King-Knight v. State of New York et al

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________
MARKUS KING-KNIGHT,
Plaintiff,
v. 	9:25-CV-0317
(GTS/DJS)
STATE OF NEW YORK; CORRECTION OFFICER
NICHOLAS E. FLEURY; CORRECTION OFFICER
AUSTIN R. MARTIN; CORRECTION OFFICER
JOSHUA S. ALLEN; CORRECTION OFFICER
LUKAS T. BENWAY; CORRECTION OFFICER
LOGAN T. HAYES; SERGEANT JARRED S.
BULLOCK; REGISTERED NURSE BRENDA
HOLCOMBE; REGISTERED NURSE CHRISTY
CONKLIN; PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT COSETTE
WITTY-LEWIS; and JOHN DOE and JANE DOE,
the names John and Jane Doe being fictitious, as the
true names are presently unknown,
Defendants.
_____________________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
UGO UZOH, P.C. 	UGOCHUKWU UZOH, ESQ.
Counsel for Plaintiff
56 Willoughby Street, Third Floor
Brooklyn, NY 11201
HON. LETITIA JAMES 	PATRICK R. BLOOD, ESQ.
NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL 	Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Defendants
300 South State Street, Suite 300
Syracuse, NY 13202
GLENN T. SUDDABY, United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
Currently before the Court, in this prisoner civil rights action filed by Markus King-
Knight (“Plaintiff”) against the State of New York, Nicholas E. Fleury, Austin R. Martin, Joshua
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S. Allen, Lukas T. Benway, Logan T. Hayes, Jarred S. Bullock, Brenda Holcombe, Christy
Conklin, Cosette Witty-Lewis, and John and Jane Doe Defendants, are the following two
motions: (1) Defendant State of New York’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1); and (2) Defendant Fleury, Martin, Allen,
Benway, Hayes, Bullock, Holcombe, Conklin, and Witty-Lewis’ motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). (Dkt. Nos. 20, 23.) For the reasons set forth
below, Defendant State of New York’s motion is denied as moot as a result of Plaintiff’s
withdrawal of his claims against it,1 and the other Defendants’ motion is granted in part and
denied in part.
I. 	RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A. 	Plaintiff’s Original Complaint and Proposed Amended Complaint
Generally, in his original Complaint, Plaintiff asserts four claims arising from his
confinement at Upstate Correctional Facility: (1) a claim of excessive force against Defendants
Fleury, Martin, Allen, Benway, Hayes, and Bullock (the “Officer Defendants”) arising from
assaults occurring against him on February 7, 2022; (2) a claim of First Amendment retaliation
against the Officer Defendants arising from his filing of complaints and grievances; (3) a claim
of deliberate indifference against all of the individual Defendants arising from (a) the failure to
1 	In his response to the individual Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff expressed that he was
withdrawing his claims against Defendant State of New York with prejudice. (Dkt. No. 33, at 8.)
Further, in his proposed Amended Complaint (which, as will be discussed below, the Court
grants his request to file) Plaintiff also removes the John and Jane Doe Defendants. The Clerk of
Court is respectfully directed to update the caption to reflect all of the changes to the parties
made in the Amended Complaint (including Plaintiff’s withdrawal of his claims against the John
and Jane Doe Defendants).
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provide adequate medical treatment for his injuries related to the assault and (b) acts of sexual
abuse and harassment against him by the Officer Defendants; and (4) a claim for failure to
intervene as to all of the individual Defendants arising from the actions underlying his other
claims. (Dkt. No. 1.)
Plaintiff has also filed a proposed Amended Complaint that is currently before this Court
for consideration. The claims raised in that proposed Amended Complaint are essentially
identical to those raised in the Complaint, although it adds factual allegations in further support
of those claims (which are discussed below). (Dkt. No. 32, Attach. 2.)
B. 	Briefing on the Individual Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss2
1. 	Defendants’ Memorandum of Law
Generally, in their motion, Defendants make four arguments. (Djt. No. 23, Attach. 1.)
First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to adequately plead the personal involvement of
any Defendant because, other than naming the Defendants and alleging that they are employed at
Upstate Correctional Facility, Plaintiff has not identified how these individuals were involved in
the alleged constitutional violations. (Id. at 8-10.)3
Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Complaint is inadequate also because he uses
improper group pleading that fails to differentiate or identify the actions of each individual
Defendant. (Id. at 10-12.)
2 	Because, as was discussed above, Plaintiff has withdrawn his claims against Defendant
State of New York, the Court will not address that Defendant’s motion, which is now moot.
3 	Page citations in this Decision and Order refer to the screen numbers on the Court's Case
Management / Electronic Case Filing (“CM/ECF”) System, not to the page numbers stated on
the documents contained therein.
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Third, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim should be
dismissed because (a) he has not alleged facts plausibly suggesting either the nature of his
alleged grievances or the fact that the relevant Defendants were aware of those grievances, and
(b) he has not alleged facts plausibly suggesting that there was any causal connection between
the alleged grievances and the alleged adverse actions. (Id. at 12-13.)
Fourth, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s deliberate indifference claims should be
dismissed because (a) again, he has not alleged personal involvement as to each individual
Defendant, and (b) he has not alleged facts to plausibly suggest that his “back pain, neck pain,
deep gashes to his face, and hearing loss” were sufficiently serious to render a failure to provide
treatment constitutionally significant or to plausibly suggest that any of the named Defendants
knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his health or safety. (Id. at 13-17.)
2. 	Plaintiff’s Opposition Memorandum of Law
Generally, in his opposition to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff makes five arguments. (Dkt.
No. 33.) First, Plaintiff argues that he has adequately alleged personal involvement as to each of
the individual Defendants because he has stated that the “officer defendants” and the “nurse
defendants” (terms which have been specifically defined in the Complaint) engaged in certain
conduct, and it is “not inconceivable” for the relevant individual Defendants in those groupings
to have all participated in the alleged assault and/or denial of medical care. (Id. at 13-15.)
Second, Plaintiff argues that each named Defendant is explicitly implicated in one or
more of the relevant claims, and it was not improper to identify the Defendants in groupings
where (as here) all of those grouped Defendants are alleged to have engaged in the relevant
conduct. (Id. at 16-18.)
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Third, Plaintiff argues that he has adequately pleaded a claim of First Amendment
retaliation because (a) the filing of lawsuits or grievances constitutes protected conduct, (b) the
alleged assault by the officers qualifies as an adverse action, and (c) there is a causal connection
between Plaintiff’s protected activity and the alleged assault. (Id. at 18-22.)
Fourth, Plaintiff argues that he has stated a claim for deliberate indifference because he
has plausibly alleged that he suffered a sufficiently serious condition that Defendants failed to
treat. (Id. at 22.)
Fifth, Plaintiff argues that, should the Court find the Complaint to be deficient, he should
be permitted to file the proposed Amended Complaint to cure those defects. (Id. at 22-24.)
3. 	Defendants’ Reply Letter-Brief
Generally, in their reply letter-brief, Defendants make two arguments. (Dkt. No. 36.)
First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot amend his Complaint as a matter of right pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 because he did not move to amend within 21 days of when Defendants filed
their motion, and therefore Plaintiff requires permission from this Court to amend. (Id. at 1-2.)
Defendants further argue that Plaintiff’s motion to amend is not compliant with this District’s
Local Rules because he has not submitted a redline/strikeout version of the proposed Amended
Complaint with his motion. (Id. at 2.)
Second, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s motion to amend the Complaint should be
denied as futile because the proposed amendments do not cure the defects identified by
Defendants’ original arguments. (Id. at 2.)
4. 	Plaintiff’s Supplementation of His Opposition to Defendants’ Motion
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After briefing on Defendants’ motion had closed, Plaintiff filed (without prior leave of
the Court) both an unsigned copy of the proposed Amended Complaint and a “marked-up copy”
(i.e., a redline/strikeout version) of his proposed Amended Complaint. (Dkt. No. 37.) Out of
special solicitude to Plaintiff as a civil rights litigant, the Court has accepted this filing.
II. 	GOVERNING LEGAL STANDARD
It has long been understood that a dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), can be based on one or both of two grounds:
(1) a challenge to the “sufficiency of the pleading” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); or (2) a
challenge to the legal cognizability of the claim. Jackson v. Onondaga Cty., 549 F. Supp.2d 204,
211 nn. 15-16 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (McAvoy, J.) (adopting Report-Recommendation on de novo
review).
Because such dismissals are often based on the first ground, some elaboration regarding
that ground is appropriate. Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a
pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) [emphasis added]. In the Court’s view, this tension between
permitting a “short and plain statement” and requiring that the statement “show[]” an entitlement
to relief is often at the heart of misunderstandings that occur regarding the pleading standard
established by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
On the one hand, the Supreme Court has long characterized the “short and plain”
pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) as “simplified” and “liberal.” Jackson, 549 F.
Supp. 2d at 212 n.20 (citing Supreme Court case). On the other hand, the Supreme Court has
held that, by requiring the above-described “showing,” the pleading standard under Fed. R. Civ.
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P. 8(a)(2) requires that the pleading contain a statement that “give[s] the defendant fair notice of
what the plaintiff’s claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Jackson, 549 F. Supp. 2d at
212 n.17 (citing Supreme Court cases) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has explained that such fair notice has the important purpose of
“enabl[ing] the adverse party to answer and prepare for trial” and “facilitat[ing] a proper decision
on the merits” by the court. Jackson, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 212 n.18 (citing Supreme Court cases);
Rusyniak v. Gensini, 629 F. Supp. 2d 203, 213 & n.32 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (Suddaby, J.) (citing
Second Circuit cases). For this reason, as one commentator has correctly observed, the “liberal”
notice pleading standard “has its limits.” 2 Moore’s Federal Practice § 12.34[1][b] at 12-61 (3d
ed. 2003). For example, numerous Supreme Court and Second Circuit decisions exist holding
that a pleading has failed to meet the “liberal” notice pleading standard. Rusyniak, 629 F. Supp.
2d at 213 n.22 (citing Supreme Court and Second Circuit cases); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. 1937, 1949-52 (2009).
Most notably, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court reversed an
appellate decision holding that a complaint had stated an actionable antitrust claim under 15
U.S.C. § 1. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). In doing so, the Court
“retire[d]” the famous statement by the Court in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957),
that “a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief.” Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 560-61, 577. Rather than turn on the conceivability of an
actionable claim, the Court clarified, the “fair notice” standard turns on the plausibility of an
actionable claim. Id. at 555-70. The Court explained that, while this does not mean that a
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pleading need “set out in detail the facts upon which [the claim is based],” it does mean that the
pleading must contain at least “some factual allegation[s].” Id. at 555. More specifically, the
“[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level [to a
plausible level],” assuming (of course) that all the allegations in the complaint are true. Id.
As for the nature of what is “plausible,” the Supreme Court explained that “[a] claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). “[D]etermining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief . . . [is] a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense. . . . [W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to
infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged–but it has not
show[n]–that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950 (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). However, while the plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer
possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully,” id., it “does not impose a probability
requirement.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
Because of this requirement of factual allegations plausibly suggesting an entitlement to
relief, “the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint
is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,
supported by merely conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.
Similarly, a pleading that only “tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement”
will not suffice. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (internal citations and alterations omitted). Rule 8
“demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id.
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Finally, a few words are appropriate regarding what documents are considered when a
dismissal for failure to state a claim is contemplated. Generally, when contemplating a dismissal
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) or Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c), the following matters outside the
four corners of the complaint may be considered without triggering the standard governing a
motion for summary judgment: (1) documents attached as an exhibit to the complaint or answer,
(2) documents incorporated by reference in the complaint (and provided by the parties), (3)
documents that, although not incorporated by reference, are “integral” to the complaint, or (4)
any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the factual background of the case.4
4 	See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c) (“A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a
pleading is a part thereof for all purposes.”); L-7 Designs, Inc. v. Old Navy, LLC, No. 10-573,
2011 WL 2135734, at *1 (2d Cir. June 1, 2011) (explaining that conversion from a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim to a motion for summary judgment is not necessary under Fed.
R. Civ. P. 12[d] if the “matters outside the pleadings” in consist of [1] documents attached to the
complaint or answer, [2] documents incorporated by reference in the complaint (and provided by
the parties), [3] documents that, although not incorporated by reference, are “integral” to the
complaint, or [4] any matter of which the court can take judicial notice for the factual
background of the case); DiFolco v. MSNBC Cable L.L.C., 622 F.3d 104, 111 (2d Cir. 2010)
(explaining that a district court considering a dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. 12(b)(6) “may
consider the facts alleged in the complaint, documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and
documents incorporated by reference in the complaint. . . . Where a document is not
incorporated by reference, the court may nevertheless consider it where the complaint relies
heavily upon its terms and effect, thereby rendering the document ‘integral’ to the complaint. . . .
However, even if a document is ‘integral’ to the complaint, it must be clear on the record that no
dispute exists regarding the authenticity or accuracy of the document. It must also be clear that
there exist no material disputed issues of fact regarding the relevance of the document.”)
[internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d 147,
152 (2d Cir. 2009) (“The complaint is deemed to include any written instrument attached to it as
an exhibit or any statements or documents incorporated in it by reference.”) (internal quotation
marks and citations omitted); Int'l Audiotext Network, Inc. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 62 F.3d 69, 72
(2d Cir.1995) (per curiam) (“[W]hen a plaintiff chooses not to attach to the complaint or
incorporate by reference a [document] upon which it solely relies and which is integral to the
complaint,” the court may nevertheless take the document into consideration in deciding [a]
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III. 	ANALYSIS
A. 	Whether Plaintiff’s Original Complaint Has Met the Requirements of Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8
After careful consideration, the Court answers the above question in the affirmative for
the reasons stated in Plaintiff’s opposition memorandum of law. See, supra, Part I.B.2 of this
Decision and Order. To those reasons, the Court adds the following analysis.
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that a pleading that states a claim
for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,” as
well as “of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and a “demand for the relief
sought.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). “Courts have found that a complaint that ‘relies on group pleading
and fails to differentiate as to which defendant was involved in the unlawful conduct is
insufficient to state a claim.’” McArdle-Bracelin v. Congress Hotel, LLC, 20-CV-0861, 2022
WL 486805, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2022) (McAvoy, J.) (quoting Stewart v. Hudson Hall LLC,
20-CV-0885, 2020 WL 8732875, at *7 [S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2020]). “The purpose of this standard
it to ‘give each defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the ground upon which it
rests,’” and “[a] complaint fails this standard when the pleading ‘lumps all defendants together in
each claim and provides no factual basis to distinguish their conduct.’” McArdle-Bracelin, 2020
WL 8732875, at *6 (quoting Atuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 F. App’x 33, 34 [2d Cir. 2001])
(internal alterations omitted). “Dismissal pursuant to [Rule 8] ‘is usually reserved for those
cases in which the complaint is so confused, ambiguous, vague, or otherwise unintelligible that
defendant's motion to dismiss, without converting the proceeding to one for summary
judgment.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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its true substance, if any, is well disguised.’” Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73, 80 (2d Cir.
2004) (quoting Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 [2d Cir. 1988]).
Defendants argue the manner in which Plaintiff has pleaded the allegations here violates
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 through the use of group pleading. However, in his original Complaint,
Plaintiff expressly provides a factual basis to distinguish between the conduct of the “defendant
officers” (defined as “Defendants Fleury, Martin, Allen, Benway, Hayes, and Bullock”) and the
conduct of the “nurse defendants” (defined as “Defendants Halcombe, Conklin, and Witty-
Lewis”). (Dkt. No. 1, at ¶¶ 17-18; see also Dkt. No. 32, Attach. 2, at ¶¶ 16-17.) Of note, related
to his excessive force and retaliation claims, Plaintiff alleges that it was the “defendant officers”
(and not the “nurse defendants”) who failed to investigate his grievances, threatened to harm
him, and later assaulted him. (Dkt. No. 1, at ¶¶ 29-33; see also Dkt. No. 32, Attach. 2, at ¶¶ 30-
35.) Granted, a closer question is presented by the fact that, in support of his deliberate
indifference claim in his original Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that the “nurse defendants”
conspired with the “defendant officers” to deny him treatment (arguably blurring the distinction
between the conduct of one group and that of the other). (Dkt. No. 1, at ¶¶ 36-37.) However, the
distinction between the officers and nurses remains. (Id.)5
Under the circumstances, the Court has difficulty finding that the original Complaint
(especially when read in the light most favorable to Plaintiff) “provides no factual basis to
5 	Furthermore, in support of this claim in his proposed Amended Complaint, Plaintiff
further alleges that the conduct of the “nurse defendants” consisted of (1) “work[ing] in cahoots”
with Defendant Bullock “to sidestep or completely omit the documentation of plaintiff’s more
serious injuries in his medical records,” and (2) being “directed” by Defendant Bullock not to
“fix . . . up” Plaintiff or “provide him with proper medical care and/or treatment.” (Dkt. No. 32,
Attach. 2, at ¶¶ 38-41.)
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distinguish the[] conduct [of Defendants]” for purposes of Atuahene v. City of Hartford, 10 F.
App’x 33, 34 (2d Cir. 2001).
For the above reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss based on the use of group pleading
is denied.
B. 	Whether Plaintiff’s Original Complaint Has Sufficiently Alleged the Personal
Involvement of the Individual Defendants
After careful consideration, the Court answers the above question in the affirmative as to
all the Officer Defendants for Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment excessive force and First
Amendment retaliation claims, but in the negative as to all Defendants for Plaintiffs’ Eighth
Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs claim for the following reasons.
For claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, “personal involvement of defendants in
alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an award for damages.” Moffitt v. Town of
Brookfield, 950 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1991). To show personal involvement, “a plaintiff must
directly plead and prove that ‘each Government-official defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.’” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 612 (2d
Cir. 2020) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676); William v. Cnty. of Cayuga, 24-CV-1055, 2025 WL
2636142, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 12, 2025) (Coombe, J.) (“A plaintiff must ‘allege a tangible
connection between the acts of a defendant and the injuries suffered.’”) (quoting Bass v. Jackson,
790 F.2d 260, 263 [2d Cir. 1986]).
Beginning with his Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, Plaintiff has alleged the
following involvement by Defendants Fleury, Martin, Allen, Benway, Hayes, and Bullock in his
original Complaint: (a) “[o]n or about December 2021, at approximately 2:00 p.m., upon
returning the plaintiff to his cell, defendant officers forcibly pushed him inside his cell and
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outside of the range of the surveillance camera and gave him a severe beating with their fists and
objects while he remained handcuffed”; (b) “[i]n addition to the physical assault, defendant
officers verbally, racially, and sexually assaulted the plaintiff by, among other things, using
racial epithets and forcibly grabbing, squeezing, and fondling his private areas”; (c) “[f]ollowing
the initial beating, plaintiff was removed to a holding pen where he was further assaulted by
defendant officers”; and (d) “Plaintiff was caused to sustain serious injuries including, but not
limited to, back pain, neck pain, deep gashes to his face, and a hearing loss.” (Dkt. No. 1, at ¶¶
31-34.) As discussed above related to Defendants’ Rule 8 argument, the Complaint explicitly
defines the term “defendant officers” as meaning Defendants Fleury, Martin, Allen, Benway,
Hayes, and Bullock. (Dkt. No. 1, at ¶ 17; see also Dkt. No. 32, Attach. 2, at ¶ 16.)
Granted, Plaintiff’s original Complaint draws no distinctions between the roles of each of
the “defendant officers” during the alleged assaults. (See generally Dkt. No. 1.) 	However,
prisoners need not always identify with precision which specific corrections officer committed
which specific act against him when multiple officers were present during an alleged assault.
See, e.g., McDay v. Eckert, 20-CV-0233, 2021 WL 4994093, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. June 25, 2021)
(“At this stage, a plaintiff need not establish which officer, among a group of officers, directly
participated in the attack and which officer failed to intervene.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing cases).
Simply stated, because his factual allegations can be liberally construed as plausibly
alleging that all Officer Defendants engaged in the alleged assault, and because it is plausible
that all six of the Officer Defendant could have assaulted Plaintiff in the manner alleged, Plaintiff
was not required to provide further specificity in order to allege the personal involvement of all
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these Defendants. The Court expresses no opinion, however, with regard to how a failure to
identify which Officer Defendant did what during the alleged assaults would fare on a motion for
summary judgment.
Turning to his First Amendment retaliation claim, Plaintiff has alleged the following
involvement by Defendants Fleury, Martin, Allen, Benway, Hayes, and Bullock in his original
Complaint: (a) “[d]uring the period while he was incarcerated at Upstate, and almost during the
entire period of his wrongful incarceration, the plaintiff usually sought to assert his rights, and
did file multiple grievances complaining about several issues including, but not limited to, the
conditions of his confinement and the deprivation of his rights”; (b) “[o]n or about August 6,
2021, the plaintiff, in addition to other grievances, complained that several correctional officers
worked in concert with unknown individuals to cut and assault him inside his cell”; (c) “Plaintiff
did subsequently file grievances complaining that defendant officers failed to investigate his
grievances and, instead, are physically abusing him and/or are conspiring with other individuals
to assault and physically abuse him”; (d) “[i]n or about December 2021, defendant officers began
threatening the plaintiff with serious bodily harm warning that he was “going to get it” and that
they were “out for him”; and (e) on February 7, 2022, the Officer Defendants engaged in the
assault described previously. (Dkt. No. 1, at ¶¶ 27-33.) As discussed above, Plaintiff has alleged
facts plausibly suggesting that the “defendant officers” (as that term is defined in the Complaint)
assaulted him after he submitted multiple grievances, including grievances specifically about
conduct of those Officer Defendants, and that the assault was the retaliatory action. (Dkt. No. 1,
at ¶¶ 27-29, 47.) Plaintiff has therefore sufficiently alleged that the relevant Defendants were
personally involved in events giving rise to his retaliation claim. However, again, the Court
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expresses no opinion with regard to whether this claim would survive a motion for summary
judgment.
Finally, as to his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim, Plaintiff alleged the
following in his original Complaint: (a) he was transferred to the correctional facility’s
emergency room and, “[w]hile at the emergency room, defendant officers conspired with the
nurse defendants to deny plaintiff the treatment needed to remedy his serious medical
conditions”; (b) “[d]efendant officers and the nurse defendants” denied this treatment
specifically by “refus[ing] to provide the plaintiff with proper medical care or treatment;” and (c)
Defendant Bullock was a sergeant (and thus superior in rank to the other Defendant Officers).
(Dkt. No. 1, at ¶¶ 12, 34-37.) These factual allegations are admittedly thin.6
Unlike the allegations related to the other claims, these allegations are simply too vague
and conclusory to plausibly suggest that any of the Defendants were personally involved in this
violation of his constitutional rights.
For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s original Complaint has alleged facts to
plausibly suggest that the Officer Defendants were personally involved related to his Eighth
Amendment excessive force and First Amendment retaliation claims, but that he has not alleged
facts to plausibly suggest that any of the individual Defendants were personally involved in the
Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim as to his medical needs.
6 	Granted, in his proposed Amended Complaint, Plaintiff elaborates on these factual
allegations, adding the following: (1) that Defendant Bullock “supervised” the other Defendant
Officers, (2) that he was “attended to by the nurse defendants” while in the emergency room, and
(3) that Defendant Bullock “directed” the Nurse Defendant “not to “fix . . . up” Plaintiff or
“provide him with proper medical care and/or treatment.” (Dkt. No. 32, Attach. 2, at ¶¶ 37, 39-
40.) Those new factual allegations will be discussed below in Part III.D. of this Decision and
Order.
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C. 	Whether Plaintiff Has Stated a Claim for First Amendment Retaliation
After careful consideration, the Court answers the above question in the affirmative for
the reasons stated in Plaintiff’s opposition memorandum of law. See, supra, Part I.B.2 of this
Decision and Order. To those reasons, the Court adds the following analysis.
“To plead a First Amendment retaliation claim a plaintiff must show: (1) he has a right
protected by the First Amendment; (2) the defendant’s actions were motivated or substantially
caused by his exercise of that right; and (3) the defendant’s actions caused him some injury.”
Dorsett v. Cnty of Nassau, 732 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Curley v. Vill. of Suffern, 268
F.3d 65, 73 [2d Cir. 2001]); see also Dayter v. Fallon, 19-CV-0301, 2019 WL 1762583, at *5
(N.D.N.Y. Apr. 22, 2019) (Kahn, J.) (“To plead a First Amendment retaliation claim under §
1983, a prisoner must allege that he engaged in conduct protected by the First Amendment that
motivated the defendant-official to retaliate against him.”) (citing Gill v. Pidlypchak, 389 F.3d
379, 380 [2d Cir. 2004]). “It is well-settled that filing a grievance is constitutionally protected
conduct.” Burroughs v. Mitchell, 325 F. Supp. 3d 249, 282 (N.D.N.Y. 2018) (Hurd, J.) (citing
Johnson v. Eggersdorf, 8 F. App’x 140, 144 [2d Cir. 2001]; Graham v. R.J. Henderson, 89 F.3d
75, 80 [2d Cir. 1996]). That a defendant’s actions were motivated or substantially caused by the
exercise of a protected right can be pleaded through allegations of conduct or statements “that
may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged retaliatory attitude,” or “indirectly through a
showing that the protected activity was followed closely by the adverse action.” Capogrosso v.
Gelbstein, 18-CV-2710, 2019 WL 4686448, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2019) (citing Smith v.
Cnty. of Suffolk, 776 F.3d 114, 118 [2d Cir. 2015]; McAvey v. Orange-Ulster BOCES, 805 F.
Supp. 2d 30, 40 [S.D.N.Y. 2011]). “A plaintiff has standing if he can show either that his speech
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has been adversely affected by the government retaliation or that he has suffered some other
concrete harm.” Dorsett, 732 F.3d at 160.
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following: (a) “[d]uring the period while he was
incarcerated at Upstate, and almost during the entire period of his wrongful incarceration, the
plaintiff usually sought to assert his rights and did file multiple grievances complaining about
several issues including, but not limited to, the conditions of his confinement and the deprivation
of his rights”; (b) “[o]n or about August 6, 2021, the plaintiff, in addition to other grievances,
complained that several correctional officers worked in concert with unknown individuals to cut
and assault him inside his cell”; (c) “Plaintiff did subsequently file grievances complaining that
defendant officers failed to investigate his grievances and, instead, are physically abusing him
and/or conspiring with other individuals to assault and physically abuse him”; (d) “[i]n or about
December 2021, defendant officers began threatening the plaintiff with serious bodily harm
warning that he was ‘going to get it’ and that they were ‘out for him’”; and (e) “[o]n February 7,
2022, at approximately 2:00 p.m., upon returning the plaintiff to his cell, defendant officers
forcibly pushed him inside his cell and outside the range of the surveillance camera and gave him
a severe beating with their fists and objects while he remained handcuffed.” (Dkt. No. 1, at ¶¶
27-31.) He further alleges that the assault “caused [him] to sustain serious injuries including, but
not limited to, back pain, neck pain, deep gashes to his face, and a hearing loss.” (Id. at ¶ 34.)
These allegations are sufficient to plausibly suggest that (a) beginning in August of 2021,
Plaintiff exercised his First Amendment rights in the form of submitted grievances, including
specifically complaining that the Officer Defendants failed to investigate his grievances and were
physically abusing him or conspiring with others to physically abuse him, (b) the Officer
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Defendants’ actions in engaging in the alleged assault in February 2022 were motivated by his
exercise of his rights given the allegations that they told him they were “going to get him” or
were “out for him” following his complaints and the temporal proximity between when he filed
his complaints, when the Officer Defendants made such statements, and when the alleged assault
occurred, and (c) Plaintiff was injured by the officer Defendants’ actions.
For the above reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim for First
Amendment retaliation is denied.
D. 	Whether Plaintiff’s Original Complaint Has Stated a Claim for Deliberate
Indifference to His Serious Medical Needs
After careful consideration, the Court answers the above question in the negative for the
reasons stated in Defendants’ memoranda of law. See, supra, Part I.B.1 and 3 of this Decision
and Order. To those reasons, the Court adds the following analysis.
The Eighth Amendment protects incarcerated prisoners from the infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment, including where officials are deliberately indifferent to the serious medical
needs of a prisoner. “‘The standard of deliberate indifference includes both subjective and
objective components.’” Mallet v. New York State Dep’t of Corrs. and Cmty. Supervision, 126
F.4th 125, 132 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 [2d Cir. 1998]).
To meet the objective component for the purposes of a motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must allege
facts plausibly suggesting that, “while he was incarcerated, he suffered from a medical condition
that is, ‘in objective terms, sufficiently serious,’” which has been defined as “a ‘condition of
urgency that may result in degeneration or extreme pain,’ . . . that ‘significantly affects daily
activities,’ or that involves ‘chronic and substantial pain.’” Mallet, 126 F.4th at 132 (quoting
Chance, 143 F.3d at 702; Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 162 [2d Cir. 2003]). Such condition
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“need not be ‘life-threatening’ or ‘at the limit of human ability to bear,’ but it must be more than
simply ‘uncomfortable and annoying.’” Mallet, 126 F.4th at 132 (quoting Brock, 315 F.3d at
163).
To meet the subjective component, a plaintiff must allege facts plausibly suggesting that
the defendant’s acts or omissions “‘evince[] a conscious disregard of a substantial risk of serious
harm.’” Mallet, 126 F.4th at 132 (quoting Darby v. Greenman, 14 F.4th 124, 128 [2d Cir.
2021]). Specifically, “‘the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could
be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.’”
Darby, 14 F.4th at 128 (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 [1994]).
As discussed above related to the issue of personal involvement, Plaintiff’s allegations in
the Complaint related to this claim are sparse, alleging in a conclusory manner that the Officer
Defendants and the Nurse Defendants refused to provide him proper medical care or treatment
for his back pain, neck pain, deep gashes on his face, and hearing loss. (Dkt. No. 1, at ¶¶ 34-37.)
Even assuming that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged personal involvement related to this claim
(which, as discussed above, the Court has found that he has not) and that his somewhat vague
allegations of injuries constitute sufficiently serious medical conditions, Plaintiff has offered no
factual allegations plausibly suggesting what necessary medical treatment Defendants denied
him, much less provided any non-conclusory allegations that would plausibly suggest that
Defendants acted with the required state of mind necessary to plead such a claim. (See Dkt. No.
1, at ¶ 51 [alleging, as to state of mind, only that “[t]he individual defendants denied plaintiff the
treatment needed to remedy his serious medical conditions and did so because of their deliberate
indifference to his need for medical treatment and care”].)
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For these reasons, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff’s claim of deliberate
indifference to his medical needs in his original Complaint fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.7 Whether that Eighth Amendment claim in his proposed Amended
Complaint sufficiently states such a claim is another matter, which the Court will now address.
E. 	Whether Plaintiff Should Be Permitted to Amend His Complaint
Generally, the parties do not present arguments regarding, and the Court finds no
noteworthy issue regarding, any of the factors ordinarily considered on a motion to amend, other
than the futility of amendment (due to a failure to state a claim). See Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S.
178, 182 (1962) (explaining that permissible grounds upon which to base the denial of a motion
for leave to file an amended complaint include “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the
part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed,
undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of
amendment, etc.”).
More specifically, the Court finds that, although Plaintiff purports to assert his Eighth
Amendment medical indifference claim against all Defendants in his proposed Amended
Complaint, the only Defendants against whom he has asserted sufficient allegations regarding
personal involvement are Defendant Bullock (who is identified by name as the individual who
7 	The Court notes that Plaintiff also appears to assert a claim of deliberate indifference
related to sexual abuse that allegedly occurred during the alleged assault. (Dkt. No. 1, at ¶¶ 32,
53.) For the same reasons as discussed related to the excessive force claim, Plaintiff’s
allegations regarding such a claim plausibly suggest personal involvement by the Officer
Defendants, and Defendants have not seemingly raised any arguments seeking to dismiss such
claim on the merits. Because neither party addresses this aspect of the deliberate indifference
claim in their papers, the Court declines to assess its merits sua sponte, particularly given that
other claims in this action survive Defendants’ motion.
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directed the Nurse Defendants not to treat Plaintiff and worked with them to “sidestep or
completely omit the documentation of plaintiff’s more serious injuries in his medical records”),
and Defendants Halcombe, Conklin, and Witty-Lewis (who are included under the definition of
“nurse defendants” in the proposed Amended Complaint as discussed above and who are alleged
to have refused to provide Plaintiff with proper medical care and omitted documentation of his
“more serious injuries” from his medical records). (Dkt. No. 32, Attach. 2, at ¶¶ 39-41.) In other
words, although Plaintiff does allege that the “officer defendants” as a collective “conspired with
the nurse defendants to deny plaintiff the treatment needed” and “refused to provide the plaintiff
with proper medical care or treatment,” these allegations are entirely conclusory as to the other
Officer Defendants given that Plaintiff specifically alleges that it was Defendant Bullock who
engaged in conduct related to denying Plaintiff treatment without specifying what role any of the
other Officer Defendants played in that denial. As a result, any deliberate indifference claim
related to denial of medical care against Defendants Fleury, Martin, Allen, Benway, or Hayes
must be dismissed for failure to plausibly allege any personal involvement by those Defendants
in the alleged denial of medical care because Plaintiff’s proposed Amended Complaint does not
rectify the defects of pleading identified previously as to those Defendants.
As to the merits of this Eighth Amendment claim, even Plaintiff’s proposed Amended
Complaint suffers from a certain vagueness that makes it difficult to determine precisely what he
is alleging. For instance, as to the existence of a serious medical condition, Plaintiff alleges that
he presented to “the emergency room at Upstate” with “injuries including, but not limited to,
back pain, neck pain, deep gashes to his face, and a hearing loss,” but he does not allege what
impact these injuries had on him other than his allegation that he still had “severe pains” on
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February 8, 2022 (the day after the alleged assault and failure to provide treatment). (Dkt. No.
32, Attach. 2, at ¶¶ 36, 42.) He notably does not clarify which of the alleged injuries specifically
continued to cause him pain, merely that he experienced pain.
It is further not clear whether the relevant Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff with any
treatment for these alleged injuries. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Bullock and the
Nurse Defendants worked together to “sidestep or completely omit the documentation of
plaintiff’s more serious injuries in his medical records,” which suggests that they may have
documented some of his less serious injuries. To the extent that Plaintiff appears to be alleging
that the relevant Defendants failed to provide him any treatment even for an injury as obvious as
“deep gashes to his face,” such allegation seems implausible. However, because Plaintiff’s
allegations must be taken as true on this motion, the Court finds that the allegations narrowly
suggest both the existence of a sufficiently serious medical condition (most notably the “deep
gashes” on his face, which certainly could be considered a condition of urgency in light of the
bleeding and risk of infection such an injury implies) and that the relevant Defendants were both
aware of and deliberately indifferent to such condition(s) in their failure to provide treatment
(through his allegation that they intentionally omitted documentation of his more serious injuries
from his medical record while also refusing to provide treatment for those same injuries).
However, again, the Court expresses no opinion with regard to whether this claim would survive
a motion for summary judgment.
For all of the above reasons, the Court permits Plaintiff to amend all of the claims
asserted in his original Complaint except his Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference
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to medical needs against Defendant Fleury, Defendant Martin, Defendant Allen, Defendant
Benway, and Defendant Hayes, which is dismissed.
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that the individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 23) is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendant State of New York’s motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 20) is
DENIED as moot; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant State of New York are
DISMISSED with prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment claim of deliberate indifference to
medical needs against Defendant Fleury, Defendant Martin, Defendant Allen, Defendant
Benway, and Defendant Hayes is DISMISSED; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff shall sign, file and serve his Amended Complaint consistent
with this Decision and Order8 within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of the entry of this Decision and
Order in accordance with L.R. 15.1(c).
Dated: February 25, 2026
Syracuse, New York
8 	While Plaintiff need not revise his proposed Amended Complaint to omit the above-
dismissed claims, the Court recommends he do so for purposes of clarity.
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