Uvino v. Wyant et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MARIA UVINO,
Plaintiff,
9:24-CV-1460
v. 	(GTS/PJE)
DEPUTY WYANT,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
MARIA UVINO
Plaintiff, pro se
366 Caniff Rd
Freehold, NY 12431
MURPHY BURNS LLP 	STEPHEN M. GROUDINE, ESQ.
Attorney for Defendants
407 Albany Shaker Road
Loundonville, NY 12211
GLENN T. SUDDABY
Senior United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Pro se plaintiff Maria Uvino commenced this action by filing a complaint asserting
claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"), together with an application to proceed
in forma pauperis ("IFP"). Dkt. No. 1 ("Compl."); Dkt. No. 4 ("IFP Application"). By Decision
and Order entered on February 4, 2025, this Court granted plaintiff's IFP Application, and
following review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b), dismissed certain of plaintiff's claims and found that her Fourth Amendment
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excessive force claim against defendant Wyant survived sua sponte review and required a
response. Dkt. No. 9 ("February 2025 Order").
Following the completion of service, counsel for defendant Wyant filed an answer to
the complaint and a Mandatory Pretrial Discovery and Scheduling Order was issued. Dkt.
No. 15 ("Answer"); Dkt. No. 16 ("Scheduling Order"). Thereafter, plaintiff filed a motion to
amend the complaint, together with a proposed amended complaint. Dkt. No. 18 ("First
Motion to Amend"); Dkt. No. 18-1 ("Prop. Am. Compl."). Defendant Wyant did not oppose the
First Motion to Amend. Dkt. No. 19.
By Decision and Order entered on July 18, 2025, the First Motion to Amend was
granted in part and denied in part, and plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim
against defendant Wyant once again remained in this action. Dkt. No. 20 (“July 2025 Order”).
On July 24, 2025, counsel answered the amended complaint on behalf of defendant Wyant.
Dkt. No. 22. Roughly three weeks later, plaintiff filed a second motion to amend the operative
pleading, together with a proposed second amended complaint. Dkt. No. 23 ("Second Motion
to Amend"); Dkt. No. 23-1 ("Prop. SAC").
By Decision and Order entered on October 1, 2025, the Court granted the Second
Motion to Amend in part and denied it in part, ordered that the proposed second amended
complaint be accepted as the operative pleading, and found that the following claims required
a response: (1) plaintiff's Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against defendant Wyant;
(2) plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment medical indifference claims against defendants Greene
County Officials John Doe #1 and John Doe #2; and (3) plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment
due process claim against defendant Deyo. Dkt. No. 30 (“October 2025 Order”).1
1 In accordance with the October 2025 Order, the proposed second amended complaint was docketed as the
second amended complaint. See Dkt. No. 31 (“SAC”).
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Presently before the Court are the following: (1) a status report filed by counsel for
defendant Wyant regarding the Greene County “Doe” defendants remaining in this action,
Dkt. No. 33 (“Status Report”); (2) plaintiff’s motion for partial reconsideration of the October
2025 Order, Dkt. No. 34 (“Motion for Reconsideration”);2 and (3) plaintiff’s letter request to
correct the last name of a dismissed defendant, Dkt. No. 41 ("Letter Request").
II. 	MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
A. 	Relevant Legal Standard
A court may justifiably reconsider its previous ruling if: (1) there is an intervening
change in the controlling law; (2) new evidence not previously available comes to light; or (3)
it becomes necessary to remedy a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice. Delaney
v. Selsky, 899 F. Supp. 923, 925 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (McAvoy, C.J.) (citing Doe v. New York
City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 789 (2d Cir. 1983)). A motion for reconsideration is
not to be used for "presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing on the
merits, or otherwise taking a 'second bite at the apple.'" Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d
136, 144 (2d Cir. 1998). The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration is strict.
Shrader v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995).
In general, motions for reconsideration are not granted unless "the moving party can
point to controlling decisions or data that the court overlooked - matters, in other words, that
might reasonably be expected to alter the conclusion reached by the court." Shrader, 70 F.3d
at 257. A motion for reconsideration "should not be granted where the moving party seeks
solely to relitigate an issue already decided." Id.
2 Plaintiff alternatively requests leave to file a third amended complaint. See Dkt. No. 34.
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B. 	October 2025 Order
The proposed second amended complaint was construed to assert the following
Section 1983 claims: (1) a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against defendant
Wyant; (2) Fourteenth Amendment failure-to-intervene and medical indifference claims
against defendant Drum arising out of the events associated with plaintiff’s arrest; (3)
Fourteenth Amendment medical indifference claims against defendants Greene County
Medical Professionals John Doe #1-3 and Ulster County Medical Professionals John and
Jane Doe #4-6; and (4) a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim against defendant Deyo.
See October 2025 Order at 7-9.
Upon review, the Court granted the Second Motion to Amend to allow plaintiff to
proceed with the following claims: (1) plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment excessive force claim
against defendant Wyant; (2) plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment medical indifference claims
against defendants John Doe #1 and John Doe #2; and (3) plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment
due process claim against defendant Deyo. See October 2025 Order at 7-9. The Second
Motion to Amend was denied with respect to all other claims raised in the proposed second
amended complaint. Id. at 9-18.
C. 	Analysis
Plaintiff does not suggest that there has been an intervening change in the controlling
law, nor has she presented new evidence which was not previously available. Rather,
plaintiff requests reconsideration of the dismissed claims based on new allegations of
wrongdoing that were not set forth in the proposed second amended complaint, record
evidence that was not attached to the proposed second amended complaint, and an
argument that the Court wrongfully imposed and relied on a heightened pleading standard in
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dismissing plaintiff’s claims against defendant Drum and certain “Doe” defendants. See
Motion for Reconsideration at 4-5.
Insofar as plaintiff seeks reconsideration based on new allegations and record
evidence, a motion for reconsideration is not the proper vehicle for presenting such
information to the Court.
Insofar as plaintiff contends that the Court erred in dismissing her claim against
defendant Drum because the proposed second amended complaint alleges that this official
“ignored a pregnant woman’s direct plea for medical care after being thrown onto her
stomach” and failed to “provide prompt hospital treatment or even basic monitoring[,]” see
Motion for Reconsideration at 5, there are at least three problems with this argument. First,
plaintiff’s argument overlooks the absence of allegations in the second amended complaint
regarding (1) why defendant Drum was present at the scene of the alleged assault, or (2)
how much time passed between when plaintiff was allegedly assaulted and when she arrived
at Greene County Jail. In the absence of such allegations, the Court had no basis to
plausibly infer that defendant Drum was responsible for delaying plaintiff’s access to medical
care in any respect.
Second, plaintiff’s argument overlooks the absence of allegations in the proposed
second amended complaint regarding the manner in which plaintiff was thrown to the ground,
and her reaction to landing on the ground. More specifically, it is unclear from the allegations
in the second amended complaint whether plaintiff landed stomach first on the ground, on her
hands and knees, or contacted the ground in some other manner. In addition, the proposed
second amended complaint does not allege what plaintiff specifically said to defendant Drum
after she was placed in handcuffs regarding her injuries or pain. Thus, the Court had no
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basis to plausibly infer that plaintiff was suffering from an obvious medical injury that
necessitated emergency medical treatment.
Third, plaintiff’s argument assumes that defendant Drum had the authority to transport
plaintiff to a hospital instead of a prison, despite plaintiff’s arrest, and that this official was
aware that medical treatment would not be available to plaintiff at the facility where she was
transported. The Court had no basis to assume such facts based on the allegations in the
proposed second amended complaint, and, short of defendant Drum having this knowledge
(and authority), the Court would have no reason to infer that transporting plaintiff to the jail
following her arrest was based on deliberate indifference to her well-being.
In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that its previous decision dismissing
plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against defendant Drum was legally correct and did not work a
manifest injustice.
Finally, insofar as plaintiff contends that the Court erred in dismissing her claims
against certain “Doe” defendants because the proposed second amended complaint “clearly
alleged that Ulster staff knew she miscarried, provided no treatment, and denied her access
to psychological care[,]” see Motion for Reconsideration at 5, the argument mistakenly
overlooks plaintiff’s obligation to plead personal involvement in alleged wrongdoing. For the
sake of clarity, the proposed second amended complaint did not include any allegations
regarding plaintiff’s specific interactions with defendants John Doe #3, Jane Doe #4, Jane
Doe #5, and John Doe #6.
In addition, with respect to defendant John Doe #3, the proposed second amended
complaint does not explain how this official should have known about plaintiff’s need for an
urgent procedure after her pregnancy was no longer viable, or indicate when plaintiff received
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treatment in relation to her interaction with this official (on an unidentified date and in an
unidentified manner). Furthermore, with respect to defendants John Doe #3, Jane Doe #4,
Jane Doe #5, and John Doe #6, the pleading does not include allegations regarding (1) the
length of time that plaintiff was pregnant, (2) any injuries suffered by plaintiff in connection
with her miscarriage, (3) any mental health treatment requested by plaintiff, or (4) any mental
health decline suffered by plaintiff. In the absence of such allegations, the Court had no
reason to infer that a need for mental health treatment was obvious such that deliberate
indifference could be inferred solely by the alleged failure to facilitate such treatment.
In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that its previous decision dismissing
plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against defendants John Doe #3, Jane Doe #4, Jane Doe #5,
and John Doe #6 was legally correct and did not work a manifest injustice.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s request for reconsideration of the October 2025 Order is denied
in its entirety.
III. 	STATUS REPORT AND REQUEST FOR LEAVE TO AMEND
The October 2025 Order directed the Greene County Attorney’s Office to attempt to
ascertain the full names of defendants John Doe #1 and John Doe #2, identified in the
second amended complaint as the Medical Professionals at Greene County Correctional
Facility who evaluated plaintiff during intake on December 27, 2021, and denied his requests
for medical treatment in the days that followed. See October 2025 Order at 16-17.
In the Status Report, counsel for Greene County states that the county “was able to
obtain a ‘Substitute Jail Order’ . . . that confirms that on December 28, 2021, the plaintiff was
transferred to the Ulster County Jail following her arrest.” See Status Report at 1. The
Status Report further states that “[a]t the time of the plaintiff’s arrest, the Greene County Jail
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did not house female inmates and all medical care at the Jail that was provided to the male
inmates was provided by a third-party contractor[,]” and the county is therefore able to
“confirm that John Doe 1 and John Doe 2 were not Greene County employees.” Id.
On October 24, 2025, the Court received a letter from plaintiff responding to the Status
Report wherein she states that she “underwent intake and medical screening at Greene
County Jail” overnight between December 27 and December 28, 2021, during which time she
“informed both jail and medical staff that she was pregnant and in pain after being slammed
on her stomach during her arrest.” See Dkt. No. 40 at 2-3. Plaintiff further states that she
“explicitly requested to be transferred to an outside hospital for evaluation and care, but her
requests were ignored[,]” and she was instead “transferred within hours to Ulster County Jail
because Greene County Jail has no female housing unit.” Id. at 3.
The Status Report assumes, without any explanation, that plaintiff could not have
suffered a violation of her constitutional rights because she was never housed in a cell at
Greene County Jail. Setting aside the fact that this case remains at the pleading stage, it is
unclear from the Status Report how long plaintiff was held at Greene County Jail, the
conditions and location of her confinement during this time, the intake process for female
arrestees, or whether the facility has a medical center.3 Thus, the information provided in the
Status Report is not enough for this Court to dismiss plaintiff’s medical indifference claim
against defendant John Doe #1 as a matter of law.
Having said that, with respect to defendant John Doe #2, plaintiff’s letter response is
completely inconsistent with the allegations in the second amended, which indicate that this
official was “a member of the medical staff at Greene County Jail[,]” and “ignored plaintiff’s
3 These facts are also not provided in the second amended complaint. See generally, SAC.
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repeated medical requests regarding pregnancy complications in early January 2022.” See
SAC at 3 (emphasis added). It now appears that defendant John Doe #2 was employed at
Ulster County Jail given that plaintiff was housed there in “early January 2022.”
While the Court is sympathetic to plaintiff’s circumstances, this case has been pending
for almost a year. In that time, plaintiff has filed three separate pleadings, each containing
slightly different facts, and naming at least one new or different defendant. Compare Compl.
with Am. Compl. and SAC. Compounding the burden placed on the Court of having to
address these shifting allegations are the vagaries in these pleadings.
For example, plaintiff’s latest representations to the Court, coupled with the documents
provided by her in support of the Motion for Reconsideration, indicate that (1) plaintiff was
transported to Greene County Jail on the night of December 27, 2021, where she remained
for a matter of hours before being transferred to Ulster County Jail, (2) on December 31,
2021, plaintiff was transported to an outside medical facility for evaluation due to “pelvic
pain,” where she appears to have remained until January 6, 2022, (3) plaintiff was transferred
back to the outside medical facility on or about January 13, 2022, and (4) plaintiff was
evaluated again by a medical professional on January 19, 2022. See Dkt. No. 34-1; Dkt. No.
40 at 2-3. None of these facts are set forth in the second amended complaint.
Moreover, although plaintiff seeks leave to file a third amended complaint to include
new “clarifying amendments” to her pleading, see Motion for Reconsideration at 5, the
proposed new allegations once again lack any details regarding (1) how long plaintiff was
held at Greene County Jail, (2) the conditions and location of her confinement during this
time, (3) the intake process that she underwent at Greene County Jail, (4) a description of the
Greene County official(s) with whom she spoke regarding her medical concerns, (5) the
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intake process that she underwent at Ulster County Jail, (6) a description of the Ulster County
Jail official(s) with whom she spoke regarding her medical concerns prior to her transport to
an outside hospital on December 31, 2021, (7) the approximate date(s) and time(s) that
plaintiff spoke with any such official(s), (8) how long plaintiff spent at the outside hospital
following her transfer there on December 31, 2021, (9) the reason plaintiff was released from
the hospital, (10) the treatment recommended by the medical professionals at the hospital,
(11) the treatment plaintiff sought and received following her return to Ulster County Jail, if
any, or (12) how and when specific officials named as defendants were aware of plaintiff’s
need for medical or mental health treatment. In the absence of such allegations, the Court
has no way to evaluate how, if at all, the “Doe” officials other than John Doe #1 were
personally involved in depriving plaintiff of access to constitutionally adequate medical
treatment following her release from the hospital. See, e.g., Grullon v. City of New Haven,
720 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2013) ("It is well settled that, in order to establish a defendant's
individual liability in a suit brought under § 1983, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, the
defendant's personal involvement in the alleged constitutional deprivation."); Ying Li v. City of
New York, No. 15-CV-1599, 2017 WL 1208422, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2017) ("Pleadings
that do not differentiate which defendant was involved in the unlawful conduct are insufficient
to state a claim."); Little v. Mun. Corp., 51 F. Supp. 3d 473, 493-94 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(dismissing without prejudice excessive force claim asserted against "members of the
'Special Search Team' and 'ESU Officers'" and noting that, "[t]o the extent that [plaintiff] does
not know the names of the members of the Special Search Team or ESU Officers involved,
he may name 'John Doe' defendants and include as much identifying information as he has
knowledge of, for the purpose of filing an amended complaint, should Little chose to do so");
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Cipriani v. Buffardi, No. 9:06-CV-889 (GTS/DRH), 2007 WL 607341, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 20,
2007) ("Dismissal is appropriate where a defendant is listed in the caption, but the body of the
complaint fails to indicate what the defendant did to the plaintiff." (citing Gonzalez v. City of
New York, No. 97-CV-2246, 1998 WL 382055, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1998))); Wright v.
Orleans Cnty., No. 14-CV-0622, 2015 WL 5316410, at *13 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2015) (noting
in a Section 1983 case that "[g]roup pleading is insufficient for purposes of Rule 8(a)(2) [of
the FRCP] which requires a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief" (citation and quotation marks omitted)); Holmes v. Allstate Corp., No. 11-CV-
1543, 2012 WL 627238, at *7, *22 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2012) ("[FRCP] 8(a) is violated where a
plaintiff, by engaging in 'group pleading,' fails to give each defendant fair notice of the claims
against it.").
Accordingly, rather than grant plaintiff’s alternative request for leave to amend and
consider the sufficiency of the “clarifying amendments[,]” the Court will afford plaintiff thirty
(30) days to file a third amended complaint that addresses each of the deficiencies identified
herein (and in the October 2025 Order) with respect to the Greene County and Ulster County
defendants (and repeats the allegations of wrongdoing that form the basis of her surviving
claims against defendants Wyant, Deyo, and John Doe #1).
Insofar as plaintiff believes that she was deprived of constitutionally adequate medical
or mental health treatment by officials after returning from hospital visits, any new pleading
must correct the pleading defects identified in this Decision and Order. Plaintiff is advised
that she will not be afforded an opportunity to file any further amended pleadings except to
the extent that she seeks to identify a “Doe” defendant by name. Plaintiff is further advised
that, in the event she does not timely file a third amended complaint, her remaining claim
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against defendant Greene County Official John Doe #2 will be dismissed without prejudice in
accordance with this Decision and Order and Rules 4(m) and 41(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.4 Any amended complaint accepted by this Court shall supersede and
replace the second amended complaint in its entirety, and must therefore be a complete
pleading which sets forth all of the claims that plaintiff wants this Court to consider as a basis
for awarding relief herein.
IV. 	LETTER REQUEST
In light of the denial of plaintiff’s request for reconsideration with respect to the
dismissal of her Section 1983 claims against defendant Drum, plaintiff’s Letter Request to
correct the last name of this official is denied as moot.
V. 	CONCLUSION
4 An action cannot proceed until the completion of service, and unidentified defendants cannot be served.
Undoubtedly, it is the Court's obligation to assist with service when a pro se prisoner is proceeding in forma
pauperis. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (Marshals Service must be appointed to serve process when plaintiff is
authorized to proceed in forma pauperis); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) ("[T]he officers of the court shall issue and serve
all process and perform all duties in [in forma pauperis] cases."); see also Wright v. Lewis, 76 F.3d 57, 59 (2d
Cir. 1996) ("By granting Wright leave to pursue his § 1983 claim in forma pauperis, Magistrate Smith shifted the
responsibility for serving the complaint from Wright to the court."); Kavazanjian v. Rice, No. 03-CV-1923, 2005
WL 1377946, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. June 6, 2005) (noting that "[f]or plaintiffs proceeding in forma pauperis . . ., the U.S.
Marshal's Office—not the plaintiff—is primarily responsible for effecting service."). However, the Court cannot
do so unless and until the pro se prisoner has provided sufficient information to facilitate service. See Carpio v.
Luther, No. 06-CV-0857, 2009 WL 605300, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2009) (acknowledging the Court's "obligation
to assist a pro se incarcerated litigant . . . to cause the summons and complaint to be served" but noting further
that "the plaintiff nonetheless retains the obligation to provide the necessary information" for this to occur).
Moreover, pursuant to Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, in the absence of a showing of good
cause, "[i]f a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—on motion or on its
own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant or order that
service be made within a specified time." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m); see also Purisima v. Astrue, No. 12-CV-3528,
2012 WL 5519295, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2012) (“Purisima still has not named or served any of the Doe
defendants, even though Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure required him to ensure that the Doe
defendants were served by August 30, 2012 (120 days from the date he filed his Complaint) or identify good
cause for his failure to do so.”); Cole v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., No. 11-CV-2090, 2012 WL 3133520, at *17-18
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2012) (noting that Rule 4(m)'s time-limit applies to “John Doe” defendants). Rule 41(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also provides that a court may, in its discretion, dismiss an action based upon
the failure of a plaintiff to prosecute it, or to comply with the procedural rules or orders of the court. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 41(b); see also Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626 (1962). This power to dismiss may be exercised when
necessary to achieve orderly and expeditious disposition of cases. See Freeman v. Lundrigan, No. 95-CV-1190
(RSP/RWS), 1996 WL 481534, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1996).
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WHEREFORE, it is hereby
ORDERED that plaintiff's request for reconsideration of the October 2025 Order (Dkt.
No. 34) is DENIED as set forth above; and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiff’s alternative request for leave to file a third amended
complaint is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part as set forth above. Plaintiff shall have
thirty (30) days to file a third amended complaint in accordance with this Decision and Order;
and it is further
ORDERED that if plaintiff timely files a third amended complaint, this matter be
returned to the Court for further review; and it is further
ORDERED that if plaintiff fails to timely file a third amended complaint as directed
above, plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against defendant John Doe #2 will be DISMISSED
without prejudice for failure to comply with this Decision and Order, and pursuant to Rule
4(m) and 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and it is further
ORDERED that all deadlines in this case will be reset following the Court’s review of
plaintiff’s third amended complaint, or the expiration of her deadline to file that pleading. The
parties should not engage in discovery before this pleading issue is resolved; and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiff’s Letter Request to correct the last name of defendant Drum
(Dkt. No. 41) is DENIED as moot; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk serve a copy of this Decision and Order on the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: November 18, 2025
Syracuse, NY
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