Lell v. Commissioner of Social Security

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
_______________________________________________
HANNAH L.,
Plaintiff,
v. 	5:25-cv-0899
(GTS/CBF)
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.
_______________________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
OLINSKY LAW GROUP 	HOWARD D. OLINSKY, ESQ.
250 South Clinton Street - Suite 210
Syracuse, NY 13202
Counsel for Plaintiff
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 	GEOFFREY M. PETERS, ESQ.
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, MD 21235
Counsel for Defendant
GLENN T. SUDDABY, United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
I. 	INTRODUCTION
Hannah L. (“Plaintiff”) brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial
review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner” or
“Defendant”) denying her application for benefits. (Dkt. No. 1.) Both parties filed briefs, which
the Court treats as motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(c), in accordance with
General Order 18. (Dkt. Nos. 11, 12.) Plaintiff also filed a reply brief. (Dkt. No. 14.) For the
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reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings is denied, Defendant’s
motion is granted, and the decision of the Commissioner is affirmed.
II. 	BACKGROUND
On August 30, 2021, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for Disability Insurance
Benefits and Supplemental Security Income under the Social Security Act (“SSA”). See T. 15.1
She alleged disability beginning on January 8, 2020, due to schizophrenia, borderline personality
disorder, and disassociation episodes. Id. at 72. Her application was initially denied on January
4, 2022, and again upon reconsideration on April 7, 2022. Id. at 15.
Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Id.
Following hearings on September 12, 2022, and April 10, 2023, ALJ Elizabeth W. Koennecke
issued a written decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled under the SSA at any time from her
alleged onset date though the date of the ALJ’s April 20, 2023, decision. See id. at 15-34. The
Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on July 20, 2023, rendering ALJ
Koennecke’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. See id. at 1-3.
Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Northern District of New York on August 28, 2023. See
Hannah L. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:23-CV-1091 (DNH/MJK), Dkt. No. 1. On August 7,
2024, the Hon. David N. Hurd, United States District Judge, ordered that the Commissioner’s
decision be reversed and remanded following the parties’ stipulation of consent to remand. Id.,
Dkt. No. 22; see also T. 1091-92. The Appeals Council issued an Order vacating the final
1 	The Administrative Record/Transcript is found at Dkt. No. 8. Citations to the Transcript
will be referenced as “T.” and the Bates-stamped page numbers as set forth therein will be used
rather than the page numbers the Court’s CM/ECF electronic filing system assigns. Citations to
the parties’ submissions will use page numbers assigned by CM/ECF, the Court’s electronic
filing system.
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decision of the Commissioner and remanding the case to an ALJ for further proceedings on
September 18, 2024. T. 1097-99.
On April 30, 2025, Plaintiff appeared for a hearing before ALJ Gretchen Greisler. See id.
at 1026-46. On May 9, 2025, ALJ Greisler issued a written decision finding Plaintiff was not
disabled under the SSA from January 8, 2020, the alleged onset date, through the date of the
ALJ’s decision. See id. at 993-1015.2 Plaintiff timely commenced this action on July 10, 2025.
See generally, Dkt. No. 1.
III. 	LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Standard of Review 3
In reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a court must first determine whether
the correct legal standards were applied, and if so, whether substantial evidence supports the
decision. Atwater v. Astrue, 512 F. App’x 67, 69 (2d Cir. 2013). “Failure to apply the correct
legal standards is grounds for reversal.” Pollard v. Halter, 377 F.3d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 2004)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Therefore, a reviewing court may not affirm the
ALJ’s decision if it reasonably doubts whether the proper legal standards were applied, even if
the decision appears to be supported by substantial evidence. Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983,
986-87 (2d Cir. 1987).
2 	Because Plaintiff did not file written exceptions and the Appeals Council did not review
the ALJ’s decision, the ALJ’s decision of May 9, 2025, became the final decision of the
Commissioner. See T. 990-92; Dkt. No. 11 at 6.
3 	While the Supplemental Security Income program has special economic eligibility
requirements, the requirements for establishing disability under Title XVI, 42 U.S.C. §
1382c(a)(3) and Title II, 42 U.S.C. § 423(d), are identical, therefore, “decisions under these
sections are cited interchangeably.” Donato v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. of U.S.,
721 F.2d 414, 418 n.3 (2d Cir. 1983) (citation omitted).
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A court’s factual review of the Commissioner’s final decision is limited to the
determination of whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the decision. 42
U.S.C. § 405(g); Rivera v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 964, 967 (2d Cir. 1991). “Substantial evidence
means more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Sczepanski v. Saul, 946 F.3d 152, 157 (2d Cir.
2020) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). If the ALJ’s finding as to any fact is
supported by substantial evidence, it is conclusive. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Diaz v. Shalala, 59 F.3d
307, 312 (2d Cir. 1995). Further, where evidence is deemed susceptible to more than one
rational interpretation, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld. See Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685
F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1212 (1983).
“To determine on appeal whether an ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining the evidence from both sides,
because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts
from its weight.” Williams on Behalf of Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988)
(citing Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951)) (additional citation
omitted). If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s findings must be sustained
“even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff’s position and despite that the court’s
independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner’s].” Rosado v.
Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (citing Rutherford 685 F.2d at 62) (additional
citations omitted). A reviewing court cannot substitute its interpretation of the administrative
record in place of the Commissioner’s if the record contains substantial support for the ALJ’s
decision. See Rutherford, 685 F.2d at 62.
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When inadequacies in the ALJ’s decision frustrate meaningful review of the substantial
evidence inquiry, remand may be appropriate. See Estrella v. Berryhill, 925 F.3d 90, 95 (2d Cir.
2019); Pratts v. Chater, 94 F.3d, 34, 39 (2d Cir. 1996). Remand may also be appropriate where
the ALJ has failed to develop the record, adequately appraise the weight or persuasive value of
witness testimony, or explain his reasonings. See Klemens v. Berryhill, 703 F. App’x 35, 35-38
(2d Cir. 2017); Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 82 (2d Cir. 1999); Estrella, 925 F.3d at 98;
Burgess v. Astrue, 537 F.3d 117, 130 (2d Cir. 2008); Pratts, 94 F.3d at 39.
B. Standard for Benefits
To be considered disabled, a plaintiff seeking disability benefits must establish she is
unable “to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or
can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months . . . .” 42 U.S.C. §
423(d)(1)(A). Additionally, the claimant’s:
physical or mental impairment or impairments [must be] of such
severity that [s]he is not only unable to do h[er] previous work but
cannot, considering h[er] age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in
the national economy, regardless of whether such work exists in the
immediate area in which [s]he lives, or whether a specific job
vacancy exists for h[er], or whether [s]he would be hired if [s]he
applied for work.
Id. § 423(d)(2)(A).
The Social Security Administration regulations outline a five-step process to determine
whether a claimant is disabled:
(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful
activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or
combination of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or
equals the severity of the specified impairments in the Listing of
Impairments; 	(4) 	based 	on 	a 	“residual 	functional 	capacity”
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assessment, whether the claimant can perform any of his or her past
relevant work despite the impairment; and (5) whether there are
significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that the
claimant can perform given the claimant’s residual functional
capacity, age, education, and work experience.
McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Burgess, 537 F.3d at 120; 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(i)-(v)). The claimant bears the burden of proof regarding
the first four steps. Kohler v. Astrue, 546 F.3d 260, 265 (2d Cir. 2008). If the claimant meets his
or her burden of proof, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at the fifth step to prove the
claimant is capable of working. Id.
IV. 	THE ALJ’S DECISION
The ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation process promulgated by the
Commissioner for adjudicating disability claims. See generally, T. 993-1015. At step one, the
ALJ found Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since her alleged onset date.
Id. at 996. Proceeding to step two, the ALJ determined Plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: “schizoaffective disorder, personality disorder, anxiety disorder, depressive
disorder, and Asperger’s disorder.” Id.
At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the impairments listed in 20
C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Id. The ALJ next determined Plaintiff had the residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform light work, with certain additional limitations,
specifically, Plaintiff
can understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions; can
perform work without a specific production rate pace, such as an
assembly line or hourly production quotas; can engage in occasional
interaction with coworkers and supervisors to perform tasks that do
not require sharing of job tasks or working in close coordination
with others; cannot interact with the public; can make simple
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decisions and tolerate occasional work changes; and requires ready
access to the restroom, but the need to use the restroom can generally
be accommodated by the customary morning, midday and afternoon
breaks.
Id. at 998. At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff had no past relevant work. Id. at 1013.
At step five, the ALJ determined, based on her age, education, work experience, and
RFC, there were jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could
perform. Id. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff was not disabled from her alleged onset
date, January 8, 2020, through the date of the ALJ’s decision. Id. at 1014.
V. 	DISCUSSION
Plaintiff argues “[t]he ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinion of [consultative
examiner] Jeanne Shapiro, Ph.D.,” and “failed to adequately explain her consideration of how
the factors of supportability and consistency led her to find the assessment by Dr. Shapiro to be
unpersuasive.” (Dkt. No. 11 at 10.) Defendant contends the ALJ did not err in discounting the
more restrictive portions of Dr. Shapiro’s opinion based on a reasonable evaluation of the
supportability and consistency of said opinion. (Dkt. No. 12 at 6-15.) The Court agrees with the
Defendant.
An ALJ is specifically required to “explain how [he or she] considered the supportability
and consistency factors” for a medical opinion. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b)(2), 416.920c(b)(2).
With respect to “supportability,” the regulations provide, “[t]he more relevant the objective
medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to support his
or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the
medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” Id. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1),
416.920c(c)(1). The regulations provide with respect to “consistency,” “[t]he more consistent a
medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other
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medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s)
or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” Id. §§ 404.1520c(c)(2), 416.920c(c)(2).
Here, after reciting the findings from the consultative examiner’s November 9, 2021,
evaluation of Plaintiff, the ALJ acknowledged “Dr. Shapiro has an understanding of our
disability program’s policies and evidentiary requirements” and “supported her opinion with an
examination of the claimant,” but determined “the objective findings from this examination do
not entirely support Dr. Shapiro’s opinion.” T. 1012 (citing T. 632-33). To that end, the ALJ
explained that
Dr. Shapiro indicated that the claimant had marked limitations in
interacting with others and marked to extreme limitations regulating
her emotions, controlling her behavior, and maintaining well-being.
However, Dr. Shapiro observed that the claimant’s demeanor and
responsiveness to questions was cooperative and that the claimant’s
manner of relating, social skills, and overall presentation were
adequate despite “a little bit” of restless motor behavior and a
“somewhat anxious affect” during the examination.
Id. (citing T. 632-33). The ALJ further noted “[t]he only objective abnormalities Dr. Shapiro
observed during her examination was [sic] the claimant’s motor behavior, which was ‘a little bit
restless’, ‘somewhat anxious’ affect, impaired memory skills, intellectual functioning that
appeared in the impaired range, a ‘somewhat limited’ general fund of information, poor insight,
and poor judgment.” Id. (citing T. 632-33).
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds Plaintiff’s contention that the ALJ failed to
explain how she considered the factor of supportability with regard to Dr. Shapiro’s opinion
unavailing. Plaintiff argues “[t]he ALJ’s rejection of the marked and extreme mental restrictions
assessed by Dr. Shapiro on the basis that ‘the objective findings from this examination do not
entirely support Dr. Shapiro’s opinion,’ fails to satisfy the regulations which require explanation
of the factor of supportability.” (Dkt. No. 11 at 15 [citing T. 1082]). In her reply, Plaintiff avers
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“ALJs are not at liberty to require substantiation of mental impairments by objective medical
evidence, as would be required for a medical impairment, because the diagnostic techniques
employed in the field of psychology are less tangible than those in the field of medicine.” (Dkt.
No. 14 at 2.) Plaintiff’s apparent contention that an ALJ may not discount an examiner’s opined
limitations where such limitations are not supported by that examiner’s own findings is wholly
unsupported. See, e.g., Villier on behalf of N.D.D.R. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2024 WL 2174236,
at *2 (2d Cir. May 15, 2024) (finding “no error in the ALJ’s explanation or his findings with
respect to Dr. Singh’s opinion” where “Dr. Singh’s opinion that [the claimant] had marked and
extreme limitations was not supported by his own treatment notes . . . .”); Nicholas S. v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., No. 5:23-CV-1613, 2024 WL 5507566, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2024) (Katz,
M.J.) (“The ALJ reasonably concluded that [] Dr. Slowik’s opinion for marked limitations was
not supported by her unremarkable examination findings.”), Report and Recommendation
adopted, 2025 WL 876077 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 20, 2025) (Kahn, J.); Porteus v. O’Malley, 2024 WL
2180203, at *2 (2d Cir. May 15, 2024) (“[T]he ALJ adequately explained that he found
unpersuasive Dr. Carr’s assessment of certain marked work-related limitations, concluding that
such limitations were unsupported by . . . Dr. Carr’s own mental status examination findings . . .
.”).4 Moreover, the Court agrees with the Defendant that, insofar as Plaintiff contends Dr.
4 	Plaintiff attempts to distinguish the instant case from Villier, arguing she “faulted the ALJ
for requiring objective medical evidence, which is entirely different from the reasoning given by
the ALJ in Villier on behalf of N.D.D.R., who discounted [the medical source]’s opinion because
it was ‘not supported by [the examiner’s] own notes.’” Dkt. No. 14 at 2 (quoting 2024 WL
2174236, at *2). However, ALJ Greisler did, in fact, discount Dr. Shapiro’s opined marked and
extreme limitations as unsupported by Dr. Shapiro’s own examination findings, noting “Dr.
Shapiro indicated that the claimant had marked limitations in interacting with others and marked
to extreme limitations regulating her emotions, controlling her behavior, and maintaining well-
being. However, Dr. Shapiro observed that the claimant’s demeanor and responsiveness to all
questions was cooperative and that the claimant’s manner of relating, social skills, and overall
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Shapiro’s findings do support the more restrictive limitations rejected by the ALJ, such
reweighing of the evidence is not permitted. See, e.g., Krull v. Colvin, 669 F. App’x 31, 32 (2d
Cir. 2016). Simply put, the ALJ appropriately considered whether Dr. Shapiro’s opinion was
supported by her own examination findings. Moreover, for the reasons discussed below, even
though Dr. Shapiro’s report includes notations of subjective reports of symptoms by Plaintiff that
Dr. Shapiro seemingly relied upon related to the marked or extreme limitations the ALJ rejected,
an ALJ is not required to credit an opinion based on a claimant’s subjective reports (regardless of
whether the impairments involved are mental or psychological) where he or she finds, as the ALJ
did here, that the evidence in the record as a whole does not support the intensity, persistence,
and limiting effects of a claimant’s subjectively reported symptoms.
Turning to the consistency factor, the ALJ found “Dr. Shapiro’s opinion is [] inconsistent
with the totality of the record, which documents improvements in the claimant’s mental
symptoms with treatment and no need for intensive outpatient or inpatient care.” T. 1012 (citing
T. 585-622; 637-726; 727-87; 788-848; 853-57; 858-917; 918-36; 937-49; 950-76; 1315-1422;
1438-1541). Plaintiff argues that “the ALJ’s statement that the record documents ‘no need for
intensive outpatient or inpatient care,’ is simply inaccurate. Dr. Shapiro documented a history of
psychiatric hospitalization as well as outpatient treatment.” (Dkt. No. 11 at 15 [citing T. 1082;
630].) While Plaintiff is correct that Dr. Shapiro reported Plaintiff “had one psychiatric
hospitalization at Saint Joseph’s Hospital in 2019 for treatment of depression,” T. 630, as the
Defendant points out, Plaintiff’s 2019 hospitalization occurred prior to her alleged onset date of
presentation were adequate . . .” and “the only objective abnormalities Dr. Shapiro observed
during her examination was [sic] the claimant’s motor behavior, which was ‘a little bit restless’,
‘somewhat anxious’ affect, impaired memory skills, intellectual functioning that appeared in the
impaired range, a ‘somewhat limited’ general fund of information, poor insight, and poor
judgment . . . .” T. 1012 (citing T. 632-33) (emphasis added).
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January 8, 2020. See, e.g., Angele J. W. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 6:23-CV-00824, 2024 WL
4204301, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. July 24, 2024) (Hummel, M.J.) (explaining, “medical evidence that
predates the alleged disability onset date is ordinarily not relevant to evaluating a claimant’s
disability.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted), Report and Recommendation adopted,
2024 WL 4204017 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2024) (Sannes, C.J.).
Moreover, the ALJ provided a thorough summary of Plaintiff’s mental health treatment,
see T. 1000-08, throughout the relevant period and explained, “records note that the claimant’s
mental signs, symptoms, and functional abilities improve when compliant with treatment.” T.
1000. Plaintiff asserts “[w]hile some of the supportive facts cited by the Commissioner in the
case at bar were referenced in the ALJ’s general summary of the evidence, the ALJ herself did
not explain how notations in the evidence summary disprove the mental restrictions which Dr.
Shapiro assessed.” (Dkt. No. 14 at 3.) However, the ALJ was not required to “disprove” the
limitations assessed by the consultative examiner, instead, the relevant inquiry is “whether
substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.” Bonet ex rel. T.B. v. Colvin, 523 F. App’x 58,
59 (2d Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original) (citing Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 417 [2d Cir.
2013]) (additional citation omitted). The ALJ’s detailed recitation of the evidence related to the
findings of the relevant physicians who treated or examined her for her medical impairments,
which generally suggests improved symptoms and functional ability during periods of
compliance with medications, treatment, and physician recommendations to avoid substance or
alcohol use, sufficiently provides a logical bridge between the evidence and the ALJ’s
conclusion that marked or extreme limitations were not warranted by the record.
As the Defendant points out, state agency medical consultant S. Hennessey, Ph.D.,
reviewed the available medical evidence on November 24, 2021, including the report from Dr.
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Shapiro’s November 9, 2021, examination of the Plaintiff, and determined “[t]he CE MSE
provider opinion of marked limitations was considered, and evaluated as not persuasive because
it was not consistent with treatment source evidence, and reported daily living skills.” T. 84.
Similarly, on April 5, 2022, state agency consultant C. Walker, Ph.D. reviewed the available
medical evidence and concluded the “most recent [medical source examinations] in file are not
reflective of marked impairment.” Id. at 148. Dr. Walker further opined that
Data support the presence of a severe psychiatric impairment that
results in more than minimal functional limitations. Despite these,
[t]he claimant is able to understand and remember simple and some
more detailed but not highly complex instructions and procedures
only. 	The 	claimant 	may 	have 	difficulties 	with 	concentration,
persistence or pace as described above, but is able to complete
routine tasks at a reasonable pace. 	The cl[ai]m[an]t may benefit
from an environment with superficial interactions. 	The claimant
exhibits some difficulty with adaptation but is able to cope with
basic changes and make routine decisions.
Id. The ALJ found the opinions of Dr. Hennessey and Dr. Walker to be persuasive. See id. at
1010-11.
Finally, Plaintiff emphasizes “this is not a case in which the CE was performed in the
context of a prior application . . . . Dr. Shapiro’s exam was performed on November 9, 2021,
well into the period at issue.” (Dkt. No. 11 at 15.) However, the fact that Dr. Shapiro examined
Plaintiff during the relevant period did not preclude the ALJ from finding Dr. Shapiro’s opined
marked to extreme limitations were not consistent with the totality of the record evidence
throughout the whole length of that relevant period. Rather, “[t]here is no requirement that the
agency accept the opinion of a consultative examiner concerning a claimant’s limitations . . . .”
Pellam v. Astrue, 508 F. App’x 87, 89 (2d Cir. 2013); see also, e.g., Walker v. Colvin, No. 3:15-
CV-0465, 2016 WL 4768806, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2016) (Hummel, M.J.). Accordingly,
the Court finds no error in the ALJ’s explanation of the consistency factor.
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In sum, Plaintiff’s contention that ALJ Greisler failed to adequately explain how she
considered the supportability and consistency factors with respect to the persuasiveness of Dr.
Shapiro’s opinion is meritless. Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate remand of the
Commissioner’s decision is warranted.
VI. 	CONCLUSION
ACCORDINGLY, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 11) is
DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Commissioner’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 12)
is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED and the Clerk of
Court is directed to enter judgment and close the case.
Dated: April 22, 2026
Syracuse, New York
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