Olivieri v. Superintendent

1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
AARON OLIVIERI,
Petitioner,
v. 	9:24-CV-1083
(MAD)
SUPERINTENDENT,
Respondent.
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
AARON OLIVIERI
Petitioner Pro Se
24-B-0813
Green Haven Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 4000
Stormville, New York 12582
HON. LETITIA JAMES 	JALINA J. HUDSON, ESQ.
Attorney for Respondent 	Ass’t Attorney General
New York State Attorney General
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
MAE A. D’AGOSTINO
United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Petitioner Aaron Olivieri seeks federal habeas relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Dkt. No. 8, Revised Amended Petition (“Rev. Am. Pet.”). Respondent filed an Answer.
Dkt. No. 12, Answer in Response; Dkt. No. 11, Memorandum of Law Supporting Response;
Dkt. No. 13, State Court Records (“SCR”).1 	Petitioner did not file a Reply. For the reasons
1 For the sake of clarity, citations to all parties' filings refer to the pagination generated by CM/ECF, the Court's electronic
filing system.
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which follow, the Revised Amended Petition is denied and dismissed.
II. 	RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A. The Indictments
This case involves two Jefferson County indictments against Petitioner:
Indictment No. 23-085, SCR, Dkt. No. 13 at 3-6, and Indictment No. 23-204, id. at 7-10.
Indictment No. 23-085 includes one count of first-degree burglary, three counts of
second-degree burglary, and one count of second-degree assault arising from the events of
February 20, 2023. See id. at 3-5. Indictment No. 23-204 includes one count of
second-degree assault, one count obstruction of government administration, and three
counts of second-degree harassment arising from the events of April 4, 2023. See id. at 7-9.
B. Pre-Plea Conference
On November 22, 2023, during a conference before the Honorable David A. Renzi,
Jefferson County Court Judge, Petitioner stated the following on the record,
I just wanted to say that I can't accept these charges, because I have mental
health issues that are severe, and I wasn’t on my medication, and I was
hallucinating and hearing voices. And while I’ve been in custody of the jail, they
weren’t giving me my proper medication either, and they beat me several times,
and they broke my face and then my nose twice. They injured my leg. They hurt
my arm, and – and they threatened me. And I would like to ask if there was any
way that I could be released into the custody of my mother who is my proxy.
SCR, Dkt. No. 13-1 at 2. Judge Renzi denied Petitioner’s request for release, and informed
Petitioner, “I’m going to let your lawyer file motions that she deems appropriate. You’re
claiming a mental health defense; she can do so.” Id. at 3. Petitioner then stated, “I would
also like a new lawyer,” id., to which Judge Renzi responded,
You have the right to an attorney. You’ve been provided that. You don’t have
the right to come in and dictate who I give you for free. If you want to hire
somebody, you have 100 percent right to do that. If you can’t afford it, I will
provide you with one, which I have done. If you’re dissatisfied with that
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attorney, hire your own or take a different path if you want. But for today’s
purposes, the information that I have in front of me, she is doing her job and
doing it appropriately and competently,
id. at 4.
C. Petitioner’s Guilty Plea
Petitioner’s plea hearing was held on December 5, 2023, before Judge Renzi. The
agreed upon disposition for Indictment No. 23-085 was for Petitioner to plead guilty to one
count of second-degree burglary and one amended count of second-degree attempted
assault. SCR, Dkt. No. 13-2 at 2. The agreed upon disposition for Indictment No. 23-204
was for Petitioner to plead guilty to one count of second-degree assault. Id. The agreed
upon sentence was three-and-a-half years in prison and five years of post-release
supervision. Id. at 3.
After being sworn in, Petitioner affirmed that he wished to enter guilty pleas to satisfy
the pending indictments against him. SCR, Dkt. No. 13-2 at 5. Petitioner affirmed that he
discussed the above disposition with his attorney, that he understood and was satisfied with
those discussions, and that he was entering the pleas with his attorney’s advice and consent.
Id. Petitioner asserted that he suffered from mental health issues but affirmed that he
understood what was happening that day. Id. at 6. Following a brief off-the-record
discussion with his attorney, Petitioner also affirmed that he was pleading guilty with full
understanding of the ramifications of doing so, including waiving any mental health defense.
Id. at 6-7. Petitioner affirmed that he understood he was giving up his right to have the
prosecutor prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in two separate jury trials, and that he
was giving up his rights to test the evidence, cross-examine government witnesses, call his
own witnesses, and testify at trial. Id. at 7-8.
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Petitioner affirmed that he was pleading guilty of his own free will and that no one had
threatened him or forced him or coerced him into doing anything that day.
SCR, Dkt. No. 13-2 at 9. Petitioner stated that he was told that he would receive a sentence
of three-and-a-half years in prison and five years on parole for pleading guilty. Id. Petitioner
then pled guilty to the second-degree burglary, second-degree attempted assault, and
second-degree assault charges and admitted to the facts underlying the charges. Id. at
10-11, 15-17. At one point, Petitioner interrupted his pleas and admissions to ask, “Is there
any way I could see a mental health doctor?” and stated, “I wouldn’t want to have a trial. I
just want my mental health to be taken care of, because I wasn’t in the proper mental health
state when this happened,” before his attorney asked to speak with him off the record.
Id. at 11-12.
Following the off-the-record discussion with counsel, Petitioner was sworn in again.
SCR, Dkt. No. 13-2 at 13-14. Petitioner affirmed that he wanted to continue with his guilty
pleas and that he was satisfied with the discussions he had with his attorney. Id. at 14.
Petitioner again affirmed that he understood that, by pleading guilty, he was waiving his right
to a jury trial and his rights to test the prosecutor’s evidence, cross-examine government
witnesses, call his own witnesses, testify, and present a mental health defense. Id. at 14-15.
Petitioner again affirmed that he was pleading guilty of his own free will. Id. at 15. Petitioner
then pled guilty to second-degree burglary, second-degree attempted assault, and
second-degree assault, admitted to the underlying facts, and stated that, by pleading guilty,
he would “get three and a half years plus five years’ parole.” Id. at 17.
Thereafter, Petitioner affirmed that he signed a waiver of his right to appeal, he had
discussed this with his attorney, and no one had threatened or forced him into signing
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anything that day. SCR, Dkt. No. 13-2 at 17-18. Petitioner affirmed that by waiving his right
to appeal, he was not giving up his right to file a notice of appeal in the next thirty days, but
he was giving up his right to have a higher, appellate court consider most claims of error and
challenges to errors that may have occurred in Petitioner’s case. Id. at 18. Petitioner
affirmed that he was waiving his right to appeal after consultation with his attorney and that
he was satisfied with those discussions. Id. at 19. Petitioner affirmed that he was waiving his
right to appeal “in return for the plea and sentencing agreement of three and a half years in
prison followed by five years of post-release supervision to run concurrent with each other.”
Id.
D. The Sentencing Proceeding
Petitioner was sentenced by Judge Renzi on February 15, 2024, to three-and-a-half
years in prison followed by five years of post-release supervision for second-degree burglary,
second-degree attempted assault, and second-degree assault. SCR, Dkt. No. 13-3 at 1-5.
Judge Renzi ordered the sentence for each conviction to run concurrently with the other.
Id. at 5. Judge Renzi also stated that a five-year stay away order of protection would be
issued, and Petitioner affirmed that he had no problem with that. Id.
III. 	PRESENT PETITION
The Revised Amended Petition asserts that Petitioner is entitled to federal habeas
corpus relief because (1) he was wrongfully charged, (2) his attorney provided ineffective
assistance and racially profiled him, (3) the trial court ignored his concerns, denied him
competent counsel, and set “excessive bail,” (4) while detained pretrial, he was denied
medical care, he was not given medication for an extended period, and his mental health
condition was not properly treated, (5) while detained pretrial, he was also beaten, racially
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profiled, and otherwise mistreated by Jefferson County correction officers, and (6) after
pleading guilty, the trial court gave him “an il[l]egal sentence.” Rev. Am. Pet. at 5-10. Little
additional information is provided regarding the above claims. In support of the claims of
racial profiling, Petitioner asserts that his attorney and correctional officers referred to him as
“you guys,” “minority,” “your kind,” and “your people.” Id. at 8. Based on all of the foregoing,
Petitioner seeks “time served or rel[ie]f of sentence.” Id. at 15.
According to the Revised Amended Petition, Petitioner did not appeal his judgment of
conviction, and he did not file any other petitions, applications, or motions concerning the
judgment of conviction in any state court. Rev. Am. Pet. at 2-3. The Revised Amended
Petition asserts that Petitioner “did not have the means or resources” to appeal, id. at 5, he
“wrote letters but the courts did not receive them,” id. at 7, he “was scared and no one would
help [him] or answer [his] calls or letters,” id. at 9, and he “was lied to [about the appellate
process] and misguided” by his attorney and possibly others, id. at 12.
Respondent filed a memorandum of law in opposition, arguing that the Revised
Amended Petition should be dismissed, and all of Petitioner’s habeas claims should be
denied, both because the claims have not been exhausted and because they are plainly
meritless, as they were largely waived by Petitioner’s guilty plea, and they fail to state a claim
for relief. Dkt. No. 11 at 6-14. Petitioner did not file a reply.
IV. 	DISCUSSION
All of Petitioner’s habeas claims will be denied because Petitioner never presented his
claims to the state courts for direct or collateral review, and, even if he had, the claims are
without merit.
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A. Standard Governing Review of a Habeas Corpus Petition
Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”),
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996) a federal court may grant habeas corpus relief
with respect to a claim adjudicated on the merits in state court only if, based upon the record
before the state court, the adjudication of the claim (1) was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States; or (2) was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in
light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. See Cullen v. Pinholster,
563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)).
The AEDPA “‘imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings’
and ‘demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.’” Felkner
v. Jackson, 562 U.S. 594, 598 (2011) (per curiam) (quoting Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766,
773 (2010)). Federal habeas courts must presume that the state court’s factual findings are
correct “unless applicants rebut this presumption with ‘clear and convincing evidence.’”
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473-74 (2007) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). “The
question under AEDPA is not whether a federal court believes the state court’s determination
was incorrect but whether that determination was unreasonable—a substantially higher
threshold.” Schriro, 550 U.S. at 473 (citing Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000)).
B. Petitioner’s Failure to Exhaust Remedies
As required by Section 2254, before seeking federal habeas relief, a petitioner must
exhaust available state remedies, or alternatively, establish either that such remedies cannot
adequately protect his rights, or that such remedies are absent. Aparicio v. Artuz,
269 F.3d 78, 89 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)). The exhaustion doctrine
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recognizes “respect for our dual judicial system and concern for harmonious relations
between the two adjudicatory institutions.” Daye v. Attorney Gen. of New York,
696 F.2d 186, 191 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Galdamez v. Keane, 394 F.3d 68, 72
(2d Cir. 2005) (“Comity concerns lie at the core of the exhaustion requirement.”). Although
both federal and state courts are charged with securing a state criminal defendant’s federal
rights, the state courts must initially be given the opportunity to consider and correct any
violations of federal law. Galdamez, 394 F.3d at 72 (citing O’Sullivan v. Boerckel,
526 U.S. 838, 844-45 (1999)). “The chief purposes of the exhaustion doctrine would be
frustrated if the federal habeas court were to rule on a claim whose fundamental legal basis
was substantially different from that asserted in state court.” Daye, 696 F.2d at 192
(footnote omitted).
The exhaustion requirement is satisfied if the federal claim has been “fairly
present[ed]” to the state court. Dorsey v. Kelly, 112 F.3d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 1997)
(quoting Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971)). A claim has been “fairly presented” if
the state court was apprised of “both the factual and the legal premises of the claim
[the petitioner] asserts in federal court.” Daye, 696 F.2d at 191. Thus, “the nature or
presentation of the claim must have been likely to alert the court to the claim’s federal
nature.” Id. at 192. “In order to meet the exhaustion requirement, a petitioner must have
presented his claim to the state courts at least once, on direct or collateral review.”
Fielding v. LeFevre, 548 F.2d 1102, 1106 (2d Cir. 1977).
As Petitioner asserts and the record reflects, in this case, Petitioner did not appeal the
judgment of conviction, and he did not file any other petitions, applications, or motions
concerning the judgment of conviction in any state court. See Rev. Am. Pet. at 2-3. As such,
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Petitioner did not exhaust the state remedies available to him. Furthermore, Petitioner has
neither shown an absence of available state remedies, nor shown that such remedies cannot
adequately protect his rights. Petitioner merely asserts that he “did not have the means or
resources” to appeal, id. at 5, he “wrote letters but the courts did not receive them,” id. at 7,
he “was scared and no one would help [him] or answer [his] calls or letters,” id. at 9, and he
“was lied to and misguided” by his attorney and possibly others, id. at 12. As Respondent
asserts, “[n]one of this explains why [P]etitioner was able to file the instant petition in this
Court but was unable to seek redress of his claims in the state courts, even after the trial
court advised him at the plea proceedings that he had 30 days from the state of sentencing to
file a notice of appeal.” Dkt. No. 11 at 10.
The Revised Amended Petition asserts only unexhausted claims, and the narrow
exceptions to the exhaustion requirement do not apply. Accordingly, either the Revised
Amended Petition may be dismissed based on the failure to exhaust, or alternatively,
Petitioner’s claims may be denied on the merits, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2).
See, e.g., Clavijo v. Wolcott, No. 24-CV-6288, 2024 WL 2301409, at *3
(W.D.N.Y. May 21, 2024) (observing that when a petition only contains unexhausted claims,
federal courts either dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction or deny the claims on the
merits under the habeas statute). As discussed below, the habeas claims asserted by
Petitioner are without merit, and they will be denied on that basis.
C. Petitioner’s Habeas Claims Lack Merit
Petitioner’s habeas claims will be denied because they are not cognizable, and they
are without merit. The Revised Amended Petition raises one sentencing-related claim and
several claims arising from events that occurred prior to entry of Petitioner’s guilty pleas.
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See Rev. Am. Pet. at 5-10. Considering the sentencing-related claim first, Petitioner asserts
that an illegal sentence was imposed upon him. Id. at 10. Yet, as Respondent asserts, the
record reflects that Petitioner received a sentence within the applicable statutory range.
See Dkt. No. 11 at 14. Petitioner’s three-and-a-half-year sentence of incarceration was within
the statutory range of imprisonment for second-degree burglary, as well as second-degree
assault and attempted assault. See Penal Law §§ 70.02(3)(b) (requiring a prison sentence
between three-and-a-half and fifteen years for a class C felony), 70.02(3)(c) (requiring a
prison sentence between two and seven years for a class D felony), 120.05(14) (“Assault in
the second degree is a class D felony.”), 140.25(2) (“Burglary in the second degree is a class
C felony.”). Petitioner’s five-year sentence of post-release supervision was within the
statutory range of supervised release for second-degree burglary. See id. § 70.45(2)(f)
(requiring a term of post-release supervision between two-and-a-half and five years for a
class C violent felony offense). “It is well-settled law that a habeas petitioner’s challenge to
the judge’s exercise of discretion in setting the length of his or her prison term does not
present a cognizable constitutional issue if the sentence falls within the statutory range.”
McClelland v. Kirkpatrick, 778 F. Supp. 2d 316, 337 (W.D.N.Y. 2011). Petitioner’s challenge
to his sentence does not present a cognizable constitutional issue because Petitioner’s
sentence was within the applicable statutory range.
Apart from Petitioner’s sentencing-related claim, all claims included in the Revised
Amended Petition arise from events preceding the entry of Petitioner’s guilty pleas.
See Rev. Am. Pet. at 5-10. “When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court
that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise
independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the
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entry of the guilty plea.” Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973). “It is well settled
that a defendant who knowingly and voluntarily enters a guilty plea waives all
non-jurisdictional defects in the prior proceedings.” United States v. Garcia, 339 F.3d 116,
117 (2d Cir. 2003). As such, all remaining claims in the Revised Amended Petition are
barred from habeas review by Petitioner’s guilty pleas.
The record does not suggest that Petitioner intends to challenge the validity of his
guilty pleas; as Respondent asserts, “[P]etitioner does not seek to withdraw his guilty plea or
to otherwise vacate his conviction. Instead, he simply seeks relief from his sentence.”
Dkt. No. 11 at 12. Additionally, the record does not suggest any viable basis for such a
challenge. “The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is ‘whether the
plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action
open to the defendant.’” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985) (quoting North Carolina
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970) (citations omitted)). To find a guilty plea valid, the record
must reflect that the criminal defendant (1) was competent to proceed and was fully aware of
the nature of the charges faced; (2) had a rational and factual understanding of the
proceedings; and (3) was cognizant of the constitutional protections relinquished upon entry
of the plea. Oyague v. Artuz, 393 F.3d 99, 106 (2d Cir. 2004). In short, a guilty plea must be
entered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
A knowing plea is entered “‘with understanding of the nature of the charge and the
consequences of the plea,’” Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 n.1 (1971)
(quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 11), and a “plea is deemed ‘intelligent’ if the accused had the
advice of counsel and understood the consequences of his plea, even if only in a fairly
rudimentary way,” Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312, 1320 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing Brady
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v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 750 (1970)). During Petitioner’s plea allocution, following
several off-the-record discussions with counsel, Petitioner affirmed that he understood what
was happening that day and that he was pleading guilty fully understanding the nature of the
charges and the ramifications of his pleas. SCR, Dkt. No. 13-2 at 5-17. Petitioner affirmed
that he understood the constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, including the
right to have the prosecution prove the cases brought against him beyond a reasonable
doubt, the right to a jury trial, the right to present a defense, and the right to testify.
Id. at 7-8, 14-15. Petitioner said he understood that he was waiving his right to appeal and
giving up his right to challenge any errors that may have occurred in the cases brought
against him with the appellate court; Petitioner acknowledged that he was doing so after
consultation with his attorney and that he was satisfied with those discussions. Id. at 18-19.
Petitioner’s “[s]olemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption of verity,”
Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977), and such statements “are generally treated as
conclusive in the face of the defendant’s later attempt to contradict them,” Adames v. United
States, 171 F.3d 728, 732 (2d Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Gonzalez, 970 F.2d 1095,
1101 (2d Cir. 1992)). Petitioner’s under oath affirmations and statements above sufficiently
establish that he understood the nature of the charges and the consequences of his guilty
pleas, and that he both had, and was satisfied with, the advice of counsel. As such, the
record reflects that Petitioner’s pleas were entered knowingly and intelligently.
Next, a plea “is deemed ‘voluntary’ if it is not the product of actual or threatened
physical harm, mental coercion overbearing the [petitioner]’s will, or the [petitioner]’s sheer
inability to weigh his options rationally.” Miller, 848 F.2d at 1320 (citing Brady,
397 U.S. at 750). Petitioner’s plea hearing included no threats, no physical harm, and no
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mental coercion. Petitioner stated that he was pleading guilty of his own free will, that no one
had threatened, forced, or coerced him into doing anything that day. SCR, Dkt. No. 13-2 at 9.
Petitioner affirmed that he understood pleading guilty would result in a sentence of
three-and-a-half years in custody and five years on parole. Id. Although Petitioner was
facing a maximum term of fifteen years of incarceration for second-degree burglary, and by
pleading guilty, Petitioner received the minimum prison sentence for this charge, this does
not suggest that Petitioner’s plea was entered into involuntarily. See United States v. Cruz,
977 F.3d 732, 733-34 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Courts have long recognized that trial judges are
entitled to encourage guilty pleas by imposing on a defendant who pleads guilty a lesser
sentence than would have been imposed had the defendant stood trial.”); see also McMahon
v. Hodges, 382 F.3d 284, 289 n.5 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Although federal judges are prohibited from
participating in plea bargaining, this blanket prohibition does not apply to state judges.”).
The record also does not suggest that Petitioner’s guilty plea was rendered involuntary
by his mental health condition. For a plea to be voluntary, a defendant must be competent to
proceed. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993). The federal standard for
determining competency is whether a defendant has “sufficient present ability to consult with
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and has “a rational as well as
factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Godinez, 509 U.S. at 396
(quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (per curiam)). “It is
well-established that some degree of mental illness cannot be equated with incompetence to
stand trial.” United States v. Vamos, 797 F.2d 1146, 1150 (2d Cir. 1986). The same is true
with respect to a defendant’s competency to plead guilty. See, e.g., King v. Cunningham,
442 F. Supp. 2d 171, 185 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (“The standard for competency to plead guilty is
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no higher than the standard for competency to stand trial.”) (citing Godinez, 509 U.S. at 398).
“The mental illness must deprive the defendant of the ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding and to understand the proceedings against him
rationally as well as factually.” United States v. Ioulevitch, 508 F. App’x 73, 75 (2d Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted).
During his plea allocation, Petitioner stated that he had mental health issues and
expressed concerns regarding his current mental health treatment, as well as the state of his
mental health at the time of the charged offenses. SCR, Dkt. No. 13-2 at 6, 11-12. Yet
nothing before the Court suggests that Petitioner’s mental health during the hearing either
deprived Petitioner of his ability to understand the proceedings against him rationally or
factually, or deprived Petitioner of his ability to consult with counsel with a reasonable degree
of rational understanding. Petitioner held several off-the-record discussions with counsel,
affirmed that he wanted to proceed with his pleas and not proceed to trial, further affirmed
that he understood the consequences of pleading guilty, including waiving any mental health
defenses, then pled guilty to the burglary and assault charges, and admitted to the facts
underlying the charges. See id. at 7, 14-15. Accordingly, the record reflects both Petitioner’s
competence and voluntariness in pleading guilty.
Last, when a petitioner seeks to challenge the validity of a guilty plea entered based
“on the advice of counsel, he must demonstrate that the advice was not ‘within the range of
competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.’” Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411,
411 (1991) (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). “[A]n evaluation of
ineffective assistance of counsel usually begins with an examination of the strength of the
Government’s case,” United States v. Helgesen, 669 F.2d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1982), but
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Petitioner has pointed to no weaknesses in the cases brought against him; the record merely
reflects that Petitioner admitted to the facts underlying the charges. See SCR, Dkt. No. 13-2
at 15-17. Further, as Respondent notes, Petitioner faced a maximum potential sentence of
fifteen years in prison for second-degree burglary, and counsel negotiated a disposition that
guaranteed Petitioner a sentence of three-and-a-half years in prison, the statutory minimum
term of imprisonment.2 See Dkt. No. 11 at 14. Absent any indication that counsel’s
performance was “deficient” and “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense,”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), the record reflects that defense
counsel’s assistance to Petitioner “was within the range of competence demanded of
attorneys in criminal cases,” McMann, 397 U.S. at 771; see, e.g., Scott v. Superintendent,
Mid-Orange Corr. Fac., 03-CV-6383, 2006 WL 3095760, *9 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2006)
(“[W]here the defendant secured a significant strategic benefit by pleading guilty, courts are
generally less likely to suspect an involuntary or misguided decision to plead.”).
In sum, the record reflects (and the Revised Amended Petition does not challenge) the
validity of Petitioner’s guilty pleas, so all claims in the Revised Amended Petition arising from
events preceding the pleas of guilty are barred from habeas review. The only remaining
sentencing-related claim is not cognizable because Petitioner’s sentence was within the
statutory range. Based on the foregoing, all habeas claims raised in the Revised Amended
Petition will be denied on the merits.
V. 	CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, it is
2 The record further reflects that, by way of the disposition, the prosecution agreed to drop seven counts, agreed to
amend one count, and agreed to have the sentences for the three remaining counts run concurrently, meaning, a
sentence of imprisonment exceeding fifteen years could have been imposed if Petitioner had proceeded to trial on the
original indictments.
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ORDERED that the Revised Amended Petition, Dkt. No. 8, be DENIED and
DISMISSED in its entirety; and it is further
ORDERED that no Certificate of Appealability ("COA") shall issue because Petitioner
has failed to make a "substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right" as 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2) requires;3 and it is further
ORDERED that any further request for a Certificate of Appealability must be
addressed to the Court of Appeals (Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)); and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court respectfully provide Petitioner with copies of the
unpublished decisions cited herein in accordance with the Second Circuit decision in Lebron
v. Sanders, 557 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2009) (per curiam); and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve a copy of this Order upon the parties in
accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: April 30, 2026
Albany, New York
3 Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); see Richardson v. Greene, 497 F.3d 212, 217 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that if
the court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds, "the certificate of appealability must show that jurists of reason
would find debatable two issues: (1) that the district court was correct in its procedural ruling, and (2) that the applicant
has established a valid constitutional violation" (emphasis in original)).
Case 9:24-cv-01083-MAD Document 15 Filed 04/30/26 Page 16 of 16