Amey v. Commissioner of Social Security

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________
SONIA A.,
Plaintiff,
5:24-CV-1506
v. 	(DJS)
FRANK BISIGNANO, Commissioner of
Social Security,
Defendant.
____________________________________
APPEARANCES: 	OF COUNSEL:
OLINSKY LAW GROUP 	HOWARD D. OLINSKY, ESQ.
Attorney for Plaintiff
250 South Clinton Street, Suite 210
Syracuse, New York 13202
U.S. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. 	KRISTINA D. COHN, ESQ.
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
Attorney for Defendant
6401 Security Boulevard
Baltimore, Maryland 21235
DANIEL J. STEWART
United States Magistrate Judge
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MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER1
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of a
decision by the Commissioner of Social Security that Plaintiff was not disabled.
Currently before the Court are Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, Dkt.
Nos. 15 & 18, and Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. 	Dkt. No. 17.
For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is
granted and Defendant’s Motion is denied.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Plaintiff applied for disability insurance and supplemental security income
benefits alleging an onset date in 2019. Dkt. Nos. 8-10, Admin. Tr. (“Tr.”) at pp. 95 &
144. 	Plaintiff’s applications were initially denied on October 28, 2019, and upon
reconsideration on July 30, 2020. 	Tr. at pp. 145-149 & 152-159. 	Plaintiff thereafter
timely requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). Tr. at pp. 163-
164. Following a partially unfavorable determination, litigation commenced in this
Court which ultimately resulted in the matter being remanded for further proceedings.
Amey v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2023 WL 5610756, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2023).
1 Upon Plaintiff’s consent, the United States’ general consent, and in accordance with this District’s General
Order 18, this matter has been referred to the undersigned to exercise full jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
636(c) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73. See Dkt. No. 5 & General Order 18.
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Plaintiff subsequently appeared and testified at a hearing before ALJ Gretchen Greisler
on July 2, 2024. Tr. at pp. 1498-1527. Vocational and medical experts also testified at
the hearing. 	Id. 	On October 11, 2024, ALJ Greisler issued a written decision finding
Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. Tr. at pp. 1466-1486.
B. The ALJ’s Decision
In her decision, the ALJ first found that Plaintiff met the insured status
requirements through December 31, 2024, but had not engaged in substantial gainful
activity between May 25, 2019, her alleged onset date, and July 19, 2021. Tr. at p. 1469.
Second, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s anemia, syncope, hypertension, post-traumatic
stress disorder, depressive disorder, and anxiety disorder were severe impairments. Id.
Third, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of
impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. §
404, Subpart P, App. 1. Tr. at 1472. Fourth, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff had the
residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform less than a full range of light work with
the following additional limitations:
The claimant can perform simple tasks at a consistent, goal-oriented pace
but not at a fast, production rate pace such as would be experienced in
assembly line type of work. The claimant can make simple decisions and
tolerate occasional work changes. The claimant can engage in occasional
interaction with supervisors and coworkers to perform tasks that do not
require working in close coordination with others or sharing of job tasks.
The claimant cannot tolerate interaction with the general public or
working around crowds of people. The claimant cannot climb ladders,
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ropes, or scaffolds, or work at unprotected heights or in close proximity to
dangerous machinery. The claimant cannot tolerate concentrated exposure
to extreme heat.
Tr. at pp. 1474-1475.
Next, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. Tr. at p. 1484. The
ALJ then found that based on Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC she
could perform several jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Tr.
at pp. 1484-1485. Finally, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in
the Social Security Act. Id.
II. RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Standard of Review
A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo
whether an individual is disabled. 	42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Wagner v. Sec’y of Health &
Human Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). 	Rather, the Commissioner’s
determination will be reversed only if the correct legal standards were not applied, or it
was not supported by substantial evidence. 	Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d
Cir. 1987). 	“Substantial evidence” is evidence that amounts to “more than a mere
scintilla,” and has been defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401
(1971).
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“To determine on appeal whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining evidence from both
sides, because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that
which detracts from its weight.” Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988).
If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s finding must be sustained
“even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff’s position and despite that
the court’s independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner’s].”
Rosado v. Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
B. Standard to Determine Disability
The Commissioner has established a five-step evaluation process to determine
whether an individual is disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. §§
404.1520, 416.920. 	The Supreme Court has recognized the validity of this sequential
evaluation process. 	Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 141-42 (1987). 	The five-step
process asks:
(1) whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful
activity; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impairment or combination
of impairments; (3) whether the impairment meets or equals the severity
of the specified impairments in the Listing of Impairments; (4) based on
a “residual functional capacity” assessment, whether the claimant can
perform any of his or her past relevant work despite the impairment; and
(5) whether there are significant numbers of jobs in the national economy
that the claimant can perform given the claimant’s residual functional
capacity, age, education, and work experience.
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McIntyre v. Colvin, 758 F.3d 146, 150 (2d Cir. 2014). 	“If at any step a finding of
disability or non-disability can be made, the SSA will not review the claim further.”
Barnhart v. Thompson, 540 U.S. 20, 24 (2003).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff seeks remand here based on the ALJ’s purported failure to properly
evaluate numerous medical opinions in the record. See Dkt. No. 15, Pl.’s Mem. of Law,
pp. 15-25. The Commissioner responds that there were no errors in the consideration of
Plaintiff’s claim and that substantial evidence supports the determination. Dkt. No. 17,
Def.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 16-14.
In evaluating medical opinion evidence, an ALJ “must consider [all] medical
opinions and ‘evaluate the[ir] persuasiveness’ based on the following five factors:
supportability, consistency, relationship with the claimant, specialization, and ‘other
factors.’” Janet Lynn W. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2025 WL 951446, at *3 (N.D.N.Y.
Mar. 31, 2025) (quoting 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(a)-(c)). Although the new regulations
no longer require an ALJ “to assign a specific ‘weight’ to a medical opinion, the ALJ
must still ‘articulate how [he or she] considered the medical opinions’ and ‘how
persuasive [he or she] find[s] all of the medical opinions.’” Cassandra G. v. Comm’r of
Soc. 	Sec., 	626 	F. 	Supp.3d 	553, 	564 	(N.D.N.Y. 	2022) 	(quoting 	20 	C.F.R. 	§§
404.1520c(a),(b)(1)). In doing so, it has been repeatedly recognized that the ALJ must
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build a “logical bridge” between the record evidence and her conclusions. 	Jolee O. v.
O’Malley, 2024 WL 688729, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2024); Hamedallah ex rel. E.B.
v. Astrue, 876 F. Supp. 2d 133, 142 (N.D.N.Y. 2012). On the record before the Court,
remand is appropriate to ensure that the full record is evaluated and proper consideration
is given to that record.
A. Failure to Explain the Evaluation of Medical Opinions
Several of the medical opinions in this case make note of the fact either that
Plaintiff reported to the provider that she had a stroke or that the record bears reference
to Plaintiff having had a stroke. Dr. Ganesh’s January 2000 opinion states that Plaintiff
“says that she was told that she had a stroke.” Tr. at p. 883. Dr. Kenney, Tr. at 1194,
and Dr. Woods, Tr. at p. 1290, both also referenced a stroke. 	The ALJ cited these
references as part of the reason for finding these opinions less persuasive. 	Tr. at pp.
1478 & 1482. The record on the question of stroke is mixed, see, e.g., Tr. at pp. 1107,
1171, 1183, & 1188, and it certainly was within the ALJ’s authority to resolve a conflict
of this sort by finding that the record did not support that Plaintiff had suffered a stroke.
McGill v. Berryhill, 2018 WL 1368047, *10 (E.D.N.Y. 2018). The weight apparently
given to these challenged notations, however, is problematic and inconsistent with the
ALJ’s obligation to clearly explain her rationale.
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While none of those opinions placed significant emphasis on limiting effects as
a result of the stroke, it appears clear that this played a key role in the ALJ’s evaluation
of the opinions. 	Dr. Ganesh offered two consultative opinions in this case. 	The first
opinion, from September 2019, was found persuasive by the ALJ. Tr. at p. 1478. The
second, from January 2020, was found “less persuasive.” 	Id. 	Dr. Ganesh’s second
evaluation found significant limitations in Plaintiff’s ability to stand, walk, and climb.
Tr. at p. 886. She also found that Plaintiff should use a cane as needed. Id. The ALJ
concluded that the record did not support the severe limitations identified by Dr. Ganesh.
Tr. at p. 1478. Dr. Ganesh’s 2020 opinion carefully noted that Plaintiff “says that she
was told that she had a stroke,” Tr. at p. 883, and significantly does not identify the
stroke as a basis for any of her opined limitations. Tr. at p. 886. And there is little in
that opinion to suggest, as the ALJ does, that it was based on an inaccurate emphasis on
a possible history of stroke. The Court notes that the two evaluations were rendered just
four months apart, but present significantly different opinions regarding Plaintiff’s
functional limitations, with the latter suggesting far greater limitations and yet the ALJ
failed here to properly explain her rejection of the more recent opinion while finding the
previous opinion more persuasive. 	The only apparent basis for distinction is the
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reference to a stroke, but the ALJ’s decision does not address any other factors that could
have contributed to the greater restrictions opined by Dr. Ganesh.2
While Dr. Woods’ opinion mentions stroke only in the narrow context of a
specific limiting effect regarding the use of a cane, Tr. at p. 1290, the first sentence of
the ALJ’s consideration of that opinion discusses the doctor’s reference to stroke. Tr.
at p. 1483. 	The key diagnosis beyond Dr. Woods’ opinion was clearly Plaintiff’s hot
flashes. Tr. at pp. 1289-1291. It is significant in the Court’s view that the ALJ found
the opinion of Dr. Cathy Berry, which also discussed the limiting impacts of Plaintiff’s
hot flashes, persuasive. Tr. at p. 1484. That opinion makes no reference to stroke. Tr.
at pp. 1293-1296. 	It is remarkably similar, however, to the limiting effects opined in
Dr. Woods’ opinion, Tr. at pp. 1289-1291, which the ALJ concluded “overstated”
Plaintiff’s limitations. Tr. at p. 1484. The reports make clear that each is based primarily
on Plaintiff’s hot flashes, giving rise to a reasonable inference that the only distinction
in treatment by the ALJ is related to the reference to stroke. While it is the prerogative
of the ALJ to evaluate and credit the various medical opinions in the record, Rebecca S.
v. 	O’Malley, 	2024 	WL 	3298956, 	at 	*4 	(N.D.N.Y. 	Apr. 	15, 	2024), 	report 	and
recommendation adopted, 2024 WL 2889127 (N.D.N.Y. June 10, 2024), the “ALJ is
2 The ALJ also questions Dr. Ganesh’s reference to a history of syncope in the January 2020 opinion. Tr. at p.
1478. But the Court notes that the same reference was in the 2019 opinion and goes without comment in the ALJ’s
decision. See Tr. at pp. 854 & 1478. The ALJ’s opinion also found syncope a severe impairment, Tr. at p. 1469,
so it is unclear why this reference appears to have been a basis for discounting Dr. Ganesh’s opinion.
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required to explain how [s]he arrived at h[er] decision.” Keli Ann D. v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 2024 WL 3493274, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. July 22, 2024). The ALJ’s failure to explain
why similar medical opinions were being treated differently is a basis for remand.
Charlene G. v. O’Malley, 2024 WL 4956969, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 10, 2024), report
and recommendation adopted sub nom. Charlene L. G. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2024
WL 4689027 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2024).3
B. Opinions of Drs. Grassl and Shapiro
The ALJ found the consultative opinions from Jeanne Shapiro, PhD and Corey
Ann Grassl, PsyD “somewhat persuasive.” Tr. at p. 1479. Each found Plaintiff to have
a range of limitations, several of which were moderate to marked. 	Tr. at pp. 861 &
891. 	The ALJ’s opinion found only the most modest limitations supported by the
record. Tr. at 1479-1480. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s conclusions in this regard
failed to proper address the supportability and consistency of those opinions with the
record at large. Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 20-23. Again, this Court agrees.
When evaluating medical evidence an ALJ must consider, among other factors,
“(1) the amount of medical evidence supporting the opinion [and] (2) the consistency
3 The ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Kenney’s opinion also begins with the doctor’s reference to stroke even though
the opinion does not directly tie any identified limitations to that factor. Tr. at pp. 1481-1482 (citing Exhibit 19F).
The ALJ’s opinion provides no explanation for placing such emphasis on this reference, which by no means form
the heart of any of the opinions offered.
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of the opinion with the remaining medical evidence.” Schillo v. Kijakazi, 31 F.4th 64,
75 (2d Cir. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). 	“[S]upportability” means that
“[t]he more relevant the objective medical evidence and supporting explanations
presented by a medical source are to support his or her medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s), the more persuasive the medical opinions or prior
administrative 	medical 	finding(s) 	will 	be.” 	20 	C.F.R. 	§§ 	404.1520c(c)(1).
“[C]onsistency” means that “[t]he more consistent a medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s) is with the evidence from other medical sources and
nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s) or prior
administrative medical finding(s) will be.” 	20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(c)(2). 	“A
conclusory analysis of the relevant factors precludes the Court from undertaking
meaningful review of the ALJ’s decision and courts in this Circuit have remanded
when the ALJ failed to address either supportability or consistency.” Jesse James U.
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2025 WL 2202992, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. May 15, 2025), report
and recommendation adopted sub nom. Jesse J.U. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2025 WL
2197193 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2025) (internal quotations and alterations omitted).
The 	ALJ’s 	opinion 	notes 	broadly 	that 	the 	Shapiro 	and 	Grassl 	opinions
“contain[] an explanation of the findings therein as support.” 	Tr. at p. 1479. 	In
rejecting the most restrictive opinions contained in those reports, the ALJ appears to
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have relied heavily on the hearing testimony of Dr. Price, who testified as a medical
expert. Tr. at p. 1480. Dr. Price, however, did not examine Plaintiff. Tr. at p. 1503.
No explanation is offered for the deference paid to Dr. Price’s opinion over those of
individuals who did examine Plaintiff. 	“[I]t is well-established that the medical
opinion of a non-examining medical expert is entitled to little weight, especially when
a claimant’s impairments are based upon h[er] mental health.” 	Armstead v. Comm’r
of Soc. Sec., 2024 WL 5077582, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 11, 2024) (citing Skartados v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2022 WL 409701, at *9 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 10, 2022)). The ALJ’s
failure to explain why Dr. Price’s opinion was given greater weight than those who
examined her requires remand here. This is particularly true given that the ALJ appears
to have relied on Dr. Price primarily to reject the most significant limitations opined
by Grassl and Shapiro. See, e.g., Marcano v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2021 WL 5315703,
at *20 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 2021), report and recommendation adopted, 2022 WL
253083 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 2022).
C. Opinion of NP Andrews
Finally, Plaintiff objects to the ALJ’s failure to consider the opinion of Nurse
Practitioner Andrews. 	Pl.’s Mem. of Law at p. 23. 	NP Andrews offered a medical
source statement in this case, Tr. at pp. 1297-1301, but the ALJ did not consider it.
That opinion clearly should have been considered. 	Alicia S. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
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2024 WL 1207789, at *8 n.3 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 2024). While the failure to consider
a medical opinion can in some cases be deemed harmless, Lisa B. v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 2022 WL 1473277, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. May 10, 2022), the Court is not in a position
to make such a finding here. First, the ALJ never mentioned the Andrews opinion at
all and gave no indication as to why it was not being considered and the Commissioner
offers no explanation for this failure in this proceeding. See generally Def.’s Mem. of
Law. 	Moreover, the Andrews opinion clearly bears on issues of significance in this
case. For example, NP Andrews opined that Plaintiff would be off task more than 20
percent of the workday and would miss more than four days of work a month. Tr. at
p. 1299. 	The ALJ rejected a similar assessment from Dr. Woods as unsupported by
the record. Tr. at pp. 1483-1484. NP Andrews’ opinion provides further support for
that opinion and the Court cannot say that had the ALJ considered it she would have
reached the same conclusion.
D. Nature of the Remand
Plaintiff seeks reversal for calculation of benefits. Pl.’s Mem. of Law at pp. 24-
25. A remand solely for calculation of benefits is appropriate “when the record provides
persuasive proof of disability and a remand for further evidentiary proceedings would
serve no purpose.” 	Parker v. Harris, 626 F.2d 225, 235 (2d Cir. 1980). 	Reversal for
calculation of benefits is considered a “rare case.” Kyle P. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2022
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WL 1659193, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. May 25, 2022); see also Baldwin v. Astrue, 2009 WL
4931363, *19 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2009) (remanding only for benefits calculation “is an
extraordinary action and is proper only when further development of the record would
serve no purpose.”). “Here, the record lacks persuasive proof of disability.” Philip B.
v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2024 WL 5454787, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2024), report and
recommendation adopted, 2025 WL 540372 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2025). The Court has
made no finding here that Plaintiff is clearly disabled, only that the evaluation of her
claim was not consistent with applicable rules. 	Remand pursuant to sentence four,
therefore, is the proper remedy. Id.
IV. CONCLUSION
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED, 	that 	Plaintiff’s 	Motion 	for 	Judgment 	on 	the 	Pleadings 	is
GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, 	that 	Defendant’s 	Motion 	for 	Judgment 	on 	the 	Pleadings 	is
DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED, that Defendant’s Motion denying Plaintiff disability benefits is
REVERSED and the matter is REMANDED pursuant to sentence four for further
proceedings; and it is further
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ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court shall serve copies of this Memorandum-
Decision and Order on the parties.
Dated: February 23, 2026
Albany, New York
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