mar.
24, 2026), R&R adopted, 2026 WL 927653 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 2026).
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Supp. 3d 122, 127 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) ("Petitioner, who is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)
and who was apprehended shortly after unlawfully crossing the border, is not entitled to an
individualized bond hearing"); Petgrave v. Aleman, 529 F. Supp. 3d 665, 669 (S.D. Tex. 2021)
("As far as Petitioner is concerned, whatever procedure Congress has authorized is sufficient due
process") (citing Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953)); St.
Charles v. Barr, 514 F. Supp. 3d 570, 579 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) ("[T]his Court is constrained to find
that Petitioner does not have a constitutional right to any additional procedure. Accordingly, the
Court cannot order Respondents to provide him with a bond hearing, nor can it order his release");
Gonzales Garcia v. Rosen, 513 F. Supp. 3d 329, 333 (W.D.N.Y. 2021) (finding that the petitioner,
who was detained pursuant to § 1225(b), was not constitutionally required to receive a bond
hearing based on the Supreme Court's decision in Thuraissigiam).
And, before Thuraissigiam, at least one decision from a district court in this Circuit
rejected an argument similar to the one raised by Petitioner here. In Thevarajah v. McElroy, the
petitioner sought habeas relief after being detained under similar circumstances: he was
apprehended upon arrival to the United States, found inadmissible by Immigration and
Naturalization Services officials, expedited removal proceedings were commenced, a notice to
appear was issued after the petitioner demonstrated a credible fear of persecution, an immigration
judge found him removable, the petitioner appealed, the BIA denied the appeal (after a remand
and other related motion practice), and the petitioner then filed a petition for review of the BIA's
decision with the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. See Thevarajah v. McElroy, No. 01-
CV-3009, 2002 WL 923914, *1-2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2002). After finding the petitioner's
detention was mandatory pursuant to § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), the Eastern District of New York
rejected his argument that the detention was unconstitutional because, inter alia, "[the] petitioner
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has been in custody this long primarily because he has exercised his right to litigate his case to the
fullest." Id. at *5.
In two recent cases, the Southern District of New York refused to extend the Second
Circuit's holding in Black to petitioners detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Palma, 2026 WL
697015, at *13 ("In sum, Black presented a different case with different governmental and private
interests at stake. Mezei and the Supreme Court's entry distinction precedents therefore foreclose
Flores's due process challenge. Although Flores is entitled to some minimal amount of due
process, the Government's interest in forgoing a bond hearing trumps his interest in receiving
one"); Acosta v. Arteta, No. 1:25-CV-9916, 2026 WL 263470, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 2, 2026) ("The
Second Circuit's decision in Black v. Decker, which involved 'two legal permanent residents' who
were detained 'under the authority of [§] 1226(c),' does not apply to Petitioner, who illegally
entered the country and has never had lawful status") (quoting Black, 103 F.4th at 137). "Section
1225(b)(2)(A) provides for mandatory detention of any alien . . . who illegally entered the United
States, has never been lawfully admitted, and, immigration officials have determined, is not
entitled to be admitted." Id. at *5 (collecting cases) (footnote omitted). "[U]nlike their
counterparts covered by [§] 1225(b)(1), noncitizens within [§] 1225(b)(2)'s ambit are entitled to
full removal proceedings; but as with [§] 1225(b)(1), those noncitizens are subject to mandatory
detention pending removal." Chen v. Almodovar, No. 25-CV-9670, 2026 WL 100761, *2
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2026).
Although Palma and Acosta are instructive as to § 1225(b)(2)(A), the post-Black and post-
Thuraissigiam cases within this Circuit that directly address § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) are Rashid and
Al-Thuraya. And, as explained, in both Rashid and Al-Thuraya the district courts held that
individuals detained under § 1225(b) have a constitutional right to a bond hearing. Guided by
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Black, Rashid, Al-Thuraya, and the majority view of district courts who have recently analyzed
detention pursuant to § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) under the Fifth Amendment, this Court finds that, at
some point, prolonged detention under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) without a bond hearing may violate
due process.5 Thus, the Court will analyze whether Petitioner's detention does so violate due
process.
C. 	Merits of the Habeas Corpus Petition
As the District of Vermont summarized, the purported statutory mandate for detention
without a bond hearing in § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii) is still subject to the Supreme Court's procedural
due process framework set out in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Rashid, 807 F.
Supp. 3d at 367 ("It is . . . highly likely that the Second Circuit will apply the Mathews framework
when it has the opportunity to consider prolonged detention under 1225(b). The court will apply
Mathews here").6
5 This conclusion is also consistent with the undersigned's recent decision in Martins v. Akshar,
No. 9:26-CV-95, Dkt. No. 16 (Feb. 3, 2026). Indeed, the following facts underly both Martins
and the present matter: the petitioners (1) raised a due process challenge to their prolonged
detention; (2) had entered the United States without valid entry documents; (3) were initially
processed for expedited removal but were put in regular removal proceedings based on positive
credible fear interviews and asylum applications; (4) had their asylum applications denied by the
immigration court; and (5) were appealing that determination to the BIA. The only notable
factual difference between Martin and the present matter it that, in Martin, the petitioner was
paroled into the United States for a time before being re-detained, whereas here, Petitioner has
been detained since he encountered Customs and Border Patrol near the border after entering
without inspection. Compare, Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 5, with Martins v. Akshar, No. 9:26-CV-95, Dkt.
No. 16 at 3-4 (Feb. 3, 2026). As noted, district courts have evaluated the reasonableness of the
length of § 1225(b) detentions without regard to whether the petitioner was previously paroled
and re-detained. See Rashid, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 363-66; Madi, 2026 WL 807543, at *1, *3-4.
6 The Court acknowledges that Thuraissigiam is more recent than Mathews by several decades.
However, as Petitioner points out, Thuraissigiam is distinguishable because the undocumented
individual had been definitively denied entry into the United States and was seeking vacatur of his
removal order. See Dkt. No. 7 at 6-7. Here, Petitioner was initially found to have a credible fear
of persecution and challenges only whether the length of his detention violates due process in the
absence of a bond hearing while his appeal before the BIA remains pending. See id.
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In Mathews, the Supreme Court identified three factors that bear on
the constitutional need for procedural protections: (1) "the private
interest that will be affected by the official action"; (2) "the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards"; and (3) "the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail."
Id. (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). Accordingly, the Court applies the Mathews test to
determine Petitioner's due process remedy, if any.
1. 	Factor One: Petitioner's Private Interests
"[T]he private interest affected by the official action is the most significant liberty interest
there is—the interest in being free from imprisonment." Id. (quoting Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at
851); see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). The Court is cognizant of the
possibility that "[i]n the case of an appeal, . . . detention may stretch on indefinitely[,]" and as a
result, "the risk of an erroneous deprivation of liberty may become more egregious . . . ." Rashid,
807 F. Supp. 3d at 365.
In evaluating the constitutionality of prolonged detention, the Second Circuit has looked to
factors such as the actual or likely length of detention, "whether the government or the petitioner
is primarily responsible for the delay[,]" whether the petitioner has a viable "defense to
removal[,]" and whether the petitioner's conditions of confinement "are meaningfully different
from the conditions experienced by those serving a criminal sentence . . . ." Id. at 367 (citing
Additionally, numerous cases from the past year have used the Mathews analysis to determine the
due process rights of immigration detainees. See, e.g., Al-Thuraya, 809 F. Supp. 3d at 140 ("In
determining whether a bond hearing is warranted, Black instructed district courts to evaluate the
factors set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge . . .").
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Black, 103 F.4th at 146). Courts also consider the nature of any crimes that the petitioner has
committed. Black, 103 F.4th at 146.
Petitioner has been detained for approximately nineteen months. With his asylum appeal
pending with the BIA, it is unknown how long he may remain subject to detention. The length of
Petitioner's detention weighs in favor of a due process remedy. See Rashid, 807 F. Supp. 3d at
368 ("[W]hile mandatory detention without a bond hearing may be constitutional at the outset, the
Second Circuit has held that, as the period of confinement increases, 'so do the required
procedural protections no matter what level of due process may have been sufficient at the
moment of initial detention.' . . . [T]here is no set point at which detention without a bond hearing
becomes unconstitutional. But courts in this circuit have generally found that detention lasting for
more than a year—and in many cases less than a year—may require a bond hearing at which the
Government bears the burden of proof") (quoting Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 853 and then
collecting cases) (internal citation omitted).
However, here, unlike in Rashid, it is Petitioner who has appealed to the BIA, not the
Government. See id. ("Here, Mr. Rashid prevailed in his asylum proceedings before the
immigration court, and the Government appealed the case to the BIA. Although the parties
completed their briefing in July 2025 . . . , the BIA can take months—or longer—to issue a
decision on appeal") (citations omitted). Thus, the fact that Petitioner was ordered removed by an
immigration judge weighs against his private interests affected by the official action of
detainment pending appeal.
Additionally, Petitioner entered this country without proper documentation, and he has not
proffered any argument or evidence regarding whether his conditions of confinement are
meaningfully different from those of criminal detainees at Broome County Correctional Facility.
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Despite his admittedly unlawful entry, however, there is nothing in the record that indicates
Petitioner has any criminal history.
Therefore, the Court finds that this factor is neutral, if not weighing slightly against a due
process remedy for Petitioner.
2. 	Factor Two: Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
As for the second factor, courts have recognized that "detention in the immigration context
'has two regulatory goals: ensuring the appearance of [noncitizens] at future immigration
proceedings and preventing danger to the community.'" Rashid, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 369 (quoting
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). A district court in this circuit has reasoned that
continuous mandatory detention without a bond hearing does not violate due process as long as
removal proceedings are progressing in some capacity and the delay is not unreasonable or
unjustified. See Ramos Funes v. Searls, No. 19-CV-6332, 2020 WL 1956346, *18 (W.D.N.Y.
Apr. 23, 2020). In Martins, this Court joined the District of Vermont in respectfully disagreeing
with that conclusion. See Martins v. Akshar, No. 9:26-CV-95, Dkt. No. 16 at 14 (Feb. 3, 2026).
This Court noted that "[i]f the detention is erroneous, the seriousness of the deprivation increases
with its duration." Id. (citing Rashid, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 369).
Here, as in Martins, the record does not indicate that Petitioner poses any safety risk to the
public. Aside from his status as an immigrant who entered the United States unlawfully, he has
no criminal history. However, there are significant factual distinctions between the present matter
and the facts underlying Martins and Rashid. In Martins, the petitioner had lived in the United
States without incident for nearly five years. See id. at 15. And, in Rashid the petitioner
prevailed in his asylum proceedings before the immigration court, so the District of Vermont
reasoned that "in the absence of a legal error by the immigration judge, it is likely he will
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ultimately be allowed to remain in the United States, build a life here, and eventually become
eligible for citizenship." Rashid, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 370. As already discussed, here, Petitioner
has never lived in the United States and the immigration court denied his asylum claim and
ordered him removed. See Dkt. No. 1 at ¶¶ 1-4. These factual distinctions weigh heavily against
Petitioner. C.f. Anazco v. Baltazar, No. 26-CV-1133, 2026 WL 1004485, *3 (D. Colo. Apr. 14,
2026) ("Petitioner's removal continues to be litigated due to petitioner's appeal of his removal
order that is pending before the BIA . . . . However, effectuation of a removal order being
prolonged by petitioner's appeal does not mean his detention is not significantly likely as
contemplated under Zadvydas") (citations omitted). 7
On the other hand, even though Petitioner's child is located in Iran, Dkt. No. 6 at 15-16,
the record does not suggest, nor do Respondents argue, that Petitioner poses a flight risk or is a
danger to the public.
Nevertheless, the second Mathews factor requires the Court to evaluate "the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards." Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. As the Southern
7 In Anazco, the District of Colorado did not engage in a Mathews analysis because the petitioner
did not request a bond hearing or argue how his due process rights were violated under Mathews.
See Anazco, 2026 WL 1004485, at *2. Nevertheless, the Court applies the same reasoning as the
court in Anazco, to the extent Petitioner contends that the prolonged nature of his detention and
the lack of a reasonable probability of his removal means that his due process rights have been
violated under Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001). It is unclear whether Petitioner seeks
release under Zadvydas, but Petitioner does request "immediate release from custody, or, in the
alternative, order a bond hearing before an immigration judge[.]" Dkt. No. 1 at 9. Regardless, the
Petition would be denied to the extent Petitioner invoked Zadvydas as a basis for release at this
time. See Al-Thuraya, 809 F. Supp. 3d at 140 ("As for Zadvydas, while its due-process teachings
are relevant here, it was a statutory-interpretation case dealing with a different statute, 8 U.S.C. §
1231(a)(6). That statute applies to noncitizens who have final removal orders in place, but who
cannot be removed . . . . [The petitioner] isn't in that position yet, given that he still is challenging
his removal") (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 682) (internal citation omitted).
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District of New York has observed, "[u]nder § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), there are no 'procedural
safeguards' in place to determine whether [the petitioner's] detention has become unreasonable."
Al-Thuraya, 809 F. Supp. 3d at 144-45. Respondents acknowledge that Petitioner's only option to
contest the length of his detention is to seek discretionary parole. See Dkt. No. 6 at 11 n.4 (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A)). As such, "any additional safeguard against unreasonable detention
will be valuable." Al-Thuraya, 809 F. Supp. 3d at 145 (citing Black, 103 F.4th at 153) (emphasis
in original). "The most obvious" procedural safeguard available "would be an individualized
bond hearing at which an [immigration judge] can consider the noncitizen's dangerousness and
risk of flight." Black, 103 F.4th at 153. Accordingly, the second Mathews factor weighs in
Petitioner's favor.
3. 	Factor Three: Government's Interests
As to the final Mathews factor, courts consider "the Government's interest, including the
function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute
procedural requirement would entail." Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335 (citation omitted). The Court
acknowledges that "the Government has a legitimate interest in ensuring that noncitizens appear
at their immigration proceedings and in preventing noncitizens from perpetrating harm in their
communities during the pendency of their removal proceedings." Rashid, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 371.
However, as in Black, "the additional procedural safeguards [the court] would allow here
under Mathews do nothing to undercut those interests." Black, 103 F.4th at 153. At a bond
hearing before an immigration judge, that judge would assess Petitioner's flight risk and
dangerousness on an individualized basis. "And while the government's legitimate interests
justify a relatively short-term deprivation of liberty, . . . the balance of interests shifts as the
noncitizen's detention is prolonged without any particularized assessment of need.” Id. at 154
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(internal citation omitted). In fact, "[t]o require that the Government justify continued detention
'promotes the Government's interest—one [the Court] believe[s] to be paramount—in minimizing
the enormous impact of incarceration in cases where it serves no purpose." Id. (quoting Velasco
Lopez, 978 F.3d at 854). Petitioner's continued detention without a bond hearing to determine its
reasonableness and justification risks wasting public resources. See id. ("[R]etaining and housing
detainees imposes substantial costs as well").
As the District of Vermont did in Rashid, and the Southern District of New York did in
Al-Thuraya, this Court concludes that a bond hearing before an immigration judge would not
diminish the Government's interests. See Rashid, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 371; Al-Thuraya, 809 F.
Supp. 3d at 145.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the third factor weighs slightly in favor of a due process
remedy for Petitioner.
4. 	Petitioner's Due Process Remedy
Based on the Mathews analysis, the Court determines that Petitioner is due a bond hearing
before an immigration judge. This Court is not the first to permit a bond hearing to a petitioner
subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). See, e.g., Sadeqi, 809 F. Supp. 3d at
1095; Rashid, 807 F. Supp. 3d at 372; Djelassi, 434 F. Supp. 3d at 923; Madi, 2026 WL 807543,
at *5. The bond hearing will give Respondents the opportunity to show an immigration judge
why Petitioner's detention is necessary to achieve the Government's objectives. "Otherwise, 'the
risk of an erroneous deprivation' of [Petitioner's] liberty interest would remain unacceptably
high." Black, 103 F.4th at 155 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
The Petition is denied, however, to the extent Petitioner requests that this Court grant his
immediate release. See Rashid 807 F. Supp. 3d at 371 ("[The petitioner] requests that the court
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grant his immediate release. His interest in his liberty, however, must be weighed against the
government's legitimate interests in detaining noncitizens who are a flight risk or who are a
danger to the community").
IV. CONCLUSION
After carefully reviewing the entire record in this matter, the parties' submissions, and the
applicable law, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. No. 1) is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part;8 and the Court further
ORDERS that Respondents provide Petitioner a bond hearing consistent with this
Memorandum-Decision and Order within thirty (30) days; and the Court further
ORDERS that at the bond hearing, consistent with the factors in Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976) and the procedures described by the Second Circuit in Black v. Decker, 103
F.4th 133 (2d Cir. 2024), Respondents will have the burden of proving by clear and convincing
evidence why Petitioner's detention is warranted; and the Court further
ORDERS that this Court's Temporary Restraining Order dated March 16, 2026 (Dkt. No.
2) is DISSOLVED; and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall enter judgment in Petitioner's favor and close
this case; and the Court further
8 The Petition is denied as to immediate release, but granted as to a bond hearing before an
immigration judge.
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ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision
and Order on the parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 24, 2026
Albany, New York
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