Johnson v. Commissioner of Social Security

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________
ROBERT J.,
Plaintiff,
5:24-CV-1550
v. 	(DJS)
FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant.
____________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
OLINSKY LAW GROUP 	HOWARD OLINSKY, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff
250 South Clinton Street, Suite 210
Syracuse, New York 13202
U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. 	CANDACE BROWN CASEY, ESQ.
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
Attorney for Defendant
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
DANIEL J. STEWART
United States Magistrate Judge
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MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER1
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of a
decision by the Commissioner of Social Security that Plaintiff was not disabled.
Currently before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Dkt.
Nos. 9 & 12, and Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Dkt. No. 11. For
the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is denied
and Defendant’s Motion is granted.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff was born in 1974, has past work experience in furniture sales, and
reported that he completed seventh grade. Dkt. No. 6, Admin. Tr. (“Tr.”), pp. 43, 273,
& 278. Plaintiff alleges disability based on spinal fusion and nerve damage. Tr. at p.
277. On January 21, 2022, Plaintiff applied for disability insurance benefits. See Tr. at
p. 10. 	Plaintiff’s application was initially denied on March 24, 2022, and upon
reconsideration on August 8, 2022. Tr. at pp. 137-147 & 150-160. Plaintiff thereafter
timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). See Tr. at p.
187. Plaintiff subsequently appeared and testified at a hearing before ALJ Bruce Fein
1 Upon Plaintiff’s consent, the United States’ general consent, and in accordance with this District’s General
Order 18, this matter has been referred to the undersigned to exercise full jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. See Dkt. No. 4 & General Order 18.
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on January 16, 2024. Tr. at pp. 39-66. A vocational expert also testified at the hearing.
Id. On January 30, 2024, ALJ Fein issued a written decision finding Plaintiff was not
disabled under the Social Security Act. Tr. at pp. 10-23. On November 19, 2024, the
Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the
final decision of the Commissioner. Tr. at pp. 1-6.
B. The ALJ’s Decision
The ALJ found that Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements under the
Social Security Act on December 31, 2020, and had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity between October 1, 2020, his amended onset date, and December 31, 2020. Tr.
at p. 12. Second, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s lumbar spine degenerative disc disease
status-post decompression and fusion surgery in 2016, being blind in his left eye, and
his obesity were severe impairments. Tr. at p. 13. 	Third, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically
equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpart P, App. 1. Tr. at pp.
14-15. 	Fourth, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) to perform sedentary work with the following additional limitations:
all postural limitations on an occasional basis but should not climb ropes,
ladders, or scaffolds. The claimant should avoid even moderate exposure to
unprotected heights and hazardous machinery. The claimant should be
limited to occupations that only occasionally require near acuity and no
binocular vision but retains sufficient visual acuity to work with larger
objects and avoid workplace hazards.
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Tr. at p. 15.
Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform his past relevant work.
Tr. at p. 21. The ALJ then found that Plaintiff was a “younger individual” on the date
last insured and had a limited education. Id. Based on Plaintiff’s age, education, work
experience, and RFC, the ALJ found that Plaintiff could perform several jobs existing
in significant numbers in the national economy. 	Tr. at p. 21. 	Finally, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Social Security Act. Tr. at p. 22.
II. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Standard of Review
A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo
whether an individual is disabled. 	42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wagner v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). 	Rather, the Commissioner’s
determination will be reversed only if the correct legal standards were not applied, or it
was not supported by substantial evidence. 	Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d
Cir. 1987). 	“Substantial evidence” is evidence that amounts to “more than a mere
scintilla,” and has been defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971).
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“To determine on appeal whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining evidence from both
sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that
which detracts from its weight.” Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988).
If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s finding must be sustained
“even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff’s position and despite that
the court’s independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner’s].”
Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
B. Standard to Determine Disability
The Commissioner has established a five-step evaluation process to determine
whether an individual is disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920. 	The Supreme Court has recognized the validity of this sequential
evaluation process. 	Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141-42 (1987). 	The five-step
process asks:
(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful
activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination
of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals the severity
of the specified impairments in the Listing of Impairments; (4) based on
a “residual functional capacity” assessment, whether the claimant can
perform any of his or her past relevant work despite the impairment; and
(5) whether there are significant numbers of jobs in the national economy
that the claimant can perform given the claimant’s residual functional
capacity, age, education, and work experience.
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McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2014). 	“If at any step a finding of
disability or non-disability can be made, the SSA will not review the claim further.”
Barnhart v. Thompson, 540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff challenges the findings of the ALJ that he was not disabled, specifically
that the ALJ erred in failing to account for the limiting effects of Plaintiff’s severe
impairments. 	In doing so, Plaintiff alleges that the ALJ improperly evaluated the
opinion of Dr. Andrew Rogall, Plaintiff’s primary care provider. See generally Dkt. No.
9, Pl.’s Mem. of Law. 	The Commissioner responds that there were no errors in the
consideration 	of 	Plaintiff’s 	claim 	and 	that 	substantial 	evidence 	supports 	the
determination. Dkt. No. 11, Def.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 5-9.
A. Dr. Rogall’s Opinion
Dr. 	Rogall 	provided 	a 	medical 	opinion 	in 	which 	he 	detailed 	significant
limitations. Tr. at pp. 974-976. In it, he opined that Plaintiff could sit for only fifteen
minutes at a time and stand for only twenty. Tr. at p. 974. He found that Plaintiff could
sit or stand for only four hours in a workday and must be able to change positions at
will. Tr. at p. 975. Dr. Rogall further gave his opinion that Plaintiff could rarely lift up
to ten pounds and never more than that. Id. He indicated that Plaintiff could never twist,
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stoop, bend, crouch, squat, or climb ladders or stairs. Id. He finally stated that Plaintiff
would be off task more than 20% of each workday. Tr. at p. 976.
The ALJ found Dr. Rogall’s opinion “unpersuasive.” Tr. at p. 19. In doing so,
the ALJ noted:
Dr. 	Rogall’s 	opinion 	is 	unsupported 	by 	and 	inconsistent 	with 	the
longitudinal record, including the opinion of Dr. Bianco that the claimant
can perform sedentary work and lift up to 10 pounds (Exhibits C2F10;
C3F5); the claimant’s generally normal physical examinations, including
those documented in Dr. Rogall’s own treatment notes, shortly before,
during, and shortly after the period at issue revealing 5/5 strength in the
extremities with normal sensation and no tenderness as well as no
abnormal musculoskeletal examination findings (Exhibits C5F21, 23, 27;
C11F86,115, 129); and the claimant’s limited and conservative treatment
during the period at issue (Exhibits C5F20, 22). Additionally, the record
contains no clinical findings during the period at issue to support Dr.
Rogall’s opinion regarding manipulative limitations; shifting positions at
will from sitting, standing, or walking; and use of a cane intermittently.
Tr. at p. 20.
Plaintiff contends that these findings were in error because the longitudinal
record is, in fact, consistent with Dr. Rogall’s opinion. 	Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 6.
Consideration of this argument begins with the well-recognized principle that “it is the
sole responsibility of the ALJ to weigh all medical evidence and resolve any material
conflicts in the record where the record provides sufficient evidence for such a
resolution.” Kami v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2020 WL 13557910, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Jan.
29, 2020) (quoting Micheli v. Astrue, 501 F. App’x 26, 29 (2d Cir. 2012)).
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Having reviewed the record and the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no
error in the ALJ’s analysis. The ALJ properly noted that Plaintiff only treated with Dr.
Rogall once during the period relevant to the disability period. Tr. at pp. 661-662. On
that occasion, Plaintiff was seen for ear pain. Tr. at p. 661. On that date, Plaintiff did
not present with any other physical symptoms or complaints of pain. 	Id. 	The only
assessment related to Plaintiff’s severe medical impairments was a notation of his body
mass index, but no new treatment or plan was put forth during that appointment. Tr.
at p. 662.
The ALJ’s assessment that Plaintiff’s other treatment with Dr. Rogall does not
support the significant limitations offered in the medical opinion is well-supported in
the record. Dr. Rogall’s exam findings, inside and outside of the relevant time period,
did not show any musculoskeletal abnormalities that would support the lifting,
standing, and sitting limitations in Dr. Rogall’s opinion. See Tr. at pp. 651, 655, 657,
660, & 662. 	Plaintiff did present with back and leg pain or numbness on several
occasions. 	Tr. at pp. 659 & 665. 	Throughout his treatment history, however, Dr.
Rogall noted that Plaintiff was not in any acute distress. 	Tr. at pp. 657 & 660. 	The
record also supports the ALJ’s finding that there are “no clinical findings during the
period at issue to support Dr. Rogall’s opinion regarding manipulative limitations.”
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Tr. at p. 20. In fact, the record reveals no such findings during the entire span of Dr.
Rogall’s treatment of Plaintiff.
Plaintiff’s citation to medical reports three or four years prior to Dr. Rogall’s
treatment of Plaintiff, Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 6-7, do not demonstrate that the ALJ
erred in evaluating Dr. Rogall’s opinion. Plaintiff’s amended onset date is October 1,
2020. Tr. at p. 10. The records cited by Plaintiff come from as far back as September
2016. 	Tr. at pp. 671-672. 	While such records are properly considered by the ALJ,
“medical evidence that predates the alleged disability onset date is ordinarily not
relevant to evaluating a claimant’s disability.” Penny M. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2025
WL 2548801, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. July 10, 2025), report and recommendation adopted
sub nom. Penny M. v. Bisignano, 2025 WL 2408601 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2025)
(quoting Angele J. W. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2024 WL 4204301, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. July
24, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 4204017 (N.D.N.Y. Sept.
16, 2024)). 	The ALJ’s purported failure to properly weigh this evidence, therefore,
was not error. 	Briscoe v. Astrue, 892 F. Supp. 2d 567, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing
cases).
Nor did the ALJ err in not including specific requirements for alternating
between sitting or standing or off task limitations identified by Dr. Rogall in the RFC.
See Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp 8-9. 	An ALJ is not required to adopt all restrictions
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identified in an opinion he finds persuasive, Bush v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2017 WL
4621096, at *8 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 13, 2017), so he clearly was not obligated to adopt
restrictions in an opinion he found unpersuasive. Angelo Michael G. v. Kijakazi, 2023
WL 4763792, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. July 26, 2023).
To the extent that Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ failed to provide a
sufficient 	consistency 	and 	supportability 	analysis 	of 	Dr. 	Rogall’s 	opinion, 	the
argument is unpersuasive. 	Supportability and consistency are “[t]he most important
factors,” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920c(a), in evaluating medical opinions under current Social
Security regulations. 	“[S]upportability” means that “[t]he more relevant the objective
medical evidence and supporting explanations presented by a medical source are to
support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), the
more persuasive the medical opinions or prior administrative medical finding(s) will
be.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(1). “[C]onsistency” means that “[t]he more consistent
a medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence
from other medical sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive
the medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520c(c)(2).
“In analyzing the supportability factor, ‘the ALJ must conduct an inquiry
confined to the medical source’s own records that focuses on how well a medical
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source supported and explained their opinion.’” James v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2026
WL 305068, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2026) (quoting Ayala v. Kijakazi, 620 F. Supp.
3d 6, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 2022)). 	Here, in evaluating the opinion of Dr. Rogall, the ALJ
noted that the limitations opined for Plaintiff are not supported by Dr. Rogall’s
objective clinical findings. 	Tr. at p. 20. 	That Dr. Rogall’s records note long-term
diagnosis does not alone establish support for the limitations set forth in the opinion
since the mere diagnosis does not say anything about Plaintiff’s limitations. Ashley M.
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2023 WL 3033283, at *5 (D. Vt. Apr. 21, 2023); Ann C. v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2020 WL 4284132, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. July 24, 2020); Tammie S.
v. Berryhill, 2019 WL 859263, at *10 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2019). 	Plaintiff contends
that the ALJ failed to properly address “the supporting explanations provide by Dr.
Rogall in the medical opinion itself.” Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 10; see also id. at p. 11
(“The ALJ did not explicitly address whether Dr. Rogall’s limitations were supported
by the explanations provided in his opinion.”). 	While the ALJ did not specifically
address supporting material directly in the opinion, this does not provide a basis for
remand because Dr. Rogall’s opinion did not provide any meaningful narrative
explanation of his opinion that could have been addressed. See Tr. at pp. 974-978.
The ALJ also clearly addressed the consistency factor. The ALJ noted that Dr.
Rogall’s opinion was inconsistent with other evidence in the record. Tr. at p. 20. He
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went on to note that other evidence in the record and other medical opinions did not
support the level of functional difficulty cited in Dr. Rogall’s opinion. This included
citation to examination notes from Doctors Karpman and Bianco which, while noting
some limitations, often reported generally normal findings. Tr. at pp. 18-19. The ALJ,
for example, credited portions of Dr. Bianco’s opinion when they were supported by
Dr. Bianco’s own records, and consistent with the opinion of Dr. Karpman, and other
examination findings. Tr. at p. 19. The ALJ also carefully considered the opinions of
other treating providers in light of what he viewed to be the most relevant medical
evidence regarding Plaintiff’s limitations. Tr. at p. 20.
Plaintiff cites to other evidence in the record from appointments with Nurse
Practitioner Jane Ogunsede which could provide support for greater limitations. Pl.’s
Mem. of Law at pp. 7-8 (citing Tr. at pp. 634-653). 	These records do not provide a
basis for finding the evaluation of Dr. Rogall’s opinion unsupported by substantial
evidence. On June 1, 2021, for example, while Plaintiff presented with ongoing back
pain and was found to have restricted range of motion, Plaintiff also had good hip,
knee, and foot flexion and extension, and normal sensation in his lower extremities.
Tr. at p. 636. Nerve block injections were ordered. Tr. at p. 638-639. It appears this
is the only time Plaintiff treated with this provider, and she did not offer a medical
opinion regarding Plaintiff’s functional capabilities. 	This single report does not
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demonstrate that the ALJ erred in evaluating the longitudinal record or the consistency
of Dr. Rogall’s opinion.
The Court finds that the ALJ properly analyzed the opinion of Dr. Rogall, and
his rejection of that opinion was supported by substantial evidence. Remand, therefore,
is not warranted on that basis.
B. Plaintiff’s Self Described Limitations
Plaintiff also objects to the ALJ’s evaluation of his testimony regarding his
limitations. 	Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 13-15. 	At the administrative hearing Plaintiff
testified to doing some cooking, some laundry, and having little difficulty with most
self-care activities. 	Tr. at p. 54. 	In his decision, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s
testimony was “not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence
in the record.” Tr. at p. 16. He found, for example, that the testimony was inconsistent
with Plaintiff’s activity level, which included cooking, laundry, grocery shopping, and
use of a wood stove. Id.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 specifically requires the Commissioner to consider
objective as well as other information, including a claimant’s own reporting in
evaluating a claimant’s abilities. 	The ALJ is tasked with evaluating a claimant’s
subjective reporting with the objective evidence in the record and retains significant
discretion in doing so. 	Raul G. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2026 WL 412085, at *13
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(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2026). 	“An ALJ may properly reject subjective complaints after
weighing the objective medical evidence in the record, the claimant’s demeanor, and
other indicia of credibility, but must set forth his or her reasons with sufficient
specificity to enable us to decide whether the determination is supported by substantial
evidence.” 	Dominique v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2014 WL 1202622, at *7 (N.D.N.Y
Mar. 24, 2014) (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
In claiming error on the part of the ALJ in evaluating his subjective complaints,
Plaintiff largely ties the ALJ’s purported error to his improper evaluation of Dr.
Rogall’s opinion. Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 13-14. As discussed above, however, the
Court finds no error in that analysis. 	Independently, the Court finds that the ALJ
adequately explained his findings. The ALJ was entitled to rely on Plaintiff’s activities
in assessing the limiting effects of his complaints. Tenesha G. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
2022 WL 35998, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2022). Plaintiff’s ability to do basic house
chores clearly is some evidence of his functional abilities and were properly evaluated
by the ALJ. Plaintiff’s own testimony provided limits on his ability to engage in certain
activities, Tr. at p. 54, so contrary to Plaintiff’s assertions there was evidence in the
record for the ALJ to evaluate the extent to which Plaintiff could engage in some of
these activities. 	“An ALJ’s evaluation of a social security claimant’s subjective
symptoms ‘is entitled to substantial deference by a reviewing court.’” 	Shari L. v.
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Kijakazi, 2022 WL 561563, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2022) (quoting Rivera v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 368 F. Supp. 3d 626, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 2019)); see also Nichole
L.Q. v. Kijakazi, 2022 WL 874398, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2022). The Court finds
no error in the ALJ’s evaluation.
IV. CONCLUSION
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is DENIED;
and it is further
ORDERED, 	that 	Defendant’s 	Motion 	for 	Judgment 	on 	the 	Pleadings 	is
GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, that Defendant’s Motion denying Plaintiff disability benefits is
AFFIRMED and the Complaint is DISMISSED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall serve copies of this Memorandum-
Decision and Order on the parties.
Dated: March 3, 2026
Albany, New York
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