Daniels v. Connor

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_____________________________________
RICHARD E. DANIELS,
Plaintiff,
v.
No. 5:25-CV-1100
DANIEL CONNOR, 	(GTS/PJE)
Defendant.
_____________________________________
APPEARANCES:
Richard E. Daniels
C2965
Jefferson County Jail
753 Waterman Drive
Watertown, New York 13601
Plaintiff pro se
PAUL J. EVANGELISTA
U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE
REPORT-RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER1
I. In Forma Pauperis
Plaintiff pro se Richard E. Daniels (“plaintiff”) commenced this action on August 15,
2025, by filing a complaint. See Dkt. No. 1. In lieu of paying this Court’s filing fee, plaintiff
submitted an application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). See Dkt. No. 2.
The 	undersigned 	has 	reviewed 	plaintiff’s 	IFP 	application 	and 	determines 	that 	he
1 This matter was referred to the undersigned for Report-Recommendation and Order pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b) and N.D.N.Y. L.R. 72.3(c).
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financially qualifies to proceed IFP.2 This Court must now assess the merits of plaintiff’s
complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915; 1915A.
II. Initial Review
A. Legal Standards
28 U.S.C. § 1915 directs that, when a plaintiff seeks to proceed IFP, “the court shall
dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal (i) is
frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 	28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B). “Thus, it is a court’s responsibility to determine that a plaintiff may properly
maintain his complaint before permitting him to proceed further with his action.” Praileau
v. Fischer, 930 F. Supp. 2d 383, 394 (N.D.N.Y. 2013).
The Second Circuit affords pro se litigants a “special solicitude” such “that a pro se
litigant’s submissions must be construed liberally, and that such submissions must be
read to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.” 	Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of
Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 477 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnote
omitted). However, the Court is not required to accept unsupported allegations that are
devoid of sufficient facts or claims. Although detailed allegations are not required at the
pleading stage, a complaint must still include enough facts to provide defendants with
notice of the claims against them and the grounds on which they are based. See Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant
2 Plaintiff is advised that although he has been granted IFP status, he is still required to pay any fees and
costs they may incur in this action, including, but not limited to, copying fees, transcript fees, and witness
fees, if applicable.
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is liable for the misconduct alleged.”); Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-56
(2007) (Noting that a plaintiff bringing suit must plead “enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.”).
“If dismissal is warranted and the plaintiff is pro se, the court generally affords the
plaintiff leave to amend the complaint.” Rich v. Akwesasne Mohawk Casino Resort, No.
8:24-CV-0255 (AMN/CFH), 2024 WL 3677262, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 8:24-CV-0255 (AMN/PJE), 2025 WL 286937 (N.D.N.Y.
Jan. 24, 2025) (citing Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1995)). “However,
an opportunity to amend is not required where ‘the problem with [the plaintiff’s] causes of
action is substantive’ such that ‘better pleading will not cure it.’” 	Id. (quoting Cuoco v.
Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000)).
III. Discussion
A. Plaintiff’s Complaint
Reading plaintiff’s complaint liberally and affording him due solicitude, plaintiff’s
claims arise out of the following series of events. Plaintiff alleges that on June 23, 2025,
Daniel Connor, Senior Probation Officer for the Jefferson County Probation Department
(“Connor”), “picked [him] up on a (mental health) pick up.” Dkt. No. 1 at 4. Plaintiff alleges
that he was removed from his home, placed in custody, and held at gunpoint by “a SWAT
team.” 	Id. at 4-5. 	While plaintiff was handcuffed outside of his home, Connor entered
plaintiff’s home without a warrant and “took a religious knife” from his kitchen cupboard.
Id. at 4. Connor told plaintiff that the knife he took was a set of “‘brass knuckles’ because
of the finger guard.” Id. Plaintiff claims that he is permitted to have the knife because he
is an ordained neolithic shaman and the knife Connor seized was an “Athem,” which “is
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a blessed knife for [his] alter.” 	Id. 	Plaintiff states that following this incident, he was
charged with felony possession of a weapon, his probation was violated, and he is
currently incarcerated at the Jefferson County Correctional Facility (“Jefferson County
CF”). 	See id. at 4-5. 	Plaintiff seeks $10,500,000 in monetary damages and an order
terminating Connor from his duties as a probation officer. See Dkt. No. 1 at 5.
B. Analysis3
Plaintiff seeks to proceed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Connor, alleging
that his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion, Fourth Amendment right against
unreasonable search and seizure, and Fourteenth Amendment rights generally were
violated. 	See generally Dkt. No. 1. 	Section 1983 “establishes a cause of action for the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws
of the United States.” 	German v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., 885 F.Supp. 537, 573
(S.D.N.Y. 1995) (quoting Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass’n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 1983)) (footnote omitted). “Section 1983 itself creates no substantive rights,
[but] . . . only a procedure for redress for the deprivation of rights established elsewhere.”
Sykes v. James, 13 F.3d 515, 519 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle,
471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985)).
1. Plaintiff’s Current Status
3 In addition to checking the box for “Other Civil Rights,” plaintiff’s civil cover sheet checks the box indicating
“U.S. Government” as the basis of jurisdiction. See Dkt. No. 1-1. However, the United States Government
is not a named plaintiff in this action. See generally Dkt. No. 1. Reading plaintiff’s complaint liberally and
affording him due solicitude, it appears plaintiff likely intended to mean that his claims involve federal
question jurisdiction. 	See Cinotti v. Adelman, 709 F. App’x 39, 40 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order)
(“[A]lthough [the plaintiff’s] pro se complaint does not refer to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the district court should
have construed it liberally as asserting § 1983 claims, which provide a basis for federal question
jurisdiction.”).
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As stated above, plaintiff’s complaint alleges that he was charged with felony
possession of a weapon, his probation was violated, and he was incarcerated at the
Jefferson County CF. See Dkt. No. 1 at 4. At this time, plaintiff remains incarcerated4 at
the Jefferson County CF with a scheduled release date of October 21, 2026.5 The Court
does not have any additional information outside of the plaintiff’s complaint regarding the
disposition of the criminal charge filed against him, his probation violation, or any
determination he received thereof. 	See generally Dkt. No. 1. 	It is unclear whether
plaintiff’s state court criminal proceedings remain pending.
2. Younger Abstention Doctrine
Insofar as plaintiff seeks to proceed against Connor for monetary damages and
injunctive relief pursuant to Section 1983 and plaintiff’s state court criminal proceedings
remain pending, his request for Court intervention triggers the Younger abstention
doctrine. See Hanyon v. Express Auto Credit Corp., No. 3:23-CV-1640 (MAD/ML), 2024
WL 248586, at *4, n.3 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, No.
3:23-CV-1640 (MAD/ML), 2024 WL 4783943 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2024) (citing Younger v.
Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)) (“In the event that Plaintiff's underlying state court proceeding
remains pending, his request for this Court’s involvement may also implicate the Younger
abstention doctrine.”).
4 N EW YORK - VINELINK , “Search For Someone,” “Daniels, Richard.”
https://vinelink.vineapps.com/search/persons;limit=20;offset=0;showPhotos=false;isPartialSearch=false;si
teRefId=NYSWVINE;personFirstName=Richard;personLastName=Daniels;stateServed=NY (last visited
May 18, 2026).
5 The Court obtained plaintiff’s current incarceration status using an inmate lookup service using plaintiff’s
identification number: C2965. See Jackson v. Sullivan Cnty., No. 16 CIV. 3673 (JCM), 2018 WL 1582506,
at *5, n.8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2018) (quoting Narvaez v. City of New York, No. 16 Civ. 1980 (GBD), 2017
WL 1535386, at *5 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 17, 2017) (quoting Tavares v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp.,
No. 13-CV-3148 (PKC/MHD), 2015 WL 158863, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 13, 2015))) (“Courts in this district
have taken judicial notice of information obtained from online inmate tracking services.”) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
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Under the Younger abstention doctrine, “federal courts [must] abstain from taking
jurisdiction over federal constitutional claims that involve or call into question ongoing
state proceedings.” Diamond “D” Constr. Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir.
2002) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 43-44.). “This doctrine of federal abstention rests
foursquare on the notion that, in the ordinary course, a state proceeding provides an
adequate forum for the vindication of federal constitutional rights.” Id. (quoting Cullen v.
Fliegner, 18 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 1994) (additional citation omitted)). 	“[I]t is settled that
for purposes of Younger abstention that [sic] a proceeding is considered pending until all
appellate court remedies have been exhausted.” 	Reinhardt v. Com. of Mass. Dep't of
Soc. Servs., 715 F. Supp. 1253, 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
“Younger abstention is required when three conditions are met: (1) there is an
ongoing state proceeding; (2) an important state interest is implicated in that proceeding;
and (3) the state proceeding affords the federal plaintiff an adequate opportunity for
judicial review of the federal constitutional claims.” 	Diamond "D" Const. Corp, 282 F.3d
at 198 (citing Grieve v. Tamerin, 269 F.3d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 2001)). “Younger abstention
is triggered only by three categories of state court proceedings: (1) state criminal
prosecutions; (2) civil proceedings that are akin to criminal proceedings; and (3) civil
proceedings that ‘implicate a State’s interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its
courts.’” Amato v. McGinty, No. 1:17-CV-593 (MAD/ATB), 2017 WL 9487185, at *10
(N.D.N.Y. June 6, 2017), report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:17-CV-00593
(MAD/ATB), 2017 WL 4083575 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2017) (internal quotations omitted)
(quoting Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. at 69, 72-73).
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“Despite the strong policy in favor of abstention, a federal court may nevertheless
intervene in a state proceeding upon a showing of bad faith, harassment or any other
unusual circumstance that would call for equitable relief.” Diamond D. Const. Corp., 282
F.3d at 198 (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 54) (internal quotations omitted). The plaintiff
has the burden of establishing that one of the Younger exceptions applies. 	See id. (citing
Kirschner v. Klemons, 225 F.3d 227, 235-36 (2d Cir. 2000)) (“[A] plaintiff who seeks to
head off Younger abstention bears the burden of establishing that one of the exceptions
applies.”).
All three conditions required by Younger are met in this case. “Plaintiff's ongoing
criminal prosecution is one of the three circumstances contemplated by Younger.” 	Keir
v. Donaldson, No. 1:25-CV-0542 (ECC/TWD), 2025 WL 3442904, at *19 (N.D.N.Y. Dec.
1, 2025) (citing Sprint Commc’ns, Inc., 571 U.S. at 70). 	“The ongoing state criminal
prosecution implicates New York State’s important interest in enforcing its own criminal
laws.” Id. (citing Sprint Commc’ns, Inc., 571 U.S. at 70). “Moreover, the state proceeding
will afford Plaintiff adequate opportunity for judicial review of [his constitutional claims
because if Plaintiff is convicted, [he] can raise [his] claims on direct appeal or through
collateral review.” Id. (citing Shelley v. Gulotta, No. 09-CV-4883 (NGG), 2010 WL 309011,
at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2010)).
The undersigned also concludes that, even affording plaintiff due solicitude, the
complaint fails to allege that any Younger exceptions apply to this matter. See generally
Dkt. No. 1; see also Hunter v. McMahon, No. 20-CV-18 (LJV-MJR), 2024 WL 4362310, at
*6 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2024) (quoting Diamond D. Const. Corp., 282 F.3d at 199) (“To
meet the bad faith or harassment exception, the federal plaintiff must show that the state
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proceeding was initiated with and is animated by a retaliatory, harassing, or other
illegitimate motive.” (emphasis omitted)); Phillips v. Schenectady Child Support Unite, No.
1:24-CV-853 (BKS/PJE), 2025 WL 895035, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2025), report and
recommendation adopted sub nom. Phillips v. Schenectady Cnty. Child Support Unit, No.
1:24-CV-853 (BKS/PJE), 2025 WL 1191320 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2025), appeal dismissed
(Sept. 18, 2025) (quoting Diamond “D” Const. Corp., 282 F.3d at 201 (quoting Kugler v.
Helfant, 421 U.S. 117, 124, (1975)) (“To satisfy the extraordinary circumstance exception,
the plaintiff must demonstrate that the state court incapable of fairly and fully adjudicating
the federal issues before it . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
As all three conditions required by Younger are satisfied and plaintiff has failed to
demonstrate that any exception to Younger applies, the analysis next turns to whether
abstention and dismissal of plaintiff’s claims is appropriate. 	“‘Abstention and dismissal’
under Younger ‘are inappropriate when [monetary] damages are sought, even when a
pending state proceeding raises identical issues and [a court] would dismiss otherwise
identical claims for declaratory and injunctive relief[.]’” Rodriguez v. Shattuck, No. 8:24-
CV-0778 (BKS/PJE), 2025 WL 1066524, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2025) (quoting Kirschner,
225 F.3d at 238); Ware v. Calistro, No. 24-CV-323 (VDO), 2025 WL 2319848, at *3 (D.
Conn. Aug. 12, 2025) (citing Morpurgo v. Inc. Vill. of Sag Harbor, 327 F. App’x 284, 286
(2d Cir. 2009) (summary order) (“District courts . . . should not abstain from exercising
jurisdiction over claims for monetary relief.”). 	“When money damages, as opposed to
equitable relief, are sought, it is less likely that unacceptable interference with the ongoing
state proceeding, the evil against which Younger seeks to guard, would result from the
federal court's exercise of jurisdiction.” 	Kirschner, 225 F.3d at 238. 	In cases involving
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money damages, “a stay of the action pending resolution of the state proceeding may be
appropriate.” Id. (citing Giulini v. Blessing, 654 F.2d 189, 192-94 (2d Cir.1981)). 6
Therefore, to the extent that plaintiff’s state criminal proceeding remains ongoing,
the undersigned concludes that, pursuant to Younger, the Court should abstain from
hearing plaintiff’s claim seeking injunctive relief and “that a stay of the remaining claims
for money damages is appropriate.” 	Rodriguez, 2025 WL 1066524, at *4 (citing
Henderson v. Heffler, No. 07-CV-0487C (JTC), 2008 WL 2915437, at *2, (W.D.N.Y. July
24, 2008)) (additional citations omitted); Diamond D. Const. Corp., 282 F.3d at 198
(quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 54); Kirschner, 225 F.3d at 235 (quoting Samuels v.
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73 (1971) (“The Younger doctrine is as applicable to suits for
declaratory relief as it is to those for injunctive relief; the Supreme Court held in a
companion case to Younger that Younger's policy would ‘be frustrated as much by a
declaratory judgment as it would be by an injunction.’”)
Accordingly, the undersigned recommends that plaintiff’s claims against Connor
for (1) injunctive relief be dismissed without prejudice7 and without leave to amend8
6 	The Supreme Court has declined to reach the issue whether Younger applies to claims for
money damages, but has noted that even if it does, the federal suit should be stayed, rather
than dismissed, if the money damages sought could not be obtained in the pending state
proceeding, even if the money damages sought could be obtained in a separate state
proceeding.
Kirschner, 225 F.3d at 238 (citing Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 201-03 (1988)).
7 “Dismissal of claims under . . . Younger . . . are generally without prejudice.” Damon v. New York, No.
8:23-CV-0074 	(GLS/CFH), 	2023 	WL 	11965130, 	at 	*20 	(N.D.N.Y. 	Mar. 	28, 	2023), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted, No. 8:23-CV-0074 (GLS/CFH), 2023 WL 11965128 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2023).
8 The undersigned notes that plaintiff requests this Court order Connor fired from his job as a Jefferson
County probation officer. The Court does not have the authority to grant the requested relief. See Bell v.
Brown, No. 1:24-CV-7804 (LTS), 2025 WL 2930266, at *6, n.7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2025) (“To the extent that
Plaintiff seeks the termination of Clark's employment with the Orange County Department of Probation
(ECF 7, at 6, 13), this Court lacks the authority to grant such relief.”) (citing Henry v. Sharp, No. 4:18-CV-
0413 (MGL)(TER), 2018 WL 1413228, at *2, n.2 (D.S.C. Feb. 20, 2018) (“Plaintiff also seeks relief which
can never be granted, by requesting Defendants be fired. This court cannot ‘fire’ Defendants.”), report &
recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 1393675 (D.S.C. Mar. 20, 2018)); Mobley v. Rodriguez, No. 7:25-CV-
6784 (NSR), 2025 WL 3042024, at *2, n.2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2025) (citing Henry, 2018 WL 1413228, at *2,
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because, as noted in footnote 8, any amendment would be futile; and (2) monetary
damages for alleged violations of his First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendment9 rights be
stayed pending a resolution of his state criminal matter(s).10 Moving forward on the
plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages would “place [this Court] in the awkward position
of having to question the validity of the underlying state proceedings while they are
ongoing, and the issues involved may well be resolved as those proceedings go forward.”
Pawelsky v. Cnty. of Nassau, New York, 684 F. Supp. 3d 73, 88 (E.D.N.Y. 2023). “The
case will be administratively closed with leave to reopen at the conclusion of the
underlying state proceedings if the issues contained herein have not been adequately
addressed.” Id. at 89; Rodriguez, 2025 WL 1066524, at *3-4 (abstaining and dismissing
n.2) (concluding that the Court lacked the authority to “terminat[e] [] any of the defendants from their current
positions” including as a police investigator, assistant district attorney, county court judge, and court
appointed attorney.). Although this Court generally affords pro se plaintiff’s an opportunity to amend, the
undersigned concludes that amendment is not warranted here because, even affording plaintiff due
solicitude and giving his complaint an extremely liberal reading, plaintiff’s complaint fails to suggest or hint
at any additional claim for injunctive relief that the Court may potentially grant. See Rich, 2024 WL 3677262,
at *2 (quoting Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112).
9 Although the undersigned recommends staying plaintiff’s claims for monetary damages, it should be noted
that plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment Due Process claim also fails to satisfy Rule 8. See F ED. R. C IV . P.
8(a)(2) (Stating that a pleading which sets forth a claim for relief shall contain “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”). Plaintiff states that Connor charging him with
felony possession of a weapon deprived him of his “Life, Liberty, and Freedom.” Dkt. No. 1 at 5. Yet,
plaintiff does not provide any additional explanation of how his due process rights were violated. 	See
generally Dkt. No. 1. Without any additional context or factual basis, plaintiff’s complaint does not provide
“fair notice of the claim[s] being asserted” against Connor such that he would have an adequate opportunity
to file an answer and “prepare an adequate defense.” Flores v. Graphtex, 189 F.R.D. 54, 55 (N.D.N.Y.
1999); F ED. R. C IV . P. 8(a)(2).
10 Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that on June 23, 2025, Connor worked for the Jefferson County Probation
Department. See Dkt. No. 1 at 4. The Jefferson County Probation Department is a municipal entity. See
J EFFERSON C OUNTY , NEW YORK , “Probation,” https://www.jeffersoncountyny.gov/departments/Probation
(last visited May 18, 2026). Plaintiff has not named Jefferson County as a defendant. See generally Dkt.
No. 1. Although the undersigned does not reach the merits because of Younger and the recommended
stay of any claims for monetary damages, for the sake of completeness, should plaintiff seek to return to
Court after the resolution of his state criminal proceeding and seek to proceed against Conner in his official
capacity for monetary damages, plaintiff is advised that he can only proceed with such claims pursuant to
Monell v. Department of Soc. Services of City of New York. See Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d 393, 397
(2d Cir. 1983) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. 859, 690-91 (1978)(“Municipalities may be sued directly under
[Section] 1983” pursuant to Monell “for constitutional deprivations inflicted upon private individuals pursuant
to governmental custom, policy, ordinance, regulation, or decision.”).
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the plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief and staying the remaining claims for monetary
damages due to the plaintiff’s ongoing criminal prosecution); Ingram v. Herrick, No. 10-
CV-1583 (GLS/RFT), 2011 WL 1113795, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2011), report and
recommendation adopted, No. 1:10-CV-1583 (GLS/RFT), 2011 WL 1100093 (N.D.N.Y.
Mar. 23, 2011), aff’d, 475 F. App’x 793 (2d Cir. 2012) (summary order) (abstaining from
interfering with the plaintiff’s claim for injunctive relief when the plaintiff faced a pending
state prosecution for an assault charge.); see generally Damron v. Houston County,
Texas, et al., No. 9:25-CV-00211-MJT-CLS, 2026 WL 707420, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 11,
2026), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. Damron v. Houston Cnty., Texas,
No. 9:25-CV-0211-MJT-CLS, 2026 WL 561186 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 27, 2026) (quoting Wallace
v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 (2007) (“A stay is the better course when the claims are
premised on the legality of the initial arrest since the statute of limitations for false
imprisonment begins to run ‘once the victim becomes held pursuant to such process—
when, for example, he is bound over by a magistrate or arraigned on charges.’”).
3. Heck Preclusion
Although the undersigned does not reach the merits due to the Younger abstention
issue, discussed above, in the interest of thoroughness and affording plaintiff a complete
picture of the possible future viability of his claims, should plaintiff seek to return to Court
to reopen this matter following the resolution of his state criminal proceeding and any
appeals, plaintiff should be aware that his Section 1983 claims for monetary damages
may also be precluded by the Supreme Court of the United States’ holding in Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
In Heck, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a Section 1983
action seeking damages is not cognizable if a decision in favor of the plaintiff
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would necessarily invalidate an extant criminal conviction unless “the
conviction or sentence had been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal . . . or called into
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”
Barzee v. Tyler, No. 8:21-CV-902 (GTS/CFH), 2022 WL 1406606, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. May
3, 2022), report and recommendation adopted, No. 8:21-CV-902 (GTS/CFH), 2022 WL
2079084 (N.D.N.Y. June 9, 2022) (quoting Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87). 	“A claim for
damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so
invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.” Heck, 512 U.S. at 487.
Plaintiff is advised that if the district judge adopts this Report-Recommendation &
Order and he returns to this Court seeking to reopen the case following the resolution of
his criminal proceedings and potential appeals, he may only proceed on his Section 1983
claims if he can demonstrate a favorable termination of either a criminal conviction,
criminal sentence, or probation violation.11 	See Barzee, 2022 WL 1406606, at *10;
Canfield v. Tartaglia, No. 6:24-CV-1303 (GTS/TWD), 2025 WL 553468, at *3 (N.D.N.Y.
Feb. 19, 2025), report and recommendation adopted, No. 6:24-CV-1303 (GTS/TWD),
2025 WL 949845 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2025) (quoting Partee v. City of Syracuse, No. 5:19-
CV-0417 (TJM/DEP), 2019 WL 2617901, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. May 23, 2019) (citing Bratton v.
New York State Div. of Parole, No. 5:05-CV-0950 (NAM/GJD), 2006 WL 2792743, at *2
(N.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2006), report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 2616954
(N.D.N.Y. June 26, 2019) (“Courts have . . . made clear that Heck and its favorable
11 “Heck bars a § 1983 claim based on an extant conviction, but it has no application to an anticipated future
conviction.” Stegemann v. Rensselaer Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 648 F. App’x 73, 76 (2d Cir. 2016) (summary
order) (citing Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393); Damron, 2026 WL 707420, at *5 ( (citing Wallace, 549 U.S. at 393-
95) (“Heck still bars the federal court from entertaining those claims until the prosecution terminates, the
stay simply allows the plaintiff to preserve her claims so that they are not lost on statute-of-limitations
grounds.”)
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termination rule applies to actions pursuant to section 1983 that challenge the fact or
duration of confinement based on the revocation of parole.”).
IV. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the reasons set forth herein, it is hereby
ORDERED, that plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis (Dkt. No. 2) is
GRANTED; and it is
RECOMMENDED, that plaintiff’s Section 1983 claim against Connor for injunctive
relief (Dkt. No. 1) be DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
in accord with the Younger abstention doctrine and without leave to amend; and it is
further
RECOMMENDED, that plaintiff’s Section 1983 claims against Connor for monetary
relief 	(Dkt. 	No. 	1) 	be 	STAYED 	pending 	the 	resolution of 	plaintiff’s 	state 	criminal
proceeding(s) and any resulting appeals, and that the Clerk administratively close the
case, with leave to reopen as detailed herein; and it is further
RECOMMENDED, 	that 	should 	the 	District 	Judge 	adopt 	this 	Report-
Recommendation & Order, the District Judge advise plaintiff that, if, following the
resolution of any criminal proceeding and appeals, he can show a favorable termination
of any criminal conviction, criminal sentence, or probation violation and wishes to reopen
this proceeding, he be directed to notify this Court of any final disposition of the state
criminal proceeding(s) within thirty (30) days of the final adjudication of the last pending
state criminal proceeding; and it is
ORDERED, that the Clerk serve a copy of this Report-Recommendation and Order
on plaintiff in accordance with Local Rules.
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14
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), plaintiff has FOURTEEN (14) days within which
to file written objections to the foregoing report. Such objections shall be filed with the
Clerk of the Court. FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THIS REPORT WITHIN FOURTEEN (14)
DAYS WILL PRECLUDE APPELLATE REVIEW. 	See Roldan v. Racette, 984 F.2d 85,
89 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Small v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d 15 (2d Cir.
1989)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV . P. 6(a), 72.12
Dated: May 21, 2026
Albany, New York
12 If you are proceeding pro se and are served with this Report-Recommendation and Order by mail, three
(3) additional days will be added to the fourteen-day (14) period, meaning that you have seventeen (17)
days from the date the Report-Recommendation and Order was mailed to you to serve and file objections.
See F ED. R. C IV . P. 6(d). If the last day of that prescribed period falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday,
then the deadline is extended until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.
See id. § 6(a)(1)(c).
Case 5:25-cv-01100-GTS-PJE Document 4 Filed 05/21/26 Page 14 of 14