Bishop v. New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision et al

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________
LANCE BISHOP,
Plaintiff,
-v- 	9:24-CV-1314 (AJB/TWD)
NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY
SUPERVISION et al.,
Defendants.
_____________________________________
Hon. Anthony Brindisi, U.S. District Judge:
DECISION and ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
On July 9, 2024, plaintiff Lance Bishop (“plaintiff”), an individual in the custody of the
New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”), filed this
42 U.S.C. § 1983 action in Supreme Court, Clinton County, alleging that DOCCS, the New York
State Office of Mental Health (“OMH”), the Clinton Correctional Facility, fourteen DOCCS or
OMH officials, and five John Does violated his civil rights while he was being housed at Clinton
Correctional Facility. Dkt. No. 2. Defendants have removed the action to federal court, where it
was initially assigned to Senior U.S. District Judge Frederick J. Scullin. Dkt. No. 1.
On November 21, 2024, defendants moved under Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint. Dkt. No. 26. After the motion was fully briefed, Dkt.
Nos. 32, 33, the matter was reassigned to this Court for all further proceedings, Dkt. No. 34.
The motion will be considered on the basis of the submissions without oral argument.
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II. 	BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from plaintiff’s state-court complaint, Dkt. No. 2, and are
assumed true for the purpose of assessing the motion to dismiss.
On July 9, 2021, plaintiff was an incarcerated individual held in DOCCS custody in the
“Upper F Block, 5-7 cell” of Clinton Correctional Facility. Compl. ¶¶ 21–22. Plaintiff was in
his cell “mourning a family member who had just passed away suddenly, and [he] was having a
particularly difficult day managing his grief.” Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiff “reached his hand through the
cell bars to grab the attention of Correction Officer Eric J. Holland, who was doing rounds.” Id.
Plaintiff asked CO Holland for help. Compl. ¶ 22. Instead of calling for an OMH staff
member, CO Holland alerted Sergeant Eric M. Fessette, who arrived with Correction Officer
Tony E. Rock and Correction Officer William F. Nelson. Id. ¶ 23. Sergeant Fessette, CO Rock,
and CO Nelson ordered plaintiff “to put his hands in the feed up slot,” placed him “in mechanical
restraints (shackles including a waist chain) and handcuffs,” and “began escorting him towards
the infirmary. Id. ¶ 24. “Plaintiff at this time required no medical attention and did not know
why staff were bringing him to the infirmary.” Id.
During this “escort,” officers took plaintiff “through the rotunda to the first and third
floors of the infirmary where, at each location, he was brutally assaulted by” Sergeant Fessette,
CO Rock, CO Nelson, Correction Officer Chad D. LaBombard, and Correction Officer Zachary
R. Babbie.1 Compl. ¶ 25. According to the complaint, this rotunda “is widely known at Clinton
[Correctional Facility] as being a safe-zone for [facility staff] to assault incarcerated individuals,
as there are no security cameras.” Id. ¶ 26 n.1.
1 This paragraph includes the five John Doe Correction Officers, who are discussed in more detail infra.
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In a series of events that began around 2:15 p.m. and lasted for about forty-five minutes,
plaintiff alleges that Sergeant Fessette, CO Rock, and CO Nelson “began punching him, choking
him, and calling him [a racial slur].” Compl. ¶ 26. Plaintiff alleges that the assaults began when
Sergeant Fessette punched plaintiff on the left side of his face while CO Nelson violently pulled
on plaintiff’s waist chain, “causing him to be lurched forward and backward.” Id. ¶ 27. At that
time, Sergeant Fessette also grabbed plaintiff by the neck and threatened him, stating: “I will kill
you and bury you under the auditorium.” Id.
Sergeant Fessette released plaintiff, who “was struggling to breathe” and “experiencing
episodes of dizziness” and “back spasms from the chain being so violently pulled.” Compl. ¶ 28.
Next, CO Nelson smashed plaintiff’s forehead into the wall multiple times. Id. ¶ 29. CO Rock
was present for these events but did not intervene. Id. ¶ 30. Afterward, Sergeant Fessette, CO
Rock, and CO Nelson shoved plaintiff up a flight of stairs. Id. ¶ 31. Sergeant Fessette punched
plaintiff “several more times” in the back of his head while CO Nelson continued to pull on the
waist chain, causing plaintiff to stumble and making it hard for him to breathe normally. Id.
Sergeant Fessette, CO Rock, and CO Nelson began escorting plaintiff to the first floor of
the infirmary. Compl. ¶ 32. According to plaintiff, incarcerated individuals call this area of the
infirmary “the Slaughterhouse” because there are no cameras and staff bring people “to the first
floor exam rooms in order to assault them.” Id. & n.2. When they reached a room on the second
floor of the hospital, Sergeant Fessette, CO Rock, and CO Nelson assaulted plaintiff again, “this
time by punching him in his ribs and continuing to punch him in the back of his head, all while
handcuffed.” Id. ¶ 33. Afterward, defendants escorted plaintiff to the third floor and placed him
“in the restraint chair” while they went to speak to OMH staff. Id. ¶ 34. According to plaintiff,
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the trip from his cell to the restraint chair took about thirty minutes, even though the whole trip
should not last more than five. Id. & n.3.
CO Holland arrived. Compl. ¶ 35. Plaintiff overheard Sergeant Fessette falsely tell CO
Holland that plaintiff had been banging his own head against the wall, that he had inflicted his
own injuries and that he was “on drugs.” Id. A short time later, Sergeant Fessette, CO Rock,
and CO Nelson brought plaintiff into another room to speak with an OMH staff member. Id. ¶
36. CO LaBombard put plaintiff in a restraint chair and applied leg restraints. Id. At this time,
Correction Officer Doe #1 “was filming” plaintiff in the restraint chair and “making faces” at
him from behind the camera. Id. ¶ 37.
Plaintiff had “obvious trauma” to his head, face, and neck. Compl. ¶ 38. But he did not
receive any medical treatment. Id. Instead, the OMH staff member who met plaintiff admitted
him to the Residential Crisis Treatment Program even though he denied “suicidality.” Id. ¶ 39.
At this time, Sergeant Fessette, CO Rock, CO Nelson, CO LaBombard, and CO Babbie removed
plaintiff from the restraint chair and “violently pull[ed] him to the ground” even though he was
still in leg restraints. Id. ¶ 40.
Next, Sergeant Fessette, CO Rock, CO Nelson, CO LaBombard, and CO Babbie dragged
plaintiff by his waist chain to an “observation cell” in the Residential Crisis Treatment Program.
Compl. ¶ 41. There, defendants threw plaintiff “face down” and “slammed” him “on to a bed
frame while each one placed their knee(s) into [his] body, pinning him down on his head, neck,
lower back and legs” even though he was still “mechanically restrained.” Id. ¶ 42. Plaintiff was
struggling to breathe throughout this entire ordeal. Id. ¶ 43.
CO Rock “forcefully ripped” plaintiff’s dreadlocks from his scalp, causing him “to bleed
and scream.” Compl. ¶ 44. Sergeant Fessette, CO Nelson, CO LaBombard, and CO Babbie did
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not intervene to stop him. Id. Instead, they stood by and watched. Id. Plaintiff alleges that this
was “emotionally and spiritually traumatizing” because his hair is an important representation of
his Rastafarian religion. Id. ¶ 45.
Sergeant Fessette, CO Rock, CO Nelson, CO LaBombard, and CO Babbie asked plaintiff
“if he would comply with a cavity search” needed to “fully admit him” to the Residential Crisis
Treatment Program. Compl. ¶ 46. Plaintiff refused. Id. Over plaintiff’s “express objection,”
Deputy Superintendent Dennis W. Bradford “approved a forced strip frisk.” Id. ¶ 47. Correction
Officer Michael J. Coryer “began filming” while OMH Nurse Cathleen A. Reusser and OMH
physician Dr. Richard J. D’Amico stood by and watched. Compl. ¶ 47.
At that time, Sergeant Fessette “forcibly tore all [plaintiff’s] clothes from his body and
conducted a cavity search of his anus and genitals by forcefully spreading his buttocks to get to
his rectum.” Compl. ¶ 48. CO Rock, CO Nelson, CO LaBombard, and CO Babbie watched and
failed to intervene. Id. According to plaintiff, this cavity search “was sexual assault.” Id. ¶ 49.
Nurse Reusser injected plaintiff “with a sedative against his will.” Compl. ¶ 50. After
that, plaintiff’s mechanical restraints were removed, “he was placed in a smock, and secured in
an observation cell where he was left to suffer while bleeding, injured, and naked” under bright
lights that were blinding. Compl. ¶ 50. There, plaintiff was “overwhelmed with the smells of
urine and feces for 24 hours of the day.” Id. Nurse Pat Manor examined plaintiff at this time
and “said he had no injuries, which was a lie.” Id. ¶ 51. Nurse Manor also “failed to treat him
and failed to give him any adequate or reasonable medical attention.” Id.
Several days later, on July 12, 2021, plaintiff was served with four misbehavior tickets
that falsely accused him of assault and fabricating evidence. Compl. ¶ 52. Plaintiff spent over
100 days in solitary confinement and suffered “other horrible sanctions” as a result of the false
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charges. Id. Almost all of these false charges were later dismissed, but the damage was already
done. Id. ¶ 54 & n.4.
III. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Rule 12(b)(1)
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a party to move to dismiss a complaint for
“lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” FED. R. C IV. P. 12(b)(1). “A case is properly dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the district court lacks the statutory
or constitutional power to adjudicate it.” Makarova v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir.
2000). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject-matter jurisdiction by a preponderance
of the evidence. Id.
Rule 12(b)(1) motions can be “facial” or “fact-based.” See Carter v. HealthPort Techs.,
LLC, 822 F.3d 47, 56–57 (2d Cir. 2016). A “facial” Rule 12(b)(1) motion is “based solely on the
allegations of the complaint or the complaint and exhibits attached to it.” Id. at 56. Under those
circumstances, the plaintiff bears no evidentiary burden. Katz v. Donna Karan Co., L.L.C., 872
F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2017). Instead, the court must determine whether the complaint and its
exhibits plausibly allege facts giving rise to subject-matter jurisdiction. Carter, 822 F.3d at 56.
In contrast, a “fact-based” Rule 12(b)(1) motion permits a defendant to proffer evidence
outside of the pleading. See Carter, 822 F.3d at 57. In that scenario, the plaintiff will ordinarily
need to come forward with evidence of their own to controvert the defendant’s showing. Id. If
the defendant identifies “material and controverted” extrinsic evidence, the court “will need to
make findings of fact in aid of its decision.” Id. However, “if the evidence proffered by the
defendant is immaterial because it does not contradict plausible allegations that are themselves
sufficient to show [subject-matter jurisdiction],” the plaintiff may rely on their pleading. Id.
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B. Rule 12(b)(6)
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a party to move to dismiss a pleading for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. C IV. P. 12(b)(6). To survive
dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
To assess this facial plausibility requirement, the court “must accept as true all of the
factual allegations contained in the complaint,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), and
draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, Chambers v. Time Warner, Inc., 282 F.3d
147, 152 (2d Cir. 2002). In doing so, the court generally confines itself to the facts alleged in the
pleading, documents attached to the complaint or incorporated into it by reference, and matters
of which judicial notice may be taken. Goel v. Bunge, Ltd., 820 F.3d 554, 559 (2d Cir. 2016).
IV. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s state-court complaint asserts more than ten causes of action against seventeen
named defendants and five John Does. Dkt. No. 2. Plaintiff has named as defendants DOCCS,
OMH, Acting DOCCS Commissioner Anthony J. Annucci (“Acting Commissioner Annucci”),
OMH Commissioner Ann Marie T. Sullivan (“Commissioner Sullivan”), Clinton Correctional
Facility, Clinton Correctional Facility Superintendent “McIntosh,” Clinton Correctional Facility
Deputy Superintendent Bradford, Sergeant Fessette, CO Rock, CO LaBombard, CO Nelson, CO
Coryer, CO Holland, CO Babbie, Nurse Reusser, Dr. D’Amico, Nurse Manor, and five John Doe
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Correction Officers. Id. Plaintiff’s state-court complaint also enumerates ten causes of action,
some of which include multiple claims for relief:
-Count One is a state-law negligence claim against DOCCS and Clinton Correctional
Facility;
-Count Two is a state-law negligent hiring, training, discipline, retention, and
supervision claim against DOCCS, OMH, Acting Commissioner Annucci, Clinton
Correctional Facility Superintendent McIntosh, and Commissioner Sullivan;
-Count Three are § 1983 claims under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments for excessive
force and conditions-of-confinement against “defendants”;
-Count Four are what appear to be state- and federal-law claims for failure to intervene
against “defendants”;
-Count Five are what appear to be state- and federal-law claims for deliberate medical
indifference against DOCCS, OMH, Acting Commissioner Annucci, Clinton
Correctional Facility Superintendent McIntosh, Commissioner Sullivan, and
“defendants”;
-Count Six is a state-law constitutional claim against “defendants,” including a non-party
correction officer named “Officer E. Banks”;
-Count Seven are federal-law conspiracy claims against “defendants”;
-Count Eight is a § 1983 First Amendment claim for violation of religious freedom
based on the alleged removal of plaintiff’s dreadlocks;
-Count Nine are federal-law claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)
and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the “Rehabilitation Act”) against “the State of New
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York,” DOCCS, OMH, Clinton Correctional Facility Superintendent McIntosh, and
Commissioner Sullivan;
-Count Ten is a state-law claim based on a violation of the Humane Alternatives to
Long-Term Solitary Confinement Act (“HALT Act”) against “defendants.”
A. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
Defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiff’s state-court complaint in its entirety. Dkt.
No. 26. According to defendants, many of the named defendants (such as DOCCS, OMH, and
Clinton Correctional Facility) are immune from the state- or federal-law claims asserted against
them while other claims are insufficiently alleged (primarily due to an alleged lack of “personal
involvement”). See id. In response, plaintiff has reasonably consented to the dismissal of the
immune defendants and his legally deficient claims but insists that his Third, Fourth, Fifth, and
Eighth causes of action are sufficiently alleged to warrant discovery. See Dkt. No. 32.
The parties’ areas of agreement do not perfectly overlap with the causes of action that are
enumerated in the complaint. First, based on plaintiff’s representation that he “does not oppose”
“Points 1-7, 9-11, and 13-14 of the motion to dismiss,” Dkt. No. 32 at 9, the following causes of
action will be dismissed: Count One, Two, Count Six, Count Seven, Count Eight, Count Nine,
Count Ten, the official-capacity § 1983 claims, and any remaining state-law claims.2 See id.
Likewise, based on plaintiff’s consent, the following defendants will be dismissed: DOCCS,
OMH, Clinton Correctional Facility, Acting Commissioner Annucci, Commissioner Sullivan,
Superintendent McIntosh, Deputy Superintendent Bradford, and CO Holland. See id.
These concessions appear to leave the federal-law components of Count Three, Count
Four, Count Five, and Count Eight (§ 1983 claims for excessive force / a failure to intervene,
2 Any Fourteenth Amendment claims asserted in the complaint (whether or not listed under a claim heading) are
also dismissed. Dkt. No. 32 at 9 (consenting to defendants’ Point IX).
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strip search / cavity search, conditions-of-confinement, deliberate medical indifference, and for
violation of religious freedom) against defendants Sergeant Fessette, CO Rock, CO Nelson, CO
LaBombard, CO Babbie, CO Coryer, Nurse Reusser, Dr. D’Amico, Nurse Manor, and one Doe.3
“Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon
fault.” Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 520
U.S. 1230 (1997). Although the state-of-mind requirement might vary, Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327, 330 (1986), a § 1983 claim holds an individual personally liable for the role his or her
acts or omissions played in violating someone’s constitutional rights, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 676 (2009). “To establish a Section 1983 violation, a plaintiff must plead (and later prove)
that each defendant was personally involved in the alleged constitutional violation.” Wiggins v.
Griffin, 86 F.4th 987, 996 (2d Cir. 2023).
Defendants contend that plaintiff’s remaining causes of action must be dismissed because
his complaint is an “impermissible group pleading[ ].” Dkt. No. 26-2 at 23–24. This argument
is rejected. There is a meaningful difference between, on the one hand, a pleading that fails to
differentiate between alleged misconduct by multiple defendants, and, on the other, a pleading
that alleges misconduct and/or bystander liability that is attributable to a relatively large number
of defendants. As discussed infra, plaintiff’s complaint falls into the latter category because it
plausibly alleges, at least for the purpose of a pre-answer motion to dismiss, how each of the
remaining defendants were “personally involved” in the alleged misconduct.
3 The only non-conclusory factual allegation in the pleading against any of the five John Doe defendants involve an
unidentified defendant that the Court has designated as “Doe #1,” who allegedly filmed plaintiff after he was put
into the restraint chair. See Compl. ¶ 37 Although the Court recognizes that plaintiff’s complaint accuses all five
John Does of being involved in the “brutal[ ] assault[s],” Compl. ¶ 25, the pleading itself does not include any non-
conclusory factual allegations against any of the other four Does. Because plaintiff’s complaint fails to allege that
Does #2–#5 were “personally involved” in any actionable misconduct, those defendants must be dismissed without
prejudice. Darby v. Greenman, 14 F.4th 124, 130 (2d Cir. 2021).
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A. § 1983 Excessive Force / Failure-to-Intervene Claims (Counts Three and Four)
The Eighth Amendment protects incarcerated individuals from the infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment. See U.S. Const. amend. VIII. “Although not every malevolent touch by a
prison guard gives rise to a federal cause of action, inmates have the right to be free from the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain at the hands of prison officials.” Hogan v. Fischer,
738 F.3d 509, 515 (2d Cir. 2013) (cleaned up).
To plausibly state an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim, the plaintiff must allege:
(1) a “sufficiently serious” or “harmful enough” use of force occurred (measured objectively);
and (2) that the defendant inflicted the force “wantonly,” i.e., for malicious and sadistic reasons
rather than in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline (measured subjectively). See,
e.g., Harris v. Miller, 818 F.3d 49, 63–64 (2d Cir. 2016) (per curiam); Crawford v. Cuomo, 796
F.3d 252, 256 (2d Cir. 2015). Correction officials may also be held liable if they fail to intervene
to stop the use of excessive force by another officer, provided that they observed the conduct and
had a realistic opportunity to intercede. See, e.g., Slolely v. VanBramer, 945 F.3d 30, 46–47 (2d
Cir. 2019) (collecting cases).
Measured against this general legal standard, plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Sergeant
Fessette, CO Rock, CO Nelson, CO LaBombard, CO Babbie, CO Coryer, and CO Doe #1 each
violated his Eighth Amendment rights during the events described in the pleading, either through
the wanton, unjustified use of physical force or by virtue of observing the misconduct and failing
to attempt to intervene to prevent the harm. See Compl. ¶¶ 26–34, 40–45, 47–49.
Likewise, at least for the purpose of a motion to dismiss, plaintiff has plausibly alleged
that Nurse Reusser and/or Dr. D’Amico were present for, but failed to intervene to prevent, at
least some of this harm from occurring. See id. ¶¶ 47–50; see also Crispin v. Roach, 2020 WL
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6263185, at *7 (D. Conn. Oct. 23, 2020) (concluding same with respect to nurse but expressing
doubt about whether facility’s medical staff possessed “authority to intervene in the use of force
by a custody staff member”).
However, the complaint fails to plausibly allege that Nurse Manor was involved in, or
present for, any use of force. Instead, the pleading alleges that Nurse Manor failed to give him
medical care after he was placed in the observation cell. Compl. ¶ 51. That allegation will be
discussed in more detail in Part IV.D infra.
B. § 1983 Strip Search / Cavity Search Claim (Counts Three and Four)
The phrase “strip search” is “often used as an umbrella term that applies to all inspections
of naked individuals.” N.G. v. Connecticut, 382 F.3d 225, 228 n.4 (2d Cir. 2004). Courts tend to
use more technical terms to capture the exact type of a search: a “visual body cavity search” is a
“visual inspection of a naked body, including genitals and anus, without any contact,” id., while
a “manual body cavity search” includes “some degree of touching or probing.” Harris v. Miller,
818 F.3d 49, 58 (2d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). In the prison setting, these claims are covered
by two constitutional provisions: the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. See, e.g., id. at 57–65.
First, under the Fourth Amendment, a challenge to an isolated bodily search (as opposed
to a prison’s regulation or policy) implicates the framework set forth in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520 (1979), which requires the consideration of: (1) the scope of the intrusion; (2) the manner in
which the search is conducted; (3) the justification for the search; and (4) the place in which it is
conducted. Harris, 818 F.3d at 58.
Second, under the Eighth Amendment, a challenge to a bodily search is treated as either
an excessive force claim or, in certain situations, a claim for sexual assault. Harris, 818 F.3d at
63 (evaluating a forcible “visual body cavity search” under Eighth Amendment rubric); Hayes v.
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Dahlke, 976 F.3d 259, 274–75 (2d Cir. 2020) (explaining that “principal inquiry” is “whether the
contact is incidental to legitimate official duties, such as a justifiable pat frisk or strip search, or
by contrast whether it is undertaken to arouse or gratify the officer or humiliate the inmate”).
Measured against these related standards, plaintiff has plausibly alleged that Sergeant
Fessette violated his Fourth and Eighth Amendment rights when he conducted a forcible cavity
search of plaintiff’s anus and genitals without an adequate justification and with the purpose of
humiliating plaintiff. Compl. ¶¶ 48–49. Likewise, at least for a motion to dismiss, plaintiff has
plausibly alleged that CO Rock, CO Nelson, CO LaBombard, CO Babbie, CO Coryer, Nurse
Reusser, Dr. D’Amico, and CO Doe #1 were present for, but failed to intervene to prevent, this
unjustified search. Id. ¶¶ 37, 46–49. However, as before, the pleading does not plausibly allege
that Nurse Manor was involved in, or present for, this alleged conduct. See Compl. ¶ 51.
C. § 1983 Conditions-of-Confinement Claim (Counts Three and Four)
The Eighth Amendment “does not mandate comfortable prisons,” Rhodes v. Chapman,
452 U.S. 337, 349 (1981), but the conditions of confinement must still be “humane,” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994). Accordingly, an inmate’s “conditions of confinement may
not ‘involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain.’” Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119,
125 (quoting Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 347).
To state an Eighth Amendment claim based on conditions of confinement, the plaintiff
must plausibly allege that: (1) objectively, the deprivation was “sufficiently serious that he was
denied the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” and (2) subjectively, the defendant
official acted with “a sufficiently culpable state of mind . . . , such as deliberate indifference to
inmate health or safety.” Walker, 717 F.3d at 125 (quoting Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 F.3d 156,
164 (2d Cir. 2001)).
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“To meet the objective element, the inmate must show that the conditions, either alone or
in combination, pose an unreasonable risk of serious damage to his health.” Walker, 717 F.3d at
125. Thus, defendant-officials violate the law “when they deprive an inmate of his ‘basic human
needs’ such as food, clothing, medical care, and safe and sanitary living conditions.” Id. (citation
omitted). “To meet the subjective element, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with
‘more than mere negligence.’” Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835). “To constitute deliberate
indifference, the prison official must know of, and disregard, an excessive risk to inmate health
or safety.” Id. (cleaned up).
Measured against this general legal standard, plaintiff has plausibly alleged that he was
subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that, after
the cavity search occurred, he “was placed in a smock, and secured in an observation cell where
he was left to suffer while bleeding, injured, and naked” under blindingly bright lights while he
suffered from the “obvious trauma” to his head, face, and neck. Compl. ¶¶ 38, 50. Plaintiff was
“overwhelmed with the smells of urine and feces for 24 hours of the day” and, despite “obvious”
physical injuries, did not receive any medical treatment. See id. ¶¶ 50–51.
To be sure, conditions-of-confinement claims typically involve extreme conditions that
are endured for a long period of time. Although it is unclear from plaintiff’s pleading how long
he suffered under observation, conditions that are “unsanitary” or that “prevent sleep” have each
been held to be “objectively” sufficiently serious under certain circumstances, and in appropriate
cases can be aggregated together to satisfy the first prong of the test. See, e.g., Walker, 717 F.3d
at 125–27. Likewise, “[e]vidence that a risk was ‘obvious or otherwise must have been known to
a defendant’ may be sufficient for a fact finder to conclude that the defendant was actually aware
of the risk.” Id. at 125 (quoting Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 164 (2d Cir. 2003)).
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Plaintiff’s factual allegations, together with the reasonable inferences that can be taken
from them, plausibly establish for the purpose of a pre-answer motion to dismiss that Sergeant
Fessette, CO Rock, CO Nelson, CO LaBombard, CO Babbie, CO Coryer, Nurse Reusser, Dr.
D’Amico, CO Doe #1, and Nurse Manor either participated in, or failed to intervene to prevent,
unconstitutional conditions of confinement when they, inter alia, forced plaintiff into a mental
health observation cell without justification and in unsanitary conditions for an unstated period
of time where was unable to sleep, and, despite actively suffering “obvious” trauma from his
injuries, which included having his dreadlocks “forcefully ripped” from his scalp, refused to give
him necessary medical care.
D. § 1983 Deliberate Medical Indifference Claims (Counts Four and Five)
The Supreme Court has held that the Eighth Amendment forbids “deliberate indifference
to serious medical needs of prisoners.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). “That is
true whether the deliberate indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the
prisoner’s needs, or by prison guards who intentionally deny or delay access to medical care or
intentionally deny or delay access to the treatment once prescribed.” Charles v. Orange County,
925 F.3d 73, 85 (2d Cir. 2019).
A deliberate indifference claim has two requirements. See Chance v. Armstrong, 143
F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998). “The first requirement is objective: ‘the alleged deprivation of
adequate medical care must be ‘sufficiently serious.’” Spavone v. N.Y. State Dept’ of Corr.
Servs., 719 F.3d 127, 138 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Salahuddin v. Goord, 476 F.3d 263, 279 (2d
Cir. 2006)). “The second requirement is subjective: the charged officials must be subjectively
reckless in their denial of medical care.” Id.
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An objectively “sufficiently serious” medical need is a “condition of urgency that may
result in degeneration or extreme pain,” “significantly affects daily activities,” or that involves
“chronic and substantial pain.” Mallet v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 126
F.4th 125, 132 (2d Cir. 2025) (cleaned up). Although the condition does not need to be “life-
threatening” or “at the limit of human ability to bear,” it must be more than “uncomfortable and
annoying.” Id. (quoting Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 1623 (2d Cir. 2003)). As the Second
Circuit has explained, “[t]he question will be whether a plaintiff plausibly alleges a condition
that produces severe and unmanaged pain.” Collymore v. Myers, 74 F.4th 22, 30 (2d Cir. 2023).
To satisfy the subjective element, the plaintiff must show that the defendant acted with a
“sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994). To
be “sufficiently culpable,” the defendant-official has to know of, and disregard, “an excessive
risk to inmate health or safety.” Clark v. Valletta, 157 F.4th 201, 209 (2d Cir. 2025) (quoting
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). In other words, “the official must both be aware of facts from which
the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw
that inference.” Id.
Measured against this general standard, plaintiff has plausibly alleged that defendants
were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. Briefly stated, plaintiff alleges that
Sergeant Fessette, CO Rock, and CO Nelson subjected him to a physical beating that left him
with serious injuries for which they did not give him any medical treatment. Compl. ¶¶ 26–34.
Next, defendants “escorted” plaintiff to the infirmary, where CO LaBombard and CO Doe #1
observed the “obvious trauma” to plaintiff’s head, face, and neck, but refused to give him any
medical treatment, either. Id. ¶¶ 36–39. During these events, CO Babbie, CO Coryer, Nurse
Reusser, and Dr. D’Amico arrived. Id. ¶¶ 41, 47. Although plaintiff had “obvious” physical
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trauma that was worsened by having his dreadlocks “forcefully ripped” from his scalp, none of
these defendants took any action to help. Id. ¶¶ 41–46. Instead, these defendants stood by while
Sergeant Fessette “forcibly” conducted an unjustified cavity search. Id. ¶¶ 47–50. Afterward,
defendants put plaintiff in the observation cell, where he was seen by Nurse Manor, who failed to
give him any medical treatment for his obvious injuries. Id. ¶ 51.
These allegations are more than enough to plausibly establish that Sergeant Fessette, CO
Rock, CO Nelson, CO LaBombard, CO Babbie, CO Coryer, Nurse Reusser, Dr. D’Amico, CO
Doe #1, and Nurse Manor were deliberately indifferent to plaintiff’s serious medical needs.
E. § 1983 Religious Freedom / Free Exercise Claim (Count Eight)
The First Amendment guarantees the right to free exercise of one’s religion. U.S. Const.
amend. I. “Prisoners have long been understood to retain some measure of the constitutional
protection afforded by the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.” Ford v. McGinnis, 352
F.3d 582, 588 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)). “To prevail
on a First Amendment claim, a plaintiff must show that he has a sincerely held religious belief,
that it was substantially burdened, and that defendants’ conduct was not reasonably related to
some legitimate penological interest.” Barnes v. Furman, 629 F. App’x 52, 55 (2d Cir. 2015)
(summary order) (collecting cases).
Measured against this general legal standard, plaintiff has plausibly alleged that, as a
result of his sincerely held religious beliefs, he wears his hair in “dreadlocks,” and “any cutting
or removal of his dreadlocks would impinge on those beliefs.” Compl. ¶¶ 45, 151. Plaintiff’s
complaint further alleges that CO Rock “forcefully ripped” plaintiff’s dreadlocks from his scalp,
causing him “to bleed and scream,” and that Sergeant Fessette, CO Nelson, CO LaBombard, and
CO Babbie did not intervene to prevent this constitutional violation but instead chose to stand by
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and watch. Id. ¶ 44. CO Rock’s alleged conduct is utterly devoid of any legitimate penological
purpose. Accordingly, plaintiff has plausibly alleged this claim against these defendants.
V. 	CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that
1. Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 26) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part;
2. Count One, Count Two, Count Six, Count Seven, Count Eight, Count Nine, Count
Ten, any official-capacity § 1983 claims, and any state-law claims are DISMISSED;
3. Defendants DOCCS, OMH, Clinton Correctional Facility, Acting Commissioner
Annucci, Commissioner Sullivan, Superintendent McIntosh, Deputy Superintendent Bradford,
CO Holland, and Does #2–#5 are DISMISSED;
4. The following causes of action REMAIN for discovery:
- 	§ 1983 Excessive Force / Failure-to-Intervene Claims (in Counts Three and Four)
against Sergeant Fessette, CO Rock, CO Nelson, CO LaBombard, CO Babbie,
CO Coryer, CO Doe #1, Nurse Reusser, and Dr. D’Amico;
- 	§ 1983 Strip Search / Cavity Search Claim (in Counts Three and Four) against
Sergeant Fessette, CO Rock, CO Nelson, CO LaBombard, CO Babbie, CO
Coryer, CO Doe #1, Nurse Reusser, and Dr. D’Amico;
- 	§ 1983 Conditions-of-Confinement Claim (in Counts Three and Four) against
Sergeant Fessette, CO Rock, CO Nelson, CO LaBombard, CO Babbie, CO
Coryer, CO Doe #1, Nurse Reusser, Dr. D’Amico, and Nurse Manor;
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- 	§ 1983 Deliberate Medical Indifference Claims (in Counts Four and Five) against
Sergeant Fessette, CO Rock, CO Nelson, CO LaBombard, CO Babbie, CO
Coryer, CO Doe #1, Nurse Reusser, Dr. D’Amico, and Nurse Manor; and
- 	§ 1983 Religious Freedom / Free Exercise Claim (in Count Eight) against
Sergeant Fessette, CO Rock, CO Nelson, CO LaBombard, and CO Babbie.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to terminate the pending motion and set an answer
deadline accordingly.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: December 8, 2025
Utica, New York
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