Kaba v. McQuinn

9:25-cv-00481Nynd4 de jun. de 2026

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
TALIBY KABA,
Plaintiff,
v.
IAN McQUINN,
Defendant.
9:25-cv-00481 (AMN/DJS)
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
TALIBY KABA
22-B-3286
Collins Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 340
Collins, New York 14034
Plaintiff pro se
HON. LETITIA JAMES 	CHI-HSIN E. ENGELHART, ESQ.
New York State Attorney General 	Assistant Attorney General
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
Attorneys for Defendant
Hon. Anne M. Nardacci, United States District Judge:
ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
On April 18, 2025, plaintiff pro se Taliby Kaba (“Plaintiff”), who was incarcerated in the
custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision
(“DOCCS”) at all relevant times, commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against
various Department of Corrections staff. See Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff sought and was granted leave
to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. Nos. 2, 6. On September 19, 2025, the Court, on initial review
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, dismissed all but Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment deliberate medical
indifference claim against Defendant Ian McQuinn. 	Dkt. No. 6 at 25. 1 	On February 20, 2026,
Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the Complaint for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. Dkt. No. 19 (“Motion”). Plaintiff opposed the Motion on March
30, 2026. 	Dkt. No. 23. 	This matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Daniel J.
Stewart, who, on May 18, 2026, issued a Report-Recommendation and Order (“Report-
Recommendation”), recommending that Defendant’s Motion be granted. 	Dkt. No. 25 at 15.
Magistrate Judge Stewart advised that under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties had fourteen days
within which to file written objections and that failure to object to the Report-Recommendation
within fourteen days would preclude appellate review. Id. No party has filed objections, and the
time for filing objections has expired. 2
For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts the Report-Recommendation in its
entirety.
II. 	STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews de novo those portions of a magistrate judge’s report-recommendation
that have been properly preserved with a specific objection. Petersen v. Astrue, 2 F. Supp. 3d 223,
228 (N.D.N.Y. 2012); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). 	If no specific objections have been filed, this
Court reviews a magistrate judge’s report-recommendation for clear error. 	See Petersen, 2 F.
Supp. 3d at 229 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes: 1983 Addition).
Similarly, if an objection simply rehashes arguments originally presented to the magistrate judge,
1 Citations to court documents utilize the pagination generated by CM/ECF, the Court’s electronic
filing system.
2 A fuller recitation of the factual and procedural history of this action is set forth in the Report-
Recommendation. See Dkt. No. 25 at 3-4.
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this Court reviews the relevant portions of the report-recommendation for clear error. 	See
Petersen, 2 F. Supp. 3d at 228-29 & n.6 (collecting cases). “When performing such a ‘clear error’
review, ‘the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in
order to accept the recommendation.’” Dezarea W. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 21-cv-1138, 2023
WL 2552452, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2023) (quoting Canady v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-
cv-0367, 2017 WL 5484663, at *1 n.1 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2017)).
“[I]n a pro se case, the court must view the submissions by a more lenient standard than
that accorded to ‘formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Govan v. Campbell, 289 F. Supp. 2d 289,
295 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)) (additional citations
omitted). The Second Circuit has held that courts are obligated to “make reasonable allowances
to protect pro se litigants” from inadvertently forfeiting legal rights merely because they lack a
legal education. Id. (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)). That said, “even a
pro se party’s objections to a Report and Recommendation must be specific and clearly aimed at
particular findings in the magistrate’s proposal[.]” Machicote v. Ercole, No. 06-cv-13320, 2011
WL 3809920, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2011) (citation omitted); accord Caldwell v. Petros, No.
22-cv-567, 2022 WL 16918287, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2022). After appropriate review, “the
court may accept, reject or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by
the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).
III. 	DISCUSSION
Because no party has filed any objections to the Report-Recommendation, the Court
reviews the Report-Recommendation for clear error.
Prior to challenging prison conditions in federal court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the
Prison Litigation Reform Act requires an incarcerated individual to first exhaust his available
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administrative remedies. 	See Ross v. Blake, 578 U.S. 632, 635 (2016) (citing 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a)). Magistrate Judge Stewart noted that in New York, administrative remedies consist of
a three-step Incarcerated Grievance Program (“IGP”), which begins with the incarcerated
individual filing a grievance within 21 calendar days of the alleged incident. See Dkt. No. 25 at
6-7 (citing N.Y. Comp. Codes R. & Regs. (“NYCCR”) tit. 7, § 701.5(a)(1)). 	The grievance is
initially reviewed by the inmate grievance resolution committee (“IGRC”); upon appeal of the
IGRC’s decision, it is reviewed by the facility superintendent; and 	upon appeal of the
superintendent’s decision, it is reviewed by the central office review committee (“CORC”), which
makes the final administrative determination. See id. at 7 (citing NYCCR §§ 701.5(b)-(d)); see
also Williams v. Corr. Officer Priatno, 829 F.3d 118, 119 (2d Cir. 2016).
Magistrate Judge Stewart also explained that an incarcerated individual’s failure to exhaust
administrative remedies may be excused if such remedies were unavailable to him, which Plaintiff
bears the burden of showing. Dkt. No. 25 at 10 (citing, inter alia, Caldwell v. C.O. Kusminsky,
No. 29-cv-673, 2020 WL 6162524, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2020), report and recommendation
adopted sub nom. Caldwell v. Kusminsky, 2020 WL 6158578 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 21, 2020)).
Magistrate Judge Stewart stated that administrative remedies may be unavailable in three potential
circumstances: “when (1) ‘it operates as a simple dead end – with officers unable or consistently
unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates;’ (2) the scheme is ‘so opaque that it becomes,
practically speaking, incapable of use,’ meaning that ‘some mechanism exists to provide relief,
but no ordinary prisoner can discern or navigate it;’ or (3) ‘when prison administrators thwart
inmates from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or
intimidation.’” 	Id. at 11 (quoting Dickinson v. York, 828 F. App’x 780, 782 (2d Cir. 2020)
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(summary order) (quoting Ross, 578 U.S. at 643-44)).
Here, Magistrate Judge Stewart concluded that Plaintiff did not exhaust his administrative
remedies because the grievance he submitted is not relevant to the events at issue with respect to
his remaining deliberate medical indifference claim against Defendant McQuinn. 	Id. at 9-10
(citing, inter alia, Gough v. Morris, No. 16-cv-1107, 2018 WL 7199494, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 14,
2018), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 416150 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2019)).
Magistrate Judge Stewart explained that Plaintiff only appealed one grievance to the CORC during
the relevant time period, which did not allege that Plaintiff had been denied proper medical
treatment, nor allege that Plaintiff had been suffering from any medical issues as a result of his
hunger strike, nor allege that any DOCCS policies or procedures regarding hunger strikes had not
been followed. 	Id. at 7-9 (citing, inter alia, Dkt. No. 19-9 at 2; Dkt. No. 19-14 at ¶ 17).
Additionally, Magistrate Judge Stewart noted that Defendant McQuinn is not named in Plaintiff’s
grievance, which, while not dispositive, provides evidence that the grievance did not concern the
remaining claim of deliberate medical indifference in this action, particularly where a different
correctional officer is named and the relief requested concerns that officer. Id. at 9-10 (citing, inter
alia, Dkt. No. 19-9 at 2).
Additionally, Magistrate Judge Stewart concluded that none of the exceptions outlined in
Ross are applicable here to excuse Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies. See id.
at 10-11. 	Regarding the first two exceptions, Magistrate Judge Stewart noted that Plaintiff has
filed and fully exhausted multiple grievances while incarcerated at Upstate Correctional Facility,
which demonstrates that Plaintiff did not view the filing of grievances as a dead end and that he
clearly understood the inmate grievance process and how to navigate it. Id. at 11 (citing Dkt. Nos.
19-15, 19-8; Walker v. Ball, No. 16-cv-437, 2018 WL 1415212, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2018),
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report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 1406632 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2018)). Magistrate
Judge Stewart also noted that Plaintiff made no allegation that the third exception is applicable
here. Id. Additionally, Magistrate Judge Stewart found that Plaintiff’s opposition to the Motion
does not rebut Defendants’ arguments with respect to the exhaustion of administrative remedies,
and that this failure alone warrants dismissal. Id. at 10 (citing Dkt. No. 23; White v. Williams, No.
12-cv-1775, 2016 WL 4006461, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. June 22, 2016) (dismissing deliberate medical
indifference claim for noncompliance with the PLRA exhaustion requirements where plaintiff
made 	no 	argument 	that 	the 	grievance 	procedure 	was 	unavailable 	to 	him), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted, 2016 WL 4005849 (N.D.N.Y. July 25, 2016)). 3
Finding no clear error, the Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Stewart that there is no
genuine dispute of material fact regarding Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust administrative remedies
with respect to his remaining claim. 	As a result, the Report-Recommendation is adopted in its
entirety.
IV. 	CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the Court hereby
ORDERS that the recommendations in the May 18, 2026 Report-Recommendation, Dkt.
No. 25, are ADOPTED for the reasons stated herein; and the Court further
ORDERS that Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, Dkt. No. 19, is GRANTED;
and the Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk shall enter judgment in Defendant’s favor and close this case; and
the Court further
3 In the alternative, if this Court reached the merits of Plaintiff’s claim, Magistrate Judge Stewart
recommended that Defendant’s Motion be denied with leave to renew following discovery and the
development of a more complete record. See Dkt. No. 25 at 12-15.
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ORDERS that the Clerk serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on the
parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 4, 2026
Albany, New York
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