Hassan v. Bondi et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
NADEEM HASSAN,
Petitioner,
v.
PAMELA BONDI, in her official capacity as U.S. Attorney
General; PHILIP RHONEY, in his official capacity as
Deputy Field Office Director, Buffalo Field
Office, U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement;
TAMMY MARICH, in her official capacity as Field
Office Director, Buffalo Field Office, U.S. Immigration &
Customs Enforcement; TODD LYONS, in his official
capacity as Acting Director, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; and KRISTI NOEM, in her official capacity
as Secretary of Homeland Security,
Respondents.
9:26-cv-00319 (BKS)
Appearances:
For Petitioner:
Matthew K. Borowski
Borowski Witmer Immigration Lawyers
4343 Union Road
Buffalo, New York 14225
For Respondents:
David M. Katz
Assistant United States Attorney
United States Attorney’s Office
100 South Clinton Street
Syracuse, New York 13261
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Hon. Brenda K. Sannes, Chief United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Nadeem Hassan is a noncitizen who has been present in the United States since
2023. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 1). On February 26, 2026, Petitioner was taken into custody by Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) in Albany, New York. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 1; Dkt. No. 7-3, ¶ 15).
Petitioner filed a petition the same day under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for a writ of habeas corpus
asserting that: (1) his detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2), without any process, was unlawful;
and (2) his detention without a bond hearing or other process violated his Fifth Amendment right
to due process. (Dkt. No. 1, ¶¶ 47–55). Petitioner sought an order granting his immediate release,
or, in the alternative, granting his immediate release pending a bond hearing, and an award of
attorney’s fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), as amended, 28
U.S.C. § 2412. (Id. at 17–18). Upon review of the petition, the Court issued an Order: directing
Respondents to show cause why the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus should not be granted;
setting a briefing schedule; scheduling oral argument; and prohibiting Respondent from moving
Petitioner outside the jurisdiction of the Northern District of New York while this matter is
pending. (Dkt. No. 2).
On March 13, 2026, following oral argument, and upon consideration of the parties’
submissions, (Dkt. Nos. 1, 7), the Court ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner an
individualized bond hearing within ten days, at which the Government would bear the burden of
proving by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner was either a flight risk or danger to the
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community. (Dkt. No. 8).1 The Court advised the parties that a written decision would follow.
This is that decision.
II. 	BACKGROUND2
On October 9, 2023, Petitioner “entered the United States without inspection . . . at the
California border, after fleeing his home country of Pakistan.” (Dkt. No. 1, ¶ 2; see Dkt. No. 7-3,
¶ 4 (“Petitioner is a native and citizen of Pakistan.”)). “At the time of entry, he was not
apprehended or inspected.” (Id. ¶ 3). Petitioner does not have any criminal convictions, has filed
an I-589 application for asylum, and has been issued a work permit. (Id. ¶¶ 4–5).
“On February 26, 2026, ICE issued and signed a Form I-200 Warrant for Arrest of Alien
for Petitioner.” (Dkt. No. 7-3, ¶ 6; see Dkt. No. 7-4, at 6–7 (Form I-200 Warrant)). ICE
“conducted a targeted enforcement operation for Petitioner” the same day in Albany, New York.
(Dkt. No. 7-3, ¶ 7). With “a photograph and physical description of Petitioner as well as
information about his physical address,” “ICE officers proceeded to Petitioner’s suspected
residence.” (Id. ¶¶ 7–8).
At approximately 11:00 a.m., ICE officers “observed a male matching Petitioner’s
description exit the residence and enter a vehicle which was registered to Petitioner.” (Dkt. No.
7-4, at 3; Dkt. No. 7-3, ¶ 8). ICE officers “followed Petitioner’s vehicle until it stopped,”
“approached the vehicle[,] confirmed Petitioner’s identity,” and “asked Petitioner to put his
vehicle in park.” (Dkt. No. 7-3, ¶ 9 (quoting Dkt. No. 7-4, at 3)). Petitioner “repeatedly shifted
the car in reverse and drive,” before putting “the vehicle in park and exit[ing] the vehicle.” (Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted)). “Upon exiting . . . the vehicle,” an ICE officer advised
1 The Government filed a status report stating that a bond hearing was held on March 20, 2026, and bond was set in
the amount of $15,000. (Dkt. No. 9).
2 Unless otherwise noted, the facts are not disputed.
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Petitioner that “he was under arrest.” (Dkt. No. 7-4, at 3). Petitioner “then fled on foot across a
busy city intersection” but was apprehended by ICE officers “after a brief foot chase.” (Id.).
Petitioner “actively resisted being placed into handcuffs” and officers gave “[v]erbal commands
to stop resisting.” (Id.). “During transport, [Petitioner] was again advised he was under arrest and
served a copy of an I-200 Warrant of arrest,” (id.), which specified “two bases for his
apprehension: (a) ‘the execution of a charging document to initiate removal proceedings against
the subject’; and (b) ‘statements made voluntarily by the subject to an immigration officer and/or
other reliable evidence that affirmatively indicate the subject either lacks immigration status or
notwithstanding such status is removable under U.S. Immigration law.’” (Dkt. No. 7-3, ¶ 14
(quoting Dkt. No. 7-4, at 6)). ICE also “served Petitioner with a Form I-862, Notice to Appear in
Immigration Court.” (Dkt. No. 7-3, ¶ 12; see Dkt. No. 7-4, at 8–11 (“Notice to Appear”)).
Petitioner was taken to the “ICE-ERO Albany Sub Office,” where he “verbally admitted
alienage, which was confirmed through law enforcement database queries.” (Dkt. No. 7-4, at 3).
While in custody, “ICE officers electronically biometrically confirmed his identity,” and served
Petitioner “with a second Form I-200, Warrant for Arrest of Alien, which added,” as additional
grounds for his apprehension, Petitioner’s “biometric confirmation” and that federal database
record checks affirmatively indicated that Petitioner “either lack[ed] immigration status or
notwithstanding such status is removable under U.S. Immigration law.’” (Dkt. No. 7-3, ¶ 14
(quoting Dkt. No. 7-4, at 7)).
Petitioner is presently being held at Clinton County Jail in Plattsburgh, New York.3 (Dkt.
No. 7-3, ¶ 15).
3 Although a bond hearing was held on March 20, 2026, and bond was set, the record does not indicate whether
Petitioner has posted bond or been released.
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III. 	JURISDICTION
“28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) authorizes a district court to grant a writ of habeas corpus
whenever a petitioner is ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the
United States.’” Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
2241(c)(3)). “Federal courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus claims by non-citizens
challenging the constitutionality of their detention.” Lopez v. Sessions, No. 18-cv-4189, 2018
WL 2932726, at *6, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98712, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2018) (citing
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 516–17 (2003)).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
A. 	Statutory Basis for Detention
The parties dispute the statutory basis for Petitioner’s detention. Petitioner, who had
resided in the United States for more than two years at the time of his arrest, asserts that his
detention was pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), which provides for discretionary authority to
detain noncitizens who are “already in the country,” “pending a decision on whether [they are] to
be removed from the United States.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 288–89 (2018) (citing
8 U.S.C. § 1226). Section 1226(a) allows a noncitizen to “request a bond hearing before an
immigration judge,” O.F.B. v. Maldonado, 810 F. Supp. 3d 394, 400 (E.D.N.Y. 2025) (citing 8
C.F.R. §§ 1236.1(c)(8), (d)(1)), and “secure his release if he can convince the . . . immigration
judge that he poses no flight risk and no danger to the community,” id. (quoting Nielsen v.
Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 397–98 (2019)). Respondents assert that Petitioner was detained under the
mandatory detention provisions of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). (Dkt. No. 7, at 14). Section
1225(b)(2)(A) requires the mandatory detention of a noncitizen “who is an applicant for
admission, if the examining immigration officer determines that an alien seeking admission is
not clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted,” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), and which,
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unlike Section 1226(a), “says [nothing] whatsoever about bond hearings,” Jennings, 583 U.S. at
297.
This Court, along with others, has already rejected Respondents’ argument that
noncitizens who previously entered the United States and are living in the United States are
subject to arrest and mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(1) and has concluded that
Section 1226(a), including its bond hearing requirements, applies to such detentions.4 See Alcon
Gaspar v. Akshar, No. 26-cv-00118, 2026 WL 699369, *6–7, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51783,
*14–18 (N.D.N.Y. Feb.17, 2026) (citing cases).
Respondents acknowledge this Court’s prior holding but argue that Petitioner falls within
Section 1225 because, unlike the petitioner in Alcon Gaspar, who was detained and released
shortly after his illegal entry and then re-detained approximately six years later, Petitioner’s
February 26, 2026, arrest was his first contact with immigration authorities since his 2023 illegal
entry. (Dkt. No. 7, at 14); see Alcon Gaspar, 2026 WL 699369, at *1, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
51783, at *3. To the extent Respondents are suggesting that since Petitioner’s February 26, 2026
arrest is his first interaction with immigration authorities, he is an “applicant for admission” and
“seeking admission” within the meaning of Section 1225(b)(2)(A), they have not cited any legal
authority that would support their position. Moreover, courts have rejected lack of contact with
4 Divided panels of the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have found that noncitizens already present in the United States are
subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) and not entitled to bond hearings. See Buenrostro-Mendez
v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2026) (reversing district court’s orders directing bond hearings under Section
1226(a)(2), finding mandatory detention provisions of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applied to noncitizens, even if they had
been living in the United States for many years); Avila v. Bondi, No. 25-3248, --F.4th --, 2026 WL 819258, at *6,
2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 8744, at *17 (8th Cir. Mar. 25, 2026) (finding mandatory detention provisions in Section
1225(b)(2)(A) applied to noncitizen who entered the United States without inspection or admission in 2016 and was
arrested in 2025 and detained without bond hearing). However, the Seventh Circuit has found the government was
unlikely to succeed on the argument that the mandatory detention provisions of Section 1225(b)(2)(A) applied to
noncitizens already present un the United States. See Castanon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048,
1061–62 (7th Cir. 2025) (finding that DHS was not likely to succeed on the argument that there is no distinction
“between a noncitizen at the border and one already in the United States” and that a noncitizen already in the United
States in subject to mandatory detention under Section 1225(b)(2)(A)).
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immigration authorities as a basis for applying the mandatory detention provisions of Section
1225. See Acuapan v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-00384, 2026 WL 507889, at *3, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
37878, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2026) (“The fact that Petitioner did not have contact with
immigration authorities upon re-entry . . . has no bearing on the statutory basis for his detention,
as courts have consistently held that noncitizens who enter without such contact are still subject
to § 1226.”) (citing cases); see also R.P.L. v. Maldonado, No. 25-cv-6886, 2025 WL 3731864, at
*1–2, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 266020, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2025) (finding Section 1226
applied where the petitioner had been living in the United States for “decades” and whose 2025
arrest was “his first encounter with immigration authorities”). This Court likewise finds
Petitioner’s lack of prior contact with immigration authorities provides no basis for departing
from its conclusion that Section 1226 governs the detention of a noncitizen residing in the United
States.
Further supporting this conclusion in this case is ICE’s use of a Form I-200 warrant to
arrest Petitioner. As other courts have observed, the Form I-200 warrant cites Sections 236 and
287 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, (Dkt. No. 7-4, at 6), which correspond to Section
1226, not the mandatory detention provisions in Section 1225, see Bonilla v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-
757, 2026 WL 485283, at *3, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35652, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2026)
(finding “an additional problem with Respondents’ invocation of Section 1225(b)(2) to justify”
detention where “nothing in the record shows that ICE arrested and detained [the petitioner]
under Section 1225(b)(2) rather than Section 1226(a)” and “[b]y contrast, the [Form I-200]
warrant reflects that [the petitioner] was arrested pursuant to sections 236 and 287 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act . . . which correspond to 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226 and 1357 . . . not 8
U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)”) (quotation marks omitted). The use of the warrant therefore undermines
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Respondents’ position that Petitioner is being detained pursuant to Section 1225(b)(2).
Respondents argue that a warrant has no “bear[ing] on the Government’s authority to detain
Petitioner under” Section 1225(b)(2)(A) and does not “foreclose the conclusion that §
1225(b)(2)(A) is the statute that authorizes Petitioner’s detention.” (Dkt. No. 7, at 14–15). But
when raised following a noncitizen’s arrest pursuant to a Form I-200 Warrant, courts have found
such arguments—that Section 1225(b)(2)(A) was, in fact, the basis for detention—to be
improper post-hoc justifications for detention. See Mejia-Pina v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-986, 2026
WL 482635, at *3, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35357, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2026) (rejecting the
respondents’ argument that the petitioner was being detained under Section 1225(b)(2) as
improper post-hoc justification where Form I-200 Warrant reflected arrest pursuant to provisions
corresponding to Section 1226, not Section 1225) (citing cases). Accordingly, the Court finds no
reason to depart from its reasoning and conclusion in Alcon Gaspar, and finds Petitioner’s
detention is under Section 1226(a).
B. 	Due Process Required
The Court next considers whether Petitioner’s detention violates due process. The Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment prevents the Government from depriving any person of
“life, liberty, or property without due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “Freedom from
imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at
the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678,
690 (2001). This protection “applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens,
whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Id. at 693. The
“essence of due process is the requirement that ‘a person in jeopardy of serious loss be given
notice of the case against him and opportunity to meet it.’” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
348 (1976) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171–72 (1951)
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(Frankfurter, J., concurring)). Habeas review is available to challenge “the lawfulness of
detention when it is first imposed” as well as “to challenge whether, at some point, an ongoing
detention has become unlawful.” Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 2020).
“The Supreme Court has been unambiguous that executive detention orders, which occur without
the procedural protections required in courts of law, call for the most searching review.” Id. at
850 (citing Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 781–83, 786 (2008)).
In evaluating procedural due process, courts apply the “three-factor balancing test as
provided in Mathews v. Eldridge”: “(1) ‘the private interest that will be affected by the official
action’; (2) ‘the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards’; and (3) ‘the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.’” Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d
at 851 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
As to the first factor, Petitioner’s “interest in being free from imprisonment” is “the most
significant liberty interest there is,” id., and it “cannot be abridged without ‘adequate procedural
protections,” Singh v. Maldonado, No. 26-cv-00019, 2026 WL 233216, at *9, 2026 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 17311, at *27 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2026) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690). Petitioner
has established his liberty interest. See id., 2026 WL 233216, at *9, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
17311, at *27 (finding the petitioner’s “liberty interest” in being free from imprisonment was
clearly established). Further, there is no evidence that Petitioner received adequate procedural
protections before he was detained. “Detention under 1226(a) must be premised on an
individualized custody determination based on the noncitizen’s dangerousness and flight risk.”
Campbell v. Almodovar, No. 25-cv-09509, 2025 WL 3538351, at *11, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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256202, at *30 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2025) (citing Velasaca v. Decker, 458 F. Supp. 3d 224, 241
(S.D.N.Y. 2000)); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8) (stating, as relevant here, “[a]ny officer
authorized to issue a warrant of arrest may, in the officer’s discretion, release an alien . . .
provided that the alien must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would
not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future
proceeding.”). Here, however, Respondents maintain since ICE was exercising its authority
under Section 1225, it did not need a specific reason to issue an arrest warrant as to a specific
noncitizen, and explained at oral argument that they were not claiming a change in circumstances
prompted Petitioner’s arrest and detention; they simply claim that an ICE issued a warrant and
conducted an operation to apprehend and detain a noncitizen. Thus, the Court finds the first
Mathews factor weighs strongly in Petitioner’s favor. See, e.g., Yao v. Almodovar, No. 25-cv-
9982, 2025 WL 3653433, at *2, * 11, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 261200, at *26 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17,
2025) (finding, notwithstanding use of arrest warrant, that ICE’s detention of the petitioner was
“discretion-free” and therefore “abridged his rights under § 1226 and violated due process”).
The second factor—“the risk of an erroneous deprivation . . . through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards”—also
weighs in Petitioner’s favor. Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 851 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Respondents appear to suggest that here, Petitioner dropped the ball, pointing out that there is no
evidence that “Petitioner requested or was denied a bond hearing prior to commencing suit.”
(Dkt. No. 7, at 16). However, as the Government acknowledged at oral argument, when
noncitizens are detained under Section 1226, they receive a notice of detention form with a box
they can check to request a bond hearing. And here, as the Government further acknowledged,
there is no indication that Petitioner received a form, or was apprised of a channel through
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which, to request a bond hearing. Thus, Respondents’ suggestion that there were procedural
safeguards available to Petitioner is without merit.
Respondents further assert that Petitioner was given a “‘Class Action Notice’ informing
Petitioner about ‘a ruling that certain immigration detainees may be unlawfully detained and may
seek release on bond or conditional parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)’” through a “bond hearing
upon . . . request.” (Dkt. No. 7, at 16 & n.6 (quoting Dkt. No. 7-4, at 12)). However, Respondents
cite no authority for the proposition that a class action notice affords Petitioner procedural due
process in the context of an arrest and detention. Thus, because the procedure Respondents used
involved no exercise of discretion and there is no evidence that Petitioner had an opportunity to
request a bond hearing challenging his detention, the risk of erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s
liberty is high.
The third factor in the Mathews analysis requires the Court to consider “the
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.” Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
It is well-established that “‘the Attorney General’s discretion to detain individuals under 8
U.S.C. § 1226(a) is valid where it advances a legitimate governmental purpose,’” and that “[t]he
Government has interests in ‘ensuring the appearance of aliens at future immigration
proceedings’ and ‘preventing danger to the community.’” Valdez v. Joyce, 803 F. Supp. 3d 213,
218 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (first quoting Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 854; and then quoting Zadvydas,
533 U.S. at 690). “‘[I]n striking the appropriate due process balance the final factor to be
assessed is the public interest,’” which “include ‘the administrative burden and other societal
costs that would be associated with’ the additional process.” Velasco Lopez, 978 F.3d at 855
(quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347).
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Here, Respondents have not articulated any public interest served through the mandatory
(non-discretionary) detention, with no opportunity for a bond hearing, of a noncitizen like
Petitioner, who has a work permit and has been living and working in the United States for more
than two years. (See Dkt. No. 7, at 15 (arguing that “[t]he applicable and mandatory duty to
detain imposed by § 1225(b)(2)(A) overrides any other, generalized procedure under which
requests for bond can be entertained.”)). The Court therefore concludes that Respondent’s
interest in Petitioner’s detention is minimal. See Crespo Tacuri v. Genalo, No. 25-cv-06896,
2026 WL 35569, at *7, 2026 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1766, at *20 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2026) (“[T]he
government’s interest in continued detention is slight insofar as petitioner was detained without
an individualized custody determination that evaluated dangerousness and flight risk or any
articulated change in circumstances”).
Accordingly, the Court finds that Respondents’ “ongoing detention of Petitioner with no
process at all, much less prior notice, no showing of changed circumstances, or an opportunity to
respond, violates his due process rights,” Valdez, 803 F. Supp. 3d at 219, and must therefore
consider the appropriate remedy.
C. 	Appropriate Remedy
“Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention. The typical remedy for
such detention is, of course, release.” Munaf v. Green, 553 U.S. 674, 693 (2008). However,
“release need not be the exclusive remedy and is not the appropriate one in every case in which
the writ is granted.” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779.
Petitioner seeks immediate release, or immediate release pending a bond hearing. (Dkt.
No. 1). The Government argues that the circumstances of this case are unlike those in Alcon
Gaspar and that immediate release is not justified, but that if the Court finds Petitioner is entitled
to relief, a bond hearing should be ordered. (Dkt. No. 7, at 10–11).
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Here, Petitioner had not engaged with immigration authorities at or near the time of entry
and had been detained less than a day at the time he filed the petition. Moreover, there is
evidence that Petitioner attempted to flee upon being told he was under arrest. Despite the
opportunity to file a reply, Petitioner did not contest this evidence. In general, noncitizens
“detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of detention,” Jennings, 583 U.S.
at 306, and the Court finds under the circumstances of this case, that a bond hearing is the
appropriate remedy, see Romero Perez v. Francis, No. 25-cv-8112, 2025 WL 3110459, at *3,
2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 219356, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2025) (ordering a bond hearing before
an Immigration Judge); Sun v. Almodovar, No. 25-cv-9262, 2025 WL 3241268, at *3, 2025 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 230613, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2025) (ordering “individualized bond hearing to
be conducted before an Immigration Judge”). The Court further finds that in absence of any
individualized assessment or identifiable government interest regarding Petitioner’s initial
detention, due process requires that the Government bear the burden of demonstrating
dangerousness or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence at any bond hearing. Lieogo v.
Freden, No. 25-cv-06615, 2025 WL 3290694, at *5–6, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 232722, at *12–
15 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (reviewing Mathews factors and finding, inter alia, no evidence of
individualized assessment supporting the petitioner’s detention, and noting that detention was
due solely to “policy change reversing decades of past practice,” and ordering bond hearing and
assigning burden of proving “dangerousness or flight risk by clear and convincing evidence” to
the respondents); see also Quintanilla v. Decker, No. 21-cv-417, 2021 WL 707062, at *3, 2021
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32633, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2021) (joining the “overwhelming consensus
of judges in this district in concluding that the Government should bear the burden to deny
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liberty at any Section 1226(a) bond hearing, regardless of the noncitizen’s length of detention”
(emphasis added)).
V. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is
ORDERED that the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus (Dkt. No. 1) is GRANTED; and
it is further
ORDERED that the Court incorporates herein its prior Order, (Dkt. No. 8); and it is
further
ORDERED that Petitioner’s request for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs under the
EAJA is GRANTED and any request for such fees and costs shall be filed by April 20, 2026,
with any response filed by May 4, 2026; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court enter judgment accordingly and close this case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 1, 2026
Syracuse, New York
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