Beaman v. State of New York et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
LORENZO BEAMAN,
Plaintiff,
9:25-CV-1402
v. 	(ECC/MJK)
STATE OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
LORENZO BEAMAN
Plaintiff, pro se
28 Oakland Place
Brooklyn, NY 11226
ELIZABETH C. COOMBE
United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Lorenzo Beaman commenced this action by filing a pro se civil rights
complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), and paying the required filing fee in
full. Dkt. No. 1 ("Compl.").1 By Decision and Order entered on October 31, 2025, the Court
reviewed the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and dismissed plaintiff’s
Section 1983 claims without prejudice as barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and for failure
1 Plaintiff commenced this action in the Southern District of New York. By Order entered on September 30,
2025, the Honorable Edgardo Ramos of the Southern District of New York directed that this case be transferred
to the Northern District of New York. Dkt. No. 3. Thereafter, this case was transferred to this District. Dkt. No.
4.
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to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Dkt. No. 5 ("October 2025 Order"). In light
of plaintiff's pro se status, he was afforded an opportunity to submit an amended complaint.
Id. at 12-14.
Presently before the Court is plaintiff’s amended complaint and supplemental
supporting documents. Dkt. No. 6 ("Am. Compl."); Dkt. No. 7 (“Supplemental Submission”).
II. 	SUFFICIENCY OF THE AMENDED COMPLAINT
A. 	The Complaint and October 2025 Order
In his complaint, plaintiff asserted claims against the State of New York and Greene
Correctional Facility based on allegations that he was assaulted by a fellow inmate while
incarcerated at Greene Correctional Facility on December 21, 2017. See Compl. at 3-4
The complaint was construed to assert Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claims
against the named defendants. See October 2025 Order at 4.
After reviewing the allegations in the complaint for sufficiency, the Court dismissed
plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims as barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and untimely. See
October 2025 Order at 5-14.
B. 	Review of the Amended Complaint
The Court previously relied on 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for its screening of the complaint
because the pleading asserts allegations of wrongdoing that occurred during plaintiff’s
incarceration. See Compl. at 2-6; Dkt. No. 1-1 at 35-40.2 The Court, however, also has the
inherent authority to ensure that plaintiff has standing to pursue his claims, that subject
matter jurisdiction exists, and that a case is not frivolous. See Rolle v. Berkowitz, No. 03-CV-
7120, 2004 WL 287678, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2004) (“[C]ourts within the Second Circuit
2 Plaintiff was not incarcerated when he commenced this action.
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have not hesitated to dismiss sua sponte claims brought by fee-paying pro se plaintiffs when
it is clear such claims ‘presen[t] no arguably meritorious issue for [the courts'] consideration.’”
(quoting Pillay v. INS, 45 F.3d 14, 17 (2d Cir.1995) (holding appellate court has authority to
sua sponte dismiss a frivolous appeal brought by a fee-paying pro se plaintiff))); Cummings v.
Giuliani, No. 00-CV-6634, 2000 WL 1597868, at * 2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2000) (dismissing
sua sponte fee-paying pro-se plaintiff's §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985 claims that were clearly time-
barred) (citing Pillay); Cook v. Sullivan Cnty. Fam. Ct. of New York State Unified Ct. Sys., No.
24-CV-03874, 2024 WL 3106248, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June 20, 2024) (same); see also Fitzgerald
v. First E. Seventh St. Tenants Corp., 221 F.3d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[D]istrict courts may
dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte even when the plaintiff has paid the required filing
fee.”); Muller v. Costello, No. 94-CV-842, 1996 WL 191977, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 1996)
(“Federal courts are under an independent obligation to examine their own subject matter
jurisdiction.” (citing U.S. v. Hayes, 115 S. Ct. 2431, 2435 (1995)); Atl. Healthcare Benefits
Trust v. Googins, 2 F.3d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Although the parties do not address the
Eleventh Amendment in their briefs, we raise it sua sponte because it affects our subject
matter jurisdiction.”); Close v. New York, 125 F.3d 31, 38-39 (2d Cir. 1997) (“[U]nless New
York waived its immunity, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.”).
The amended complaint is identical to the original complaint, with the exception of a
caption change. Compare Compl. with Am. Compl. Indeed, even the signature date on both
pleadings is the same. Moreover, while plaintiff has filed additional documentation with his
amended complaint related to his state court action and communications with the state court
and his former attorney, see Dkt. Nos. 6-1, 6-2, 7, none of these filings present a basis for
tolling the applicable limitations period by more than four years, or finding that the Eleventh
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Amendment’s jurisdictional bar is inapplicable to plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against the
State of New York and Greene Correctional Facility.
Accordingly, and for the reasons set forth in the October 2025 Order, plaintiff’s Section
1983 claims are dismissed as untimely, and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Collins v. Unified Ct. Sys. of New York, No. 91-CV-349, 1991 WL 111218, at *1 (N.D.N.Y.
June 17, 1991) (“The complaint is frivolous; the court has seen essentially the same
allegations made in the prior two suits; additionally, much of the complaint is barred by virtue
of the applicable limitations period (three years), or by the 11th Amendment or by the doctrine
of absolute judicial immunity.”), aff'd sub nom. Collins v. Unified Ct. Sys. NY, 962 F.2d 3 (2d
Cir. 1992); Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (action
frivolous where “factual contentions are clearly baseless,” as when “the claim is based on an
indisputably meritless legal theory,” e.g., where “a dispositive defense clearly exists on the
face of the complaint”); Cummings v. Giuliani, No. 00-CV-6634, 2000 WL 1597868, at *2-3
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2000) (dismissing sua sponte fee-paying pro se plaintiff's claims that were
clearly time-barred); Islam v. Melisa, No. 18-CV-2535, 2020 WL 1452463, at *12 (E.D.N.Y.
Mar. 24, 2020) (“The Court construes Islam as naming Dr. Melisa Jn. Pierre as a defendant in
this action and dismisses Islam's claims against her as frivolous because they are clearly
time-barred, . . . having been brought over four years after Islam last interacted with Dr.
Melisa[.]”); Castro v. United Sec. Inc., No. 10-CV-6152, 2011 WL 4916402, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 17, 2011) ("[C]ourts within the Second Circuit consistently have held that lack of legal
knowledge or legal assistance is not an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable
tolling." (citation omitted)); Pino v. Ryan, 49 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding sua sponte
dismissal of section 1983 claim based on statute of limitations “especially appropriate where
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... the injuries complained of [by the pro se plaintiff] occurred more than five years before the
filing of the Complaint”).
III. 	CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, it is hereby
ORDERED that this action alleging federal claims under Section 1983 is DISMISSED
with prejudice. The Clerk is directed to terminate the defendants and close this case; and it is
further
ORDERED that the Clerk serve a copy of this Decision and Order on plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 22, 2026
Syracuse, NY
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